Beijing’s Playbook for Asset Stripping
The West needs to unwind PRC acquisitions and mergers
Friends,
This week, the PRC commissioned and launched its third conventionally-powered aircraft carrier, the Fujian. In honor of that occasion, Xi Jinping attended the ceremony and stressed just how important the nation’s military modernization and build-up was important to him and the Chinese Communist Party.
Xi Jinping center on the deck of the Fujian in Hainan. Xi is looking awful Pooh-like in this photo. Notice China’s F-35 copy, the J-35, in the background. I guess America should just interpret this behavior as imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.
The Fujian joins her sister ships, the Liaoning (former Soviet aircraft carrier) and the Shandong (the first domestically produced Chinese aircraft carrier). None of these carriers are nuclear-powered, but the PRC is planning for its fourth carrier to be nuclear-powered.
I don’t really know what to make of the PRC’s obsession with building aircraft carriers. On the one hand, aircraft carriers clearly represent power and prestige, something that the Party and its military leaders crave. But on the other, I’m constantly coming across articles that claim that aircraft carriers are the battleships of the 21st Century. A platform that was appropriate for a different century and a different world of technology.
Is this massive effort to build out a aircraft carrier heavy navy just an effort to ape the United States or are these platforms the basis of power projection and therefore necessary for the PRC to achieve its military objectives? I’m just an Army guy, so I’ll admit I don’t know which it is.
Beijing’s Asset Stripping Playbook
There is a drama unfolding in the Netherlands after the Dutch Government intervened in October to prevent the complete asset stripping of the Dutch semiconductor company, Nexperia. Nexperia makes semiconductors for automobiles produced in Europe, Japan, North America and the PRC, but produces those semiconductors in the PRC under its parent company, Wingtec Technology.
Wingtec Technology is a partially PRC state-owned semiconductor company (which means that it is completely controlled by the Chinese Communist Party) and in 2019, Wingtec acquired the Dutch semiconductor company. Under Wingtec’s management, Nexperia has been expanding its markets share across the automobile sector.
In October, the Dutch Government detected that Wingtec was stripping the intellectual property, tools, and supplies out of its Dutch company and shipping it all to the PRC. Dutch authorities believed that its was consolidating control over the industry and would shutdown the European operations and potentially use the full control of its auto semiconductor manufacturing to coerce the Netherlands and other European countries. The Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs employed its Goods Availability Act to seize the company’s Dutch operations and halt its Chinese owners from stealing the technology and tools out of the country.
Needless to say, the PRC Government responded aggressively by denying any wrongdoing and then shutting down the operations of Nexperia in the PRC which sent shockwaves through the global automobile industry.
With the involvement of multiple European countries, the European Union and the United States, it appears that on Friday, Beijing agreed to like semiconductor supply resume operation which avoids a potential shutdown of global automobile manufacturing.
If this kind of thing sounds familiar, you’re right. It matches a playbook of corporate asset stripping that the Chinese Communist Party has employed for years to gain access to technology that they otherwise could not get.
As this drama unfolds, a similar one is taking place in the United Kingdom. The UK-based company Dynex Semiconductor makes chips for high-speed rail systems and in 2008 the UK Government permitted CRRC, the PRC state-owned rail corporation to purchase Dynex.
For years, CRRC has been transferring technology out of Dynex and into one of its Chinese subsidiaries. In just the last few months, Dynex has shut down production in the UK and now CRRC’s subsidiary in the PRC has the monopoly for producing these semiconductors. The Telegraph detailed this story last week (see #20 below).
This follows a similar series of events that took place in 2020, as the UK semiconductor company Imagination Technologies became the target of a CCP asset stripping campaign. In November 2017, after being blocked under CFIUS by the U.S. Government from acquiring Lattice Semiconductors, the PRC-capitalized private equity firm Canyon Bridge Fund purchased Imagination Technologies for 550 million GBP, side-stepping screening efforts by the U.S. and Europe. Imagination held significant intellectual property for neural processing and GPUs and in 2020, just as the pandemic was raging in the UK, Imagination’s PRC owners attempted to strip the technology from Imagination and move it to the PRC.
Just this week, Kate O’Keeffe at Bloomberg released a story she has clearly been investigating for months about the PRC asset stripping campaign against the autonomous trucking company, TuSimple. The technology was stripped out of TuSimple even after the Treasury Department imposed a mitigation plan on the acquisition through CFIUS which was supposed to prevent this from happening see #2 below).
It appears that every acquisition made by PRC companies over the last two decades should be examined closely and unwound.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
China Started Separating Its Economy from the West Years Ago
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, November 3, 2025
Two decades of sustained effort to build national self-reliance and minimize imports have antagonized trade partners but fortified what a senior adviser called Beijing’s “bulwark” against conflicts.
President Trump has used tariffs to try to reduce American reliance on Chinese exports and prevent China’s factory overcapacity from swamping the U.S. economy. But his effort has hit an obstacle: Beijing was already well on its way to weaning its economy from the United States.
For two decades, China has systematically pursued economic self-reliance. China has been able to establish choke points to pressure the U.S. economy, while making it harder for Washington to block China.
Self-reliance has been a cornerstone of Chinese policymaking not just under Xi Jinping, the country’s top leader since 2012, but also under his predecessor, Hu Jintao.
Their program of replacing imported manufactured goods with domestic production has been costly and often inefficient. But it has left the West with dwindling leverage it can deploy during disputes.
China’s leaders have become increasingly public about emphasizing the self-reliance drive. It took a prominent place at an annual gathering of the Communist Party’s Central Committee last month, when the country’s top officials laid out a sketch of China’s next five-year plan.
“We must first and foremost intensify efforts toward achieving greater self-reliance and strength in science and technology,” Mr. Xi said in a speech.
This year, China has wielded one of its most powerful choke points — its almost complete control over the world’s supply of rare-earth metals and rare-earth magnets.
Faced with restrictions on China’s supply of rare earths, Mr. Trump last week accepted a compromise with Mr. Xi.
Saga of Chinese Trucking Firm Exposes US National Security Gaps
Kate O’Keeffe, Bloomberg, November 5, 2025
American officials thought they’d secured a deal with TuSimple to protect autonomous-driving technology. It didn’t work.
It was Chinese tech mogul Charles Chao’s last supper with the US leaders of the self-driving truck startup he helped take public at an $8.5 billion valuation a year earlier. Red wine was flowing during the June 2022 meal at Fleming’s steakhouse in San Diego, but Chao was about to spoil the evening.
Turning to the company’s chief executive officer, Chao played a marketing video on his phone showing an autonomous freight truck speeding through the desert. But the ad wasn’t for TuSimple Holdings Inc. It was for a second self-driving venture Chao’s company was backing called Hydron. The startup had just launched in China and appeared to be tapping TuSimple’s pioneering technology — despite a US government deal meant to keep it in America.
The diners were stunned, according to several people with knowledge of the events. It was the worst-case scenario for TuSimple — Chao’s steakhouse surprise marked the beginning of the company’s end. It was also a disaster for US officials, whose yearslong effort to rein in the Chinese entrepreneur’s influence over a company with cutting-edge technology had failed.
At the heart of the saga was an unsuccessful bid by the US government to make a tech company wall off its US and China operations through a contract meant to protect national security. Critics say the episode underscores the risks the Trump administration faces as Beijing seeks to weaken US national security safeguards and a breakthrough nears with another innovative tech company with deep China roots: TikTok.
The fallout from TuSimple is still reverberating. A judge on Friday found that Chao and his allies continued to influence the company even after a US deal was cut to prevent exactly that.
The TuSimple episode “is one of the clearest examples of predatory Chinese investment siphoning US innovation to Beijing — at the expense of our national security and American investors,” Representative John Moolenaar, the Michigan Republican who chairs the Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, said in a statement to Bloomberg News.
Central to the TuSimple case is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States — a Treasury Department-led panel known as Cfius that also includes the Pentagon, Justice Department and other cabinet agencies. The panel can recommend the president block transactions outright or propose that dealmakers agree to guardrails to protect national security.
The slew of failings around TuSimple exposed flaws in this latter approach, demonstrating how a savvy investor like Chao can outrun Cfius and navigate the web of regulations Americans rely on to protect innovation.
A representative for TuSimple, now known as CreateAI, said it never improperly shared technology with China. A spokesperson at the Pentagon, which sparked Cfius’ review of TuSimple, directed questions to the Treasury Department, which declined to comment. The US government hasn’t accused Chao of wrongdoing, and Chao’s lawyer denied his client exerted undue influence over TuSimple.
Cfius agreements with Chinese companies “do not protect national security,” said Matthew Pottinger, who served as deputy national security adviser during President Donald Trump’s first term and now chairs the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “It’s a fig leaf for capitulation.”
This account of TuSimple’s downfall and the lessons it holds is based on interviews Bloomberg had with more than three dozen people involved in the events as well as a review of public records and a trove of previously unreported confidential company and government documents.
Today, China is a global power in autonomous driving, led by companies including Baidu Inc. and Pony AI Inc. But the US got a head start more than two decades ago when the Pentagon backed a series of competitions to develop the technology to reduce battlefield deaths.
China was determined to catch up. In 2015, President Xi Jinping’s government cited autonomous driving technology as a priority for domestic development in its “Made in China 2025” industrial plan. TuSimple was founded months later with funding from Sina Corp., known for its microblogging site Weibo, in which the Chinese government has a golden share. The chairman and CEO of Sina? Charles Chao.
…
Matthew Johnson, a China analyst at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington, said the TuSimple episode underscores how ill-equipped US regulators and investors are when it comes to assessing the risks of doing business with what are, at their core, Chinese entities.
“We as a country do not appear to have sufficient capacity to understand China and its systems,” he said. “We are not serious.”
China Is Stamping Out Dissident Art
Shannon Van Sant, Foreign Policy, October 31, 2025
Curators, painters, and performers are facing jail or exile. A Bangkok museum curator recently fled to London after Chinese and Thai officials pressured him to remove the names of Hong Kong, Uyghur, and Tibetan artists from an exhibition. Among them were artists Clara Cheung and Gum Cheng Yee Man, who had created an installation about espionage and whose name have been removed from the show, which was critical of authoritarian governments. The pressures was just one example of a growing campaign by the Chinese Communist Party to wipe out dissident artists and to ensure that only government-approved messages appear in galleries—both inside and outside China’s borders.
The pressure from Chinese officials in Thailand follows the arrest in January of Christian musician and performance artist Fei Xiaosheng, a resident of eastern Beijing’s Songzhuang art district. Fei’s friends believe authorities targeted him due to his public solidarity with the Hong Kong democracy movement. For decades, Fei had used symbolism in his installations to criticize the CCP, including, in a 2011 photography exhibit, the display of a blank wall in homage to then-detained artist Ai Weiwei. Before President Xi Jinping assumed power, artists like Fei tested the boundaries of political expression, leading to a boom in China’s contemporary art scene. But the space for artistic independence is narrowing fast as authorities try to use art to enforce a positive image of the CCP’s past.
Fei’s arrest came a few months after that of another prominent artist, Gao Zhen. A U.S. permanent resident, Gao Zhen was visiting China when police seized him in his studio outside Beijing in front of his wife and child who were traveling with him, on Aug. 26, 2024. Authorities said they detained him on suspicion of insulting revolutionary heroes and martyrs.
“Our works are a critique of authoritarianism and a call for historical reflection, but they are not acts of defamation,” Gao Zhen’s brother and artistic partner, Gao Qiang, told me.
In 2011, I made a documentary film about the Gao brothers and the Songzhuang art district. The pair made provocative pieces depicting leaders such as Mao, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and Bin Laden. Gao Qiang said their work was an exploration “of the myths surrounding the authoritarian figures and the harm caused by their unchecked power.” At the time, Beijing granted the Gao brothers some latitude, allowing politically sensitive artwork to remain standing, covered in cloth, at the back of their studio.
The Gao brothers sold to U.S. movie stars and tycoons, like Leonardo DiCaprio and hedge fund mogul Steve Cohen, and exhibited in galleries around the world. I filmed the Beijing studio where workers prepared their art for shipment overseas, including a bronze statue titled “Mao’s Guilt,” depicting the Chinese leader on his knees, remorseful and supplicant. I watched as workers separated the sculpture into parts, ensconcing Mao Zedong’s head and body into individual boxes, partially obscuring its iconography from the Chinese customs authority, which approves all art for export.
US-China escalation is here to stay
Sarah Beran, Financial Times, November 3, 2025
The latest Trump-Xi deal won’t easily mend the faultlines that have opened between Washington and Beijing.
Markets celebrated the deal reached between President Trump and President Xi last week, and with good reason: stabilising the US-China relationship is good for the Indo-Pacific region and the west. But the agreement is far from a silver bullet. Both countries are agreeing to a détente that is tactical, not strategic, with a limited set of deliverables and an uncertain timeline.
Structural competition between the US and China has opened a faultline that no summit or deal can easily mend. Both countries have sought to capitalise on their perceived advantages by weaponising their deep, complex interdependence. China’s vast rare earth export controls are the most recent escalation, and the latest truce only temporarily postpones the pain. With the export control framework now in place, future moves will be all the more destructive.
Washington and Beijing are both overconfident in the leverage they hold over one another. Beijing, which previously mirrored Washington’s actions through so-called “proportional retaliation”, has now begun to hit hard and asymmetrically, buoyed by a belief that it can now deal with the US as an equal. Meanwhile, the US erroneously believes China’s economy is teetering on the edge and that it will concede in the trade war to avoid economic collapse.
In the short term, US and Chinese leaders will continue trying and failing to capitalise on their imagined advantages. With each round of escalation will come a renewed urgency to de-risk and limit the damage, igniting a painful effort to unwind interdependence.
Trump’s first trade war in 2017 sparked a Chinese effort to diversify away from reliance on US soyabeans, which fell from 40 per cent of Chinese imports in 2016 to roughly 9 per cent in 2025. US export controls on advanced semiconductors in 2022 intensified Chinese efforts to innovate, with Beijing championing Huawei’s Ascend chip series and DeepSeek’s AI models.
Beijing’s focus on self-reliance is not a new development; it has been core to the leadership’s approach since 1949. In this context, rare earth export controls have a dual purpose: to retaliate and help keep critical supply chains onshore, including rare earths and batteries.
China’s bureaucracy is ill-suited to implement this export control regime and has minimal co-ordination, inspection or enforcement capability. Risk-averse provincial officials and Ministry of Commerce officials will need political cover to grant licences. The application process will be cumbersome, opaque and prone to breakdowns. In turn, the US will perceive bad faith in China’s inability to guarantee an uninterrupted flow of rare earths, likely sparking new escalatory cycles. Meanwhile, licence applications will vacuum up information on foreign supply chains that can be weaponised in the future.
For now, there is little alternative to Chinese rare earths. Foreign companies will need to work closely with Chinese partners to fast track licences through the bureaucracy and identify channels for chambers of commerce or home governments to flag shipments caught up between the geopolitical rivals.
In the longer term, diversification away from China and, where possible, from rare earths, must be part of long-term planning for companies and countries. Licences for foreign companies with a military nexus in their supply chains will be unlikely to see relief, even under the terms of the Trump-Xi deal, so urgent alternatives will be needed. Mines and processing capabilities in the US and other countries will take years to come online and initial volumes will mean long wait times. This is not just about finding sources outside of China, it is also about relocating supply chains: Chinese companies also control over 60 per cent of global production and 90 per cent of refining and processing.
The failure to find alternatives before this shock was a market failure: cheaper, higher quality, more efficient components from China meant there was no economic incentive to change course. It will take an Operation Warp Speed-like effort for the shift to take place in time to make a real difference. In the meantime, companies must ready themselves for continued cycles of escalation, disruptions of supply chains and the slow pulling apart of the two economies.
As US-China dynamics drive a global push towards resilience and sovereignty, governments will make significant investments in securing critical supply chains, creating major opportunities for businesses that can position themselves as central to domestic innovation ecosystems. Escalation is here to stay and companies must develop the flexible, adaptable supply chains they need to weather the storm.
Germany Mulls Paying Deutsche Telekom to Replace Huawei Gear
Jenny Leonard, Jillian Deutsch, and Kamil Kowalcze, Bloomberg, October 30, 2025
Germany is considering using public funds to pay Deutsche Telekom AG and other telecom operators to replace Huawei Technologies Co. equipment, people familiar with the matter said.
The development would equate to a taxpayer-funded overhaul of the country’s telecom networks after operators long resisted government efforts to remove gear from the Chinese company over security concerns. It also effectively means extra spending on Germany’s digital infrastructure, which lags behind many other European countries.
The sums at stake remain under discussion and it’s unclear if the government will seek an abrupt or gradual switch, said the people, who asked not to be identified because talks are private. The costs to replace Huawei equipment in Germany would exceed €2 billion ($2.3 billion), one of the people said.
U.S. to Block Nvidia’s Sale of Scaled-Back AI Chips to China
Qianer Liu, The Information, November 6, 2025
The White House has told others in the federal government it won’t allow Nvidia to sell its latest scaled-down AI chips to China, despite President Donald Trump’s hints over the summer that he might allow the company to do so, according to three people with knowledge of the matter.
The decision is a major blow to the AI chip giant, which has seen its revenue from China shrivel this year as a result of tighter export restrictions imposed by the U.S. government over national security concerns. Though Trump recently made clear he won’t allow the company to sell its most advanced Blackwell AI chips to China—despite briefly opening the door to that idea a few weeks ago—he suggested in August that he might allow a scaled-down version into China that was 30% to 50% less powerful.
The chip in question is known as the B30A. While it’s a downgraded version of Blackwell, it is far more powerful than the other chips the U.S. government currently allows Nvidia to sell in China. It also outperforms anything Chinese chip companies can produce, with more than double the processing power of the best chip from Huawei Technologies, for instance, according to an analysis by the Institute for Progress, a Washington-based think tank.
The B30A chip would be a game-changer for Chinese AI developers. Nvidia has sent samples of the chip to some of its Chinese customers, according to two people with direct knowledge of the sample. Unlike other Nvidia chips that have been sold to China, the B30A can be used to train large language models when efficiently organized in big clusters, which is what many Chinese companies desperately need, said the two people.
Nvidia is still working on tweaking the B30A design in the hope that the administration will change its mind, according to two Nvidia employees.
A White House official confirmed the administration won’t allow Nvidia to sell the scaled-back chips. An Nvidia spokesman repeated past statements that the company “has zero share in China’s highly competitive market for datacenter compute, and does not include it in our guidance.”
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has relentlessly lobbied the Trump administration for approval to sell advanced AI chips to China. Over the summer, President Trump reversed a ban he had imposed a few months earlier on Nvidia’s sale of its existing China-only chip, the H20, in exchange for Nvidia agreeing to share 15% of the resulting revenue with the government.
COMMENT - Apparently some responsible folks are taking action.
Hacker group “Anonymous 64” hacks into Chinese government website and replaces it with anti-communist information.
Points Media, November 3, 2025
[GOOGLE TRANSLATE] On Tuesday (21st), the hacker group “Anonymous64” claimed on the social media platform X that they had hacked into multiple Chinese government websites and news websites, including the Baoding Municipal Bureau of Justice, the Commercial Industry Committee of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, and China News Network, and replaced the pages with anti-communist information such as “There would be no new China without the Communist Party” and “The 15th Five-Year Plan scam”.
Anonymous 64 stated on Monday that it hacked multiple Chinese government websites during the second wave of attacks, including the Baoding Justice Bureau, the Public Security Information Network, and three news websites that specialize in external propaganda for the Chinese Communist Party.
In the fourth wave of operations, they hacked into the forums of nine universities, including Fudan University, Central South University, and Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications.
The website’s homepage was changed to feature images satirizing Chinese Communist Party leaders and bearing the slogans “No Communist Party, no new China” and “No enslavement, we want freedom; no lies, we want the truth.” The website’s text was also changed to criticize the Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee as a hoax.
The last post by “Anonymous 64” was on June 3rd of this year, with content related to the June 4th incident. At that time, the organization also hacked into websites such as China Enterprise News Network and China and Foreign News Network, changing the homepage image to one with the words “Never Don’t forget June 4th” and an image of “Tank Man” Wang Weilin.
Last September, China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) repeatedly named “Anonymous 64” as having ties to Taiwan’s cyber and communications forces, alleging that they attempted to spread disinformation and interfere with public communications. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense denied the allegations.
China’s Ministry of State Security stated that in June 2023, the organization registered a social media account under the name “Anonymous 64” and launched rampant cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. The Ministry specifically named three active members and published their names and photos. The Ministry stated that it has launched an investigation into these three individuals in accordance with the law.
Authoritarianism
The Trade War Couldn’t Change China’s Economy
Jonathan Cheng and Jason Douglas, Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2025
China’s ‘red tourism’ boom
Edward White, Financial Times, November 2, 2025
Key figures at odds over collapse of China spy case
Kate Whannel, BBC, November 1, 2025
Xi’s latest moves show corruption is still a big military problem
Ying Yu Lin, Aspi Stratagey, November 3, 2025
Provisions on Lawfully Regulating the Application and Oversight of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Location
China Law Translate, November 3, 2025
China Urges US to Avoid ‘Red Lines’ After Reaching Trade Truce
Bloomberg, November 3, 2025
China, Russia vow joint response to ‘unilateral’ sanctions during Russian PM visit
Reuters, November 4, 2025
G2 or not G2: Trump’s new favorite term for US-China relations carries a lot of history’s baggage
Didi Tang, AP News, November 3, 2025
Watching China in Europe—November 2025
German Marshall Fund, November 4, 2025China bans foreign AI chips from state-funded data centres, sources say
Reuters, November 5, 2025
Trump Says Xi Will Help Fight Fentanyl. Will China Follow Through?
Brian Spegele, et al., Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2025
U.S. Government Was Aware of Massive Chinese Fentanyl Seizure in Vancouver Long Before Ottawa Disclosure: Source
The Bureau, November 4, 2025Chinese owners of UK factory move crucial chip production out of Britain
James Titcomb, The Telegraph, November 3, 2025
Dynex is a leading producer of semiconductor devices vital in building high-speed rail systems.
A UK semiconductor factory owned by China has shut down production of crucial microchips as Beijing tightens its grip on the global electronics supply chain.
Lincoln-based Dynex Semiconductor has stopped making its high-voltage chips in Britain, company accounts have revealed.
Meanwhile, its blacklisted Chinese owner is expanding vast domestic facilities producing the same components.
The development is likely to raise fresh fears about Chinese companies hollowing out the UK’s electronics industry.
Last week, Chinese-owned tech company Nexperia was accused of transferring microchip technology from Manchester before its seizure by the Dutch government threatened a global carmaking crisis.
The Bureau, November 6, 2025
Netizen Voices: “Stop Complaining, Hu Xijin. You Played a Part in This.”
Cindy Carter, Chinese Digital Times, October 24, 2025
New police plan to expand AI-enabled CCTV blanket to public housing estates raises questions over privacy
Hong Kong Free Press, October 27, 2025
Environmental Harms
In Cameroon, Chinese Trawlers Devastate National Park Communities
ADF, November 4, 2025
Artisanal fishermen in Cameroon’s Douala-Edéa National Park are decrying Chinese trawlers that destroy their fishing gear, fish in prohibited zones, and use illicit nets and chemicals to catch fish.
A fisherman in Mbiako, a fishing town of about 3,000 people along the Sanaga River basin, said three local fishermen were shot in 2024 amid confrontations with the industrial trawlers, which access the park from the Gulf of Guinea via the Sanaga River. They fish on Lake Tissongo and in the park’s mangrove swamps and coastal waters.
“The trawlers’ army pursues us with guns at sea,” the fisherman anonymously told the Global Voices news outlet. “Occasionally, they spot us and purposefully destroy and cut our nets with the catch. They shoot if we chase them to retrieve the nets.”
These practices are common among Chinese trawlers operating in West Africa, the world’s epicenter for illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. According to the IUU Fishing Risk Index, China is the world’s worst illegal fishing offender. West Africa loses an estimated $10 billion annually to IUU fishing, while Cameroon’s government estimates that the country loses about $33 million annually to the scourge.
FISH Act Seeks to Restrict Russia and China’s Illegal Fishing in Alaskan Waters
Natalie Spaulding, Must Read Alaska, November 1, 2025
Why climate change now threatens China’s future
The Economist, November 3, 2025Ken Moritsugu, PBS, November 6, 2025
China is likely to overdeliver on the modest goals the government has set to cut carbon pollution, experts say. The question is whether that will be enough to help the world curb warming?
That’s important ahead of the annual United Nations climate conference, known as COP30, which is being hosted in Brazil and gets underway this week. China’s 2035 goals, a 35-page document submitted Monday, adds detail to the broad targets announced by leader Xi Jinping in late September.
Foreign Interference and Coercion
China in New Mexico: Beijing’s Science War for the American Southwest
PwK International, David Tashji, October 28, 2025
China’s Ministry of State Security is no longer an ocean away. It has quietly infiltrated into America’s high deserts — the vast, remote expanses of New Mexico, Nevada and Arizona — where the nation’s most advanced science, weaponry, and space systems are born. From the high-security corridors of Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories to the desert test ranges of White Sands and the orbit-tracking arrays of Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, this is ground zero for the next chapter of great-power competition in the sciences.
This report will unpack how Beijing is embedding itself into the “science war” of the American Southwest. It will trace how Chinese talent-recruitment programs, academic partnerships, state funded corporate investment, phony front businesses, narcotics trafficking rings, persistent cyber operations and dirty handed influence operations are converging on the region’s labs, test sites and infrastructure. Based on recent arrests, export-control prosecutions, critical-infrastructure intrusions, and real-estate acquisitions, we will map how the desert is actually a treasure map of high value applied research and scientific discovery and a prime target of the Chinese Ministry of State Security and their asymmetric, intel first Great Power Competition long game.
This report offers an assessment of the broader architecture of influence: dual-use research in New Mexico feeding into China’s missile and quantum ambitions; Nevada’s mineral and energy corridors being shaped by state controlled foreign capital; and unclassified networks at national labs leveraged as proxies for breakthrough weapons modeling.
China Unleashes Media Blitz on Taiwan Before Xi-Trump Meet
Bloomberg, October 28, 2025
Can South Korea Manage the Competing Needs of the U.S. and China?
Choe Sang-Hun, New York Times, November 1, 2025
How China really spies on the UK
Gordon Corera, BBC, October 30, 2025Significance of the Saudi-Pakistani Defence Agreement – A Strategic Opportunity for China
Syed Ismail and Zhoushi Bai, RSIS, November 6, 2025
Taiwan’s main opposition party elects new leader in a race clouded by claims of China meddling
The Asahi Shimbun, October 20, 2025
Taiwan says China has added conditions to its attendance at APEC summit
Ben Blanchard, Reuters, November 4, 2025
China creates Day of Taiwan’s Restoration as part of sovereignty claims over island
Huizhong Wu, AP News, October 24, 2025
Australia ‘increasingly alone’ in countering China’s influence in Pacific, aid report shows
The Guardian, October 26, 2025China Targets Taiwanese Companies with Claim They Assist Psychological Warfare Efforts
Brian Hioe, New Bloom, November 3, 2025
Five Taiwanese companies have been singled out by Chinese state-run media with allegations that they work together with the military in conducting psychological warfare operations targeting China. This proves a new development, when it comes to the fact that the Chinese government has, in recent times, continuously lashed out at Taiwan with the claim that Taiwan conducts psychological warfare against it. The five companies–EZTrust, LargitData, DiTV, DigiMiracle, and Master Concept–are tech companies that have taken tenders for app and digital tool development from the Chinese government.
Some have taken the view that China is seeking to construct a narrative of Taiwanese aggression against China, so as to justify future action against it. An alternative view is that China is trying to mirror Taiwan’s claims regarding China, in that the Tsai and Lai administrations have criticized China for “cognitive warfare” designed to influence domestic elections in Taiwan.
Either way, such claims from China have become increasingly commonplace. China has also tried to emphasize that there will be consequences for participating in such activities.
Last month, China issued cash rewards for information on eighteen members of what it claims to be members of a “psychological warfare unit”, responsible for tasks such as disseminating propaganda, shoring up the morale of Taiwanese troops, and intelligence gathering. In a similar timeframe, the Chinese government also issued bounties on three lieutenant colonels in the Military Intelligence Bureau, claiming that they ran a propaganda outfit called the “Taiwan Independence Navy.”
Such cash rewards were mostly symbolic, in that they were only 10,000 yuan. And members of Taiwanese military intelligence are already cautious in most cases about travel to China or to countries aligned with China.
This was not the first time that China had issued cash bounties for members of the military. In June, the Chinese government publicized the names and issued bounties for individuals it claimed to be Taiwanese hackers who are members of the Information, Communications, and Electronic Force Command (ICEFCOM), publicizing their national identification numbers.
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
UK university halted human rights research after pressure from China
Amy Hawkins, The Guardian, October 26, 2025
Leading professor at Sheffield Hallam was told to cease research on supply chains and forced labour in China after demands from authorities.
A British university complied with a demand from Beijing to halt research about human rights abuses in China, leading to a major project being dropped, the Guardian can reveal.
In February, Sheffield Hallam University, home to the Helena Kennedy Centre for International Justice (HKC), a leading research institution focused on human rights, ordered one of its best-known professors, Laura Murphy, to cease research on supply chains and forced labour in China.
Laura Murphy, professor of human rights and contemporary slavery at the Helena Kennedy centre for international justice at Sheffield Hallam University.
Murphy’s work focuses on Uyghurs, a persecuted Muslim minority in China, being co-opted into forced labour programmes. Her research, and that of colleagues at the HKC, has been cited widely by western governments and the UN, and has helped to shape policies designed to root out goods made by forced labour from international supply chains. The Chinese government rejects accusations of forced labour, and says that Uyghur work programmes are for poverty alleviation.
In February, Murphy was told that her work on China, described previously by the university as “groundbreaking”, had to stop. The website for the Forced Labour Lab, Murphy’s small team of researchers at the HKC, was taken down – although several of the reports remain available in other, less visible parts of the university archive.
In October, the university said it was lifting the ban on Murphy’s work on China and forced labour, and apologised.
COMMENT - Oh Britain… this is not a good look.
Chinese intimidation stopped UK university from publishing human rights report
Amy Borrett, Laura Hughes and David Sheppard, Financial Times, November 3, 2025Voice of Tibet, November 7, 2025
The inaugural IndieChina independent film festival, scheduled to be held in New York from November 8th to 15th, was abruptly canceled two days before its opening. Zhu Rikun, the festival’s director, stated that he and his family and friends have been subjected to continuous harassment and threats recently.
Human Rights Watch criticized this incident, stating that it demonstrates the Chinese authorities’ extension of “speech control” overseas, and that artistic freedom is facing new forms of suppression.
The IndieChina Independent Film Festival, originally scheduled to be held in New York from November 8th to 15th, was the first film festival in the United States focusing on Chinese independent films. However, the festival’s director, Zhu Rikun, recently began receiving pressure and threats from “unknown individuals,” ultimately leading to the decision to cancel the event.
In a telephone interview with Nikkei Asia, Zhu Rikun said that harassment and threats were happening daily and were becoming increasingly serious, initially targeting those close to him and later all those invited to the film festival. He stated that although he did not feel personally threatened, the constant pressure he received, coupled with verbal threats against his family in China, forced him to make the decision to cancel the film festival.
According to the organizers, the film festival plans to screen more than 40 documentaries and short films on topics that are strictly censored in China, such as the LGBTQ community and the Anti-Rightist Movement in the 1950s. The festival will also include video conferences between the directors.
Zhu Rikun, from Guangdong, is one of the earliest curators to promote the independent film movement in China. His “China Documentary Exchange Week” and “Beijing Independent Film Festival” were shut down by the authorities in 2011 and 2014, respectively.
Afterward, he moved to the United States, hoping to continue promoting independent Chinese cinema in a free environment. Zhu Rikun said, “I thought things would be better here, but I was wrong.”
Human Rights Watch criticized the incident as a new example of transnational repression by the Chinese government. Yalkun Uluyol, a China researcher at the group, pointed out that the Chinese government’s reach into New York and the shutdown of a film festival demonstrates the authorities’ attempt to control how the world perceives and discusses China.
Human Rights Watch, November 6, 2025
Chinese authorities harassed several dozen Chinese film directors and producers, as well as their families in China, causing them to pull films from the inaugural IndieChina Film Festival in New York City, Human Rights Watch said today. On November 6, 2025, the festival’s organizer, Zhu Riku, announced that the film festival, scheduled for November 8-15, had been “suspended.”
“The Chinese government reached around the globe to shut down a film festival in New York City,” said Yalkun Uluyol, China researcher at Human Rights Watch. “This latest act of transnational repression demonstrates the Chinese government’s aim to control what the world sees and learns about China.”
Chiang Seeta, a Chinese artist and activist, reported that nearly all participating directors in China faced intimidation. Even directors abroad, including those who are not Chinese nationals, reported that their relatives and friends in China were receiving threatening calls from police, said Chiang.
On November 1, the organizers issued an announcement on social media saying they had received messages from some film directors and producers and their families about Chinese government harassment: “We are deeply concerned about the situation. … [I]f you are under pressure not to attend the festival … we fully understand and respect it.” By November 4, more than two-thirds of participating films had cancelled their screenings.
After the festival was suspended, Zhu issued a statement that the decision was not out of fear, but rather to “stop harassment of … directors, guests, former staff, and volunteers associated with the festival, including my friends and family.”
Halloween Under Control: When the State Fears Imagination
Human Rights in China, November 5, 2025
Across China this year, Halloween once again became a test of political limits. On October 31, police in Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and other cities filled commercial streets and subway stations to prevent people from wearing costumes. Universities circulated directives warning students not to celebrate or post Halloween-related content online. Even delivery workers dressed as characters from Journey to the West were stopped and ordered to “rectify” their appearance.
Officials described these measures as efforts to “maintain order” and “avoid religious influence.” In reality, they reveal a deeper anxiety: spontaneous public gatherings, however playful, challenge a system built on surveillance and predictability. The CCP understands that humor, anonymity, and costume dissolve hierarchy and make everyone temporarily equal. That brief equality is what cannot be tolerated.
Meanwhile, overseas Chinese communities marked the same night in freedom. In Los Angeles at a Halloween parade, a group dressed as a “Naked Emperor Xi Jinping” and carried a “Xi Jinping Coffin,” using satire to expose the very fear that silenced laughter at home.
What the Party fears is not the costumes, but what they represent—the human capacity to imagine life beyond control.
300 million tourists just visited China’s stunning Xinjiang region. There’s a side they didn’t see
Kelly Ng, BBC, November 1, 2025
Yunnan: Lisu Christian Detained for Organizing Religious Gatherings
Li Xiaosi, Bitter Winter, November 3, 2025Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, October 30, 2025
The Court of Final Appeal’s deadline for the government to create a framework recognising same-sex couples came and went on Monday without word from authorities.
Hong Kong authorities will likely face no consequences for failing to enact a framework for recognising married same-sex partners, a government adviser has said, as the top court’s deadline for the mechanism has passed.
In a 2023 landmark verdict, the Court of Final Appeal gave the government two years to establish a framework giving legal recognition to same-sex partners with overseas marriage registrations. The deadline was on Monday.
Laura Murphy on Enforcing America’s Ban on Uyghur Forced Labor
Eliot Chen, The Wire China, November 12, 2025Voice of Tibet, October 29, 2025
In recent years, state-run boarding schools across Tibet have been frequently exposed for their egregious practices, including political indoctrination, cultural assimilation, and abuse of Tibetan children. Recently, the CCP held a so-called “International Academic Symposium on Boarding Education and Plateau Development” in Chengdu, attempting to defend its colonial-style boarding school policy.
The CCP claims that these schools “not only improve educational accessibility and teaching quality,” attempting to use the guise of “education” to conceal the reality of forced Sinicization.
On October 27, the Chinese Communist Party held a so-called “International Academic Symposium on Boarding Education and Plateau Development” at the University of Electronic Science and Technology of China in Chengdu, Sichuan Province, in an attempt to justify the forced Sinicization education in Tibetan colonial boarding schools.
According to Chinese state media, the “domestic and foreign experts” who participated in the seminar believed that boarding schools “not only improve educational accessibility and teaching quality, but also promote exchanges and integration among multiple ethnic groups.”
State media also stated that “in Western countries, boarding schools often provide elite education for the children of the aristocracy or wealthy families. In China, however, state-run boarding schools are mainly aimed at ordinary families, and the government provides substantial subsidies, enabling more students from remote areas to receive quality education.”
This station has reported on the systematic “Sinicization” of Tibetan children in CCP boarding schools on numerous occasions. Under the “Sinicization of Tibet” policy, more than one million Tibetan children (about 78% of the total number of Tibetan children), aged between 4 and 18, have been forced to leave their parents and communities to enter CCP-run boarding schools to receive political indoctrination and cultural assimilation education.
‘They told me not to speak out’: the woman who took on China – and won her husband’s freedom
Tom Levitt, The Guardian, October 23, 2025Hong Kong woman, 19, pleads guilty to sedition over videos promoting ‘subversive’ shadow legislature
James Lee, Hong Kong Free Press, November 4, 2025
Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, October 31, 2025
Why is China again targeting underground ‘house churches?’
Yuchen Li, DW, October 22, 2025
Decolonizing the Chinese narrative on Uyghurs: The mission of sociologist Dilnur Reyhan
Filip Noubel, Global Voices, October 23, 2025
National security trial of Hong Kong Tiananmen vigil group delayed again to January
James Lee, Hong Kong Free Press, October 24, 2025
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
From Outside Assaults to Insider Threats: Chinese Economic Espionage
Darren E. Tromblay, ITIF, November 3, 2025How China Collateralizes: Inside a $400 Billion Cash-Secured Lending System
Anna Gelpern, Omar Haddad, et al., Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, November 1, 2025
China’s post-2008 lending surge to emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs) ranks among the largest global lending booms of the past 150 years. Many of these borrowers have weak legal and governance institutions, high debt risks, and limited access to international capital markets. How does China structure loans to maximize the likelihood of repayment?
The data. The study builds on AidData’s Global Chinese Development Finance (GCDF) dataset, identifying all collateralized public and publicly guaranteed (PPG) loan commitments issued by Chinese lenders between 2000 and 2021. Using AidData’s Tracking Underreported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology, the authors documented the collateral terms for each loan. The resulting How China Collateralizes (HCC) Dataset (Version 1.0) draws on more than 12,000 sources, including financial statements, loan and security agreements, IMF and World Bank debt analyses, official correspondence, and media reports — offering the most comprehensive global record of China’s secured sovereign lending to date.
A global lending model built on collateral. Nearly half of all PPG loans that Chinese lenders extended to EMDEs between 2000 and 2021 are collateralized — that is, backed by a specific stream of revenue or asset that creditors can seize or control if the borrower defaults. PPG debt refers to obligations either directly owed by governments or guaranteed by them. The researchers identify 620 collateralized loan commitments worth $418 billion, extended by 31 Chinese creditors to 158 borrowers in 57 countries across Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. These loans represent nearly half of China’s total $911 billion PPG lending portfolio over the 22-year period, making collateralization and cash-flow control a defining feature of its sovereign lending model. The practice is led by China’s policy banks — chiefly the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank) — state-owned institutions tasked with advancing both national development and foreign-policy goals.
Cash, not assets, anchors repayment. Contrary to the common perception that China secures its overseas loans with ports, power plants, or other physical infrastructure, the vast majority of collateral is cash-based rather than asset-based. The researchers find that roughly four out of five (79%) collateralized loans are backed by foreign currency revenues deposited in dedicated escrow or repayment accounts, most of them held in China’s banks — often the same institutions that extended the loans. These arrangements allow China’s creditors to monitor, intercept, and control repayment flows directly, minimizing credit risk without requiring formal seizure of assets.
Most loans are secured by export earnings unrelated to the financed project. The single largest source of collateral for China’s loans is commodity export revenue — not the income from the projects being financed. The researchers find that more than 60% of all collateralized loans are secured by foreign currency earnings from oil, gas, copper, cocoa, and other raw materials, typically deposited into escrow accounts controlled by China’s lenders. In many cases, these commodities have no direct connection to the financed project. For example, Angola’s oil exports were pledged to back loans for public infrastructure, while Ghana’s cocoa revenues secured unrelated power and road projects. By tying repayment to steady foreign-exchange inflows — rather than volatile project revenues — China’s lenders achieve greater repayment certainty while retaining flexibility to finance politically strategic or high-risk projects.
Cross-collateralization deepens dependence. China’s lenders often structure loans so that multiple debts share the same revenue stream or collateral pool — a practice known as cross-collateralization. Roughly half of all secured loans rely on shared repayment accounts or overlapping collateral arrangements, some spanning 15 to 20 years. In practice, a single export commodity or escrow account can secure several unrelated projects, sometimes financed by different lenders in China. This design effectively locks borrowers into long-term repayment chains, where funds tied to one loan cannot be redirected without creditor consent. To preserve access to new financing, borrowers must keep replenishing the same accounts, often at the expense of fiscal flexibility. For China’s state lenders, cross-collateralization enforces repayment discipline and reduces the risk of selective default. For borrowers, it creates a sticky and opaque dependence, complicating debt restructuring and making the financial relationship with China difficult to unwind.
Control without publicity. The researchers find that China’s secured loans rely far more on “quasi-collateral” — that is, contractual and operational control over borrower revenues — than on formal, publicly registered property rights. In traditional sovereign or corporate finance, lenders might secure a loan through formal liens, pledges, or charges that are publicly recorded and legally enforceable. Chinese creditors, by contrast, prefer practical control: they use loan covenants, payment- routing agreements, and set-off rights that allow them to monitor and seize revenues directly as they flow through designated accounts. These instruments give Chinese banks the same functional protection as a lien — priority access to cash — without requiring registration or disclosure. In a lending environment where legal enforcement is uncertain and multiple creditors compete for repayment, this system offers speed, secrecy, and certainty. Debtors, too, may prefer such arrangements, which shield sensitive financial terms from domestic or international scrutiny.
Layered security, continuous control. China’s creditors often use multiple, overlapping security mechanisms — including escrow accounts, deposit covenants, offtake agreements, and quasi-collateral arrangements — applied from first disbursement to final repayment. Together, these tools give lenders priority access to borrower revenues at their source, whether from commodity sales, service fees, or foreign-exchange earnings, ensuring repayment flows remain uninterrupted. This “life-cycle layering” of security increases repayment certainty for high-risk borrowers and maximizes recovery prospects in case of default. Access to borrower revenues functions simultaneously as a source of repayment, information, and leverage, enabling Chinese creditors to safeguard their exposure and influence borrower behavior. The result is a lending model built for control and adaptability, blending commercial risk management with strategic statecraft.
Securing repayment at the expense of transparency, autonomy. Collateralization is a defining feature of China’s global lending model, enabling state-owned banks to adapt market tools — like escrow accounts and revenue routing — to make risky loans safer. But these same mechanisms carry trade-offs. Because restricted accounts are easily concealed, they can evade public scrutiny more effectively than liens on physical assets, undermining debt transparency. The structure also limits fiscal autonomy, as large shares of export or tax revenue are locked outside national budgets. By tying repayment to commodity or foreign-exchange inflows, the model heightens borrowers’ exposure to global price swings and erodes budgetary flexibility. For creditors and international institutions, the spread of undisclosed collateralized debt poses new challenges for sovereign debt management and restructuring.
Nvidia’s Huang doesn’t buy the national security concerns over selling chips to China
Tasmin Lockwood, CNBC, October 31, 2025
China to Suspend Some Rare-Earth Curbs and US Chip Firm Probes
Hadriana Lowenkron, Bloomberg, November 1, 2025
China’s Pause on Rare Earth Controls: What to Know
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, October 30, 2025
China Is Filling Up Its Oil Reserves Fast
Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2025Starbucks once seemed unstoppable in China. Its US owner is now giving up control
John Liu, Simone McCarthy, and Joyce Jiang, CNN, November 4, 2025
France to Suspend Shein Sales After Finding Childlike Sex Dolls, Weapons
Chelsey Dulaney and Noemie Bisserbe, Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2025
China ‘made a real mistake’ by ‘firing shots’ on rare earths, says Scott Bessent
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, October 31, 2025
Supply chains at their limit – Germany trapped
Handelsblatt, Martin Benninghoff, et al., November 3, 2025
Nexperia’s China unit says it has ‘sufficient inventories’ after Dutch parent’s supply suspension
Reuters, November 1, 2025
Canada launches C$6.4bn minerals push as race to counter China heats up
Ilya Gridneff, Financial Times, October 31, 2025
China ‘made a real mistake’ by ‘firing shots’ on rare earths, says Scott Bessent
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, October 31, 2025
Will Trump’s Tariff Deal Tilt the Playing Field Back Toward China?
Ana Swanson and Alexandra Stevenson, New York Times, November 2, 2025
Schularick predicts that major German car manufacturers will disappear by 2030.
Valerie Ndoukoun, Handelsblatt, November 1, 2025
“As long as bonuses are tied to profit, those who ignore risks win.”
Franziska Telser, Handelsblatt, November 3, 2025
Fountain Pens Are More Popular Than Ever—and Purists Are Fuming
Soobin Kim and Timothy W. Martin, Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2025
Starbucks to Sell Stake in China Business
Heather Haddon, Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2025
Rare-Earth Magnet Startups Seal $1.4 Billion Deal with Trump Administration
Heather Somerville, Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2025
Shein’s fast-fashion fight in France goes up a gear with sex doll scandal
Helen Reid, Reuters, November 4, 2025
How China’s Chokehold on Drugs, Chips and More Threatens the U.S.
Yoko Kubota, Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2025
China’s Export Control Taskforce Adds Most Headcount Since 2022
Josh Xiao, Bloomberg, November 4, 2025
Toyota, Honda turn India into car production hub in pivot away from China
Daniel Leussink, Reuters, November 5, 2025
What Trade War? China’s Export Juggernaut Marches On
Agnes Chang and Daisuke Wakabayashi, New York Times, November 3, 2025
China Delays Return of Astronauts After Debris May Have Hit Spacecraft
Alexandra Stevenson and Selam Gebrekidan, New York Times, November 4, 2025
China’s rare-earth curbs should spur US to forge new supply chains
Hannan Hussain, Nikkei Asia, November 5, 2025
China’s Offer to Store Foreign Gold Gets Taken Up By Cambodia
Bloomberg, November 5, 2025
Cyber and Information Technology
China starts exporting quantum computers as its systems become more competitive
Altynay Junusova, MERICS, October 2, 2025
Can China’s Poorly Attended Fourth Plenum Fulfill Xi’s Dream of Tech Self-reliance?
David Shen, Commonwealth Magazine, October 28, 2025Nvidia’s Jensen Huang says China ‘will win’ AI race with US
Madhumita Murgia and Cristina Criddle, Financial Times, November 6, 2025
Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang has warned that China will beat the US in the artificial intelligence race, thanks to lower energy costs and looser regulations.
In the starkest comments yet from the head of the world’s most valuable company, Huang told the FT: “China is going to win the AI race.”
Huang’s remarks come after the Trump administration maintained a ban on California-based Nvidia selling its most advanced chips to Beijing following a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping last week.
The Nvidia chief said that the west, including the US and UK, was being held back by “cynicism”. “We need more optimism,” Huang said on Wednesday on the sidelines of the Financial Times’ Future of AI Summit.
COMMENT - It looks like Jordi Hays and John Coogan are hitting “peak Jensen” over at TBPN… just saying.
China signals easing of Nexperia semiconductor export ban
Thomas Hale, et al., Financial Times, November 1, 2025
TikTok Investigated in France Over Content That Promotes Suicide
Gaspard Sebag, Bloomberg, November 4, 2025
Trump Officials Torpedoed Nvidia’s Push to Export AI Chips to China
Lingling Wei, et al., Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2025
China offers tech giants cheap power to boost domestic AI chips
Zijing Wu and Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, November 3, 2025
US Tech Firms Are Bound by China’s Rising Techno-Nationalism
Katherine Michaelson, The Diplomat, November 4, 2025
China offers tech giants cheap power to boost domestic AI chips
Zijing Wu and Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, November 3, 2025
China’s Security State Sells an A.I. Dream
Vivian Wang, New York Times, November 4, 2025
Military and Security Threats
Chinas militia forces train to get strong in the new era
New York Times, October 27, 2025Chinese Buoys at Scarborough Shoal
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, CSIS, November 5, 2025
The Philippine Coast Guard on October 15 released photos of two newly installed Chinese buoys at Scarborough Shoal. Coming in the wake of security concerns from South Korea over similar Chinese floating structures in the Yellow Sea, the buoys’ installation has raised alarms in Manila over the possibility that Beijing’s increasing efforts to assert control over Scarborough could be heading toward a physical occupation of the shoal via the construction of permanent facilities.
The PLA’s Long March toward a World-Class Military
The National Bureau of Asian Research, October 27, 2025Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Ivana Ke, Amanda Kerrigan, and Edmund J. Burke, RAND, October 22, 2025
Vietnam Is Building Islands to Challenge China’s Hold on a Vital Waterway
Gabriele Steinhauser, et al., Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2025
Pakistan eyes 2026 launch for first Chinese submarine in $5 billion arms deal
Joe Cash, Reuters, November 2, 2025
Airbus manager calls for industry to prepare for potential conflict
Handelsblatt, November 3, 2025
Australia supplying China with critical mineral vital for hypersonic missiles and its nuclear program
Angus Grigg, Alex McDonald and Will Nicholas, ABC, November 2, 2025
One Belt, One Road Strategy
The Panama Canal Dispute and Sino-US Competition in Latin America
Zhang Jiuzhen, RSIS, November 4, 2025
The dispute between the US and China over the Panama Canal is the culmination of a decades-long competition for influence in Latin America between the two great powers. Although China has made progress in the economic, political and cultural arenas, the US continues to enjoy a cumulative advantage over China in the competition.
Indonesia’s China-backed bullet train derailed by mounting debt
A. Anantha Lakshmi and Diana Mariska, Financial Times, November 2, 2025
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is booming
The Economist, November 2, 2025
Silk Roads and Surveillance: How Aid Became a Tool of Control in Xinjiang
Massimo Introvigne, Bitter Winter, November 3, 2025
China’s Massive African Mine Threatens to Upend Iron Ore Market
Thomas Biesheuvel and William Clowes, Bloomberg, November 3, 2025
Opinion
The New “China Shock” Is Hitting Poor Countries the Hardest
Shoumitro Chatterjee, Project Syndicate, October 10, 2025
Drug supply – Europe’s risky dependence on China
Handelsblatt, November 3, 2025China’s Global Initiatives Are Worth Taking Seriously
Henry Tugendhat, Foreign Policy, October 30, 2025
…
In other words, the China of today is not the China of yesterday. Although it often seeks to present itself as the leading voice of the global south, the truth is that its economic successes, as well as its economic vulnerabilities, have driven it toward policy positions that necessarily conflict with many countries in that grouping. Even within academic circles, China’s leading thinkers on international relations have come to view the world from a great power perspective as distinct from Global South scholars who typically reflect the concerns of smaller states.
China Is Quietly Sparking Latin America’s Startup Race
Juan Pablo Spinetto, Bloomberg, November 4, 2025
How Should Trump Approach China? A Debate.
Jason Furman, et al., New York Times, November 4, 2025Trump Seeks to Counter Russia, China in Their Own Backyard
Alexandra Sharp, Foreign Policy, November 6, 2025