Beijing further undermines Hong Kong's future
Aloha!
I join you this week from Honolulu and I’m on my way to the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi next week. I heard it was balmy for my friends attending the Munich Security Conference, but I can assure you: it has been even more balmy for me here in the Hawaiian Islands.
On Thursday morning next week at the Raisina Dialogue, I will be speaking on a panel titled “Deterrence and Decoupling: Decoding the West’s China Stance.” I’ll be join by some great colleagues from Europe. Also I’m looking forward to hearing Prime Minister Modi on Wednesday evening and participating in a great event organized by Samir Saran and his team at ORF. Tune in and watch if you can’t be there in person. And if you are there, give me a shout, it would be great to catch up with readers in person.
I’ve focused my commentary this week on the first few articles, but before we jump into that, I wanted to highlight an exchange at the Munich Security Conference on Friday.
Its between my CEO at Palantir, Dr. Alex Karp, and the CEO of NXP Semiconductors, Kurt Sievers. Sievers speaks first and his remarks seem straight out the best 2009 thinking on globalization and efficient markets, a world of benign international relations where companies can blithely ignore the implications of their so-called “commercial” technology… unsurprisingly, Karp pushes back hard on these outdated notions.
Link here
I love the look on the face of the European Commission’s Executive Vice-President, Margrethe Vestager (Commissioner for Competition) sitting next to Karp as this exchange begins… she could clearly see what was coming.
Interestingly, the panel was moderated by DHS Secretary Mayorkas. Here’s the full panel video.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. PAPERWALL: Chinese Websites Posing as Local News Outlets Target Global Audiences with Pro-Beijing Content
Alberto Fittarelli, The Citizen Lab, February 7, 2024
Key Findings
A network of at least 123 websites operated from within the People’s Republic of China while posing as local news outlets in 30 countries across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, disseminates pro-Beijing disinformation and ad hominem attacks within much larger volumes of commercial press releases. We name this campaign PAPERWALL.
PAPERWALL has similarities with HaiEnergy, an influence operation first reported on in 2022 by the cybersecurity company Mandiant. However, we assess PAPERWALL to be a distinct campaign with different operators and unique techniques, tactics and procedures.
PAPERWALL draws significant portions of its content from Times Newswire, a newswire service that was previously linked to HaiEnergy. We found evidence that Times Newswire regularly seeds pro-Beijing political content, including ad hominem attacks, by concealing it within large amounts of seemingly benign commercial content.
A central feature of PAPERWALL, observed across the network of websites, is the ephemeral nature of its most aggressive components, whereby articles attacking Beijing’s critics are routinely removed from these websites some time after they are published.
We attribute the PAPERWALL campaign to Shenzhen Haimaiyunxiang Media Co., Ltd., aka Haimai, a PR firm in China based on digital infrastructure linkages between the firm’s official website and the network.
While the campaign’s websites enjoyed negligible exposure to date, there is a heightened risk of inadvertent amplification by the local media and target audiences, as a result of the quick multiplication of these websites and their adaptiveness to local languages and content.
These findings confirm the increasingly important role private firms play in the realm of digital influence operations and the propensity of the Chinese government to make use of them.
COMMENT – The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto has been doing some great, data-informed and open-source, investigative work over the years (TikTok, WeChat, online censorship in the PRC, biometric collection in the PRC, etc.).
2. Abu Dhabi AI Firm to Pare Back China Presence in Pivot to US
Abeer Abu Omar, Bloomberg, February 11, 2024
Abu Dhabi’s G42 is paring back its presence in China and has pledged to invest in key Western markets in an effort to assuage US concerns over the artificial intelligence firm’s ties to Beijing.
“All of our China investments that were previously made are already divested,” G42 Chief Executive Officer Peng Xiao said in an interview with Bloomberg News. “Because of that, of course, we have no need anymore for any physical China presence.”
COMMENT – Time will tell how serious G42 is about making these changes. I suspect the ties will remain quite strong between this Emirati firm and the PRC’s technology ecosystem. I’ve heard reports that over half of their researchers at computing labs are visiting PRC professors, including a sizeable proportion from the “Seven Sons of National Defense”:
Beihang University
Beijing Institute of Technology
Harbin Engineering University
Harbin Institute of Technology
Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Northwestern Polytechnical University
Under the PRC’s Military-Civil Fusion strategy, any entity in the PRC could be pressed into service, but these seven universities are of particular concern given the close and enduring ties with the PLA.
It would be prudent to withhold judgement on G42 until we’ve seen a demonstrated track-record of compliance with dual-use export controls and the cutting of ties with institutions like the ones above.
3. Latham & Watkins cuts off its Hong Kong lawyers from international databases
Chan Ho-him, Kaye Wiggins, and Suzi Ring, Financial Times, February 12, 2024
US law firm acts as data security laws in territory look set to be strengthened on same lines as China’s.
US law firm Latham & Watkins is cutting off automatic access to its international databases for its Hong Kong-based lawyers, in a sign of how Beijing’s closer control of the territory is forcing global firms to rethink the way they operate.
The world’s second-highest-grossing law firm has told staff that while Hong Kong will have access by default to China documents, from this month they will not be able to see other content in its international databases unless specifically given permission, according to two people with knowledge of the matter.
The move underscores the growing difficulties for global companies operating in a city that made its name as an international financial hub. It comes after Beijing introduced new anti-espionage and data laws restricting information flows out of the country.
The law firm’s policy cuts off Hong Kong lawyers from default access to content in its US, Europe, Middle East and Asia databases.
Latham & Watkins is now “treating Hong Kong as the same as mainland China”, one of the people said, as US firms grow wary over Beijing’s closer control of the territory. The law firm declined to comment.
It is already considered best practice to wall off confidential client data, restricting access only to those who need to see it. However, the change will mean staff in Hong Kong no longer have default access even to non-private files from outside China.
Latham & Watkins is also separating its Hong Kong office database from the rest of Asia — its offices in Seoul, Singapore and Tokyo — to create a new “Greater China” database shared with the Beijing office, the people said.
“There’s definitely a concern over the new [Hong Kong security law] . . . that essentially puts Hong Kong data laws on par with China’s,” the first person added.
COMMENT – A death knell for Hong Kong and the integration of the PRC into the wider global economic system.
Hong Kong served as the bridge between the PRC and the outside world, an isolated island of strong legal protections where the minutia of day-to-day business could be done between lawyers around the world and the clients they represent.
Beijing has detonated shape-charges on the columns and girders of this bridge with their National Security Law. They did so because they fear the outside world and the ideas that could undermine the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly hold on power.
Clearly a firm like Latham & Watkins has tried over the last few years to make it work. To see them give up suggests that there aren’t any work arounds.
4. It pains me to say Hong Kong is over
Stephen Roach, Financial Times, February 11, 2024
There is more to economic vitality than the stock market. But for Hong Kong, the market has always been emblematic of success. Imagine, a small city state with what had long been the world’s fourth largest exchange (it is now fifth, according to Bloomberg data), a global leader of new stock offerings as recently as 2019.
It pains me to admit it, but Hong Kong is now over. A city I once called home and have cherished as a bastion of dynamism has had the world’s worst-performing major stock market over the past quarter of a century. Since the handover to China in 1997, the Hang Seng index has been basically flat, up only about 5 per cent. Over that same period, the S&P 500 has surged more than fourfold; even mainland China’s underperforming Shanghai Composite has far outdistanced the Hong Kong bourse.
Hong Kong’s demise reflects the confluence of three factors. First, domestic politics. For the first 20 years after the handover, its political scene was relatively stable. China was a passive Big Brother. The wheels came off in 2019-20 when, under Carrie Lam, the Hong Kong leadership made the mistake of proposing an extradition arrangement with China that sparked massive pro-democracy demonstrations. China’s response, clamping down through the imposition of a new Beijing-centric national security law, shredded any remaining semblance of local political autonomy. The 50-year transition period to full takeover by the People’s Republic of China had been effectively cut in half.
In the spring of 2019 at the onset of the democracy protests, the Hang Seng index was trading at nearly 30,000. It is now more than 45 per cent below that level at 15,750. Milton Friedman’s favourite free market has been shackled by the deadweight of autocracy.
Second, the China factor. The Hong Kong stock market has long been considered as a levered play on mainland China. For a variety of reasons, the Chinese economy has hit a wall. Structural problems — especially the dreaded three Ds — debt, deflation and demography — have combined with the impact of the Covid pandemic as well as cyclical pressures in the property market and local government financing vehicles. These forces have sparked a three-year bear market that has taken China’s broad CSI 300 index down more than 40 per cent from its spring 2021 peak. Reflecting collateral damage on Chinese enterprises listed in Hong Kong and the city’s China-sensitive services sector, the Hang Seng has fallen 49 per cent over the same period.
Third, global developments. Since 2018, the US-China rivalry has gone from bad to worse. Hong Kong has been trapped in the crossfire. Moreover, America’s “friendshoring” campaign has put pressure on Hong Kong’s Asian allies to pick sides between the US and China. This has driven a wedge between Hong Kong and many of its largest Asian trading partners. Outsize consequences are likely, especially since Hong Kong’s foreign trade totals 192 per cent of its gross domestic product.
There is no easy way out for Hong Kong from the interplay between these three developments. Hong Kong has no political discretion to chart its own course. While the Chinese economic factor might improve, I suspect any rebound is likely to be shortlived in light of lasting headwinds from a shrinking workforce and worrisome productivity prospects. Nor do I see an easy path to the resolution of US-China tensions that would prompt a reversal of the friendshoring trend.
The contrarian would argue, of course, that all this bad news is already discounted in an oversold Hong Kong stock market. China’s recent moves — a raft of government stimulus actions, jawboning, and replacement of the chief securities regulator — might trigger a temporary bounce. However, sceptical investors need to see more from Beijing than just another page from its timeworn countercyclical playbook. Until that happens, Hong Kong is likely to be mired in a trap made in China.
I will never forget my first trip to Hong Kong in the late 1980s. Notwithstanding a frightening, steep landing at the old Kai Tak airport, I was immediately taken with the extraordinary energy of the business community. Back then, Hongkongers had both a vision and a strategy. China was just beginning to stir, and Hong Kong was perfectly positioned as the major beneficiary of what turned into the world’s greatest development miracle. It all worked out brilliantly, for longer than anyone expected. And now it’s over.
COMMENT – I suspect that Xi and his cadres don’t really care about the Hong Kong that Stephen Roach is wistful of… I think they viewed that Hong Kong as a threat to their rule. An island of liberalism and limited government that posed the risk of contagion to the rest of the PRC.
Had Hong Kong continued to outshine its Mainland sister cities (in the minds of the Chinese people), it would have eroded the Party’s grip on power.
From the Party’s perspective, Hong Kong’s demise is a necessary evil.
5. Lawmakers weigh blacklist for firms lobbying for Chinese military-linked companies
Daniel Lippman and Caitlin Oprysko, Politico, February 14, 2024
Lawmakers weigh a ban on firms lobbying for Chinese companies: Several members of Congress are considering closing their doors entirely to meetings with lobbying firms that represent companies linked to the Chinese military, five people familiar with the matter told Daniel.
“It’s definitely a conversation among members on the China committee,” said one Republican committee member, who noted that a bipartisan group of members was discussing the idea. “These companies represent our adversary and there is obviously an orchestrated effort on their part to buy us off with lobbying firms to gain influence.”
The ban lawmakers are considering would include firms that represent Chinese companies on the Pentagon’s so-called 1260H entity list, even if they’re trying to meet to discuss American clients — a potentially massive upheaval, given that several of the firms are among the most lucrative in town.
A photo has been circulating on Capitol Hill listing various Chinese companies and their lobbying firms, as well as different federal government entity lists that they are on. Included on the list are Chinese drone maker DJI, which has the Vogel Group, Avoq (formerly Subject Matter) and CLS Strategies on retainer, and lidar maker Hesai Group, which retains Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck and Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld. None of the firms responded to a request for comment.
Some Hill staffers have informally told Brownstein — K Street’s top lobbying firm by revenue — to not take such clients, according to one of the people. And one senior Republican congressional staffer said they’ve already started to avoid the firms in question. “I don’t answer their calls. I don’t forward their emails and don’t reply to their emails until I hear confirmation that they are not playing for both sides and trying to make a profit off of what’s likely to be a coming Chinese-U.S. conflict,” said the person, who said they keep a list of the firms printed out on their desk.
But so far no lawmakers have publicly said they are avoiding such meetings. “The more moderate members seem to be extremely hesitant and opposed to these types of efforts,” said one GOP congressional staffer who has worked on this issue extensively.
“Going after lobbying firms, especially those tied to China, is like touching the third rail of politics,” added Craig Singleton, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a think tank hawkish on China issues. “These firms wield an outsized impact on policymaking and fundraising, and members know it.”
Singleton said that based on his conversations with members and staffers, another idea that is being discussed is a new transparency directive that would require lobbyists who want to engage Hill offices to disclose whether they or their firm represent any Chinese companies and, if so, to provide those company names.
“China’s lobbying roster reads like a who’s who of Washington insiders, from retired Pentagon brass to former high-ranking congressional aides. One moment they’re advocating for a Fortune 100 company or U.S. defense contractor, the next they’re billing hours for DJI, Huawei, or another Chinese firm linked to China’s military or Chinese human rights atrocities,” he said.
The idea of blacklisting these lobbying firms was first discussed a few years ago but didn’t come to fruition because the firms represent so many American companies and groups that it was seen as impractical, one of the people involved said, but the rumblings have picked back up in recent months as some in Washington try to counter Chinese influence.
The issue has also spurred various legislative proposals. In 2021, Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) and Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) introduced a bill that would force lobbyists for Chinese companies to register under FARA, which a person close to the China committee said will be reintroduced. And senators have introduced a bill in the past two Congresses that would overrule FARA’s commercial and LDA exemptions for clients based in a country deemed a U.S. adversary.
COMMENT – I’m so glad Politico did this piece.
The naming and shaming of lobbying firms has begun. If Hill staff and their Members can stick together by refusing access to the firms associated with these PRC Companies, we might see some changes. I’m convinced it starts with the frontline staffers. If they refuse to take calls from these firms, it will make a real difference.
As Beijing has made it increasingly difficult for American and other foreign companies to operate within the PRC (unless they support the Chinese Communist Party’s interests), PRC efforts to manipulate U.S. policy-making and legislation has ramped up significantly as they exploit massive loopholes in FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act) and lobbying laws. Addressing these loopholes will require concerted legislative efforts, but the first step is illuminating that we have a huge problem.
6. Preparing Supply Chains for a Coming War
John G. Ferrari and Mark Rosenblatt, AEI, February 15, 2024
The United States’ dependence on Taiwan and inability to prosecute a long war give the PRC leverage. The United States must build resiliency and Congress should shift its approach away This is not a call for “Buy America.” It is instead a call to urgently build resilience apart from inputs, such as critical minerals, to outputs, such as planes and missiles.
COMMENT – This is a serious problem, my hat is off to John Ferrari and Mark Rosenblatt for pushing the issue forward. In Washington, I think there is a growing awareness of the problem and the Biden Administration is certainly trying to address it, but to date, these efforts have been insufficient.
One reason for the lack of progress has been the issue pointed out in the article before this one: massive lobbying efforts of those who stand to take financial losses if these supply chains are made more resilient and less exposed to the PRC.
Authoritarianism
7. The CCP’s Investors: How American Venture Capital Fuels the PRC Military and Human Rights Abuses
The Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and The Chinese Communist Party, February 8, 2024
In this investigation, the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party (Select Committee or Committee) set out to understand the relationship between U.S. venture capital firms (VCs) and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) explosive growth in two advanced technology sectors: artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductors.
Both technologies have civilian and military applications. Both will drive the future of warfighting, and both are necessary components of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Orwellian surveillance state and human rights abuses. Both technologies also provide the foundation for advancements in other cutting-edge technologies such as biotechnology and quantum computing.
The Committee examined five U.S. venture capital firms that have a sizeable footprint in PRC AI and semiconductor companies to better understand whether and how American capital and expertise have supported the PRC’s technological advancement.
We found that these five VCs alone have made investments worth at least $3 billion into PRC technology companies that facilitate human rights abuses including genocide, contract with the Chinese military, or strengthen the PRC’s semiconductor supply chains and advance China’s national security ambitions.
We also found evidence that VCs provide intangible support, including expertise, to companies, including problematic PRC companies in the targeted sectors.
COMMENT – Interest in this topic started years ago and my good friends Mike Brown and Pav Singh did much of the spade work with their January 2018 report, “China’s Technology Transfer Strategy: How Chinese Investments in Emerging Technology Enable A Strategic Competitor to Access the Crown Jewels of U.S. Innovation.” The U.S. Government has been taking incremental actions for at least that long (see President Trump’s decision to block, via CFIUS, a Silicon Valley private equity firm called Canyon Bridge from acquiring an advanced semiconductor company in late 2017, “Order Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor Corporation by China Venture Capital Fund Corporation Limited”).
That work six years ago made it more difficult for Beijing to gain direct access to cutting-edge technology in the United States. The U.S. Government relied on authorities under CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) to restrict or block PRC efforts to acquire these technologies through investments in the United States. CFIUS allows the United States to review and restrict “inbound investment” into the United States which harms national security.
The work by Chairman Gallagher’s Select Committee focuses on the ways in which Beijing has sought to adapt to these efforts by the United States Government by incentivizing U.S. investors to take their capital and, more importantly, their knowhow to the PRC. Addressing the challenges that Chairman Gallagher and Ranking Member Krishnamoorthi highlight in this report requires a new set of authorities to review and restrict “outbound investment.” Leaders in Congress and the White House have been trying to address this but have met with significant pushback. That pushback has come particularly from the Chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, Representative Patrick McHenry (R-NC).
McHenry’s intransigence (see the Charlotte Observer OpEd from December, “Investments in China: NC’s Patrick McHenry is out of step on this issue”) on this issue has meant that little can be done legislatively… however, McHenry has announced his retirement which means there could be an opening to move this issue forward in the next Congress.
The White House has begun the process of trying to figure out what the Executive branch can do with their existing authorities (in August, Biden signed “Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern”), but unfortunately the White House handed this issue to the Treasury Department which has largely been in the McHenry camp and spent a year battling to prevent the issuance of the Executive Order to address outbound investment (Axios’ “scoop” in January 2023 that the White House was considering an Executive Order on outbound investments to the PRC).
Rather than direct Treasury to use existing authorities under IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act), the White House punted in August by directing Treasury to spend a year “studying” the problem, despite the fact that they had been “studying” it for over a year already.
8. Maoist Thought and Xi Jinping’s Leadership
Mercy A. Kuo, The Diplomat, February 13, 2024
9. Four Years On, Tributes to Covid Whistleblower Dr. Li Wenliang
Cindy Carter, China Digital Times, February 8, 2024
10. ASML says geopolitics, new export restrictions remain risks
Reuters, February 14, 2024
11. How China Miscalculated Its Way to a Baby Bust
Liyan Qi, Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2024
12. Australia trade minister to ask China to lift barriers, query Wang sentence
Reuters, February 13, 2024
13. Facial recognition technology could be used in Hong Kong to fight crime, maintain national security: police chief Raymond Siu
Lo Hoi-ying, South China Morning Post, February 11, 2024
14. How Taiwan’s elections challenge the power of China’s Communist Party
Frederik Kelter, Aljazeera, February 10, 2024
15. As China Tries to Present a Friendlier Image, a New Face Emerges
David Pierson, New York Times, February 14, 2024
16. China Opposes ‘Illegal Sanctions’ in Response to EU Proposal
Bloomberg, February 13, 2024
17. Chinese firm behind ‘news’ websites pushes pro-Beijing content globally, researchers find
Zeba Siddiqui, Reuters, February 7, 2024
18. Navigating the Political Economy of Cold War 2.0
Ronald U. Mendoza, The Diplomat, February 12, 2024
19. EU proposes sanctions on Chinese firms aiding Russian war effort
Lisa O'Carroll, The Guardian, February 14, 2024
Environmental Harms
20. The energy transition would cost 20% more without China, analysis says
Mary Hui, Quartz, February 13, 2024
21. Exclusive: Duke Energy to remove Chinese battery giant CATL from Marine Corps Base
Michael Martina, Reuters, February 9, 2024
Foreign Interference and Coercion
22. The amateur sleuths taking on the CCP Pianogate sparked a rebellion among 'Overseas Chinese'
Sam Dunning, Unherd, February 12, 2024
23. The Biden campaign joins TikTok
Elena Schneider, Politico, February 11, 2024
24. European Commission to open investigation into TikTok, Bloomberg reports
Reuters, February 9, 2024
25. China’s YouTube Propaganda in Latin America
Sascha Hannig Nuñez, The Diplomat, February 13, 2024
26. Alibaba Seeks Middle East Partners as Beijing Deepens Gulf Ties
Farah Elbahrawy, Bloomberg, February 13, 2024
27. Messi’s ‘miracle’ return stirs Chinese anger and conspiracy theories
Simone McCarthy, Chris Lau, CNN, February 9, 2024
28. Thailand’s New Government Rebalances Its Relationship with China
Tommy Walker, The Diplomat, February 6, 2024
29. Building International Support for Taiwan
Jude Blanchette, Ryan Hass, and Lily McElwee, CSIS, February 13, 2024
30. Top US House China hawk plans visit to Taiwan next week
Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hills, Financial Times, February 13, 2024
31. U.S.-China Tensions Have a New Front: A Naval Base in Africa
Michael M. Phillips, Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2024
32. German investment in China rises to record high
Sarah Marsh, Reuters, February 14, 2024
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
33. Chinese migrants flock to U.S.-Mexico border on economic pressures
Masahiro Okoshi, Nikkei Asia, February 13, 2024
34. Forced labor still haunts China’s Xinjiang, report finds
Stuart Lau and Antonia Zimmermann, Politico, February 13, 2024
35. Mass Detentions in Xinjiang Persist on 27th Anniversary of Ghulja Massacre
Arthur Kaufman, China Digital Times, February 6, 2024
36. Volkswagen to discuss future of Xinjiang operations with Chinese JV partner
Patricia Nilsson, Financial Times, February 14, 2024
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
37. China’s domestic travel takes off, but foreign visitors yet to make a comeback
Hayley Wong, South China Morning Post, February 13, 2024
38. Chinese start-up Galactic Energy plans reusable rocket debut this year
Ling Xin, South China Morning Post, February 12, 2024
39. How monumental is China’s challenge to build its own jet engine for the C919 as it seeks aviation self-reliance?
Amanda Lee, South China Morning Post, February 11, 2024
40. EU to blunt China’s edge on steel, aluminium exports as proposed carbon tax could reach 21%: Goldman
Eric Ng, South China Morning Post, February 14, 2024
41. China faces 'lost decade,' 30 years after Japan
Ryushiro Kodaira, Nikkei Asia, February 13, 2024
42. Does Evergrande’s Collapse Threaten China’s Economy?
Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Council on Foreign Relations, February 13, 2024
43. Chinese EVs set to make bigger splash in Europe with huge new ships
Eiki Hayashi, Nikkei Asia, February 12, 2024
44. MSCI to Remove Swath of China Stocks from Indexes as Markets Sink
Ishika Mookerjee, Bloomberg, February 12, 2024
45. MSCI Drops 66 Companies from China Index Amid Market Slump
Tracy Qu, Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2024
46. Is China’s Economic Dominance at an Inflection Point?
Allen J. Morrison and J. Stewart Black, Harvard Business Review, February 13, 2024
47. US House panel accuses VC firms of aiding Chinese military and genocide
Demetri Sevastopulo and George Hammond, Financial Times, February 8, 2024
48. U.S. Lawmakers Seek Investigation Against China’s WuXi AppTec
Kimberley Kao, Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2024
49. Chinese-backed solar factory stirs suspicions in rural Ohio
Amanda Chu, Financial Times, February 13, 2024
50. U.S. Gas Producers Are Racing to Sell to Asia. And Mexico Is Key.
Max Bearak, New York Times, February 13, 2024
51. WuXi Shares Hit by U.S. Committee Seeking Inquiry, Blacklisting
Kimberley Kao, Wall Street Journal, February 14, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
52. China is quietly reducing its reliance on foreign chip technology
The Economist, February 13, 2024
53. Chinese hackers infiltrated plane, train, and water systems for five years, US says
The Guardian, February 8, 2024
54. US to Launch $5 Billion Research Hub in China Chips Race
Mackenzie Hawkins, Bloomberg, February 9, 2024
55. Next Steps to Close the Gap with China on Licensed Spectrum for Commercial 5G
Clete Johnson, CSIS, February 12, 2024
Military and Security Threats
56. Beijing slams Five Eyes for cyberattack allegations
Jeff Pao, Asia Times, February 10, 2024
57. Red Genes: Assessing WuXi AppTec's Ties to the Party-Army-State in China
Sunny Cheung, Arran Hope, and Peter Mattis, Jamestown Foundation, February 9, 2024
58. China preparing for 'protracted' war, says think tank
Rhyannon Bartlett-Imadegawa, Nikkei Asia, February 14, 2024
59. Requirements for nuclear deterrence and arms control in a two-nuclear-peer environment
Greg Weaver and Amy Woolf, Atlantic Council, February 2, 2024
60. China’s Shipyards Are Ready for a Protracted War. America’s Aren’t.
Niharika Mandhana, Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2024
61. Hackers for China, Russia and Others Used OpenAI Systems, Report Says
Karen Weise, New York Times, February 14, 2024
62. China’s Military and Surveillance Capabilities Have Been Boosted by U.S. Funds, House Report Says
Heather Somerville, Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
63. Bitcoin Mining: Why Ethiopia Is Attracting Chinese Crypto Miners
David Pan and Fasika Tadesse, Bloomberg, February 7, 2024
64. As China debt looms, Kenya president seeks more diverse funding
Kana Watanabe, Nikkei Asia, February 13, 2024
65. China Keeps Building Stadiums in Africa. But at What Cost?
Elian Peltier, New York Times, February 10, 2024
Opinion Pieces
66. China may add ‘superabrasives’ to list of restricted defense materials
Nazak Nikakhtar and Paul Devamithran, C4ISRNET, January 26, 2024
67. US Energy Superpower Status and a New US Energy Diplomacy
Paul Dabbar, Hoover Institution, February 13, 2024
68. India’s Elite Worries About America
Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2024
69. China airbrushed away its foreign minister. Why?
David Ignatius, Washington Post, February 12, 2024
70. Beijing Is Set to Rescue the Market Again: But Is That the Right Thing to Do?
Victor Shih, The Wire China, February 4, 2024
71. The Senate Rejects American Retreat
Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2024