Are the Pandas Coming Back?
Are the Pandas Coming Back?
Friends,
Greetings from New Delhi!
I had a wonderful time here at the Raisina Dialogue, got to see old friends and meet some new ones.
Originally, the panel I was supposed to speak on included a Chinese Senior Colonel, but at the last minute it looks like he backed out. When the video is posted, I’ll include the link.
Panel session titled, “Deterrence and Decoupling: Decoding the west’s China Stance.” From left to right, former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt, Allison Hooker, Abigaël Vasselier, Matt Turpin, Teddy Bunzel, and our moderator Róbert Vass.
I really appreciated the hospitality of my Indian hosts and want to thank the think tank, ORF for a great conference. I’m going to take some time to process all I heard, so will follow up with more detailed comments in the coming weeks.
Weapon of coercion
First let’s turn to the Big News
For some, including my own kids, the most important China news this week is… wait for it… pandas are coming back to the United States.
If you remember last year, the PRC’s panda cartel demanded that America return their pandas and punish America’s children because we made a bit of a fuss about a spy balloon flying over our country.
The fact that this is news at all, should remind us that the Chinese Communist Party is seriously messed up. What kind of sicko uses cuddly pandas as a tool of geopolitical coercion?!?
According to reports, it looks like San Diego and Washington will get new ones in the coming weeks or months. Everything should go as planned, assuming Beijing doesn’t fly another spy balloon over the United States and then have a temper tantrum when it’s made public… damn, I spoke too soon.
The other Big News
Over the space of about 72 hours, multiple Washington lobbying firms terminated their relationships with PRC companies associated with the PLA and human rights abuses. Knowledge of these companies background had been known for months and years, but these lobbying firms were comfortable representing them to Congress.
That all changed this week when Politico released an exclusive report on how various Congressional offices were putting together lists of these firms and their clients with the intent of blacklisting them (#5 and #6 below).
Overnight, the firms started dropping those clients over the fear that if Congressional offices stopped picking up the phone for them, then their business with every other client would be jeopardized.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Ottawa's Interference Inquiry jolted with second Diaspora boycott
Sam Cooper, The Bureau, February 20, 2024
Hong Kong and Uyghur immigrant groups fear legal standing of several Chinese Canadian politicians; Hong Kong group also questions Commissioner Hogue's ties to Liberal PMs.
Canada’s Foreign Interference Commission faces intensifying credibility concerns as a Hong Kong immigrant group becomes the second diaspora group to boycott Ottawa’s examination into Chinese interference, based on concerns that several politicians “suspected of ties to Chinese Consulates” were awarded legal standing by Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue.
In addition to publishing a statement to the Commission citing “concerns over its objectivity and security integrity,” Hong Kong Canadian boycott spokesperson Ivy Li personally questioned Commissioner Hogue’s own professional links to former Liberal prime ministers Pierre Trudeau and Jean Chrétien.
In late January, the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project (URAP) pulled out of the inquiry, accusing Commissioner Hogue of enabling "a significant security risk" to the diaspora in Canada and their families in China.
URAP spokesman Mehmet Tohti said his group could not participate because two Toronto-area Liberal politicians — MP Han Dong and former Ontario MPP and current Markham Deputy Mayor Michael Chan — were given full standing, meaning their lawyers will be able to question other participants in the proceedings.
In its statement Tuesday, Canadian Friends of Hong Kong named these same politicians and also added Senator Yuen Pau Woo — granted intervener status by Hogue — to the list.
“We have grave concerns regarding the objectivity and the security integrity of the Foreign Interference Commission Inquiry, primarily due to standing being granted to individuals suspected to have strong ties to the Chinese Consulates, and their proxies,” the statement says.
COMMENT – The Canadian Government’s efforts to investigate the PRC’s malign PRC activities has been marred by problems since the evidence of political interference became public over a year ago.
First Prime Minister Trudeau tried to dismiss concerns over Chinese interference in the 2019 and 2022 national elections, in which the CCP sought to aid Trudeau’s Liberal Party by funding a series of candidates. As pressure mounted in March 2023, Trudeau rejected calls for a public inquiry and instead appointed the former Governor General of Canada, David Johnston as a special rapporteur on foreign interference with the mission top produce a report by October. That investigation ended almost as soon as it started as it became clear that Johnson’s long-time family ties to Trudeau called his objectivity into question.
Johnston resigned in disgrace in June after recommending against a public inquiry by making the spurious argument that the intelligence was too sensitive to have a public inquiry [the irony being that if the intelligence is too sensitive to share publicly, how on earth is the public to believe that no political interference had taken place as the Trudeau Government seemed to want everyone to believe].
It all began to look like Trudeau was simply covering up massive Chinese political interference campaign that had clearly benefited him and his ruling Liberal Party in two election cycles.
Then in September, after long negotiations with Canada’s other political parties, Trudeau was forced to announce a public inquiry.
This is something Trudeau should have done a year earlier when the evidence went public.
Better yet, Trudeau should have acted when his own most senior advisors and Canada’s intelligence agencies first brought him evidence that Beijing was seeking to manipulate Canada’s democracy… in June 2017. This is when his own National Security and Intelligence Advisor, Daniel Jean, and Chief of Staff, Katie Telford, prepared a memo for the Prime Minister detailing Beijing’s efforts.
Or perhaps Trudeau could have acted when the PRC took two Canadian citizens hostage in retaliation for the arrest of the Huawei CFO… in December 2018. That was nearly a year before the October 2019 Canadian elections which spurred this whole controversy.
But the controversy has not stopped.
Instead of focusing on Beijing’s activities, Trudeau decided to cloud the matter by broadening the inquiry to include multiple countries and in January expanded it again to include accusations that India interfered in Canada’s elections. Remember when Trudeau oddly went on the floor of Parliament to accuse the Indian Government of murdering a Canadian Sikh leader (an accusation that his own ministers walked back immediately), well that was four days before he was finally forced to agree to a public inquiry on PRC political interference.
The Canadian Prime Minister appears unwilling to tackle these problems seriously given the likely harms it will do to important members of the ruling party in Ottawa.
2. Some Authors Were Left Out of Awards Held in China. Leaked Emails Show Why.
Alexandra Alter, New York Times, February 17, 2024
The Hugo Awards, a major literary prize for science fiction, have been engulfed in controversy over revelations that some writers may have been excluded based on their perceived criticism of China or the Chinese government.
Suspicions in the science fiction community have been building for weeks that something was amiss with last year’s awards, which rotate to a different city each year, and in 2023 were hosted in Chengdu, China. Now, newly released emails show that the awards were likely manipulated because of political concerns.
COMMENT – It appears that the CCP’s efforts in instill a culture of self-censorship is working as they intended. Worth re-reading Perry Link’s 2002 essay about the PRC titled, The Anaconda in the Chandelier.
3. China coast guard caused 'panic' by boarding tourist boat, says Taiwan
Kelly Ng, BBC, February 19, 2024
Taiwan has accused China's coast guard of triggering "panic", after six Chinese officials briefly boarded a Taiwanese tourist boat.
They checked the ship's route plan, certificate and crew licenses, and left half an hour later.
It comes less than a week after a Chinese fishing boat was pursued by Taiwan's coast guard in the same area. The boat later capsized, killing two.
4. FBI Director Says China Cyberattacks on U.S. Infrastructure Now at Unprecedented Scale
Joe Parkinson and Drew Hinshaw, Wall Street Journal, February 18, 2024
As intelligence chiefs and policymakers gathered for this city’s annual security conference focused on the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation urged them not to lose sight of another threat: China.
Christopher Wray on Sunday said Beijing’s efforts to covertly plant offensive malware inside U.S. critical infrastructure networks is now at “a scale greater than we’d seen before,” an issue he has deemed a defining national security threat.
Citing Volt Typhoon, the name given to the Chinese hacking network that was revealed last year to be lying dormant inside U.S. critical infrastructure, Wray said Beijing-backed actors were pre-positioning malware that could be triggered at any moment to disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure.
“It’s the tip of the iceberg…it’s one of many such efforts by the Chinese,” he said on the sidelines of the security conference that has been dominated by questions over Ukraine and the death of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. China, he had earlier told delegates, is increasingly inserting “offensive weapons within our critical infrastructure poised to attack whenever Beijing decides the time is right.”
COMMENT – When will Treasury and the White House impose sanctions on the PRC entities responsible for these attacks on U.S. critical infrastructure?
It seems like the only official willing to draw attention to this is the FBI Director.
5. Lobbyists dump Chinese clients after blacklist threats
Daniel Lippman and Caitlin Oprysko, February 21, 2024
Firms Sever Ties with China Clients: Several of K Street’s top firms are no longer working for Chinese companies that are linked to the Chinese military, Daniel reports, after PI reported last week that several members of Congress were considering banning the firms from meetings with their offices.
— Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, which began lobbying for Chinese lidar maker Hesai Group in August, filed termination paperwork over the weekend. The firm reported earning $300,000 in lobbying fees during the course of its work for Hesai.
— Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck also parted ways with Hesai this week, after being hired in September. The firm reported being paid $220,000 over the course of its work for the company. Some Hill staffers had previously informally told Brownstein — K Street’s top lobbying firm by revenue — to not take such clients.
— The Vogel Group has also dropped the Chinese drone company DJI, for which they have lobbied since 2022, and Complete Genomics, which it signed last fall. The firm reported pulling in $865,000 in lobbying revenues from DJI over the course of their relationship, and $450,000 from Complete Genomics.
— The ban lawmakers were considering would have included firms that represent companies on the Pentagon’s so-called 1260H entity list for “Chinese military companies,” even if they were trying to meet to discuss American clients — a potentially massive upheaval, given that several of the firms are among the biggest in town. DJI and Hesai Group are on the 1260H list. Complete Genomics is not on the list, but its former parent company, BGI Genomics, is.
— All of these firms and their Chinese clients were included in a photo that has been circulating on Capitol Hill, which also includes the different federal government entity lists that they are on. One senior Republican congressional staffer told PI last week they had already started to avoid the firms in question.
— Akin Gump parted ways with a second company not on the 1260H list, electronics firm Xiaomi, with a firm spokesperson pointing out that it hadn’t engaged in any reportable activity for the company in months. Akin Gump reported $1.2 million in lobbying revenues from the company since 2021.
— Avoq (formerly Subject Matter) and CLS Strategies, which also lobby for DJI, had no comment on whether they are keeping DJI as a client, nor did Steptoe, which lobbies for BGI. Brownstein declined to comment on the terminations and Vogel Group did not respond to requests for comment on the terminations, along with Hesai, DJI, Xiaomi and Complete Genomics.
6. The China lobbying terminations continue
Caitlin Oprysko, Politico, February 23, 2024
The Terminations Continue: Yet another lobbying firm has cut ties with one of its Chinese clients after PI reported that several members of Congress were considering banning the firms that represent those clients from meetings with their offices. Steptoe has terminated its contract with Shenzhen-based biotech company BGI, according to disclosure filings.
— The white shoe law and lobbying firm is the fifth this week to part ways with a Chinese client after PI reported their inclusion on a list circulating around the Hill that named firms lobbying for Chinese companies that are on federal entity lists.
— BGI hired Steptoe in July after the House passed language in its annual defense authorization bill that would bar the government from continuing to do business with certain Chinese biotech companies. Disclosures show BGI paid Steptoe more than $900,000 for the work on the bill, which ultimately only required the Pentagon to evaluate whether Chinese biotech companies should be added to a list of entities operating in the U.S. that are affiliated with the Chinese military, which BGI was already on.
— Last month, a bipartisan, bicameral group of lawmakers including the heads of the House Select China Committee, introduced a standalone measure that would ban federally funded medical providers from working with companies like BGI.
COMMENT – These two articles make me very happy.
7. The Taiwan Catastrophe
Andrew S. Erickson, Gabriel B. Collins, and Matt Pottinger, Foreign Affairs, February 16, 2024
In recent years, Chinese leader Xi Jinping has shown an impatient determination to resolve Taiwan’s status in a way his predecessors never did. He has ordered a meteoric military buildup, instructing Chinese forces to give him by 2027 a full range of options for unifying Taiwan.
These signals are triggering debate in Washington and elsewhere about whether Taiwan is strategically and economically important enough to merit protection through the most challenging of contingencies. But make no mistake: whether one cares about the future of democracy in Asia or prefers to ponder only the cold math of realpolitik, Taiwan’s fate matters.
Authoritarianism
8. No incentives, but ideological work to drive China – ITALIAN
Francesco Sisci, Settimana News, February 22, 2024
On February 18, Hunan Party Secretary Shen Xiaoming delivered an eloquent speech to local cadres, urging the entire province to liberate itself from:
The existing mindset, work inertia, and path dependence
The vicious competition of self-centeredness and involution
The fear of looking ahead and backward
Being afraid of this and that
Being willing to live in the middle of the stream.
The state of being willing to settle in the middle with no major differences.
The argument illustrates that China is in a complicated loop. The same Hunanese who delivered and received the message must know it’s mostly useless.
In fact, cadres were proactive under Deng because he allowed them to have power and money. This worked for a while, but then it led to corruption during Jiang Zemin’s times.
Why should an official be proactive now that the money aspect has been taken away? If he can’t obtain money and faces the risk of making mistakes, then there’s no upside, only downside in being proactive. Nevertheless, he won’t rebel and will instead hold on to the system because it gives him power, but not more than that.
To be proactive in these conditions, one must be an idealist. However, if you’re an idealist, you might be against the party or against Xi. Or, if you are pro-party, pro-Xi, and an idealist, you might be a fanatic, and a fanatical official poses a different set of problems. Incidentally, so far, there is little trace of real fanaticism; just a lot of pretended fanaticism.
China should have adopted massive systemic reforms long ago to address these problems. But it didn’t because there was no urgency at the time. Reforming now is hazardous and complex, and the results are more uncertain. Moreover, the same officials chafing under these reeducation cycles fear reforms that would take away or just dent their small power. Despite this, they remain inactive due to a lack of incentives and a plethora of disincentives.
Therefore, the system is in a loop, where inaction is met by greater pressure from above. It’s all very exhausting, but there’s also a lot of resistance to changing ways. It creates a lot of entropy wasting a lot of resources. Tearing down large unsold apartment building that can’t be sold is a practical show of the existing troubles.
9. China building up tech for 'censorship apparatus,' U.S. report says
Tomoko Ashizuka, Nikkei Asia, February 20, 2024
China is trying to control global opinion on Taiwan, Hong Kong and other issues through its extensive censorship apparatus and is advancing technologies for this purpose, according to a new report released by a U.S. congressional advisory panel.
The bipartisan U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) on Tuesday published the report analyzing China's domestic and global censorship practices.
10. Censorship Practices of the People’s Republic of China
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 20, 2024
This report, prepared for the Commission by Exovera’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis (CIRA), examines the elaborate and pervasive censorship apparatus used by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to maintain the Party's monopoly on political legitimacy, shape the behavior of China’s citizenry, and control information beyond its borders.
Some Key Findings Include:
Under General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping’s rule, the Party has significantly expanded the scope and stringency of its censorship apparatus, with a particular focus on solidifying its control over internet content. At the same time, the CCP allows for limited discussions of sensitive topics that do not directly threaten its hold on power, such as China’s role in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Despite the importance the CCP places on domestic information control, its censorship apparatus is unevenly developed and plagued by unfunded mandates. The PRC’s policy of assigning legal liability to internet service providers (ISPs) and private website owners has driven these entities to self-police and censor content posted on their platforms.
Current Party guidance for internet content moderation stresses that deletion and blocking of posts should be a last-resort measure and that Party organs should instead focus their energy on proactive measures such as public engagement and “spreading positive propaganda.”
PRC information operations frequently “flood the zone” on foreign social media platforms with irrelevant content designed to hijack or demobilize discussions of topics the Party deems to be sensitive, such as human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Tibet.
The Party’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the flexibility and adaptability of its censorship apparatus during crisis scenarios. For example, at the outset of the pandemic, criticisms of local officials and mentions of whistleblower Li Wenliang were initially censored but were later co-opted and amplified by Party-state outlets after public outcry in order to boost the legitimacy of the CCP.
The PRC actively seeks to censor international acknowledgements of Taiwan sovereignty in order to diplomatically isolate the island and lessen international willingness to intervene in a prospective cross-Strait conflict.
The PRC is devoting considerable resources toward the development and fielding of advanced AI and big data analysis technologies for online content monitoring. Many of these AI-enabled “public opinion guidance” tools rely on off-the-shelf components imported from the United States, such as general processing units (GPUs) and cloud computing infrastructure.
11. Xi aims anti-graft purge at China's military on eve of centenary
Yukio Tajima, Nikkei Asia, February 8, 2024
12. How China stifles dissent without a KGB or Stasi of its own
The Economist, February 15, 2024
Much thought has gone into making the Beijing Police Museum a family-friendly attraction. Housed in a classical mansion near Tiananmen Square, the museum is big on crime-fighting heroics. Glass cases show guns used by Chinese police. A model of a police dog sports a bullet-proof vest, commando-style helmet and protective boots on its paws. During the lunar-new-year holidays, a recent weekday found parents and children admiring displays about police helicopters, drug squads, traffic patrols and cyber-officers keeping the internet “healthy”. Political repression earns a passing mention—but in a historical section. An old photograph shows student protesters being arrested by plain-clothes agents, decades before the Communist Party took power.
Finding that museum’s opposite—a site that symbolises the dark side of the police state—would not be a straightforward task. China has no direct equivalent of the Soviet-era KGB, meaning a secret-police agency with armies of officers. There is nothing in Beijing like the KGB’s Lubyanka building, a notorious city-centre prison whose name struck fear into Muscovite hearts. For all that, political protests against Communist Party rule are vanishingly rare. That is because the party has built the most capable surveillance state in history, argues “The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China”, a new book by Minxin Pei.
13. BOOK - The Sentinel State: Surveillance and the Survival of Dictatorship in China
Minxin Pei, Harvard University Press, 2024
COMMENT – I haven’t read Minxin’s latest book, but It is going in my Amazon cart.
Minxin’s main argument appears to be that instead of technology, it is the Party’s vast web of human resources that powers its Leninist authoritarian state.
14. Hong Kong: Governments Should Oppose Security Bill
Human Rights Watch, February 19, 2024
15. China Silences AI on Touchy Questions of Politics, History; Concerns AI Could Be Used for Indoctrination
Yomiuri Shimbun, February 20, 2024
16. Chinese companies revive Mao Zedong-era militias
Edward White, Financial Times, February 19, 2024
17. Strongmen Find New Ways to Abuse Interpol, Despite Years of Fixes
Jane Bradley, New York Times, February 20, 2024
The international police organization has toughened oversight of its protocols, which autocrats have used to pursue dissidents. But the autocrats have adapted.
18. Tipping Point? Germany and China in an Era of Zero-Sum Competition
Noah Barkin and Gregor Sebastian, Rhodium Group, February 15, 2024
19. US investors in emerging markets switch to ETFs that exclude China
Sun Yu, Financial Times, February 14, 2024
20. Russians use Chinese partner to produce Citroen cars at idled Stellantis plant
Gleb Stolyarov and Alexander Marrow, Reuters, February 14, 2024
Carmaker Stellantis halted production in Russia in April 2022.
But the decision did not stop Russian operators from joining forces with a Chinese partner the following year to start making new versions of Stellantis' Citroen models, according to customs data and two people familiar with the matter.
In December last year, Russian company Automotive Technologies imported at least 42 car kits for assembling the Citroёn C5 Aircross model at the Kaluga plant, which is still majority-owned by Stellantis, customs records drawn from a commercial trade data provider showed.
Environmental Harms
21. U.S. 'very concerned' about China's dominance as a critical minerals supplier, energy chief says
Sam Meredith, CNBC, February 14, 2024
22. Chinese fishing vessels are going scorched earth and pumping cyanide into contested waters, Philippine fishing authority says
Matthew Loh, Yahoo! News, February 19, 2024
The Philippines' fisheries bureau says China is trying to "intentionally destroy" Scarborough Shoal.
The fish-rich atoll is hotly contested by China but internationally recognized as the Philippines'.
The bureau on Saturday accused Chinese vessels of pumping cyanide into the shoal's waters.
The Philippines' fishing bureau has accused Chinese fishing vessels of using cyanide to destroy Scarborough Shoal, a fish-rich atoll in the South China Sea contested by both Manila and Beijing.
"These Chinese fishermen use cyanide," Nazario Briguera, a spokesperson for the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, said on Saturday, per a translation from Filipino by The Philippine Star.
Cyanide fishing is a controversial fishing method that typically involves dumping the highly toxic chemical near coral reefs or in fishing grounds to stun or kill fish so they can be easily captured.
It's widely condemned because it indiscriminately affects most marine species in the area, causes severe damage to aquatic ecosystems, and can make fish harmful to handle or eat.
But Brigeura accused the Chinese fishermen of using cyanide to also "intentionally destroy Bajo de Masinloc to prevent Filipino fishing boats to fish in the area," The Philippine Star noted. Bajo de Masinloc is the Spanish name for Scarborough Shoal.
The spokesperson estimated that the alleged use of cyanide would result in about $17,850,000 in damages to the region, the outlet reported.
The bureau said it hadn't conducted a formal study of the total damage but said it was a "serious concern," The Philippine Star reported.
COMMENT – Looks like a good case for the International Court of Justice to take up.
23. African donkey trade ban to slash China’s supply of traditional medicine ejiao
Jevans Nyabiage, South China Morning Post, February 20, 2024
24. World’s biggest solar company warns west not to cut out Chinese suppliers
Edward White, Financial Times, February 14, 2024
25. Chinese Communist Party-linked green energy firm receiving $200M in taxpayer funding begins razing trees in Michigan
Thomas Catenacci, New York Post, February 16, 2024
26. Beijing could plunder more than $100bn in US green energy incentives
Miles Dilworth, Daily Mail, February 18, 2024
Foreign Interference and Coercion
27. India's Modi woos UAE and Qatar to counter China in Middle East
Shuntaro Fukutomi and Satoshi Iwaki, Nikkei Asia, February 15, 2024
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has embarked on a trip to the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, seeking to increase economic cooperation and bolster ties in the Middle East as China expands its influence there.
Modi met with UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi on Tuesday. This was Modi's seventh trip to the UAE since taking office in 2014, and his third in eight months.
28. A strategy to counter malign Chinese and Russian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean
Matthew Kroenig, Jason Marczak, and Jeffrey Cimmino, Atlantic Council, February 12, 2024
29. What the Red Sea Crisis Reveals About China’s Middle East Strategy
Jon B. Alterman, Foreign Policy, February 21, 2024
30. India-China Relations Are Unlikely to See Much Progress
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, China Power, February 15, 2024
India-China relations are unlikely to see much progress in the coming year. Tensions between the two countries increased dramatically after a clash along their disputed border in 2020. Despite more than a dozen rounds of talks since then, there has been no resolution and only minor progress. While it may not be in the interests of either India or China to let the situation escalate, the risk is real.
There are several reasons for the intense dispute between the two Asian giants. One is the worsening balance of power between the two countries, which increases Indian insecurity. India is an emerging power with a fast-growing economy, but China’s rise has been far more impressive and consequential. That China has been able to bring its vast economic resources and influence to bear at both the regional level and even globally has put great pressure on India.
This political pressure has been wielded by Beijing against India at a number of points. For example, China scuttled India’s application for membership to the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG), despite a personal appeal from Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China’s leader Xi Jinping. India has been seeking membership to the NSG, a nuclear technology control regime, for several years as part of its efforts to integrate with the global non-proliferation architecture.1 Similarly, China has repeatedly used its influence to block India’s proposals to place individuals in Pakistan wanted by India on terror charges on a United Nations watchlist.
Beyond such political pressure, the growing imbalance also matters in relative military power. U.S.-China competition means that China’s military power is growing fast. For example, China has concurrently developed two stealth fighter planes, making it the only country other than the United States to do so.2 For a long time, India was proud to be the only Asian country operating aircraft carriers, but China now has two operational carriers, and its new class of aircraft carrier has nearly twice the displacement of India’s. Beijing is also building naval vessels at a pace that India cannot match. Sooner than later, these carriers will likely begin to operate in waters closer to India. Although India has not made any official public comment yet, China’s recent and unprecedented nuclear weapon expansion will also likely begin to gnaw at India’s deterrent force.
31. Chinese Influence Campaign Pushes Disunity Before U.S. Election, Study Says
Tiffany Hsu, New York Times, February 15, 2024
A long-running network of accounts, known as Spamouflage, is using A.I.-generated images to amplify negative narratives involving the presidential race.
A Chinese influence campaign that has tried for years to boost Beijing’s interests is now using artificial intelligence and a network of social media accounts to amplify American discontent and division ahead of the U.S. presidential election, according to a new report.
The campaign, known as Spamouflage, hopes to breed disenchantment among voters by maligning the United States as rife with urban decay, homelessness, fentanyl abuse, gun violence and crumbling infrastructure, according to the report, which was published on Thursday by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a nonprofit research organization in London.
An added aim, the report said, is to convince international audiences that the United States is in a state of chaos.
Artificially generated images, some of them also edited with tools like Photoshop, have pushed the idea that the November vote will damage and potentially destroy the country.
One post on X that said “American partisan divisions” had an image showing President Biden and former President Donald J. Trump aggressively crossing fiery spears under this text: “INFIGHTING INTENSIFIES.” Other images featured the two men facing off, cracks in the White House or the Statue of Liberty, and terminology like “CIVIL WAR,” “INTERNAL STRIFE” and “THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.”
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
32. Genetics journal retracts 18 papers from China due to human rights concerns
Amy Hawkins, The Guardian, February 15, 2024
33. Australian writer Yang Hengjun won't appeal suspended death sentence in China
Kirsty Needham, Reuters, February 20, 2024
34. Volkswagen Under Pressure to Ditch Its China Joint Venture as U.S. Impounds Vehicles
William Boston and Bertrand Benoit, Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2024
35. US Porsche, Bentley and Audi imports held up over banned Chinese part
Peter Campbell, Demetri Sevastopulo, and Patricia Nilsson, Financial Times, February 14, 2024
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
36. Thailand Weighs Tax on Cheap Chinese Goods Hurting Local Firms
Pathom Sangwongwanich, Bloomberg, February 15, 2024
37. China’s seed industry at least a generation behind as Western giants enter ‘Industry 4.0 Era’, must increase collaboration
Mia Nulimaimaiti, South China Morning Post, February 8, 2024
38. Youth unemployment in China: New metric, same mess
Nicole Goldin, Atlantic Council, February 16, 2024
39. China’s foreign firms grapple with upward mobility in post-Covid era as state-owned peers rise
Frank Chen, South China Morning Post, February 15, 2024
40. As Chinese scramble to save money, ‘everyone realises winter has come’, and they’re trying to get out of the cold
Mandy Zuo, South China Morning Post, February 16, 2024
After carefully reviewing the interest rates that several banks were offering for lump-sum term deposits, Li Yuan put 200,000 yuan (US$27,800) in a small local institution, ensuring that her hard-earned savings would see an annual return of 3.2 per cent for three years.
This marked the second year she has done so. And her carefully weighed investment decisions are being made as traditional means of investment in China have largely fallen by the wayside on the nation’s road to a stable economic recovery in uncertain times.
“I started planning to save for my son last year,” said the mother of a toddler in the northern province of Hebei. “There’s no big reward in bank deposits, but at least they’re predictable.
“The real estate market is bad, and so is the stock market. Even wealth-management products can’t guarantee a positive return.”
Li, who owns a small business and considers herself fortunate that it survived the pandemic, is among the millions of members of China’s middle class who have been left scratching their heads as they search for moneymaking investments that don’t come with outsized risk.
41. Hong Kong stock market has weak start to the Year of the Dragon
Kenji Kawase, Nikkei Asia, February 14, 2024
42. Japan's nominal GDP outgrows China's for first time in 46 years
Yohei Matsuo and Kenji Kawase, Nikkei Asia, February 16, 2024
43. Penfolds Maker to Divert Wines to China Should Tariffs End
Keira Wright, Bloomberg, February 14, 2024
44. Ford Sees ‘Colossal’ Competitive Threat in Low-Cost Chinese EVs
Keith Naughton, Bloomberg, February 14, 2024
45. Why the world’s mining companies are so stingy
The Economist, February 18, 2024
46. China is warily eyeing the US and EU’s pursuit of “collective economic security”
Mary Hui, Quartz, February 15, 2024
Last month, the US-EU Trade and Technology Council — a forum focused on deepening transatlantic cooperation on things like supply chains, export controls, and tech standards — held bilateral talks in Washington, DC.
The US’s statement following the meetings noted that top American officials “stressed the importance of fortifying our collective economic security, including by further de-risking and diversifying of our economies.”
While China was not explicitly named in the statement, the country invariably looms over any discussion of economic security. Notably, there was no mention of decoupling — a phrase that US officials have sought to distance themselves from in favor of de-risking. But Beijing’s ears did perk up at “collective economic security.”
New(ish) phrase, same gist
The phrase “collective economic security,” as used in the context of the west’s attempt to reduce reliance on China, is not new. In December 2022, G7 leaders pledged to “strengthen our collective economic security to external shocks and wider risks.” Last May, British prime minister Rishi Sunak said that “[the G7's] collective economic security matters now more than ever.” And in a September visit to Seoul, US deputy secretary of commerce emphasized the importance of protecting the “collective economic security of our allies, including Korea.”
But of late, the phrase has been increasingly picked up in Chinese-language press coverage and analyses. Last week, a researcher at China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a prominent think tank affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of State Security, wrote in a widely circulated op-ed criticizing the US and EU’s pursuit of collective economic security, which he called a “false proposition.”
“[A]lthough the United States advocates ‘collective economic security’ to safeguard so-called common interests, it nakedly pursues its own self-interest in economic policy coordination involving Europe, enlarging its own country’s pie at the expense of others,” Dong Yifan wrote in the state-owned tabloid Huanqiu.
Separately, the CICIR last month published a report looking at global strategy and security risks in the year ahead. The report noted intensifying geopolitical competition that is reshaping global trade and production flows, highlighting what it sees as Washington’s attempts to “weaponize” the global economy under the banners of “nearshoring,” “friendshoring,” “de-risking,” “minilateral supply chain alliances” — and yes, “collective economic security.”
47. Silicon Valley Should Carefully Assess Its AI and Semiconductor Dealings in the Middle East
James Goodrich, CSIS, February 21, 2024
48. China's biggest banks are finally getting scared by the West's sanctions against Russia
Huileng Tan, Business Insider, February 20, 2024
49. To Avoid Hefty Tariffs, China’s BYD Eyes U.S. Car Market Via Mexico
River Davis, Ryan Felton, and Selina Cheng, Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2024
50. China Revives Socialist Ideas to Fix Its Real-Estate Crisis
Lingling Wei and Stella Yifan Xie, Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2024
51. West challenges China's critical minerals hold on Africa
Andy Home, Reuters, February 18, 2024
52. Rubio urges SEC to block Shein IPO unless China operating risk disclosed
Katherine Masters, Reuters, February 15, 2024
53. What a Viral Post on Giraffes Says About China's Fed-Up Investors
Li Yuan, New York Times, February 15, 2024
As their losses pile up, Chinese investors are losing confidence not only in the stock market but in the government’s ability to turn the economy around.
Like many Chinese people, Jacky hoped that he could make enough money investing in China’s stock markets to help pay for an apartment in a big city. But in 2015 he lost $30,000, and in 2021 he lost $80,000. After that, he shut down his trading account and started investing in Chinese funds that track stocks in the United States.
It’s a perilous time for investors in China. Their main vehicle, so-called A shares of Chinese companies, fell more than 11 percent in 2023 and have continued their losses this year. Many investors have instead flocked to the exchange-traded funds that track foreign markets and that have been performing much better.
Putting money in stocks is inherently risky. But Chinese investors are experiencing something especially alarming: financial losses in the markets, declining home values and a government that doesn’t want any public discussion of what’s happening.
With their frustrations piling up, Chinese investors recently found a way to vent that wouldn’t be quickly censored. They started leaving comments on an innocuous post about giraffe conservation on the official Weibo social media account of the U.S. Embassy in China. They lamented the poor performance of their portfolios and revealed their broader despair, anger and frustration. The giraffe post has been liked nearly one million times since Feb. 2, much more than what the embassy’s Weibo posts usually get. Many of the comments also offered admiration for the United States, as well as unhappiness about their own country.
Cyber & Information Technology
54. Chinese Hackers Embedded in US Networks for at Least Five Years
Jamie Tarabay, Bloomberg, February 7, 2024
The Chinese state-sponsored hacking group known as Volt Typhoon has been living in the networks of some critical industries for “at least five years,” according to a joint cybersecurity advisory issued by the US and its allies on Wednesday.
The compromised environments are in the continental US and elsewhere, including Guam, the advisory said. It was published by US agencies and their security counterparts in Australia, Canada, the UK and New Zealand.
55. China Exerts Grip on Tech as Beijing Expands Economy Control
Yuan Gao, Bloomberg, February 19, 2024
56. Is quantum computing the next technology on the EU's regulation agenda?
Jonathan Keane, Euronews, January 30, 2024
57. Two Cases Aim to Cut Off China and Iran from U.S. Technology
Julian E. Barnes, New York Times, February 7, 2024
58. EU opens formal investigation into TikTok over possible online content breaches
Foo Yun Chee, Reuters, February 20, 2024
The European Union will investigate whether ByteDance's TikTok breached online content rules aimed at protecting children and ensuring transparent advertising, an official said on Monday, putting the social media platform at risk of a hefty fine.
EU industry chief Thierry Breton said he took the decision after analysing the short video app's risk assessment report and its replies to requests for information, confirming a Reuters story.
59. TikTok violates Indonesian in-app transactions ban, says minister
Reuters, February 19, 2024
Military and Security Threats
60. U.S. to Invest Billions to Replace China-Made Cranes at Nation’s Ports
Dustin Volz, Gordon Lubold, and Doug Cameron, Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2024
The Biden administration plans to invest billions in the domestic manufacturing of cargo cranes, seeking to counter fears that the prevalent use of China-built cranes with advanced software at many U.S. ports poses a potential national-security risk.
The move is part of a set of actions taken by the administration Wednesday that is intended to improve maritime cybersecurity. They include a U.S. Coast Guard directive to mandate certain digital-security requirements for deployed foreign-built cranes at strategic seaports, as well as an executive order by President Biden setting baseline cybersecurity standards for computer networks that operate U.S. ports.
Administration officials said more than $20 billion would be invested in port security, including domestic cargo-crane production, over the next five years. The money, tapped from the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure bill passed in 2021, would support a U.S. subsidiary of Mitsui, a Japanese company, to produce the cranes, which officials said would be the first time in 30 years that they would be built domestically.
“We felt there was real strategic risk here,” said Anne Neuberger, U.S. deputy national security adviser for cyber and emerging technology. “These cranes, because they are essentially moving the large-scale containers in and out of port, if they were encrypted in a criminal attack, or rented or operated by an adversary, that could have real impact on our economy’s movement of goods and our military’s movement of goods through ports.”
61. Biden cracks down on port cyber threats, with an eye on China
Morgan Chalfant, Semafor, February 21, 2024
62. VIDEO – The risks of simultaneous conflicts in the Indo-Pacific
Atlantic Council, February 13, 2024
63. Does the US Army’s future lie in Europe or Asia?
The Economist, February 19, 2024
64. Navy envisions ‘hundreds of thousands’ of drones in the Pacific to deter China
Patrick Tucker, Defense One, February 16, 2024
65. Why Space Force is growing more alarmed by China’s eyes in the sky
Sandra Erwin, Space News, February 16, 2024
As China expands its presence in orbit, the U.S. Space Force continues to express concern about Beijing’s advancing satellite capabilities. The latest cause for alarm is China’s deployment of imaging satellites in geostationary orbit.
China, to be sure, has operated optical imaging satellites in GEO for nearly a decade. Still, the capabilities of these earlier satellites are limited compared to China’s latest additions in 2023.
One that has caught the Space Force’s attention is an advanced optical imaging satellite launched in December, Yaogan-41. With an estimated resolution of 2.5 meters, it brings a significant improvement over previous GEO optical satellites capped at 15-meter resolution. This level of visual fidelity would allow China to spot vehicles, aircraft, and vessels across wide regions.
Another is a GEO-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging satellite, Ludi Tance-4, that can see through clouds and darkness. Paired with the optical resolution of Yaogan-41, China now potentially has persistent visual and radar surveillance over strategically important areas like the Indo-Pacific.
66. Hal Brands on the Looming Threat of Global Conflict
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, and Hal Brands, CNAS, February 16, 2024
67. FBI warns Chinese malware could threaten critical US infrastructure
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, February 18, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
68. Roads, Copper, and Cobalt: DRC and China Strike New Mega Deal
Alex Stonor, Geopolitical Monitor, February 13, 2024
In early February, China’s Sinohydro Corp and China Railway Group inked a $7 billion deal in infrastructure projects in the DRC. Beyond setting the stage for the construction of 7,000 kilometers of roads in the coming two decades, the agreement was related to their Sicomines copper and cobalt joint venture. Both parties have agreed to maintain the existing shareholding structure, with the Chinese partners committing to pay 1.2% of royalties annually to the DRC, as outlined in a recent statement.
The agreement stems from a deal struck by the previous DRC government under President Joseph Kabila, whereby Chinese partners agreed to build infrastructure such as roads and hospitals in exchange for a 68% stake in the joint venture with the DRC’s state mining company, Gecamines. President Felix Tshisekedi’s government had been reviewing this agreement, and the Chinese partners initially committed to spending $3 billion on infrastructure projects. However, the state auditor, Inspection Generale des Finances (IGF), demanded an increase in this commitment to $20 billion.
Opinion Pieces
69. America’s Space War Vulnerability
Wall Street Journal, February 15, 2024
70. Why America Can’t Have It All
Stephen Wertheim, Foreign Affairs, February 14, 2024
71. Wyoming Hits the Rare-Earth Mother Lode
Michael Auslin, Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2024
72. Scared Strait
Foreign Affairs, February 20, 2024
73. What Putin and Xi Have in Common
Leon Aron, American Enterprise Institute, February 14, 2024
74. Year of the Dragon: navigating a multipolar world
Adriel Kasonta, Asia Times, February 15, 2024
75. Jason Matheny on Tech, National Security and China
Bob Davis, The Wire China, February 18, 2024
76. Why China Won't Fight the Houthis
Yun Sun, The Wire China, February 18, 2024
77. The German business dilemma in China
Patricia Nilsson, Financial Times, February 15, 2024
78. China's deflation problem won't go away by itself
William Pesek, Nikkei Asia, February 15, 2024
79. Houthi Red Sea crisis serves China’s main goal: undermining the US
Yun Sun, South China Morning Post, February 8, 2024
For China, the easiest and most politically convenient response to the current Middle East turmoil lies not in joining the US but blaming it
Beijing’s position of a two-state solution as a precondition to solving the Gaza crisis is unlikely to be realised, but it achieves the goal of undermining Washington.
Chinese policy in the Middle East is shaped by two factors: China’s threat perceptions and its strategic calculus regarding its great-power competition with the United States. And when it comes to dealing with the US, China’s approach comes down to three “noes”: no cooperation, no support and no confrontation. This credo underlies China’s decision not to push back against the Iran-backed Houthis as they carry out drone and missile attacks on Red Sea shipping lanes.
The Red Sea attacks – a response to Israel’s war against Hamas in Gaza – have not directly threatened Chinese ships, and the Houthis insist this will not change. Neither Chinese nor Russian vessels will be targeted, a senior Houthi official declared last month, as long as they are not connected with Israel. But the attacks will still affect China’s economic interests, and not only because of the need to avoid links with Israel. COSCO, China’s largest shipping conglomerate, has already been forced to suspend all shipping to Israel, owing to security concerns.
The identification of ships or their flag countries is not always straightforward, and shipping that affects China’s interests can still be targeted. But avoiding the area is costly. The Red Sea is one of the most sensitive choke points for world trade. If Chinese ships heading to Europe must circle around the Cape of Good Hope, rather than following the traditional route through the Suez Canal, a 26-day journey grows to 36 days and adds significantly to costs.
Longer shipping routes could also raise import prices, potentially fuelling inflation in China. If oil prices are affected, China’s economy – already in the doldrums – will come under even more pressure. More broadly, continued shipping disruptions will hamper China’s efforts to boost its economy by strengthening external trade.