Friends,
Just before the inauguration of President Trump, he spoke with Xi Jinping by phone. That call was followed up on Friday by one between Wang Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister, and the newly confirmed Secretary of State, Marco Rubio.
Rubio had spent the week hosting his Japanese, Australian, and Indian counterparts in the first multilateral event hosted by the Trump Administration: the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting in which the ministers agreed to elevate “security” on the Quad agenda. [hmmm… I wonder which country poses a security problem for Australia, Japan, India, and the United States]
Within minutes of concluding the call with Rubio, the PRC Foreign Ministry released their interpretation of the phone call, which ended with:
"I hope you will behave yourself and play a constructive role in the future of the people of China and the United States and in world peace and stability."
As Wang Yi said this, I can almost imagine the gentle instrumental of Booker T. & the M.G.’s song “Behave Yourself” playing in the background. The group’s use of the organ personifies Memphis soul and “Behave Yourself” was the first song they ever did together in 1962. The four musicians started jamming on a Sunday in the studio when their singer failed to show up. The owner of Stax Records heard the jam and wanted them to record it. They needed a B-side and came up with “Green Onions,” which will sound familiar to a lot of you.
Whether Wang Yi said “behave yourself” or not is irrelevant.
[Aside from letting me make a tenuous connection to ‘the Great American Songbook’… which is the alternative motivation of this newsletter… what would our civilization be without music?!?]
The press release captured what the PRC wanted its audience to believe. The wording conjures up visions of a teacher scolding a naughty student, a vibe that plays well with the Foreign Ministry’s principal the audience… the Paramount Leader, Xi Jinping.
The other important thing with the press release is that it asserts a “consensus.” This “consensus” is supposedly built on “principles of mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.”
Just as we saw following the Xi-Biden meeting in Bali, Indonesia (the “Bali Consensus”) and the Xi-Biden meeting in Woodside, California (the “Woodside Consensus”), Beijing is desperate to portray the leaders of the United States as sharing a consensus with Xi Jinping.
This creates a dynamic that should be exploited.
Beijing *needs* Washington to agree there is a consensus more than Washington needs that from Beijing. If Beijing wants to get investor and consumer confidence to recover (and put a floor under their worsening economic depression), then they need folks to believe that tensions between the PRC and the world’s wealthiest consumer market are improving.
But for Washington, the opposite is likely true.
If Washington wants greater investment in domestic manufacturing and industrial base growth, then it is important for folks to believe that Beijing will continue to face obstacles in exporting their goods to the United States… and that those conditions will get worse over time.
Much has been made that on Day 1, the Trump Administration did not impose tariffs on the PRC and *only* issued the Presidential Memorandum, “America First Trade Policy.” This is interpreted by some as a weakening of U.S. resolve. But of course, most of the tariffs imposed by the first Trump Administration are still in place and in many ways, the Biden Administration tighten the screws.
The new Administration has time to conduct careful analysis of what should be done next.
The Trade Policy Memorandum directs a number of actions on Day 1 of the Administration, that took months or years to initiate in the first Trump Administration.
Some examples:
1) USTR is directed to conduct an immediate evaluation of the Phase 1 trade deal and recommend appropriate actions. [As everyone knows, Beijing failed to fulfill its commitments under that agreement, so obviously a detailed evaluation will reveal that]
2) USTR is ordered to assess the Biden Administration’s latest report evaluating the 2018 Section 301 investigation of “Forced Technology Transfer” and recommend actions.
3) USTR is directed to initiate additional Section 301 investigations into “other acts, policies, and practices by the PRC that may be unreasonable or discriminatory and that may burden or restrict United States commerce, and shall make recommendations regarding appropriate responsive actions, including, but not limited to, actions authorized by section 2411 of title 19, United States Code.” [What is Section 2411 of Title 19 and what authority does that law grant, you might ask? Well it grants far reaching authorities to the U.S. Trade Representative and makes mandatory certain trade restrictions on countries that harm the United States… read more here]
4) USTR and the Commerce Department are directed to evaluate legislative proposals to withdraw Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the PRC and make recommendations.
5) The Secretary of Commerce is directed to assess the status of property rights (patents, copyrights, trademarks) conferred on PRC persons and entities and make recommendations to ensure reciprocal treatment.
6) The Secretary of Commerce and other relevant Departments are directed to assess the U.S. export control system and advise modifications for strategic adversaries or geopolitical rivals (aka the PRC) with the goal of maintaining and enhancing the U.S. technological edge, closing loopholes for adversaries/rivals, and incentivize compliance by other countries.
7) The Secretary of Commerce is directed to review and recommend changes to the rulemaking of the Office of Information and Communication Technology and Services (ICTS) on connected vehicles and consider expanding restrictions and controls to other connected products. [the entire ICTS regime was created by the first Trump Administration and expanded by the Biden Administration to hammer the PRC]
8) Directs the Treasury Secretary to evaluate the outbound investment screening regime and determine modifications.
9) Directs OMB to evaluate how foreign governments (aka the PRC) are distorting U.S. federal procurement programs.
10) Assess fentanyl flows and the nexus with the PRC, Mexico and Canada and make recommendations. [I suspect this will also touch the money-laundering that the PRC enables to aid illegal drug flows into the United States… 200 Americans die each day to this]
As I look at those requirements and understand what research has already been done on these topics (as well as some of the individuals who have been selected to conduct these tasks), and I’m left to conclude that things are going to get very, very rough for the PRC.
The Memorandum is written in such a way as to make clear that the PRC represents the most significant obstacle to carrying out the Administration’s trade and economic policies. It is framed broadly to cover the world, but countries other than the PRC appear to have viable pathways to avoid a showdown with the United States as long as they withdraw their support to Beijing.
It will take a few months to get these things done, to determine what screws to turn that will do the most damage to the PRC economy, while minimizing harm to the U.S. economy. But when they are done, the U.S. Government will have very broad powers to impose significant economic pain on the PRC economy… an economy that is NOT well positioned to absorb more pain.
I recommend keeping those 10 actions in mind and watching how things develop over the coming months.
Before we set aside the PRC Foreign Ministry’s read-out of the Wang Yi-Rubio phone call, I want to highlight a section that I find interesting:
“Wang Yi said that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the choice of the Chinese people. China's development has a clear historical logic and strong endogenous driving force.”
This points to something that CCP leaders are clearly sensitive about… and probably something we should dig into.
After a year of enormous political change across the world, the fact that the Chinese people clearly DON’T have a choice when it comes to the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is most glaring. One of the major themes is that COVID incumbent leaders have faced rebuke and have been driven from power… except in places like the PRC where citizens don’t have a choice.
It forces folks like Wang Yi to assert loudly what everyone knows to be untrue.
There is a Baghdad Bob sort of vibe with statements like this.
We all know that the Chinese people would probably choose different leadership IF they had a choice, but they don’t. This is why Xi Jinping is terrified of people like Jack Ma… the Chinese people admire him and believe he is competent at dealing with the problems facing China.
Which makes the second sentence about China’s development just as interesting.
As the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership continues to harm China’s development with mismanagement and corruption (Xi has been rooting out corruption for a dozen years and more CCP members are punished each year… see article #1), the “endogenous driving force” (aka the Chinese people) are bound to hold their leaders responsible.
In an effort to direct the ire of the Chinese people away from themselves, the Party is desperate to paint the United States as responsible for these problems. That may have worked when China was weak, but Xi and his cadres have assured the Chinese people that they are now strong. It is quite hard for the Party to deal with this contradiction and their failure to deal with these problems, further undermines the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.
Now is the time to be amplifying these contradictions and encouraging the Chinese people to hold their leaders accountable.
***
Last thing is the Tweet of the Week:
There has been a lot of hyperventilation this week over DeepSeek’s R1 AI model.
How Chinese A.I. Start-Up DeepSeek Is Competing with Silicon Valley Giants (New York Times)
How small Chinese AI start-up DeepSeek shocked Silicon Valley (Financial Times)
Silicon Valley Is Raving About a Made-in-China AI Model (WSJ)
Some present it as *proof* that export controls don’t work, but that seems to miss what have been the real obstacles that PRC companies face.
I encourage folks to listen to Jordan Schneider’s ChinaTalk podcast this week, “Emergency Pod: DeepSeek R1 and the Future of AI Competition with Miles Brundage.”
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Xi Tells Officials Scared of Being Purged: It’s OK to Make Mistakes
Chun Han Wong, Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2025
With China’s economy on the line and many bureaucrats too cowed to act, party enforcers vow to be lenient—when appropriate.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping is intensifying a war on corruption that has punished officials in record numbers—with the side effect of leaving many unwilling to act for fear of punishment.
To help his bureaucrats rediscover their mojo and revive a stagnating economy, Xi is also promoting the message that some mistakes are acceptable. His decree to the Communist Party: Enforcing strict discipline shouldn’t fuel a climate of fear that saps the can-do spirit that once helped power China’s economic rise.
The approach is to “combine strict control with loving care,” Xi has said, to “encourage cadres to forge ahead and be enterprising.”
To that end, Xi has ordered party enforcers to absolve blame for honest mistakes and rekindle entrepreneurial verve across the rank and file. The party elite approved a new economic plan that embedded Xi’s directive, dubbed the “Three Differentiates,” which calls for leniency for well-meaning officials who make innocent errors, and differentiating them from those who willfully break the rules.
Xi’s campaign seeks to tackle a key challenge in his top-down leadership of the world’s second-largest economy: how to wield decisive control over a vast, unwieldy bureaucracy without stifling the local dynamism that he says China needs to overcome deep-seated economic issues.
As part of the push for calibrated clemency, authorities have also pledged to curb false accusations against bureaucrats—a phenomenon that grew amid Xi’s purges—and encourage remorseful offenders to make amends by working harder. State media meanwhile called for reviving a sense of mission among officials who might otherwise stay passive to avoid trouble.
In the past two years, discipline inspectors have barreled through the worlds of finance, energy, healthcare, sports and defense—rounding up scores of high-ranking bureaucrats, bankers, executives and military officers. Some of those targeted had vanished for weeks, even months, before Beijing acknowledged the investigations.
State television profiled some of these cases this month in a four-part documentary series featuring confessional interviews with an ex-justice minister and a former provincial party boss who were purged for corruption. At its conclave this month, the CCDI said it would continue to repair systemic problems in sectors including finance, state enterprises, energy, healthcare and sports.
The task of figuring out the right balance between harshness and leniency falls to party enforcers, who have been publicizing cases where errant officials were punished lightly or spared.
In one example, according to an official account, enforcers gave clemency to a former township party chief who faced allegations of negligence for rushing into a project to improve the safety of the local water supply.
The project, in the northeastern province of Heilongjiang, didn’t result in financial losses and investigators found the official was contrite and hadn’t sought personal gain—meriting “criticism and education” in lieu of formal punishment.
Authorities also clamped down on false accusations. Between January and late December last year, Heilongjiang punished 137 people for framing officials and cleared the names of more than 1,100 party members who had been wrongly accused, the CCDI said.
One example cited in Shandong province involved a village party chief who cooked up corruption claims against officials from neighboring villages in an attempt to interfere with performance rankings, according to an official account.
As part of a nationwide effort to bring errant officials back into the fold, inspectors in the southern cities of Shenzhen and Shaoguan have been counseling thousands of “fallen cadres” who were disciplined by the party, with the aim of getting them to “stand up and start again,” according to Guangdong province’s disciplinary commission.
The party also ramped up efforts to curb bureaucratic inertia in May, when authorities disciplined roughly 10,600 people for offenses related to policy inaction, recklessness or deceit—an 80% jump from April and roughly 2.7 times the number from a year earlier, according to CCDI data. The numbers have continued to climb.
Bureaucratic passivity is one of the “challenges unique to major parties” that Xi says the Communist Party must overcome to stay in power. These challenges, he says, include questions about how the party can remain united, energetic and capable of getting things done.
Punishing people for doing stuff…
Punishing people for NOT doing stuff…
COMMENT – The perpetual purge of Chinese Communist Party members at all levels will have very negative outcomes over time.
While we don’t necessarily have direct evidence yet, I think we should rightly draw a positive correlation between these wide-ranging purges and the abysmal performance of the Chinese economy.
This is likely a vicious cycle in which the beatings will continue until morale improves.
I think we should recognize the reality that faces the PRC today: they are in their own “Depression.”
After a period of enormous industrial and economic expansion, with profits invested in speculation and unrealistic expectations of perpetual double-digit growth, the Chinese economy is reverting to the mean. Chinese citizens lack confidence that their expectations from a decade or two ago will be met, they worry that their children won’t have the opportunities they had, and they are worried that there is almost no safety net for them. And after the experience of the Party’s mismanagement of COVID and the crackdown on the most productive portions of the economy, Chinese citizens aren’t convinced that their leaders (the Chinese Communist Party) know how to get them out of this mess.
Will they be in the streets? Probably not as they are certain that the one thing the regime is really good at is domestic surveillance and crushing dissent.
Instead, Chinese citizens will grow more cynical and less confident.
Since they lack the political means to change their leaders, Chinese citizens are getting even more risk averse and cutting back on their spending, even as the Chinese Communist Party tries to turn things around by ramping up production. This creates overcapacity which Beijing dumps on to global markets causing third countries to erect barriers to Beijing’s beggar thy neighbor policies.
This creates the dynamic in which prices drop.
At first this sounds like a good thing… who doesn’t like cheaper prices. [This has been Xi Jinping’s refrain, saying that deflation is a good thing.]
[is this Xi’s ‘let them eat cake’ moment?]
But there is a problem with deflation because it means that wages drop while the cost of your debts goes up.
Individuals and entities that accumulated huge debts during the period of enormous expansion and COVID, find that those debts are even harder to pay with deflation. Which encourages individuals and entities to spend less today and tomorrow, so that they can service their expanding debts, further driving down prices and wages.
You almost couldn’t design a worse situation for a country to be in.
The best thing that could happen for the Chinese people is if they could dump their current leaders and bring in new ones who could make structural changes.
This is what Americans did in the 1932 election when we were in a similar situation. American voters ‘threw the bums out’ and brought in new leadership that could make structural changes to the American economy.
But of course, that is the absolute last thing the Chinese Communist Party would ever consider.
So, it looks like the Chinese people are stuck with the leaders who are the least capable of getting them out of this mess.
2. Anti-Americanism will remain the foundation of the PRC’s foreign policy
Charles Parton, Council on Geostrategy, January 23, 2025
Executive summary
Whatever policies Donald Trump, President of the United States (US), pursues towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will not make a difference to the long-term aim of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP aims to make the PRC the world’s most powerful country and to change global governance to better suit the CCP’s interests and values. The party sees this dethroning of the US as involving a long-term struggle against hostile forces. While the CCP has long harboured a suspicion of the US, putting this perceived ‘struggle’ with America centre stage is the work of Xi.
Crucial to effecting the CCP’s foreign policy is the strategy of the United Front Work Department (UFWD). Its essence is to identify the ‘main enemy’ and seek to move other parties from a position of amity or alliance with the main enemy to one of neutrality, or from a position of neutrality to the CCP’s side.
There are eight identifiable ways in which the CCP’s united front strategy is applied to its long-term goal:
Portraying Beijing as the leader of the so-called ‘Global South’. Xi and other leaders spend time meeting and cultivating relationships with the leaders of even the smallest countries. All have one vote in the United Nations (UN) and other international fora.
Reforming existing global governance structures to include an anti-US bias. The CCP supports the UN and other international organisations, but wants to reform them and change their values.
Building alternate structures. Beyond reforming international organisations, the CCP assiduously promotes the establishment of new ones with a different focus from bodies currently led by Euro-Atlantic nations. These organisations range from the BRICS gathering, to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the ten member Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Characterising the US as a menace on the world stage, in contrast to Beijing’s approach to foreign relations. This includes accusations of American bullying tactics and ‘cold war’ thinking, among many other claims.
Aligning with Russia and countries which oppose the US. The CCP works on the principle that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’.
Accusing the US of interference in regional affairs and of being an unreliable ally.
De-dollarisation. The CCP’s desire to move away from reliance on the US dollar as the main currency for trade and finance is long-standing and given added impetus by sanctions imposed on Russia.
Denigrating the US and its systems. The CCP uses its extensive propaganda machinery to weaken the appeal of the US to both domestic and international audiences. It portrays American democracy as seriously flawed, inferior to Beijing’s own ‘whole process people’s democracy’.
Relations between Beijing and Washington reached their nadir in the period from summer 2022 and November 2023. Xi and Joe Biden, former President of the US, had no calls or meetings in 12 months. Typical was a paper by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) from May 2023, which accused the US of using coercive diplomacy against developing countries, of violating the principles of fair trade, military pressure, intensifying division and antagonism in the international community, and a raft of other crimes.
The two countries’ leaders eventually met in November 2023 at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in San Francisco. High-level contacts and meetings were resumed, as well as some consultations on international and regional issues. But tensions, accusations and cancellations remain.
Wherever the unpredictability of Trump takes American policy – and the likelihood is that current policies on technology, tariffs, Taiwan and more will continue – the CCP’s united front strategy and the eight methods outlined in this report will continue to underpin CCP diplomacy.
Europe and the rest of the so-called ‘Global North’ will increasingly be forced to choose between the protagonists. In line with its united front strategy, the CCP will reinforce efforts to detach America’s allies from their traditional alignment. On the other side, Trump and his new close team are unlikely to tolerate an ambiguous stance from allies. For the UK in particular, with its close trade and investment links with the US, the importance of the Five Eyes grouping and of military ties, the direction of the choice is inevitable. Europe, too, is likely to be faced with unpleasant consequences if it does not make a clear choice. The idea that economic interests and national security can be kept separate is past its sell-by date.
COMMENT – I think framing the CCP’s grand strategy as “anti-Americanism” is broadly correct.
I’m certain that there are large swaths of Chinese citizens who don’t share this concept, they continue to harbor desires that their country could adopt elements of “Americanism.” How else to explain the continued migration of Chinese citizens.
But for the Party and its leadership, they know that the ideals that “Americanism” represents is an existential threat to their rule. Disparaging and undermining the United States becomes both a domestic and foreign policy imperative.
3. China Will Treat Foreign and Domestic Firms Equally, Vice Premier Tells Davos
Kelly Wang, Xu Heqian, Yue Yue, and Guan Cong, Caixin Global, January 23, 2025
Chinese Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang vowed that China will treat foreign-invested companies and domestic firms equally, in a show of the top leadership’s determination to reassure foreign investors.
Speaking at the World Economic Forum (WEF) Annual Meeting in the Swiss town of Davos on Tuesday, Ding emphasized the importance of continued reform and opening up, listing it as one of the major trends that characterize the Chinese economy.
COMMENT – If you believe this, I have a bridge to sell you in Shanghai… just Venmo me the cash and I’ll send you the title. I promise.
4. Trump Gives TikTok an Illegal Amnesty
The Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2025
The tech firms that host the app are putting their shareholders at risk by failing to comply with the law.
President Trump took the oath of office Monday promising to faithfully execute the duties of his office, which include implementing the laws passed by Congress. Yet in one of his first acts as President, Mr. Trump effectively suspended a law requiring TikTok to divest from its Chinese owner ByteDance by Jan. 19.
Mr. Trump issued an executive order on Monday promising not to enforce the law’s penalties against tech companies that host the TikTok app for 75 days. He said he needs this time to consult with advisers “on the national security concerns posed by TikTok, and to pursue a resolution” that saves the platform.
Congress spent years studying the security concerns and resolved them with the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which passed with large majorities last spring. The law lets the President grant a one-time 90-day reprieve from a ban if TikTok demonstrates “a path to executing a qualified divestiture,” “evidence of significant progress,” and “relevant legal agreements to enable” its execution.
None of these conditions have been met. Mike Waltz, Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, on Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation” cited interest in buying TikTok from investor Kevin O’Leary. But there is no formal offer and no interest in such a deal from ByteDance.
While challenging the law in court, TikTok rebuffed potential suitors. Beijing effectively blocked a deal by imposing export controls on its algorithms, which it treats as state secrets. After losing at the Supreme Court on Friday, TikTok and Beijing have shown a seeming openness to a deal. And Mr. Trump floated a “joint venture” in which the U.S. would have a 50% stake. It isn’t clear if he meant the U.S. government or private investors would own the American 50%. But it’s illegal either way.
The law precludes “the establishment or maintenance of any operational relationship” between TikTok’s U.S. operations “and any formerly affiliated entities” like ByteDance “that are controlled by a foreign adversary, including any cooperation with respect to the operation of a content recommendation algorithm or an agreement with respect to data sharing” (our emphasis).
In other words, TikTok must sever all ties with ByteDance and China. Mr. Trump can’t suspend laws like an English King before the 1689 Bill of Rights. It’s true that Barack Obama and Joe Biden refused to enforce some laws, but Mr. Trump just told the country he’s different.
Congress is a co-equal branch of government, not a subsidiary of the President. Members passed the law after finding that TikTok was collecting user data that would let Beijing spy on Americans.
Yet now he’s canoodling with CEO Shou Zi Chew, who was spotted at the inauguration next to Tulsi Gabbard, the President’s nominee for director of national intelligence, of all people. Talk about a horrible signal. Mr. Trump is relaying that he puts pleasing China’s Xi Jinping above a law passed by Congress.
Mr. Trump also promised not to enforce the law’s penalties on tech firms that carry TikTok, which can reach up to $850 billion. He directed his Attorney General “to issue a letter” granting broad immunity to providers that continue hosting TikTok. But Mr. Trump can’t rewrite the law by decree, and such a letter wouldn’t excuse companies like Apple, Google and Oracle from complying.
Arkansas Sen. Tom Cotton warned Sunday that “any company that hosts, distributes, services, or otherwise facilitates communist-controlled TikTok could face hundreds of billions of dollars of ruinous liability under the law.” He’s right. State Attorneys General could sue tech companies for putting their citizens’ data at risk. Shareholders could sue the companies for risking ruinous penalties if they fail to comply with law.
Mr. Trump directed his AG to “defend the Executive’s exclusive authority to enforce the Act.” But the Justice Department can’t stop others from suing. Mr. Trump’s TikTok order shows a Biden-like disdain for limits on his power that doesn’t bode well for the next four years.
COMMENT – President Trump is wrong to provide this lifeline to ByteDance and his whataboutism undermines U.S. national security.
5. Censorship Creeps Up on “TikTok Refugees” Fleeing to Chinese App Xiaohongshu
Arthur Kaufman, China Digital Times, January 16, 2025
Pending a Supreme Court ruling, the U.S. government’s crackdown on TikTok might end the app’s availability in U.S. app stores this weekend. The looming ban has prompted American users to seek a new home in another Chinese app, Xiaohongshu, also known as RedNote. Nearly three million “TikTok refugees” downloaded RedNote in just one day, pushing it to the top of the list of most downloaded apps in the U.S. Duolingo also reported a 216 percent spike in U.S. users learning Mandarin Chinese.
Part of the “refugees’” motivations for joining RedNote include protesting the U.S. government’s attempts to block their access to TikTok, but Chinese apps of course come with their own heavy dose of restrictions. Yaling Jiang summarized the dilemma brought about by this unexpected turn of events: “The hodgepodge of Western and Chinese users within the ‘Great Firewall’ has created unprecedented regulatory problems that have never been dealt with by either China or the U.S.” Kinling Lo and Viola Zhou at Rest of World described how the presence of American users on RedNote is an existential challenge for the platform’s censors:
Xiaohongshu’s censorship system is likely being greatly challenged, Eric Liu, a former content moderator for Weibo and currently a U.S.-based editor with China Digital Times, told Rest of World.
“The fact that Americans are using Xiaohongshu is already [stepping] on the red line,” Liu said. “This is something that will not be able to last because Americans don’t practice self-censorship.” To comply with Chinese law, the app may need to create a wall between domestic and foreign users, as ByteDance has done with TikTok and Douyin, he added.
[…] “The platform needs to figure out how global it wants to be, how it wants to position itself, and what its globalization or internationalization development plan is in the next few years,” said [Sheng Zou, an assistant professor at the School of Communication of Hong Kong Baptist University], who researches social media and popular culture. [Source]
A straightforward crackdown on the new arrivals may not be inevitable. The Pekingnology newsletter highlighted comments from former Global Times editor Hu Xijin, who argued: "This development should not be viewed primarily as a risk but as a rare opportunity [….] Retaining this wave of refugees is worth our careful consideration and effort." Blogger Xiang Dongliang wrote on Thursday that, based on signals from state media, he had downgraded his confidence in Xiaohongshu launching a separate American or international version of the app (that would exclude China-based users) from 98% to 80%, but he also noted that these probabilities were far from definitive.
COMMENT – In a development that should surprise no one, users who moved to other PRC apps found their speech being restricted and their feeds conforming with Chinese Communist Party guidance.
6. American TikTokers Get a Taste of Chinese Censorship as They Rush to RedNote
Shen Lu, Hannah Miao, and Raffaele Huang, Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2025
Users looking for a TikTok alternative learn about daily life in China, but some posts are taboo.
It took only about a day for Chinese censors to crack down on posts from Americans who had flooded onto the Chinese social-media app Xiaohongshu.
American TikTok users started downloading Xiaohongshu, which translates as Little Red Book and is known to Americans as RedNote, a little more than a week ago when it looked like TikTok might face a ban in the U.S. Their arrival was greeted by Chinese users and opened an unexpected window for free exchange. American and Chinese Xiaohongshu users have swapped recipes, showed off their homes and compared salaries.
Early last week, officials from China’s top internet regulator told Xiaohongshu to keep a close watch on interactions between Chinese and foreign users and intervene if necessary, according to people familiar with the discussions. The Cyberspace Administration of China asked Xiaohongshu to filter topics that Beijing deems sensitive, including China’s domestic politics, the people said.
7. Xi and Putin discuss relations with Trump, Ukraine and Taiwan
Dmitry Antonov, Guy Faulconbridge, and Liz Lee, Reuters, January 21, 2025
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed on Tuesday how to build ties with Donald Trump, prospects for a peace deal to end the war in Ukraine and Moscow's firm support for Beijing's position on Taiwan.
Xi and Putin, who spoke for an hour and 35 minutes by video call after Trump was sworn in as U.S. president on Monday, proposed a further deepening of the strategic partnership between their countries which worries the West.
China and Russia declared a "no limits" partnership in February 2022 when Putin visited Beijing, days before he sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine. Putin has in recent months described China as an "ally".
Putin, 72, speaking from his Novo-Ogarevo residency outside Moscow and Xi, 71, speaking from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, called each other "dear friends", and Xi told Putin about a call with Trump on Friday on TikTok, trade and Taiwan.
Xi and Putin "have indicated a willingness to build relations with the United States on a mutually beneficial, mutually respectful basis, if the Trump team really shows interest in this," Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov told reporters in Moscow. "It was also noted from our side that we are ready for dialogue with the new U.S. administration on the Ukrainian conflict."
Ushakov said Putin wanted long-term peace in Ukraine, not a short-term ceasefire, but any deal must take into account Russia's interests. No specific proposals for a call with Trump have been received, he said.
Trump has said he will be tough on China and speak to Putin about ending the war in Ukraine. In remarks to reporters after his inauguration, Trump said Putin should make a deal to end the war because the conflict was destroying Russia.
Xi has called for talks to end the war in Ukraine and has accused the U.S. of stoking the war with weapons supplies to Kyiv, which says it is ready to seek a negotiated solution that respects its interests.
"The relationship between Xi’s China and Putin’s Russia is 'the most significant undeclared alliance in the world'," said Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University, who wrote a 2023 paper of the same title, opens new tab.
"Xi will play a decisive role in the early end of the war in Ukraine that Trump has promised - and that I’m betting will happen."
WORLD VIEW
Trump has described Xi as "a good poker player" and said he got along "great" with Putin, but that during his first term he had warned the Russian leader that the U.S. could strike Moscow if Moscow went further in Ukraine.
Putin and Xi share a broad world view, which portrays the West as decadent and in decline as China challenges U.S. supremacy in many areas.
"We jointly advocate building a more just multi-polar world order, and we are working in the interests of ensuring indivisible security in the Eurasian space and in the world as a whole," Putin said.
Ushakov said the Putin-Xi video call had been planned before Trump's inauguration.
The U.S. casts China as its biggest competitor and Russia as its biggest nation-state threat.
China is the largest consumer of Russian energy, and the biggest single oil export market for Russia, Putin said, adding that they would push ahead with cooperation on cooperating on fast neutron reactors and reprocessing nuclear fuel.
On Taiwan, Ushakov said Russia had "confirmed its unwavering position of support for the one-China principle."
China regards democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory and Xi said in a New Year's speech that no one could stop China's "reunification" with Taiwan.
Taiwan's government rejects Beijing's claims. It says only its people can decide their future and Beijing ought to respect the choice of the Taiwanese people.
COMMENT – With Putin aged 72 and Xi aged 71, I think we should assume that the two will remain in close strategic alignment for the rest of their lives in power (let’s assume a decade or out to 2035).
Given that dynamic, we should call it what it is: the Sino-Russian Alliance.
Putin and Xi spent the last dozen years building a relationship and a common world view. They see themselves in an existential struggle with the ‘Global West’ and they see that their rivals are both divided AND in denial about the geopolitical situation. This makes them optimistic even as they recognize the challenges, they face both domestically and internationally.
These conditions are unlikely to change until one or both leaders leave the stage.
To date, we have been unable to drive a wedge between Beijing and Moscow. We have downplayed the significance of their Alliance to make ourselves feel good and to avoid internalizing the gravity of what their alliance means to our security.
Like the Fox in Aesop’s Fables, we speak disparagingly of the Sino-Russian relationship and dismiss it as not really an alliance.
We should be doing the opposite.
We should take their alliance seriously and plan accordingly.
The Bureau, January 23, 2025
She calls herself “Chinaloa.” Born in Guangdong Province in 1986, her parents labored in a factory 400 kilometers from home, unable to share in the miracle of China’s economic rise. Seeking a better future, they secured labor visas and migrated to Mexico in late 2000, taking jobs in a relative’s restaurant. Remarkably, by the next decade, their daughter, Qiyun “Chinaloa” Chen, had risen to the ranks of elite money brokers, facilitating cocaine and fentanyl operations across the Western Hemisphere.
For enemies and allies alike—Chinaloa—the moniker she used in encrypted WeChat texts—fuses two worlds: Chinese money laundering and the narco-terror of Mexico’s Sinaloa and Jalisco Nueva Generación Cartels. Few outside elite law enforcement circles, however, understand that U.S. intelligence views Chinese gangsters with suspected Communist Party affiliations as intrinsically connected to the brutal Mexican cartels in counter-narcotics investigations, ultimately posing greater threats to American borders and sovereignty.
Yet the story of “Chinaloa” Chen, a Chinese migrant who brought together 14K Triad money launderers and a feared matriarch of Sinaloa nicknamed the “Iron Lady,” sits squarely at the center of what President Donald Trump now calls an unprecedented crackdown on drug trafficking and illegal migration. Within hours of returning to the Oval Office, Trump signed a series of executive orders that promise to designate certain cartels and criminal groups as terrorists, invoke the Alien Enemies Act to remove them, and mobilize the U.S. military for reinforced border security. His new hard line aims to eradicate cartel influence in fentanyl, human trafficking, illegal immigration, and border threats, imposing punitive measures on nations Trump accuses of complicity—China, Mexico, Canada, Panama, and beyond.
COMMENT – I expect the nexus highlighted in this Substack post to receive a lot more attention.
Authoritarianism
9. Explainer: What is the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute and why was it raided by national security police?
Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, January 18, 2025
Polls conducted by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI) are among the few remaining indicators of public sentiment in post-security law Hong Kong, where large-scale protests have disappeared and many advocacy groups have disbanded.
The Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI) made headlines after its office was raided on Monday and its CEO and president, Robert Chung, and two other staff members were taken to a police station to assist in a national security investigation.
The developments came weeks after police issued arrest warrants and a HK$1 million bounty last month for six people living overseas, including Chung Kim-wah, a social scientist who was PORI’s deputy chief executive officer. Chung Kim-wah was accused of inciting secession and colluding with a foreign country, both offences under the national security law.
Chung Kim-wah, a former assistant professor in social sciences at the Hong Kong Polytechnic University, announced in April 2022 that he had left the city for the UK. He called Hong Kong a place where one may “no longer live normally and without intimidation,” and finished his contract with PORI later that month.
After police issued the arrest warrants, Robert Chung said PORI would be unaffected. Secretary for Security Chris Tang said on Monday, after the pollster’s office was raided, that the case’s investigation has nothing to do with PORI.
With dozens of civil society groups disbanded and large-scale protests disappearing since Beijing imposed a national security law, PORI’s polls are among the few remaining indicators of the public’s views on societal issues.
COMMENT – Nothing screams paranoia quite like raiding the offices of a public opinion polling firms that reveals inconvenient truths.
10. Wife and son of wanted ex-pollster questioned by Hong Kong national security police – reports
Hans Tse, Hong Kong Free Press, January 14, 2025
11. Ships carrying missile propellant ingredients set to sail from China to Iran, say officials
Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, January 22, 2025
12. Chinese politics enters a potentially stormy year
Katsuji Nakazawa, Nikkei Asia, January 16, 2025
Xi Jinping loyalists reject the silent majority's calls for a new policy direction.
13. TikTok, RedNote and the Crushed Promise of the Chinese Internet
Li Yuan, New York Times, January 20, 2025
China’s internet companies and their hard-working, resourceful professionals make world-class products, in spite of censorship and malign neglect by Beijing.
14. Trump’s foreign policy is all about China
James Woudhuysen, Spiked, January 21, 2025
15. Ten Years After Umbrella Protests: What has changed for Hongkongers?
Yasemin Yam, Global Voices, January 18, 2025
16. Big drop in internal investigations into China’s corruption busters in 2024
William Zheng, South China Morning Post, January 22, 2025
17. China Moves to Stall Apple, BYD Production Shifts in Asia
Sankalp Phartiyal, Shruti Srivastava, and Debby Wu, Bloomberg, January 17, 2025
18. The Quad foreign ministers joint statement: short and sweet
Euan Graham, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, January 22, 2025
19. China Sees a Fresh Decline in Population, Despite a Rise in Births
Liyan Qi, Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2025
20. Unplug ‘Great Firewall’ to help China compete, Shanghai lawmaker says
William Zheng, South China Morning Post, January 17, 2025
21. China hits back at US curbs with multifront probes into American firms
Sylvia Ma, Luna Sun, and Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, January 16, 2025
22. Biden Made a Global Push to Constrain China. What Will Trump Do?
Edward Wong, New York Times, January 19, 2025
President Biden emphasized alliances to counter China, focusing on deterrence and technology restrictions. As Trump takes office, he signals a more transactional approach, including potential tariffs and trade deal revisions, while praising Xi Jinping. Biden's policies strengthened U.S. ties in Asia and Europe but heightened tensions with Beijing, particularly on Taiwan and semiconductor controls. Critics argue this provoked China’s innovation push. Trump’s direction remains uncertain, with possibilities ranging from closer economic ties to heightened competition, reflecting ongoing challenges in managing U.S.-China relations.
Environmental Harms
23. China’s Self-Reliance Push Hampers Trump-Pleasing Energy Deals
Bloomberg, January 20, 2025
24. Cattle Gallstones, Worth Twice as Much as Gold, Drive a Global Smuggling Frenzy
Samantha Pearson, Wall Street Journal, January 19, 2025
25. Chinese fishing firm tied to IUU allegations nearing completion on Ghana fishing port project
Mark Godfrey, Seafood Source, January 21, 2025
Chinese fishing firm Rongcheng Ocean Fisheries Co. is nearing completion on a CNY 150 million (USD 21 million, EUR 19.5 million) fishing port project in the West African nation of Ghana, despite allegations that the firm has engaged in illegal fishing practices in the country’s waters.
The municipal government of Weihai, a major aquaculture and fish-processing hub where Rongcheng Fisheries is headquartered, announced the update at a 18 December press conference, highlighting it as an example of China’s continued efforts to develop infrastructure and partnerships with nations across Africa.
Foreign Interference and Coercion
26. German TikTokers like China, Russia more, poll shows
Thomas Escritt, Reuters, January 20, 2025
Germans who get their news through TikTok are less likely to see China as a dictatorship, be less critical of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and be more sceptical about climate change and the utility of vaccines than consumers of other media.
The findings, in a poll by Allensbach for a foundation linked to Germany's liberal, pro-business Free Democrats, showed that only users of Elon Musk's platform X came close to the same propensity for believing in conspiracy theories as TikTok users.
27. EU should welcome Chinese car factories, says Mercedes chief
Andrew Bounds and Kana Inagaki, Financial Times, January 18, 2025
28. Dutch government excludes most ASML sales to China from 'dual use' export data
Toby Sterling, Reuters, January 17, 2025
The Dutch government excludes billions of euros of sales by technology company ASML to China from disclosures on sensitive goods exports, it has told Reuters, following a policy decision that has not been previously reported.
The move is of interest because disclosure of exports of "dual use" goods with potential military applications had previously been routine in the Netherlands, and experts who rely on public data to understand states' military capabilities, including parliament, may no longer have the full picture.
29. Elon, I love you. Signed, China
Tuvia Gering, Discourse Power, January 23, 2025
Today’s Discourse Power features an investigation by me and my colleagues at Planet Nine’s Digital Intelligence Team (DIT). Last month, PRC diplomat Zhang Heqing, known for his wolf warrior outbursts and pro-CCP disinformation on X, updated his bio to "Inspector of X." Soon after, his account began posting AI-generated cultish praise for billionaire Elon Musk, now a key ally of President Donald Trump. The article explores how Musk’s growing influence in US politics, media, and business makes him an ideal conduit for Beijing’s global influence.
30. Trump sees a new threat on the Mexican border. It’s called China.
Mary Beth Sheridan, Washington Post, January 18, 2025
31. Philippines arrests Chinese national on suspicion of espionage
Reuters, January 20, 2025
32. ‘We’ll be surprised’ by US-China improvements, Harvard scholar argues in Davos
Frank Chen, South China Morning Post, January 21, 2025
Graham Allison bucks a trend among analysts warning of worsening ties between the world’s biggest economies, and he does not see Donald Trump as a China hawk.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House could bring about a surprising improvement in US-China ties, including in trade, a prominent American scholar contended in Davos, adding that Trump may not even be categorised as a “China hawk”.
Instead of the widely discussed “trade war 2.0”, Graham Allison, a professor with the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, said during a panel discussion at the World Economic Forum on Tuesday that ties between the two superpowers could tick up.
“I’m betting this time next year … we’ll be surprised on the upside in the relationship,” said Allison, best known for his 2017 book, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?
COMMENT – Beijing’s talking points delivered by their favorite borrowed boat.
33. Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Marco Rubio, U.S. Department of State, January 15, 2025
34. Russia-China ties play a stabilising role in international affairs, Putin tells Xi
Reuters, January 21, 2025
35. Australia foreign minister says Quad in Washington shows 'iron-clad' commitment
Kirsty Needham, Reuters, January 19, 2025
36. China keen to engage as Gaza war halts, but will US-Israel ties hinder efforts?
Zhao Ziwen, South China Morning Post, January 22, 2025
37. UK and EU urged to follow US and block funding for World Anti-Doping Agency
Rob Draper, The Guardian, January 15, 2025
Pressure is intensifying on the World Anti-Doping Agency, with the UK and European Union being urged to stop funding the global body. It follows the US decision to withhold its financial backing over Wada’s handling of the 23 Chinese swimmers cleared to compete at the Olympics in 2021.
The shadow sports minister, Stuart Andrew, is calling on the government to follow the example of Joe Biden’s US administration and consider withholding funds if Wada cannot show full transparency over the China case.
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
38. Fearing Deportation, Uyghurs Held in Thailand Go on Hunger Strike
Sui-Lee Wee and Nyrola Elimä, New York Times, January 19, 2025
Christopher Knaus and Helen Davidson, The Guardian, January 19, 2025
Australia is allowing thousands of imports from Chinese companies blacklisted by the US over alleged links to forced Uyghur labour, including a supplier of parts to Sydney Metro vehicles, government documents have revealed.
In 2021 the Biden administration passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and from the following year began outlawing imports from dozens of companies, seizing shipments at the border and releasing a public blacklist of the companies, mostly operating in Xinjiang.
But far from following its ally’s lead, the Australian government has continued to wave through thousands of imports from US-blacklisted companies.
40. Guangdong, Shengja Church: Leaders Sentenced for “Illegal Business Operations”
Qi Junzao, Bitter Winter, January 22, 2025
41. Exams for Muslim Imams—on Xi Jinping’s Thought on Religion
Ma Wenyan, Bitter Winter, January 14, 2025
In Hunan, Hui imams should pass a test: but the main subject matters of the exam are the Secretary General’s speeches and the new regulations on religions.
42. Thailand denies it plans to send 48 Uyghurs held in detention centres back to China
Hong Kong Free Press, January 22, 2025
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
43. China shipbuilders boost capacity, cementing grip on industry
Kohei Fujimura, Nikkei Asia, January 17, 2025
From state giant to newcomer, players tap growing demand for cleaner-fuel vessels.
Chinese shipbuilders are rapidly expanding capacity to capture a surge in orders for more environmentally friendly vessels, though their growing lead in the industry has raised alarm in the U.S.
Construction of a new factory building and dormitory was underway at Hengli Group's shipyard in Dalian in mid-January, part of a 9.2 billion yuan ($1.25 billion) investment to expand the group's capacity for supertankers and ultralarge container ships by the end of 2025.
44. China’s economic need and soft diplomacy spur about-face on visa-free entry
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, January 21, 2025
45. An initiative so feared that China has stopped saying its name
The Economist, January 16, 2025
Like Lord Voldemort from Harry Potter, “Made in China 2025” is an initiative which induces so much fear and loathing abroad that Chinese officials dare not speak its name. The plan, introduced a decade ago, called for pouring money and resources into dozens of industries. The goal was to turn China into a green and innovative “manufacturing power”, one that relied less on labour and Western supply chains, and more on automation and new home-grown technologies. This was Xi Jinping’s vision for the Chinese economy.
46. Xi Dodges Early Trump Tariffs, Buying China Time to Influence US
Bloomberg, January 20, 2025
47. China's BYD, Haier and more expand in Thailand, eyeing new trade war
Kenya Akama, Nikkei Asia, January 19, 2025
48. China Faces Trump’s Return Just as Reliance on Exports Soars
Bloomberg, January 19, 2025
49. China Welcomes Back Hollywood Films in Bid to Boost Spending
Bloomberg, January 21, 2025
50. Trump says he's considering a 10% tariff on China beginning as soon as Feb. 1
Darla Mercado and Evelyn Cheng, CNBC, January 21, 2025
51. China's unfinished Country Garden homes leave buyers in the cold
Noriyuki Doi, Nikkei Asia, January 21, 2025
52. EU takes China to WTO over high-tech patent royalties
Reuters, January 20, 2025
The European Commission filed a complaint at the World Trade Organization on Monday against what it said was China's "unfair and illegal" practice of setting worldwide royalty rates for EU standard essential patents without the patent owner's consent.
The Commission, which oversees the trade policy of the 27-nation European Union, said China had empowered its courts to set worldwide rates for high-tech EU companies, notably in the telecoms sector.
53. Trump Says He Plans to Impose 10% Tariffs on Chinese Imports on Feb. 1
Alan Rappeport, New York Times, January 21, 2025
President Trump announced a 10% tariff on Chinese imports starting Feb. 1, citing China's role in the fentanyl crisis as the reason. This follows plans for 25% tariffs on Canada and Mexico for alleged drug and migrant flows. The move, building on existing tariffs from his first term, risks escalating trade tensions and invites retaliation. Economists warn it could increase inflation and harm economic growth. Meanwhile, Trump is pushing for renegotiations of trade deals like USMCA and China's fulfillment of past agricultural purchase commitments.
54. US Commerce Department Finalizes Rule on Connected Vehicles with Supply Chain Links to China and Russia
Tamer a. Soliman, Rajesh De, Adam S. Hickey, Stephen Lilley, Timothy J. Keeler, and Emily King, Mayer Brown, January 21, 2025
55. Panama Starts Audit of China-Linked Port Operator Amid Trump Takeover Threat
Li Rongqian and Wang Xintong, Caixin, January 22, 2025
56. Thailand's visa waiver for Chinese tourists under fire after string of crimes
Panarat Thepgumpanat and Chayut Setboonsarng, Reuters, January 21, 2025
57. How China pushes to fly home-grown COMAC jets overseas
Phuong Nguyen, Francesco Guarascio, and Lisa Barrington, Reuters, January 20, 2025
58. China's crude oil imports from top supplier Russia reach new high in 2024
Chen Aizhu, Reuters, January 20, 2025
59. China urges independent business decision-making after Trump proposes 50% US ownership of TikTok
Reuters, January 19, 2025
60. China's ageing villages face yawning healthcare gap in fragile economy
Farah Master, David Kirton, and Kevin Yao, Reuters, January 19, 2025
61. Trump raises prospects for a negotiated reset on US-China ties
Joe Cash and Xiuhao Chen, Reuters, January 21, 2025
62. Chinese Shares Fall After Trump Repeats Tariff Threat
Farah Elias, Wall Street Journal, January 22, 2025
63. China orders pay cap at state-owned financial firms, sources say
Reuters, January 22, 2025
Cyber & Information Technology
64. Trump signs executive order to pause TikTok ban, provide immunity to tech firms
Bobby Allyn, National Public Radio, January 20, 2025
65. China Has Raised the Cyber Stakes
Adam Segal, Foreign Affairs, January 21, 2025
Eva Dou, The Wire China, January 16, 2025
67. [FREE]_China_Chatbot_13
Lingua Sinica, Substack, January 16, 2025
68. Apple’s Smartphone Sales Slump in China as Huawei Gains Market Share
Kimberley Kao, Wall Street Journal, January 21, 2025
69. Tech war: US adds Chinese AI unicorn Zhipu to trade blacklist before Biden’s exit
Ben Jiang, South China Morning Post, January 16, 2025
Chinese start-up Zhipu AI said it “strongly disagrees” with a US decision to add the company and its subsidiaries to an export blacklist, as the administration of President Joe Biden released a flurry of trade restrictions just days before he leaves office.
The US Department of Commerce on Wednesday added 25 China-based companies and two Singapore-based firms to its Entity List, accusing them of supporting Beijing’s military advance. Blacklisted companies are barred from buying technology from US businesses without special government approval.
Beijing-based Zhipu said late on Wednesday that the US move “lacks a factual basis”. It added that the firm’s inclusion on the Entity List “will not have a substantial impact” on its operations.
70. Huawei seeks to grab market share in AI chips from Nvidia in China
Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, January 20, 2025
71. Elon Musk complains about China ban on X as Donald Trump prepares TikTok reprieve
Ryan McMorrow and Joe Leahy, Financial Times, January 20, 2025
72. TikTok Engineered Its Shutdown to Get Saved. But Trump’s Solution May Fall Short
David E. Sanger, New York Times, January 19, 2025
73. Who Is Behind RedNote, the Chinese App Attracting TikTok Users Worried About the Ban?
Meaghan Tobin, New York Times, January 17, 2025
74. TikTok owner asks Chinese staff in Singapore to pay taxes to Beijing
Zijing Wu and Owen Walker, Financial Times, January 22, 2025
75. TikTok owner ByteDance plans to spend $12bn on AI chips in 2025
Zijing Wu and Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, January 21, 2025
76. Tencent ramps up global AI efforts with roll-out of advanced Hunyuan 3D-generation system
Iris Deng, South China Morning Post, January 22, 2025
Military and Security Threats
77. Mitigating national security risks
Chen Kuan-ting and Gahon Chiang, Taipei Times, January 14, 2025
78. Maritime Mayhem: The Urgency of Cyber Threats in the South China Sea
Ilona Drozdov, SIGNAL Group, January 23, 2025
The South China Sea, a vital maritime hub that accounts for 24% of global maritime trade and facilitates about $7 trillion in global trade annually, is increasingly susceptible to a hidden but powerful threat: cyberattacks. As the maritime sector becomes increasingly reliant on digital technologies for navigation, port operations and logistics management, cyber threats pose a growing risk to the region’s stability and security.
Cyberattacks could disrupt critical maritime operations, cripple port operations and exacerbate military tensions, further destabilizing a region already burdened by territorial disputes. If left unaddressed, these vulnerabilities could escalate into economic disruption and even conflict, with repercussions felt worldwide.
79. Exclusive: How U.S. Forces and NASA could Inadvertently be Spying for China
Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Newsweek, January 18, 2025
80. Taiwan activates backup communication for Matsu Islands after undersea cables malfunction
The Straits Times, January 22, 2025
81. Why Trump Sees a Chinese Threat at the Panama Canal, and Locals Don’t
Santiago Pérez and Kejal Vyas, Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2025
82. Jake Sullivan, White House National Security Adviser, Reflects on China Policy
Edward Wong, New York Times, January 19, 2025
83. US removes malware allegedly planted on computers by Chinese-backed hackers
Sarah N. Lynch, Reuters, January 14, 2025
84. Chinese hackers accessed Yellen's computer in US Treasury breach, Bloomberg News reports
Reuters, January 16, 2025
85. China Deploys Security to Try to Reassure a Country on Edge
Vivian Wang, New York Times, January 16, 2025
86. Taiwan lawmakers risk alienating Donald Trump with defence funds freeze
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, January 21, 2025
87. Aiming to weaken US foes, Trump faces an 'unholy alliance'
David Brunnstrom, Michael Martina, and Daphne Psaledakis, Reuters, January 21, 2025
One Belt, One Road Strategy
88. Bangladesh Eyes Deeper Ties with China as India Relations Suffer
Arun Devnath, Bloomberg, January 21, 2025
Opinion Pieces
89. Hong Kong's rule of law has been derailed
Patrick Poon, Nikkei Asia, January 22, 2025
90. There can be no winners in a US-China AI arms race
Alvin Wang Graylin and Paul Triolo, MIT Technology Review, January 21, 2025
The escalating U.S.-China AI competition poses significant risks to global stability, technological progress, and peace. A zero-sum approach undermines collective progress and amplifies geopolitical tensions. Recommendations for policymakers include prioritizing civilian AI applications, fostering bilateral and multilateral governance frameworks, mitigating misuse risks, and incentivizing collaborative research. Leveraging AI for shared global challenges, like climate change and health care, can reshape perceptions and unlock its potential for humanity. Collaboration, not confrontation, ensures a sustainable and prosperous AI future.
91. China’s Oil Demand Is Vanishing Faster Than It Looks
David Fickling, Bloomberg, January 19, 2025
92. TikTok Saga Shows Americans Can’t Be Bothered to Take on China
Hal Brands, Bloomberg, January 22, 2025
93. China’s Cut-Rate Economic Growth
The Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2025
94. Beat China with Fortress Am-Can
Doug Ford, Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2025
95. Trump’s trade challenge
Rana Foroohar, Financial Times, January 19, 2025
96. China can outfox Trump’s tariffs
Tej Parikh, Financial Times, January 19, 2025
97. The Debate Over Trump’s Favorite Word Needs a Reset
Peter Coy, New York Times, January 20, 2025