America has a stalker
As the evidence of Beijing’s espionage activities proliferate, Americans are understandably a little freaked out
Friends,
I was tempted to open this week’s commentary with something blowing up the Twitterverse: are hostile drones the size of small cars circling the eastern seaboard of the United States?
[Serious question: is the Twitterverse now called the X-verse? That sounds like a Marvel comic version of the Metaverse, so that can’t be right, huh?]
But to be honest, I can’t figure out what’s going on as Federal, State, and Local officials point fingers at one another and complain that they lack the Congressional authority to act, while simultaneously telling the public there is no reason to be alarmed.
NSC Spokesperson John Kirby at the podium on Thursday reassuring the public about unexplained drones over New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.
This particular drone problem may not have anything to do with the PRC, but it brings back too many memories of the ineptitude on display during the whole Chinese Spy Balloon fiasco two years ago and revelations over the past few weeks of other spying activities by Beijing makes folks a bit jumpy.
By the way, Americans still haven’t gotten a full accounting of that infamous event, even though we recovered the bus-sized payload almost two years ago and it is probably still sitting in an FBI warehouse in Quantico.
So since we lack official photos, I asked ChatGPT to create an image of a busted-up spy balloon being investigated in a secret government warehouse… hopefully the public will learn more soon.
The recent revelations of PRC surveillance activities in Cuba (#2 below), the extent of SALT TYPHOON’s compromise of U.S. telecommunications networks (#6 below), and the arrest of a PRC national last week for flying drones over Vandenberg Space Force Base and then being caught as he boarded a flight to China (#7 below) raises all kinds of questions.
What is behind this uptick in espionage? Are we just detecting more of it or is the PRC acting more aggressively?
To what degree is all of this espionage tied to potential sabotage activities that were uncovered early this year with VOLT TYPHOON?
What should American and allied institutions be doing to protect themselves? How about typical Americans? (due to the revelations of the PRC’s SALT TYPHOON attack, the FBI and CISA for the first time recommended that Americans use encrypted apps like Signal for their communications)
What kind of retaliation would be appropriate? Should we expel PRC officials over these actions as we’ve done with Russian activities of equal significance? (Of note, the PRC Government continues to follow the three Golden Rules of Lying: admit nothing, deny everything, and make counter accusations)
Most head-scratching to me is that despite all this evidence of PRC espionage and cyber attacks, the Biden Administration decided to press ahead with an amended U.S.-PRC Science and Technology Agreement (STA) this week (see #4 and #5 below). Just as Administration officials and Democratic Senators are observing that SALT TYPHOON represents the most serious compromise of U.S. telecommunications systems, like ever, folks at the State Department seem blind to those circumstances and rush through a newly signed agreement that Beijing desired.
Apparently, holding science and technology cooperation at risk is something the Biden team refuses to contemplate.
It seems pretty clear to me that the PRC has decided to significantly expand its espionage against the United States, well beyond forward deployed military forces in the Western Pacific. One might even conclude that Beijing intends to do something in the near future, which has my ‘spidey senses tingling.’
As I considered a song that best encapsulates this dynamic, my first thought was “Every Breath You Take,” by The Police.
I had forgotten just how creepy the lyrics are:
Every breath you take
And every move you make
Every bond you break
Every step you take
I’ll be watching you
Every single day
And every word you say
Every game you play
Every night you stay
I’ll be watching you
From the official music video of Every Breath You Take, off the album Synchronicity (1983), back when it was apparently perfectly normal to be a stalker.
Now that’s a disturbing image to leave you with for the week… you’re welcome!
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Foreign Affairs, December 12, 2024
Since the turn of the millennium, the United States has been ravaged by an opioid epidemic that has killed nearly one million Americans. At first, most of these victims died after overdosing on heroin or various prescription painkillers. But over the last five years, the deaths have been largely driven by a single, synthetic drug: fentanyl. Since finding its way into the illicit drug market, fentanyl has steadily crowded out other opioids, to the point that it is now responsible for most opioid poisonings. In 2023, for example, roughly 81,000 Americans died from opioids. Fentanyl caused nearly 75,000 of those deaths.
It is hard to overstate how deadly fentanyl is. The drug is more than 30 times as powerful as heroin, and so its spread has helped drive the number of opioid deaths to record highs. The human cost of the spike is visible to anyone who knows someone who overdosed, and to plenty of people who don’t. It was very apparent to me at a recent congressional hearing on this epidemic, where a packed auditorium of grieving families brought pictures of loved ones who had succumbed to fentanyl poisoning.
In assigning blame for the fentanyl epidemic, experts and ordinary Americans alike point to a variety of factors, such as economic hardship, poor medical care, and the predatory behavior of opioid distributors—including infamous pill mills that overprescribe addictive substances. But increasingly, they are also blaming a country on the other side of the world: China. They do so for good reason. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, China produces the vast majority of the chemicals needed to make fentanyl. Just a few years ago, it was estimated that fentanyl sourced from China accounted for 97 percent of illicit seizures. According to a bipartisan investigation by the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, of which I am the leading Democratic member, the CCP even subsidizes the production of illicit ingredients and allows the deadly substances to be openly sold on otherwise closely surveilled e-commerce platforms.
It isn’t surprising that the CCP has let this trade fester. For Beijing, the American fentanyl epidemic is an ocean away. There is little incentive to care about stopping a U.S. crisis. China’s legitimate chemical industry, meanwhile, benefits from light-touch regulation.
But if the CCP believes it can get away with ignoring the fentanyl trade, it has misread the room. Americans are more furious than ever about the epidemic, and they are beginning to demand that their representatives take action against China to save the lives of their fellow citizens. Whatever marginal benefits China’s economy may derive from lax chemical regulations, they are far outweighed by the very real possibility that American anger regarding the CCP’s role in the epidemic will push Washington to adopt a harder line toward Beijing.
That means Beijing must get serious about cracking down on fentanyl production. The CCP must, among other things, prosecute more people for exporting the drug’s precursors. It must better police the online platforms on which these chemicals are openly peddled. It needs to go after the money-laundering schemes that allow the trade to flourish, including by cooperating with U.S. law enforcement officials. It also needs to tell its own local officials to prevent the export of these deadly substances. And the CCP must act fast. Otherwise, American anger toward China might push Beijing and Washington into a conflict that nobody desires.
ACTION IS NOT AUTOMATIC
China is essential to the fentanyl industry. It is effectively the sole source for the ingredients Mexican drug cartels use to make synthetic opioids, which the cartels then smuggle into the United States. This fact means the CCP could irreparably impair the cartels’ ability to produce fentanyl and thus largely prevent the drug’s distribution. Doing so would not end the U.S. opioid epidemic. But it would almost certainly curtail it.
Yet history shows that the CCP generally acts only when forced to do so. For years, U.S. officials—including me—called for China to schedule (meaning to classify) certain critical precursor chemicals as controlled substances. Yet these pleas were too often ignored. Beijing made some progress only after consequence-backed diplomacy. For instance, in November 2023, the United States resumed bilateral counternarcotics cooperation and established a working group to facilitate these initiatives. But it also added China to the list of the primary, illicit-drug-producing countries. Being on this so-called Majors List restricts various forms of U.S. assistance, but such a formal designation also foreshadows even greater costs to come. Faced with real pressure and looming consequences, the CCP began to relent, scheduling many substances and taking other positive steps.
To understand why China will not act willingly—but will respond to pressure—one needs to understand what motivates Beijing. The CCP is a ruling party that subjects its own citizens to unthinkable abuses, so it is not going to prioritize preventing tragedy in the United States. But it will prioritize protecting its interests. Beijing does not like its companies facing sanctions and its government facing cascading, multilateral condemnation. And so when all branches of the U.S. government speak up, including through diplomacy, and demonstrate willingness to impose tangible consequences for facilitating the fentanyl epidemic, the CCP is more likely to listen and act.
Congress has an important role to play here. Earlier this year, we enacted fentanyl sanctions legislation that will help deter bad actors in China. Building off its investigatory findings, my Select Committee also established a bipartisan Fentanyl Policy Working Group, led by Representatives Jake Auchincloss and Dan Newhouse, with support from past committee chair Mike Gallagher and current committee chair John Moolenaar. Its purpose is to show Beijing that Washington’s concerns are acute and that it is ready to act, including by imposing significant economic consequences on bad actors that depend on the U.S. financial system. Even in a time of significant polarization, the United States must be crystal clear with China that Americans are united in stopping this epidemic. If the CCP fails to recognize this reality, it will not end well for either country.
WHAT WORKS
If China acts to stop the flow of fentanyl, it should be able to succeed. China’s counternarcotics enforcement, after all, is effective domestically. While the United States reported tens of thousands of fentanyl-poisoning deaths last year, China reported zero. That figure is almost certainly an underestimate, but it nonetheless reflects the fact that China does not tolerate fentanyl distribution within its borders. If a Chinese group supplies fentanyl at home, its members face severe sanctions—including death—in a criminal justice system that frequently abrogates international norms and values.
But even amid this harshness, exporters of fentanyl ingredients frequently suffer no consequence, even when U.S. law enforcement hands their names to Beijing on a platter. When Washington indicts a Chinese exporter, the CCP often refuses to extradite the person. In one case, China even asked U.S. officials not to file charges against a known exporter. Chinese officials claim they lack the legal framework needed to go after these exporters, but the country’s domestic enforcement suggests otherwise. Even if China does need to update its code, an authoritarian state should have no problem making those adjustments, including by closing the substantial loopholes related to pill presses (the industrial tools used for fentanyl manufacturing, which remain severely underregulated). It should be able to ensure that every single U.S. law enforcement extradition request and request related to counternarcotics is never ignored and swiftly met.
Beijing must also vigorously pursue enforcement in noncriminal contexts. This means stopping Chinese e-commerce platforms from openly permitting the sale of fentanyl precursors and analogs. Today, people can log on to multiple Chinese platforms, type in the name of these chemicals, and find sellers who openly tout their ability to bypass U.S. customs enforcement. When the Select Committee tested just one of these sites earlier this year, it found over 5,000 offers for narcotics precursors, including in bulk. Even after Chinese authorities were on notice of these findings, far too many posts remained online.
Beijing should go after more than producers and markets. It must also go after the flow of funds between sellers and their drug cartel customers. That means better monitoring of transactions and working to prevent suspicious ones. To effectuate such enforcement, China must establish meaningful “know your customer” requirements across its chemical production and shipping industries, so that criminal sales can be easily traced. In addition, Beijing must ban all the remaining substances U.S. authorities have identified as opioid precursors but that nonetheless remain legal—as well as substances used to produce other dangerous drugs, such as xylazine (or “tranq”). Finally, Chinese law enforcement officials have to establish strong information-sharing mechanisms with U.S. law enforcement. Chinese officials can help U.S. officials identify not just importers but also money-laundering schemes, given that some of those schemes extend across borders.
PLAYING WITH FIRE
When it comes to combating crime, these steps—enforcing criminal laws, acting against rogue e-commerce platforms, scheduling deadly substances, and sharing information—are fairly standard. As a result, they should be easy to enact. But given the gravity of the fentanyl crisis and China’s role in it, these steps may not be sufficient. To show that it is serious and to fully crush illegal exports, Beijing will have to go further.
To begin, the CCP should instill accountability within its own ranks by imposing consequences on those who have turned a blind eye to fentanyl production. It should review how many opioid ingredients were exported from a given official’s region when deciding whether that person is promoted or demoted. It could even expel the worst offenders from the CCP altogether. Similarly, Beijing should establish a zero-tolerance policy toward those who do not prioritize stopping the export of these deadly substances. Ignorance is not an excuse.
China must also address each of the disturbing findings of the Select Committee’s bipartisan investigation. For example, it is unacceptable that China’s value-added tax system offers rebates for illicit chemical producers. Beijing must terminate government ownership of entities that support the industry—and then take action against them.
Chinese officials may be reluctant to take such measures against what is, to them, a foreign issue. Some analysts have even speculated that certain CCP officials may stall until the party can use the fentanyl crisis as leverage in unrelated international disputes. But with the American people’s eyes squarely on them, their current approach is increasingly untenable. If they fail to stop the flow of chemicals and thus keep fueling American pain, they will propel the U.S. government to employ even stronger measures.
The CCP now knows beyond any doubt the implications of what is occurring within China’s borders. Government officials know that failing to stem the flow of synthetic opioids means that death tolls in the United States will remain unacceptably high. And they know that intensifying cooperation in the battle against illicit narcotics is imperative to save these lives. If China fails to embrace a genuine whole-of-government effort to end the epidemic—from closing all regulatory loopholes to prioritizing enforcement—the status quo will become beyond inexcusable. The CCP should not play with fire.
But Americans must also be honest with themselves about China’s role. To put it bluntly, the CCP is both part of the problem and, by necessity, part of the solution. U.S. officials must hold bad actors in China accountable for the epidemic but also insist on progress and encourage the CCP to work with Washington. Doing so is the only way to protect countless Americans—and people around the world—from the scourge of fentanyl.
2. China’s Intelligence Footprint in Cuba: New Evidence and Implications for U.S. Security
Matthew P. Funaiole, Aidan Powers-Riggs, Brian Hart, Henry Ziemer, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Ryan C. Berg, and Christopher Hernandez-Roy, CSIS, December 6, 2024
The Issue
China has long been rumored to operate spy facilities in Cuba, but few details about its footprint there have been made public. Research by CSIS reveals four sites within Cuba that are most likely to be supporting China’s efforts to collect intelligence on the United States and its neighbors. Satellite imagery and open-source analysis offer an unprecedented look into these facilities and provide clues as to how they could be used to spy on sensitive communications and activities in the region. These sites have undergone observable upgrades in recent years, even as Cuba has faced increasingly dire economic prospects that have drawn it closer to China. In light of these developments, the United States and its regional partners should carefully monitor China’s growing role in Cuba, harden sensitive communications, and push for transparency to reduce the likelihood of miscalculation.
Introduction
China’s ambitions to expand its global intelligence-gathering capabilities have drawn it to the doorstep of the United States. In a striking revelation in June 2023, Biden administration officials confirmed reports that China has access to spy facilities in Cuba. Later divulgences by the Wall Street Journal suggested that officials had identified as many as four facilities of concern and tracked Chinese technicians entering and exiting several.
Rumors of a Chinese intelligence presence in Cuba have been simmering for decades. Yet the latest revelations fed new speculation about the extent and depth of Beijing’s footprint there. Coming just months after a Chinese spy balloon crossed much of the continental United States, these reports contributed to renewed concerns over China’s expanding efforts to collect intelligence on the U.S. homeland.
Cuba’s proximity to the southern United States and the Caribbean makes it a prime location for collecting signals intelligence (SIGINT) on the region. Sitting less than 100 miles south of Florida, Cuba is well-positioned to keep watch on sensitive communications and activities, including those of the U.S. military. The southeastern seaboard of the United States brims with military bases, combatant command headquarters, space launch centers, and military testing sites. For Beijing, having access to SIGINT capabilities in Cuba would open a significant intelligence window inaccessible from within Chinese territory.
Satellite imagery and other unclassified information analyzed by CSIS provides an unprecedented look at four facilities across Cuba that have equipment capable of collecting SIGINT. Some are decades old but appear to have undergone upgrades in recent years; others have materialized only within the past few years. These four facilities—selected from nearly a dozen Cuban sites of interest analyzed by CSIS—are the most likely to be supporting China’s intelligence efforts in the region.
COMMENT – Time to turn the screws on Cuba harder.
3. This Unreadable Russian Novel Is Xi Jinping’s Spiritual Guide
John Garnaut and Sam Chetwin George, New York Times, December 15, 2024
In late October, while much of the world was focused on the buildup to the U.S. elections, President Xi Jinping of China was issuing a call for global resistance to the American-led world order.
Speaking in Kazan, Russia, at the summit of BRICS nations, he told the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Iran, Egypt and several other countries that the world had entered a pivotal new era “defined by turbulence and transformation.”
“Should we allow the world to remain turbulent or push it back on to the right path of peaceful development?” Mr. Xi asked. He invoked, as a spiritual guide for the task ahead, an 1863 Russian novel that glorified revolutionary struggle and inspired Vladimir Lenin.
Mr. Xi has frequently drawn on Russia’s historical and literary tradition to convey his intent to undermine — and ultimately displace — Western ideas and institutions. But by urging a spirit of revolutionary sacrifice within BRICS, a group that is expanding to include new member-states, Mr. Xi is signaling an intent to rally the developing world for an intensified struggle against American power.
The obscure and radical novel that the Chinese leader cited as his inspiration offers a glimpse into Mr. Xi’s mind-set as he prepares to test Donald Trump’s commitment to the institutions and alliances that underpin the U.S.-led order.
The book, “What Is to Be Done? Tales of New People,” was written by Nikolai Chernyshevsky in a prison cell in 1862 and 1863, after czarist authorities jailed him for “an evil intent to overthrow the existing order” because of his alleged connections to subversive organizations. The novel is little known in the West, perhaps because its meandering, confusing account of a love triangle in a utopian sewing cooperative is a tough read. The Russian poet Afanasy Fet said that Mr. Chernyshevsky’s real crime was “premeditated affectation of the worst sort in terms of form” and that reading the book was an “almost unbearable” task. One of the authors of this essay can attest to that, having tried and failed to complete it several times while stationed as a journalist in Beijing.
The book’s appeal for Mr. Xi lies in its protagonist, Rakhmetov. The scion of a princely family, Rakhmetov rebels against his domineering father at age 16, strengthens his body through hard physical work and moves to St. Petersburg, where he is recruited into an underground group and reborn as an “extraordinary man” — the ultimate revolutionary.
Rakhmetov renounces good food, wine and women. He reads the classics of philosophy, literature and science. He eschews a mattress and even spends a night on a bed of nails to test himself, leaving his body covered in blood. He is “completely impervious to personal emotion, possessing no personal heart” and focused purely on doing whatever it takes to achieve his aims.
The book’s radical utilitarian ideology roused Lenin, who borrowed the title “What Is to Be Done?” for his own landmark 1902 essay in which he broke with pacifist social democrats in favor of forming a vanguard of aggressive professional revolutionaries.
It also inspired many of Mao Zedong’s radical Red Guards and the urban youths who answered Mao’s call to live with Chinese peasants in the countryside during the Cultural Revolution. Among these so-called sent-down youths was Mr. Xi. He first read the book as a teenager while living in a cave in rural Shaanxi Province, according to his own account. He was “shocked” by Rakhmetov’s ascetic ways but saw them as ideal for toughening one’s will. Mr. Xi has said he emulated Rakhmetov’s example by removing his mattress, taking cold showers and exercising outside in the rain and snow.
Mr. Xi invoked precisely this ethos of sacrifice and fortitude at the BRICS summit, telling other leaders that Rakhmetov’s “unwavering determination and ardent struggle encapsulate exactly the kind of spiritual power we need today. The bigger the storms of our times are, the more we must stand firm at the forefront with unbending determination and pioneering courage.”
Perhaps tellingly, China has downplayed the radical nature of Mr. Xi’s program for Western consumption, airbrushing his reference to Rakhmetov out of official English transcripts of his remarks.
Mr. Xi has been steadily raising the pressure in his effort to undermine U.S. power. In 2022 he declared a “no limits” partnership with Russia and aligned with President Vladimir Putin on his war in Ukraine. He has also been advocating something he calls the “Global Security Initiative,” which serves as the rhetorical and philosophical framework for his plans. It espouses ideals such as “common security” and the protection of each country’s “legitimate security concerns.” But its real purpose seems to be to provide cover for those who would challenge U.S. strategic interests (it has been invoked by China to justify Mr. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine) and, ultimately, protect the interests and political systems of China and its partners from U.S.-imposed constraints.
The Chinese leader wants more nations under this banner. In Kazan, he and Mr. Putin repeatedly stressed the importance of security as BRICS welcomed new members such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates — and applicants and observers such as Cuba, Venezuela and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Many of these have their own revolutionary or Leninist roots and need little encouragement to rally against America. As the president of Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian, said en route to the summit, “BRICS can be a way out of American totalitarianism.”
Mr. Xi recognizes the importance of geopolitical leverage and is weaving together a coalition of authoritarians. He has entrenched China’s partnership with Russia, strengthened support for Iran during its proxy wars with Israel and refrained from criticizing China’s sole official ally — North Korea — over its deployment of troops to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. China has worked to repair previously frayed ties with countries such as India, Vietnam and Brazil, and is strengthening other relationships across the developing world.
Mr. Xi appears to believe momentum is on his side. Mr. Trump, on the other hand, comes into office with U.S. capabilities stretched by conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine. He has surrounded himself with a mix of isolationists and China hawks while sowing doubt about America’s commitment to allies and partners such as Ukraine and Taiwan.
Mr. Xi previewed his stiffened posture at an Asia-Pacific summit in Lima, Peru, last month in comments that were clearly aimed at the incoming U.S. president. He listed a series of “red lines” that “cannot be challenged,” including staying out of Beijing’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea and insisting that Washington “support” China’s goal of unification with Taiwan — wording that goes well beyond what the United States has committed to for decades.
Mr. Putin remains an essential partner to Mr. Xi. Russian state media reported this year that Mr. Putin planned to give the Chinese leader an old copy of Chernyshevsky’s book for his birthday in June, and he staged the BRICS summit in the Tatarstan region, Rakhmetov’s ancestral home. The two men met in October at the Kazan Kremlin, which sits at the end of what was once named Chernyshevsky Road.
But there is no mistaking who is in charge here. It is Mr. Xi who is assuming the mantle of Rakhmetov — the “extraordinary man,” the agent of history — and believes his iron will and visionary leadership will deliver the world from American turbulence.
COMMENT – I’m always amazed by the insights that John Garnaut and his small firm can uncover, that most of the mainstream China watcher community seems to miss.
This article is a case in point, by comparing the English language text that the PRC Foreign Ministry releases to the world with the original text in Chinese, Garnaut and his team continue to uncover disturbing themes that Xi and his cadres push while trying to obscure themselves to the outside world.
Those who have spent significant time studying and analyzing Xi’s own statements and writings, like Garnaut, but also folks like Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung in their book, The Political Thought of Xi Jinping, or Kevin Rudd in his book, On Xi Jinping: How Xi’s Marxist Nationalism is Shaping China and the World, paint a pretty disturbing picture of what Xi is trying to achieve and the lengths he will go to do it.
But their views still seem to be at odds with an important portion of the China watcher community who seem to be fixated on methodologies that once worked.
I’ve heard many China watchers decry that travel to the PRC is difficult and that folks can’t get access to mid-level officials in the PRC, making it difficult to understand what’s happening. That may be true, but given that Xi has consolidated power over the past dozen years, it may no longer be as important to focus on those mid-level sources. If we want to understand the PRC’s direction of travel and what objectives the PRC is trying to achieve, it may be much better to focus on the path Xi is blazing, rather than the opinions of folks who lack the power and influence to set their own paths.
Two decades ago, there were multiple power centers, cliques, and constituencies competing for control over the direction of the PRC. During that time, it made a lot of sense to be on the ground speaking to those different groups and understanding the dynamics between them. Conversely, it made little sense to pay close attention to the speeches of leaders and official documents which were the products of watered down deliberations between these competing power centers.
My sense is that it is much less important, and useful, to approach analyzing China that way today.
Not because there aren’t a variety of opinions and groups, but because Xi has successfully changed the political landscape in his favor and brought Leninism back with a vengeance.
There is an old cliché that China is not a monolith… and that is absolutely true in a literal sense… but one of the purposes of a Leninism is to create political thought that is monolithic, or in other words, the deliberate rejection of pluralism.
So, in a political system that is eradicating pluralism, it seems like a methodological mistake to focus one’s analysis on the views of outsiders. Instead, one should take the *Leader* seriously.
4. US updates a science and technology pact with China to reflect growing rivalry and security threats
Didi Tang, Associated Press, December 13, 2024
The U.S. has updated a decades-old science and technology agreement with China to reflect their growing rivalry for technological dominance. The new agreement, signed Friday in Beijing after many months of negotiations, has a narrower scope and additional safeguards to minimize the risk to national security.
The State Department said the agreement sustains intellectual property protections, establishes new guardrails to protect the safety and security of researchers and “advances U.S. interests through newly established and strengthened provisions on transparency and data reciprocity.”
It covers only basic research and does not facilitate the development of critical and emerging technologies, the department said. This includes technologies related to artificial intelligence and quantum computing, which are considered crucial for economic strength and military supremacy.
China’s science and technology ministry also announced the signing, but provided no details or assessment in its one-line statement. The Chinese foreign ministry said earlier this year that such cooperation is mutually beneficial.
The first such agreement was signed in January 1979 when the two countries established diplomatic ties to counter the influence of the Soviet Union and when China severely lagged behind the U.S. and other Western nations in science and technology.
The agreement was last extended in 2018, and given temporary extensions last year and this year to allow for negotiations. Washington had come to view the agreement as failing to reflect the shift in U.S.-China relations and China’s emergence as a heavyweight in the field. The new agreement extends cooperation for five years.
As the tech war between the two countries has escalated, the U.S. has banned exports of advanced chips to China and restricted U.S. investments in certain technologies that could boost China’s military capabilities. Cooperation in science and technology chilled in universities and research institutions after a Trump-era program was introduced to curb China’s spying. The program was ended in 2022 after multiple unsuccessful prosecutions of researchers and because of concerns that it had prompted racial profiling.
5. Amendment and Extension of the U.S.-PRC Science and Technology Agreement (STA)
U.S. Department of State, December 13, 2024
On December 13, 2024, the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) signed a protocol to amend the U.S.-PRC Science and Technology Agreement (STA) and extend it for five years. The STA provides consistent standards for U.S.-PRC bilateral government-to-government scientific cooperation.
This modernized and strengthened Agreement sustains intellectual property protections, establishes new guardrails for implementing agencies to protect the safety and security of their researchers, and advances U.S. interests through newly established and strengthened provisions on transparency and data reciprocity.
The amended Agreement ensures that any federal science and technology cooperation with the PRC under the STA benefits the United States and minimizes risks to U.S. national security. The amended Agreement covers only basic research; this Agreement does not facilitate the development of critical and emerging technologies.
The modernized STA is one way in which the United States is responsibly managing strategic competition with the PRC. It is the result of extensive consultations across the U.S. Government and months of negotiation between the United States and the PRC.
COMMENT – I think it was a bad idea to extend this agreement.
By having an STA in place, American institutions are at an asymmetric disadvantage to their PRC counterparts (who are firmly under the control of the CCP) and it only exacerbates the subnational seams that the Chinese Communist Party exploits for its own purposes.
The better option was just letting it expire in August and not negotiating a replacement until the Sino-American relationship was less rivalrous.
Letting the STA expire without replacement would not have ended all science and technology collaboration, as the advocates of renewal falsely claimed, it would simply have removed the Federal top-cover that certain special interests utilize to pursue scientific collaboration that is not in the national interest.
6. AUDIO - How China Hacked America’s Phone Network
New York Times “The Daily” Podcast, December 12, 2024
An alarming new hack by China has penetrated the nerve center of the United States: its telephone network.
David E. Sanger, the White House and national security correspondent for The New York Times, discusses what the scope of the attack tells us about China’s growing power.
7. Northern California Man Arrested for Allegedly Flying Drone Over and Photographing Vandenberg Space Force Base
U.S. Attorney's Office, Central District of California, December 11, 2024
A Northern California man has been arrested on a federal criminal complaint for allegedly flying a drone over and taking photographs of Vandenberg Space Force Base, the Justice Department announced today.
Yinpiao Zhou, 39, of Brentwood, is charged with failure to register an aircraft not providing transportation and violation of national defense airspace.
Zhou was arrested Monday at San Francisco International Airport prior to boarding a China-bound flight and made his initial appearance Tuesday in United States District Court in San Francisco.
Zhou remains in federal custody pending prosecutors’ appeal of a federal magistrate judge’s decision to release him. No plea was taken and his arraignment is expected to be scheduled in U.S. District Court in Los Angeles in the coming weeks.
“This defendant allegedly flew a drone over a military base and took photos of the base's layout, which is against the law,” said United States Attorney Martin Estrada. “The security of our nation is of paramount importance and my office will continue to promote the safety of our nation’s military personnel and facilities.”
According to an affidavit filed on December 8 with the complaint, on November 30, 2024, drone detection systems at Vandenberg Space Force Base in Santa Barbara County detected a drone flying over the base. The drone systems detected that the drone flew for nearly one hour, traveled to an altitude of almost one mile above ground level, and originated from Ocean Park, a public area next to the base. Base security personnel went to the park, spoke to Zhou and another person accompanying him, and learned that Zhou had a drone concealed in his jacket – the same one that flew over the base.
Agents later searched Zhou’s drone pursuant to a federal search warrant and saw several photographs of Vandenberg Space Force Base taken from an aerial viewpoint. A search of Zhou’s cellphone showed Zhou conducted a Google search approximately one month earlier for the phrase “Vandenberg Space Force Base Drone Rules” and messaged with another person about hacking his drone to allow it to fly higher than it could otherwise.
Zhou is a Chinese citizen and lawful permanent resident of the United States, most recently returning to the United States from China in February 2024. The person accompanying Zhou at Ocean Park most recently entered the United States from China on November 26.
A complaint contains allegations that a defendant has committed a crime. Every defendant is presumed to be innocent until and unless proven guilty in court.
If convicted, the defendant would face a statutory maximum sentence of four years in federal prison.
COMMENT – Don’t be surprised when another American is taken hostage in the PRC on trumped up charges.
As we saw with the negotiated prisoner swap two weeks ago for individuals who had been held, in some cases, for more than a decade, the Chinese Communist Party will need more leverage to get folks like Zhou and his partner released.
My advice: even though the State Department unwisely lowered the travel advisory threat for the PRC, do NOT travel to the PRC or jurisdictions that the Party controls.
Universities, businesses, and NGOs should implement their own restrictions on sending their people to the PRC. Personally, I would only consider going there with a diplomatic passport, and I advise all friends and family members against traveling there. You never know when you might be an attractive target for hostage taking.
There is a long-established pattern of behavior by the CCP, institutions which ignore that pattern are acting unethically. It is equally unethical for U.S. Government officials to recommend that Americans travel to the PRC given the Government’s demonstrated inability to protect them.
8. China’s Xi is likely to decline Trump’s inauguration invitation, seeing it as too risky to attend
Didi Tang, Associated Press, December 12, 2024
Chinese leader Xi Jinping would likely see President-elect Donald Trump’s invitation to attend his inauguration as too risky to accept, and the gesture from Trump may have little bearing on the increasingly competitive ties between the two nations as the White House changes hands, experts say.
Trump’s incoming press secretary, Karoline Leavitt, confirmed on Thursday that Trump extended an invitation to the Jan. 20 ceremony. The Chinese Embassy in Washington said it had no information to provide. But experts don’t see Xi coming to Washington next month.
Why wouldn’t Xi attend?
“Can you imagine Xi Jinping sitting outdoors in Washington, D.C., in January at the feet of the podium, surrounded by hawkish members of Congress, gazing up at Donald Trump as he delivers his inaugural address?” said Danny Russel, who previously served as assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.
Russel, now vice president for international security and diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute, said Xi would not allow himself to “be reduced to the status of a mere guest celebrating the triumph of a foreign leader — the U.S. president, no less.”
Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank, said Beijing will play it safe when there’s no protocol or precedent for a Chinese leader to attend the inauguration of a U.S. president.
“I don’t think the Chinese will take the risk,” Sun said. There could be risks in the guest list, for example, Sun said, noting that Taiwan’s top diplomat in the U.S. attended the swearing-in of President Joe Biden in 2021. Beijing considers Taiwan to be Chinese territory and has repeatedly warned the U.S. that it is a red line not to be crossed.
Should Trump slap tariffs as high as 60% on Chinese goods upon taking office as he’s threatened, Xi would look like a fool if he had chosen to attend, and that’s unacceptable to Beijing, Sun said.
Rather, Chinese officials are known for their obsession with the dignity and security of their leader when traveling abroad, said Russel, who has negotiated high-level summits with the Chinese. “They have always demanded that any leader trip to Washington be treated as a full ‘state visit’ with all the bells and whistles,” Russel said.
What’s ahead for U.S.-China relations?
But it should be expected that planning is underway for Trump and Xi to meet in person soon, Russel said. Trump prefers in-person meetings with foreign leaders, especially key adversaries, and Beijing might believe it can get a better deal by dealing directly with Trump, Russel said.
Trump’s return to the White House is expected to further intensify the U.S.-China rivalry. He has picked several China hawks for his Cabinet, including Sen. Marco Rubio as the secretary of state and Rep. Mike Waltz as the national security adviser.
Beijing has adopted a “wait-and-see” approach but says it is prepared to hit back should Washington raise tariffs on Chinese goods or make other unfriendly moves.
Sun of the Stimson Center cautions that Trump’s invitation does not exclude hostile policies toward China. Trump visited China in 2017 and “played nice,” but the following year he launched the trade war, she said.
“We’ve seen this before,” Sun said. “For Trump, there’s no contradiction between carrot and stick. For China, that’s a contradiction. It will add to China’s desire to play safe, not to be played by Trump, whether it is a friendly or a hostile message.”
COMMENT – Some will interpret President-elect Trump’s invitation to Xi to attend the inauguration as in line with a perceived affinity for dictators… I see it differently.
In my mind this is yet another example of placing one’s rival on the horns of a dilemma (making your rival choose between unpleasant options). It is no secret that Xi and his leading cadres want early access to the President-elect, but they want it on terms that favor Xi. By personally and publicly extending an invitation directly to Xi, President-elect Trump makes it more difficult for Xi to control the pace and timings of their interactions.
If Xi were to accept, then Xi would essentially take a bit part in a drama where the President-elect is the clear protagonist. If Xi refuses, then he is the one seen as refusing the hospitality of the President-elect (for those who are keeping score in the Xi-Trump meetings, it is Xi’s “turn” to come to the United States).
Imposing dilemmas on your rivals is graduate-level strategic shit, as it throws them off balance and increases the likelihood the other side will make a mistake.
To me, this is the antithesis of the careful, “managed competition” approach that characterized the Biden Administration since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
The Biden Administration seemed to adopt an approach that sought to achieve stability as an end and that it was America’s responsibility to pursue de-escalation at every turn. This enabled America’s adversaries and rivals to join forces and place the United States on the horns of various dilemmas.
We will see whether this approach works, but I’m more hopeful that it will compared to the cautious and timid approach we have seen over the past few years.
9. VIDEO - China’s United Front Exposed: Officials’ Leaked Calls and Tactics to Buy Off Taiwanese Influencers
Fun TV, December 6, 2024
This documentary exposes how China's United Front Work Department influences Taiwanese influencers, using financial incentives to sway opinions. It includes transcripts of phone calls with Chinese officials, shedding light on the intricate nature of cross-strait relations.
COMMENT – This is absolutely fascinating. Within a few days, there had been over 2 million views, most of that probably in Taiwan.
Authoritarianism
10. Hong Kong officials learn neighborhood surveillance from China
Wei Sze and Dawn Yu, Radio Free Asia, December 5, 2024
The city will be carved into subdistricts, with volunteers watching for potential signs of unrest.
Hong Kong is sending district councilors and other local officials to mainland China to learn how the ruling Chinese Communist Party uses local networks of volunteers to monitor the population and target potential unrest before it happens.
China’s “red armband” brigade of state-sanctioned busybodies have been dubbed the biggest intelligence network on the planet by social media users, and have supplied information that has also led police to crack major organized crime, according to state media.
Neighborhood committees in China have long been tasked with monitoring the activities of ordinary people in urban areas, while its grid management system turbo-charges the capacity of officials even in rural areas to monitor what local people are doing, saying and thinking.
These local forms of surveillance and social control are known in Chinese political jargon as the “Fengqiao Experience.”
Now, it looks as if Hong Kong will be adopting similar measures, according to the city’s Secretary for Home and Youth Affairs, Alice Mak, who confirmed that 18 local officials had already been to the eastern province of Zhejiang to study the system.
“Through classroom study and on-the-spot understanding of the practical methods of the Fengqiao Experience ... district councilors understand that regional governance requires strengthening communication with citizens, understanding their emergencies, difficulties and worries, as well as the early detection and resolution of citizens’ problems,” Mak told the Legislative Council on Wednesday.
She said the Fengqiao Experience will be implemented in Hong Kong by newly introduced “care teams,” and that further training is in the pipeline.
COMMENT – Sad, just sad.
Here’s more on the Fengqiao Experience:
China Media Project, April 16, 2021
A relic of the Mao Zedong era, the “Fengqiao experience” refers to a heavily mythologized approach to social and political governance that essentially directed the masses themselves at the local level to carry out the on-site “rectification” of so-called “reactionary elements” in society. The “Fengqiao experience” was the process of mobilizing the masses in order to “strengthen the dictatorship over class enemies.” It is named after Fengqiao Township, which is today a part of the city of Zhuji in Zhejiang province. Though radically unsuited, many would say, to a contemporary China ostensibly ruled by law under the Constitution, the “Fengqiao experience” has made a prominent return under Xi Jinping, entering official language about rule of law and public security.
In understanding the so-called “Fengqiao experience,” there are two key points of background that must first be understood. The first is that in 1962, during the Tenth Plenary Session of the 8th CCP Central Committee, Mao Zedong again raised the prospect of “class struggle”. It was at that meeting, in fact, that Xi Zhongxun, the father of General Secretary Xi Jinping, was purged after being falsely charged with leading an anti-Party clique. The second point is that it was in 1963 that Mao Zedong launched his Socialist Education Movement, also known as the Four Cleanups Movement. This was essentially a ploy to root out elements within the Party that Mao regarded as “reactionary.”
The phrase “Fengqiao experience” was not in fact featured in the People’s Daily in the 1960s, and through most of the 1970s. But here is how the top Party leader of Fengqiao District reflected back on the Four Cleanups in the official People’s Daily fourteen years later, on December 21, 1977:
In 1963, the seven communes in my district, under the leadership of the work team of the provincial Party committee of Zhejiang and the prefectural and county leaderships, carried out the first group of socialist education campaigns. During this movement, complying with Mao’s great injunction to “never forget the class struggle,” the masses were mobilized, enemies and friends distinguished, and four types of destructive activities perpetrated by reactionary elements were thoroughly exposed. At that time, some grassroots cadres and activists, full of revolutionary fervor, demanded that all reactionary elements involved in destructive activities be rounded up. Faced with this situation, we organized cadres and the masses to study a series of Mao’s guidelines and policies on struggling against the enemy. Through detailed ideological and political work, and a massive campaign of study and debate, awareness was substantially raised among cadres and the masses, who recognized that by relying on their own strength they could deal with an rehabilitate the enemy. This overcame the simple reliance . . . upon violent methods, relying instead on the masses classifying and listing the enemy, carrying out struggle through education, review and explanation, and relying also on the masses carrying out monitoring and rehabilitation locally. As a result, not one person was rounded up, and still the vast majority of enemies were dealt with.
These so-called “reactionary elements,” or silei fenzi, referred to landlords, wealthy peasants, counterrevolutionaries and evildoers. A subsequent investigation, done after the end of the Cultural Revolution and printed in the February 5, 1979, edition of the People’s Daily, showed that the population of Fengqiao was 130,000, of which some 3,000 had been identified as “reactionary elements.” That means that 1 in 50 people in Fengqiao were regarded as “enemies.” The persecution of people like this across the country was part of the awful political landscape of that era.
In 1963, the work team of the provincial Party committee of Zhejiang summarized the methods employed in Fengqiao in a document called, “Experiences in Struggling Against the Enemy During the Socialist Education Movement in Fengqiao District, Zhuji County”. During the National People’s Congress in 1963, the minister of public security, Xie Fuzhi, gave a speech called, “Relying on the Strength of the Masses, Strengthening the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, Transforming the Majority of ‘Reactionary Elements’ into New People”. Xie’s speech made specific mention of the example provided by Fengqiao.
On November 20, 1963, Mao Zedong added his written instructions to the Xie Fuzhi speech, in which he said: “The example of Zhuji raised here is a good one — various regions should follow this example, expanding the work through pilot programs.” Two days later, on November 22, Mao Zedong spoke with the deputy minister of public security, Wang Dongxing: “Of all the work carried out by the ministry of public security, the most important was the question of how to work among the masses, how to educate and organize them so that they can take part in the general work of public security. Judging from the experience of Zhuji, once the masses have risen, they can do things as well as you and as strong as you. You must not forget to mobilize the masses.”
The implication in Mao’s remarks was that public security officials should not focus on simply arresting “reactionary elements,” but must organize the masses to “re-educate” and reform them. Before the Cultural Revolution, the ministry of public security released materials about Fengqiao, but the People’s Daily never reported on these. On December 21, 1977, the People’s Daily published the piece from the top Party leader of Fengqiao District quoted above. That piece was called, “Raising High the Red Flag of Fengqiao Erected by Mao Zedong, Relying on the Masses to Strengthen Dictatorship”. It was the first introduction to what would be called the “Fengqiao experience,” or fengqiao jingyan:
In the struggle against the enemy, arrest is necessary and proper for a small number of class enemies; as for those you can choose to arrest or not, none should be arrested; you must mobilize the masses to carry out a struggle of reason, to deal with the enemies, carrying out on-site monitoring and rehabilitation, without the need to submit issues to higher authorities. This experience was affirmed and praised by the greater leader and teacher Mao Zedong.
On September 5, 1978, the People’s Daily published an official editorial called, “Rectifying and Strengthening Public Security Work”. It talked about how “Fengqiao District in Zhejiang’s Zhuji County relied on the masses to carry out on-site rectification of reactionary elements, reforming the vast majority of them into self-supporting laborers for the law.” “Their successful experience,” the article said, “was praised by Mao Zedong, and was known as a red flag on the front lines of public security.”
Fengqiao Experience for the New Era
Until recently, no top Chinese leader since Mao Zedong had ever been quoted publicly in the People’s Daily or other state media making remarks on the “Fengqiao experience.” Not Deng Xiaoping. Not Jiang Zemin. Not Hu Jintao. But in 2013, marking the 50th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s written instructions, Xi Jinping broke this pattern by issuing “important instructions on the development of the ‘Fengqiao experience’.”
Ever since the 2013 anniversary, China’s Party-state media have emphasized that “the vitality of the Fengqiao experience lies in its following of the mass line.” The concept was only ever about class struggle, and never about, as Party-state media have reported, “employing legal thinking and legal methods to resolve problems and tensions concerning the vital interests of the masses.” And Mao Zedong’s mass line was always about organizing the masses to control evildoers, about the exercise of a “dictatorship of the masses”. These ideas are poles apart from modern ideas of rule of law. So why is Xi so interested in renewing them and showcasing them? Why is there talk of a “Fengqiao experience for the New Era”)?
Much of the CCP’s language about public security and social management in the Xi era now emphasizes the “mass line,” propagating the idea, essentially, that the masses, or the public, must be involved in the process of being governed by the Party. This is not about involving the public in governance, an idea that is anathema to a ruling Party that spurns a robust civil society or more independent media. Rather, it is about mobilizing the public – including through new digital tools – in order to better achieve the Party’s governance objectives, including public security.
One example of technology enabled “mass line” governance that might illustrate the contemporary conception of the “Fengqiao experience” can be seen in the hotline created in April 2021 by the Cyberspace Administration of China, with encouraged members of the public to report those online and on social media who criticized the CCP and its history, the latter referred to disparagingly as “historical nihilism”.
But the “Fengqiao experience” has been applied as well to the local granular application of social and political control through neighborhood committees, companies and other units as the grassroots level. On November 26, Chen Yufan, a member of the celebrity rock duo Yu Quan, was arrested in Beijing along with his girlfriend on charges of drug use and possession. According to a post made to the official WeChat account of police in the city’s western district of Shijingshan, Chen was arrested in “a local residence” after police received “a community tip”. The community members providing the tip off were apparently from a “community group,” or qunzhong zuzhi known as the “Old Neighbours of Shijingshan”. In Beijing, this is one of a number of fairly well-known and well-documented community groups. Others include the likes of the “Chaoyang Masses”, the “Haiding Internet Users”, the “Xicheng Aunties” and the “Fengtai Advising Squad”. These groups point to the application of the “Fengqiao experience” as part of China’s emerging regime of “innovated” social management.
11. Prices Won’t Stop Falling in China, and Beijing Is Grasping for Solutions
Hannah Miao, Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2024
Companies are pumping out goods amid falling prices, creating vicious cycle that is eroding confidence.
The country that invented paper is making way too much of it.
So Shandong Chenming Paper, one of China’s biggest paper manufacturers, did what any company faced with overcapacity would do: It cut prices to unload more supply while it tried to ride out the storm.
Instead, its losses mounted. Last month, the company said it had racked up around $250 million in overdue debts. Creditors sued and some of the manufacturer’s bank accounts were frozen, it said.
The papermaker’s troubles are only the latest sign of the havoc caused by falling prices in China, as factories struggle to cope with overcapacity and weak demand.
Chinese leaders this week pledged to do more to stimulate the economy, including by cutting interest rates and boosting government borrowing. But pressure is building on Beijing to take even more forceful action to prevent a downward spiral of deflation that becomes self-reinforcing, potentially landing China in a longer-term recession.
Prices for goods leaving Chinese factories have fallen year-over-year for 26 consecutive months, dropping 2.5% in November from a year earlier, and there is little sign of them turning up again soon. China’s gross domestic product deflator, a broader gauge of price levels across the economy, has been in negative territory for six consecutive quarters, the longest stretch since the late 1990s.
COMMENT – I think one might call this a death spiral.
This is what happens when you let ideologues run an economy.
12. China cracks down on ‘chaotic’ online financial commentary
Chen Zifei, RFA, December 12, 2024
The move is likely linked to a recent speech by an economist casting doubts on government figures.
China’s internet censors are going after “chaotic” online financial information that claims to be “expert guidance,” the country’s powerful State Internet Information Office has said.
The moves come after censors took down a speech that went viral from economist Dong Shanwen, who warned that youth unemployment was tanking the economy, and that official growth figures had hugely underestimated the problem.
“The ... Office has kept up a high-pressure crackdown on chaotic online financial information, and has worked with relevant departments to deal with a number of accounts engaged in illegal stock recommendations, illegal financial intermediaries and other activities on platforms such as Douyin, Kuaishou, Weibo, and WeChat,” state news agency Xinhua reported on Thursday.
The authorities are also going after “illegal information that diverts and attracts traffic,” as well as unlicensed financial service providers and “get rich quick” investment schemes, it said.
China’s financial markets have had a roller-coaster ride in recent months amid speculation over a long-awaited government stimulus package for the country’s flagging economy.
‘Turning off the lights’
Instead of embarking on promising careers and pouring their disposable income into the economy, young people in today’s China are tightening their belts and “turning off the lights and eating noodles,” Gao Shanwen, chief economist at SDIC Securities, told an investor conference in Shenzhen earlier this month.
“Turning off the lights and eating noodles” is a catchphrase typically used to describe someone who is down on their luck after failed investments in the stock market, according to Baidupedia.
Gao’s personal financial commentary account on WeChat was later deleted, according to social media reports on Dec. 5.
Fellow economist Fu Peng, who recently commented that China’s middle class is in decline and that the government’s economic rescue measures won’t be as effective as they were in 2008, has also had his WeChat account restricted.
13. Frank Speeches by Economists Gao Shanwen, Fu Peng Result in Mass Online Censorship, WeChat Bans
Cindy Carter, China Digital Times, December 6, 2024
Viral video and transcripts of two unusually critical speeches about the state of the Chinese economy—by economists Gao Shanwen and Fu Peng, respectively—have been deleted from multiple platforms almost as fast as netizens can share them. In a speech in Shenzhen on December 3, Gao Shanwen (chief economist for SDIC Securities) analyzed concerning regional data on high youth unemployment, pointed to the undercounting of unemployed and discouraged workers, and suggested that China’s GDP growth over the last few years has been significantly overstated.
In a closed-door event for HSBC in Shanghai on November 24, Fu Peng (chief economist for brokerage house Northeast Securities) noted that while lower-income workers suffer the most during periods of economic contraction, their travails hardly make a dent in the macro-economic data. Afterward, it was rumored that Fu had been summoned by regulatory authorities displeased with his remarks, but Fu himself denied the rumors. Now it appears that both Gao and Fu’s WeChat accounts have been shut down, likely in retaliation for their frank assessments of the troubled Chinese economy.
A video report and longer news article from Bloomberg noted the “unusual candor” of Gao Shanwen’s speech, which highlighted concerns that demographic disparities are dragging down the Chinese economy, as young households curtail consumption in response to low wages and a weak labor market, middle-aged households suffer from layoffs and economic uncertainty, while older households enjoy greater stability and a healthier financial cushion:
“The younger a province’s population is, the slower its consumption growth has been,” Gao said at an investor conference in Shenzhen on Tuesday, citing his analysis of regional data. In public remarks live-streamed on several platforms, he described China’s post-pandemic society as being “full of vibrant old people, lifeless young people and despairing middle-aged people.”
The unsparing remarks quickly drew attention on China’s social media including Weibo, where videos and transcripts of Gao’s speech have been trending. The candor was all the more unusual at a time when local analysts try to moderate their language or even censor certain words such as “deflation,” as officials call for creating a more positive narrative around the economy.
Many of the recordings and notes of Gao’s speech posted on Weibo and WeChat have been removed by Wednesday morning, with some of the pages showing there were complaints that the content violated rules for online public accounts. [Source]
For Nikkei Asia, Stella Yifan Xie reported that Gao and Fu’s candid speeches challenged official government narratives promising “bright prospects” for the Chinese economy:
China likely overstated its gross domestic product by 10 percentage points over the past three years, said Gao Shanwen, chief economist at SDIC Securities, who has advised Chinese policymakers in the past. Meanwhile, he said that a total of 47 million people were unable to find formal jobs during the same period, suggesting a massive undercounting of joblessness, according to a transcript of his speech.
[…] Gao is not the only expert to cause a stir recently. Last month, Fu Peng, chief economist at Chinese brokerage Northeast Securities, said the official consumer price index is a poor measure of domestic demand due to the oversized weighting of volatile food prices. Instead, he said that surveying the state of low-skill workers such as delivery people and ride-hailing service drivers would offer a more accurate gauge of the health of the broader economy, adding that he believes a shrinking middle class is the biggest challenge facing the Chinese economy.
"Whenever the economy contracts, it’s those at the bottom who suffer the most at first," Fu said at a closed-door event in Shanghai on Nov. 24, a transcript of which circulated online over the weekend. "However, that barely has any impact on the macro economic data."
Both speeches sparked a buzz on social media, with many praising the economists as "rare" macro analysts with "conscientiousness." One user on Weibo, an X-like social platform in China, wrote that the analysis resonated with the public like "one stone that stirred up a thousand waves."
"They spoke the truth and hit the nail on the head," the user wrote. "It’s time to wake up and stop being intoxicated by the dream of prosperous times." [Source]
A report from Reuters described the online censorship that followed Gao and Fu’s speeches, and the recent shuttering of both economists’ WeChat accounts:
Gao’s speech was shared online and went viral on social media, but access was later blocked. Local online news reports that had carried his comments were also not accessible.
Attempts to follow Gao’s blog on WeChat, or reach him there, were blocked by the platform with a notice that the account had violated rules.
[…] When Reuters checked Fu’s account on Friday, a notice said access had been blocked.
[…] In October, the Cyberspace Administration of China – the country’s cyberspace regulator – said it had launched a special campaign to better regulate online news and information and would "rectify" any illegal conduct, following increased scrutiny over independent content creators online including commentaries. [Source]
Such censorship of economic content reflects the extreme sensitivity of expert opinions that repudiate or deviate from the official government narrative on the economy, or that question official economic statistics or overall management of the economy. Even nationalist pundit Hu Xijin was banned from posting online for a time (he has since been reinstated) due to comments on the private economy that seemingly fell afoul of the Party line following the Third Plenum last summer. CDT editors have archived numerous speeches and articles from prominent Chinese economists, academics, and pundits over the past several years, many of them censored.
14. China deletes warning that youth unemployment is tanking economy
Wang Yun, RFA, December 4, 2024
Internet censors have taken down a speech by a top Chinese economist that went viral after he warned that a widespread lack of opportunities for young people was dragging down growth, which he said had been overstated by several percentage points in recent years.
Instead of embarking on promising careers and pouring their disposable income into the economy, young people in today’s China are tightening their belts and “turning off the lights and eating noodles,” Gao Shanwen, chief economist at SDIC Securities, told an investor conference in Shenzhen on Tuesday.
“Turning off the lights and eating noodles” is a catchphrase typically used to describe someone who is down on their luck after failed investments in the stock market, according to Baidupedia.
Gao’s warning, which had been widely shared on social media, was apparently considered sensitive enough to be removed from the “Economist Book Club” public account on WeChat, on which had posted the speech in full.
The WeChat link on Wednesday returned the notice: “This content is no longer available due to complaints of violations.”
Gao’s speech was a direct contradiction of claims by the ruling Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping that consumption, particularly by young people, would be the driving force behind post-lockdown economic growth.
Yet, formerly prosperous workers in China, both white-collar and blue, have told Radio Free Asia that they are struggling, despite the upbeat tone of state media which is under pressure to deliver positive economic news.
Meanwhile, rampant youth unemployment in China has left millions of young people floundering, living at home, relying on delivery jobs or, in a growing trend, “pretending to go to work.”
15. Censors Remove Reflections on Democracy Inspired by Korean Crisis
Alexander Boyd, China Digital Times, December 6, 2024
Korea’s political crisis has spurred a host of commentary and reflection in China despite censorship. While state broadcaster CCTV issued minute-by-minute updates on the crisis, censors have taken down translations of articles from The Atlantic and The Guardian that were published to WeChat. “South Korea’s Warning for Washington,” by Bryan Klass in The Atlantic and “Democracy Isn’t Supposed to Work Like This” by Raphael Rashid in The Guardian have both been censored on WeChat. The former argues “one person—a power-hungry politician or a self-serving general—could destroy decades of progress in an instant” and the latter touches on the government’s brutal repression of the Gwangju pro-democracy movement that left hundreds dead in 1980. Potentially sensitive comparisons to Xi Jinping and June 4 aside, it is impossible to ascertain why, exactly, censors removed the two articles. Bars on citing or republishing foreign media coverage or orders to restrict coverage to republication of content from central state media are common approaches to handling potentially sensitive stories that are not completely silenced, however.
Images of Korean citizens blocking the military’s advance on the National Assembly in a manner reminiscent of the 1989 Tiananmen Tank Man were shared widely on Weibo. A dark strain of commentary accompanied their spread: namely that the South Korean military was risibly weak for not opening fire on demonstrators. (Tank Man himself was not harmed during the iconic confrontation, though his subsequent fate remains uncertain.) One WeChat author collected these messages in an essay titled, “Know-Nothings Mock the Korean Military for Not Opening Fire on the People, How ‘Low.’”
Though the article was later deleted by the author—possibly in an effort to avoid political repercussions—CDT preserved an archived copy. In its closing lines, the author references an apocryphal anecdote popular on the Chinese internet about a question posed by a German judge to the last East German guard convicted of shooting someone fleeing over the Berlin Wall: “Couldn’t you just have aimed your rifle one inch higher?” The phrase is often used on the internet to both mock idealists and, more sincerely, to convey the difference between democracy and autocracy:
One netizen wrote, “Is it wrong to be gentle towards civilians?”
Then the entire comment section mocked them!
Another commenter responded, "You’d like the machinery of violence to be a bit more gentle?"
Their point was that the tools of violence are meant to be ruthless and violent. Even when dealing with the public, there should be no qualms about opening fire.
When you mock the Korean military, take a moment to ask yourself: Where does the phrase “aim your rifle one inch higher” come from? Then think about why South Korean citizens were willing to stand up for themselves while facing down the barrel of a gun. [Chinese]
COMMENT – I hadn’t thought of this dynamic, but it makes complete sense. Of course, the Chinese people would see what happened in Seoul and reflect on their own experiences where the Chinese military DID fire on the people.
We often imagine that the contagion of democracy will flow from the United States to China, it is probably more likely that it will instead flow from South Korea to China, given the dynamism of Korean pop culture and the rich cultural flourishing of Korean dramas that touch on these topics.
I suspect we will look back and find that Korean films and Korean culture were revolutionary and they overpowered the attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to combat them with “politically correct” entertainment.
I also find the phrase, “Couldn’t you just have aimed your rifle one inch higher?”, to be a powerful meme for the pathologies of authoritarianism.
16. Risky Business
Sean Williams, The Wire China, December 8, 2024
17. Inside a High-Stakes U.S.-China Prisoner Swap
Aruna Viswanatha, James T. Areddy, Brian Spegele, and Gordon Lubold, Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2024
18. China launches AI that writes politically correct docs for bureaucrats
Laura Dobberstein, The Register, December 9, 2024
Chinese web and AI giant Baidu last week teamed with government communications organ Xuexi to create a tool that generates politically correct documents for bureaucrats.
Xuexi is an app that offers info about Chinese president Xi Jinping's life and thoughts – plus tools that allow users to chat about them together.
Reports from Hong Kong and China claim Baidu teamed with Xuexi to create a tool that Chinese bureaucrats can use to check documents they create to ensure they properly reflect Xi Jinping's thoughts – and that references to his ideas come from fact-checked sources.
The tool can also be used to produce documents that quote government statistics and policies.
COMMENT – What a nightmare… this is why we should be halting AI development!
19. The Era of Supply Chain Spy Wars Is Here
Calder Walton and Kevin Quinlan, Foreign Policy, December 10, 2024
20. From Apple to Starbucks, Western firms’ China dreams are dying
The Economist, December 8, 2024
21. Two years on, Chinese carry 'painful' memories of COVID lockdowns
Qian Lang and Hsia Hsiao-hwa, RFA, December 6, 2024
The rapid U-turn followed protests, and led to millions of infections and deaths across the country.
At the 20th party congress in October 2022, ruling Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping made it clear to the country that his hugely unpopular zero-COVID restrictions, including grueling lockdowns and the mass testing, tracking and quarantining of citizens, would remain in place for the foreseeable future.
Just a few weeks later, young people holding up blank sheets of paper started gathering in their thousands in public places and university campuses across China, sparked by a fatal lockdown fire in Xinjiang’s regional capital Urumqi, calling on Xi to step down and amid growing calls for pandemic restrictions to end.
Within days, a new policy had been announced, and authorities across the country began abandoning Xi’s pet policy, lifting quarantine requirements and travel bans in a bid to rescue the country’s flagging economy.
Two years after the easing of restrictions, many who were there still have vivid memories of being sealed up in their apartments, and of the wave of COVID-19 infections and deaths that ripped through the country once restrictions were lifted.
Guo Bin was living at his parents' home in the northeastern city of Changchun in 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic emerged in Wuhan and spread around the country and to the rest of the world.
COMMENT – The Chinese Communist Party has imposed a sort of collective amnesia over the Chinese people on what transpired at the end of “dynamic zero-COVID.”
22. China’s Critical Minerals Embargo Is Even Tougher Than Expected
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, December 9, 2024
23. US alleges China hacked calls of 'very senior' political figures, official says
Alexander Cornwell, Reuters, December 7, 2024
24. US agencies to brief House on Chinese Salt Typhoon telecom hacking
David Shepardson, Reuters, December 9, 2024
25. Hong Kong verdict against Yuen Long attack victims prompts widespread criticism
Luk Nam Choi and Edward Li, RFA, December 13, 2024
Former lawmaker says authorities are ‘rewriting history.’
The verdict by a Hong Kong court has generated widespread criticism after it found seven people -- including former lawmaker Lam Cheuk-ting -- guilty of “rioting” when they tried to stop white-clad men wielding sticks from attacking passengers at a subway station in 2019.
Exiled former pro-democracy lawmaker Ted Hui, who like Lam is a member of the Democratic Party, accusing authorities of “rewriting history.”
“It’s a false accusation and part of a totally fabricated version of history that Hong Kong people don’t recognize,” Hui told RFA Cantonese after the verdict was announced on Dec. 12.
“How does the court see the people of Hong Kong?” he asked. “How can they act like they live in two separate worlds?”
The District Court found Lam and six others guilty of “taking part in a riot” by as dozens of thugs in white T-shirts rained blows down on the heads of unarmed passengers -- including their own -- using rattan canes and wooden poles at Yuen Long station on July 21, 2019.
Lam, one of the defendants in the subversion trial of 47 activists for holding a democratic primary, is also currently serving a 6-years-and-9-month prison sentence for “conspiracy to subvert state power.”
26. Assad's fall in Syria exposes limits of China's Middle East diplomacy
Laurie Chen, James Pomfret, and Antoni Slodkowski, Reuters, December 9, 2024Just over a year ago, China gave Bashar al-Assad and his wife a warm welcome during their six-day visit to the country, offering the former Syrian leader a rare break from years of international isolation since the start of a civil war in 2011.
As the couple attended the Asian Games, President Xi Jinping vowed to support Assad in "opposing external interference" and in Syria's rebuilding, while his wife Asma was feted in Chinese media.
But the abrupt end to the rule of the authoritarian leader so explicitly backed by Xi only last year has dealt a blow to China's diplomatic ambitions in the Middle East and exposed the limits of its strategy in the region, analysts say.
A coalition of rebels seized Syria's capital Damascus on Sunday after a lightning offensive that toppled Assad's regime and ended his family's 50-year dynasty.
"There's been a lot of an exaggerated sense of China's ability to shape political outcomes in the region," said Jonathan Fulton, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.
While the collapse of the Assad regime was seen reducing the influence in the Arab world of his main backers, Iran and Russia, it was also a blow for China's global ambitions, said Fulton.
"A lot of what (China has) been doing internationally has relied on support with those countries, and their inability to prop up their biggest partner in the Middle East says quite a lot about their ability to do much beyond the region."
Environmental Harms
27. China’s EV manufacturing and Australia’s connected vehicles conundrum
Henry Storey, Lowy Institute, December 10, 2024
28. China’s Solar Industry Looks to OPEC for Guide to Survival
Bloomberg, December 8, 2024
29. Europe’s Big Battery Ambitions Are Failing, and China Is Benefiting
Stefan Nicola, Wilfried Eckl-Dorna, Tom Fevrier, and William Wilkes, Bloomberg, December 9, 2024
Foreign Interference and Coercion
30. No Limits? The China-Russia Relationship and U.S. Foreign Policy
Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine, Council on Foreign Relations, December 2024
31. Ferdinand Marcos says South China Sea resupply missions to go on
Ramon Royandoyan, Nikkei Asia, December 10, 2024
32. Paraguay kicks out Chinese envoy after he urges country to cut ties with Taiwan
The Guardian, December 5, 2024
Officials declare Xu Wei persona non grata after he asks Paraguay government to choose China over longtime ally.
Paraguay has expelled a Chinese envoy for allegedly interfering in its domestic affairs and urging the South American nation to break off ties with Taiwan.
In a curt statement on Thursday, Paraguay’s foreign ministry said it had revoked the visa of Xu Wei, a senior Chinese envoy to Latin America who was in Paraguay for an annual UNESCO meeting, declaring him persona non grata “over interference in internal affairs.” The Chinese diplomat was given 24 hours to leave the country.
The day before, Xu skipped the UNESCO session and instead turned up at congress in the capital of Asunción, where he caused a diplomatic stir by calling on Paraguay to ditch Taiwan, the self-governing democratic island of 23 million people that China claims as its territory.
Paraguay is the only nation in South America and one of just 12 worldwide that recognizes Taiwan as a country. The Paraguayan government has stayed firm in its commitment – even as Beijing ramps up its lobbying of foreign counterparts to stop recognizing the island.
In recent years, four countries in Latin America – Honduras, Panama, the Dominican Republic and El Salvador – have cut ties with Taiwan in favor of Beijing, whose one-China principle forces countries to choose between having full diplomatic relations with China or Taiwan.
From the halls of the futuristic congress building in Asunción that Taiwan helped fund, Xu stressed Beijing’s interest in establishing relations with Paraguay, but said the onus was on officials in Paraguay to make the first move.
“It is either China or Taiwan,” he said. “I recommend that the government of Paraguay make a correct decision as soon as possible.”
COMMENT – For those who think the days of Wolf Warrior diplomacy are over, think again.
The Guardian highlighted this article from three years ago, just to remind folks of what the Chinese Communist Party does to folks who take the *wrong* stance on this issue:
Emma Graham-Harrison, The Guardian, March 24, 2021
Paraguay said its government had been approached by unofficial brokers claiming to offer access to Chinese-manufactured batches of Covid-19 vaccine in return for cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan, although Beijing has denounced the claim as “malicious disinformation”.
So-called vaccine diplomacy has flourished as many countries crippled by the pandemic are struggling to source supplies to protect their populations. Russian-made doses have already formed part of a prisoner swap deal between Israel and Syria.
The deals offered in Paraguay appear to represent one of the most heavy-handed attempts to weaponise protection against Covid-19 since the first batches of vaccine began rolling off production lines.
33. I was censored from talking about Chinese influence in Latin America
Juan P. Villasmil, The Spectator, December 5, 2024
34. How a Criminal with Close Ties to China Became a New York Power Broker
Michael Forsythe, Bianca Pallaro, Jay Root, and Benjamin Weiser, New York Times, December 9, 2024
35. China's plans for large new London embassy rejected by local officials
Reuters, December 9, 2024
36. U.S. TikTok Ban Is Upheld by Appeals Court
Jacob Gershman, Meghan Bobrowsky, and Sarah E. Needleman, Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2024
37. TikTok Faces U.S. Ban After Appeals Court Denies Bid to Overturn New Law
Sapna Maheshwari, New York Times, December 6, 2024
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
38. Side Effects: the Human Rights Implications of Global Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Linkages to XUAR
Mishel Kondi, Center for Advanced Defense Studies, October 8, 2024
39. To Fight Forced Labor, Shein and Patagonia Dig into the Atomic Makeup of Their Clothes
Dylan Tokar, Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2024
40. Canada sanctions Chinese officials for human rights violations
Global Affairs Canada, December 10, 2024
Canada has imposed sanctions on 8 Chinese officials under the Special Economic Measures (People's Republic of China) Regulations, responding to grave human rights violations, particularly in Xinjiang, Tibet, and against Falun Gong practitioners.
The sanctions address arbitrary detentions, forced labor, and violence against ethnic and religious minorities. Canada continues to raise concerns about China's human rights record and calls for adherence to international human rights obligations.
COMMENT – Great job Canada!
41. Tibetan monk in poor health after his release from prison
RFA, December 6, 2024
Rachung Gendun served 3 1/2 years in prison for sending prayer offerings to the Dalai Lama.
A Tibetan Buddhist monk imprisoned for sending money for prayer offerings to be made to the Dalai Lama and the abbot of India’s Kirti Monastery has been released from jail but remains in poor health, according to two sources in Tibet familiar with the situation.
Rachung Gendun, arrested in April 2021 for allegedly sending donations to the Tibetan Buddhist spiritual leader and the monastery abbot, was released on Nov. 16, serving three and a half years in prison.
Chinese authorities consider it illegal for Tibetans to contact exiles. They are particularly sensitive about contacts made with the Dalai Lama, who fled to northern India in 1959 and has been living there ever since.
Tibetans living inside Tibet have faced persecution in the past for sending monetary donations and religious offerings in the name of the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan religious figures.
Many have done so discreetly, risking potential repercussions from Chinese authorities, in a show of their unwavering faith in their spiritual leader despite the Chinese government’s crackdown on Tibetan religious expression.
Gendun is in poor health and is currently undergoing treatment at Hashi Hospital in Chengdu, Sichuan province, said the source inside Tibet, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to fear of reprisals.
42. US-China prisoner swap reunites Uyghur families as work continues to secure others' freedom
Kasim Kashgar, VOA, December 6, 2024
Lost in much of the debate over "hostage diplomacy" after last week's rare prisoner swap between the U.S. and China is that in addition to the three Americans, three Uyghurs were on the flight from China. The exchange highlights Beijing's persecution of ethnic minorities prompting renewed international scrutiny.
A U.S. State Department spokesperson confirmed to VOA that the three Uyghurs were on the flight but declined to provide additional details "out of respect for their privacy."
"The Biden-Harris administration has continuously advocated for cases of humanitarian concern, including Uyghurs," the spokesperson told VOA. "We are pleased that these [Uyghur] individuals are home with their families."
Among those freed was 73-year-old Ayshem Mamut, the mother of prominent Uyghur rights advocate and Uyghur American lawyer Nury Turkel.
According to Turkel, the last time he saw his mother was 20 years ago, when she traveled to Washington for his graduation from American University.
"Her last trip to the U.S. was in the summer of 2004, when she came to D.C. with my late father for my law school graduation," Turkel told VOA.
Turkel's parents stayed in the U.S. for about five months before returning to China. Since then, his mother had been barred from leaving the country.
"The Chinese authorities never specifically said why my parents couldn't leave the country," Turkel said. "However, I believe a travel ban was imposed on my parents because of my decadeslong advocacy work and my U.S. government service from 2020 to 2024."
Turkel served as a commissioner and chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom from 2020 to 2024. In response to his advocacy for religious freedom for oppressed communities, he was sanctioned by China in 2021 and Russia in 2022.
Turkel described the reunion with his mother as a profoundly emotional moment, crediting years of persistent advocacy by individuals and institutions across multiple U.S. administrations.
COMMENT – I’ve known Nury Turkel for several years and I’m very happy for him and his family.
43. Activists tell US Congress of China’s far-reaching cultural erasure
Alex Willemyns, RFA, December 5, 2024
Uyghur, Tibetan, Mongolian and Chinese activists say it’s hard to escape Beijing’s repressive reach.
A campaign by China’s government to rewrite the cultural identity and history of the country’s minority ethnic groups and political dissidents is increasingly being waged on American shores, activists told a U.S. congressional hearing on Thursday.
The Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian and Chinese activists said that while the United States once stood as a bastion of free speech and a redoubt of cultural preservation for groups targeted by the Chinese Communist Party, many now feared Beijing’s extensive reach.
Rishat Abbas, the president of the U.S.-based Uyghur Academy, told the hearing of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China that his sister Gulshan had been jailed in China on a 20-year sentence due to his and other family member’s anti-government activism abroad.
The U.S. government says China’s government is carrying out a “genocide” against the mostly Muslium Uyghur minority in the country’s far-west. Many Uyghurs abroad actively campaign to end the genocide and to do what they can to preserve their language and culture.
But many look to the treatment of the family members, still trapped in China, of those Uyghurs who choose to speak out, and decide it’s safer not to provoke the Chinese Communist Party, even from abroad.
“My sister’s imprisonment is a clear action of retaliation,” he said. “Her detention exposes the CCP’s aggressive policies that target Uyghurs simply for their identity and for the activism of their relatives abroad.”
“She has never engaged in any form of advocacy in her life,” he said.
Abbas said he was nonetheless not deterred, and hoped to one day bring a Uyghur-language textbook developed in the United States back to China’s Xinjiang region, where Uyghurs live under surveillance.
Lawfare
It’s not only Uyghur immigrants who have been targeted.
In years gone by, American higher education institutions like Stanford University fearlessly curated U.S.-based historical archives about events censored by the Chinese government, said Julian Ku, a constitutional law professor at New York’s Hofstra University.
But things have changed.
Ku pointed to a lawsuit brought in the United States by the Beijing-based widow of the late Li Rui – a former secretary to Mao Zedong and later dissident who donated diaries to Stanford.
Stanford says Li Rui donated the diaries through his daughter, fearing that they would be destroyed by Chinese officials if left in China. But Li Rui’s widow says they are rightfully hers and wants them returned.
The widow, Ku explained, was inexplicably being represented by “some of the most expensive law firms in the United States,” and had likely already racked up legal fees in the “hundreds of thousands of dollars – and probably more – on a widow’s Chinese state pension.”
Describing the tactic as “lawfare,” he suggested that the widow had powerful backers funding the battle, who may not even care if the litigation is ultimately successful.
The nearly four years of costly legal battles sent a message to other U.S. universities, museums or nonprofits to avoid any contentious documents that might attract the attention of Beijing, Ku said.
“They might think, ‘Well, maybe I don’t want to acquire that one, because it might subject me to litigation in China and maybe litigation here in the United States,” he said. “It serves as a deterrence for universities, museums and other institutions in the United States.”
Living in fear
Like Uyghurs, many ethnically Han Chinese in America also fear speaking out against Beijing even while in the United States, said Rowena He, a historian of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing who was last year banned from entering Hong Kong.
“It’s very difficult to not to be emotional being in this room again because I remember 5-10 years ago, when I was first invited to testify to Congress,” He recalled. “I was extremely hesitant, because I was so concerned about my family members, and I was so worried.”
“I lived with fear ever since the day I started teaching and researching the topic of Tiananmen,” she explained, citing the “taboo” around the topic in China, where the massacre is not openly acknowledged.
She said increased funding for curriculums with alternate Chinese histories to the one put forward by Beijing could be one way to counter the “monopoly on historiography” held by China’s government.
“If you go to Chinatown, many people are still supporting the CCP, even though they’re physically in the United States,” He said, noting that figures like herself were denigrated as anti-government.
“Sometimes people call us ‘underground historians,’ but I do not like the term ‘underground,’” she said. “We are the historians.”
Government funding
Geshe Lobsang Monlam, a Tibetan monk who authored a 223-volume Tibetan dictionary and helps lead efforts to preserve Tibetan language outside of China, said one of the main obstacles for Tibetans outside China outside of pressure from Beijing was finding needed funds.
“Inside Tibet, the young Tibetans have appeared powerless in their ability to preserve and promote their language,” the monk said, pointing to concerted efforts to erase use of the Tibetan language as young Tibetans grow proficient in using Mandarin through smartphones.
“If there can be assistance by the United States to help procure technological equipment that can enable those of us in exile to continue our work on preservation of Tibetan culture and language and way of life … that would be very useful for us,” he explained.
Temulun Togochog, a 17-year-old U.S.-born Southern Mongolian activist, similarly appealed for more funding for cultural preservation.
Togochog said while the decreased global focus on the plight of Mongolians in China had allowed her family in the United States to openly teach her about Mongolian culture and their native language with little fear of reprisal, resources were few and far between.
Mongolians living in China’s Inner Mongolia were increasingly facing a similar treatment to Tibetans and Uyghurs, she said, with a “systematic oppression and erasure of Mongolian language” taking place in favor of what is called “patriotic education” lionizing the communist party.
In September 2020, many Southern Mongolians protested the policies through coordinated school boycotts and strikes, but there was little news coverage of the ensuing mass arrests, she explained.
“Approximately 300,000 southern Mongolian students joined the movement,” she said. “The Chinese government responded harshly, detaining and placing under house arrest 8-10,000 people.”
The young activist called on Congress to fund Mongolian-language programs on Voice of America, which currently do not exist. She said that would help the “minority within a minority” to more actively “preserve their language, culture and identity” from erasure.
COMMENT – It seems to me that international organizations like the United Nations should be conducting hearings like this on a regular basis.
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
44. China's theme parks lose their magic, with 40% earning no profit
Noriyuki Doi, Nikkei Asia, December 7, 2024
45. Chinese startups race to upgrade cold chain logistics
Wataru Suzuki, Nikkei Asia, December 9, 2024
46. Will China Take Over the Global Auto Industry?
Brad W. Setser, Council on Foreign Relations, December 8, 2024
47. Xi Readies Bargaining Chips for US Trade War
Bloomberg, December 10, 2024
48. Why Isn’t Europe Diversifying from China?
Agatha Kratz, Camille Boullenois, and Jeremy Smith, Rhodium Group, December 2, 2024
49. China Forex Reserves Climbed in November
Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2024
50. China regulators tell banks to expedite offshore company listings, sources say
Selena Li, Scott Murdoch, Julie Zhu, and Kane Wu, Reuters, December 9, 2024
51. Beijing Shifts Stance on Economy, but Words Alone Won’t Be Enough
Jacky Wong, Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2024
52. China Exports Growth Slows Unexpectedly, Imports Drop Further
Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2024
53. In China’s Rapidly Aging Cities, Young People Flee and Few Babies Are Born
Yoko Kubota and Liyan Qi, Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2024
54. Xi Jinping says China will remain world’s ‘growth engine’
Cheng Leng, Joe Leahy, and Thomas Hale, Financial Times, December 10, 2024
55. China Eases Overall Monetary Policy Stance for First Time in 14 Years
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, December 9, 2024
56. Potential U.S. Policy Changes Pose Risks to Asian Economies, ADB Says
Fabiana Negrin Ocho, Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2024
57. China reveals its playbook for dealing with impending Trump trade war
Kathrina Northrop and Vic Chang, Washington Post, December 10, 2024
58. Biden Administration Looks to Reinforce U.S.-China Ties Ahead of Trump’s Return
Alan Rappeport, New York Times, December 11, 2024
59. Chinese authorities are considering a weaker yuan as Trump trade risks loom
Reuters, December 11, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
60. US-China Tech War Fuels Asia Boomtowns Built on AI, Chips
Yuan Gao, Nguyen Xuan Quynh, Ram Anand, and Andy Lin, Bloomberg, December 6, 2024
61. In Indonesia, smartphone makers want sales, Jakarta wants investment
Cheng Ting-Fang and Lauly Li, Nikkei Asia, December 11, 2024
62. Nvidia Hit with China Probe in Global Tech War Escalation
Amy Thomson, Bloomberg, December 9, 2024
63. India Could Be Apple and Samsung’s Solution to the Future of Phones
Andre Williams, Wired, December 7, 2024
64. TikTok-owner ByteDance takes lead in race to capitalise on AI in China
Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, December 7, 2024
65. Congress could ban new drones from two Chinese manufacturers
David Shepardson, Reuters, December 9, 2024
66. Chinese surveillance firm Uniview calls on US to reconsider its trade sanction
Iris Deng, South China Morning Post, December 11, 2024
67. It’s not just TikTok. You probably use lots of Chinese technology.
Shira Ovide, Washington Post, December 10, 2024
Military and Security Threats
68. China Is Cutting Off Drone Supplies Critical to Ukraine War Effort
Mark Bergen, Mackenzie Hawkins, and Gian Volpicelli, Bloomberg, December 9, 2024
69. Biden approves national security memo on China, Iran, North Korea and Russia ahead of Trump's return
Aamer Madhani, Associated Press, December 11, 2024
70. US Marines start partial transfer from Okinawa in Japan to Guam under plan agreed 12 years ago
Mari Yamaguchi, Associated Press, December 14, 2024
The partial transfer of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam began on Saturday, 12 years after Japan and the United States agreed on their realignment to reduce the heavy burden of American troop presence on the southern Japanese island, officials said.
The relocation started with 100 members of III Marine Expeditionary Force stationed on Okinawa moving to the Pacific island for the initial logistical work, the U.S. Marine Corps and Japan’s Defense Ministry said in a joint statement.
Under the plan agreed between Tokyo and Washington in April 2012, about 9,000 of the 19,000 Marines currently stationed on Okinawa are to be moved out of Okinawa, including about 4,000 of them to be moved to Guam in phases. Details, including the size and timing of the next transfer, were not immediately released.
The Marine Corps is committed to the defense of Japan and meeting operational requirements to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific, and it will maintain presence in the region “through a combination of stationing and rotating Marines in Japan, Guam and Hawaii,” the joint statement said.
COMMENT – I suspect that Beijing is happy to see at least a portion of the U.S. Marine Corps move farther away from Taiwan and its coast.
71. Canada Seeks Stronger US Ties in Arctic to Counter Russia, China
Danielle Bochove, Bloomberg, December 6, 2024
72. Taiwan on Alert as China Sends More Vessels Nearby Than 2022
Yian Lee, Bloomberg, December 8, 2024
73. US sanctions Chinese firm for hacking firewalls in ransomware attacks
Sergiu Gatlan, Bleeping Computer, December 10, 2024
74. China starts military movements after Taiwan leader’s first foreign trip
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, December 8, 2024
75. China Stages Largest Show of Force in Decades After U.S. Visit by Taiwan’s Lai
Joyu Wang and Austin Ramzy, Wall Street Journal, December 10, 2024
76. Island in the crosshairs
Gerry Doyle, Vijdan Mohammad Kawoosa, and Arathy J Aluckal, Reuters, December 10, 2024
77. China says it takes 'necessary measures' to defend sovereignty over Taiwan
Ryan Woo, Ben Blanchard, and Yimou Lee, Reuters, December 10, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
78. Australia seals Nauru aid deal to counter China's influence
Sophie Mak, Nikkei Asia, December 9, 2024
79. A US Navy ship will make its first port call in 8 years in Cambodia, a close ally of China
Sopheng Cheang, Associated Press, December 13, 2024
A U.S. Navy warship will make a port call next week in Cambodia, China’s close ally in Southeast Asia, the first such visit in eight years, according to a Cambodian statement on Friday.
Cambodia’s Ministry of National Defense said USS Savannah will dock at the port of Sihanoukville on the Gulf of Thailand on Dec. 16-20. Savannah, classed as a Littoral Combat Ship, carries a crew of 103, the ministry said.
The visit was scheduled after a U.S. request for a port call, it added, and would “strengthen and expand the bonds of friendship as well as promote bilateral cooperation” between the two nations.
The United States has not yet announced the visit and there was no comment from the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, Cambodia’s capital.
Relations have long been rocky and Washington has criticized Cambodia’s government for political repression and human rights violations. The U.S. has also been concerned about the upgrading of a Cambodian naval base near Sihanoukville, which it believes will be utilized by Chinese vessels to serve Beijing’s strategic interests in the region.
Opinion Pieces
80. Jerome Cohen on China's Rule by Law
Evan Peng, The Wire China, December 8, 2024
81. Jimmy Lai's trial is a test of global resolve on Beijing's overreach
Luke de Pulford, Nikkei Asia, December 11, 2024
82. Six takeaways from Commander of US Indo-Pacific Command Admiral Samuel Paparo
Lynn Kuok and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution, December 6, 2024
83. Starmer's China Reset Has a Supersized Problem
Matthew Brooker, Bloomberg, December 10, 2024
84. Beware of China’s Political Grandstanding on Stimulus
Shuli Ren, Bloomberg, December 9, 2024
85. China’s Economy on the Loose (Money)
The Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, December 9, 2024
86. Mixing Marx with Confucius: the heart of the matter for China
Josephine Ma, South China Morning Post, December 10, 2024
87. Europeans need to learn some lessons about power — and fast
Rana Foroohar, Financial Times, December 8, 2024