Friends,
Before we dive into the week’s news about the PRC, I recommend doing some research on how an open convention might work when the Democratic Party meets in Chicago this August to pick its Presidential candidate.
[Mark your calendars, the Democratic Convention is scheduled for August 19-22]
The likelihood that it will be someone other than Joe Biden has significantly increased since his debate performance on June 27 and the interviews he has given since then. Unless you have been living in a cave for the last ten days, you know this has consumed the U.S. media cycle and will likely overshadow the GOP Convention that is scheduled for July 15-18 in Milwaukee.
This week, Washington hosts the NATO Summit, but all the attention is on whether Biden drops out of the race.
Back in February, the New York Times commentator Ezra Klein broached the subject of an open convention with an episode of his podcast on how it might work and an interview with Elaine Kamarck, the author of Primary Politics: Everything You Need to Know About How America Nominates its Presidential Candidates.
I recommend taking an hour and listening to the episode, “Here’s How an Open Democratic Convention Would Work.” We are getting awfully close to the August 1 scenario Ezra and Elaine discuss halfway through the episode.
I think we are in for a rollercoaster August.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. China exerts new control over its young expats in the US
Sun Yu, Financial Times, July 2, 2024
China is demanding acts of loyalty from its young professionals living and working in the US, sometimes putting them at odds with local law and immigration requirements, as it seeks more control over expatriates amid rising tensions between the two countries.
The demands are increasingly being placed on Chinese nationals who joined the country’s Communist party as students or young professionals before they left home, in the hopes of career advancement once they eventually return.
By some estimates, at least 10,000 members of the party are studying or working in the US. This is a small fraction of its 5.4mn Chinese diaspora but many are in top roles at leading universities and corporations in the technology and finance sectors.
The directives have included participating in webinars during which they are coached to promote China’s image in front of their American peers, paying membership dues to the Communist party, studying political material sent from China and checking in with party officials to ensure their continued loyalty, according to interviews and documents obtained by the Financial Times.
In interviews with 10 party members studying and working in the US, students said they had followed the demands to speak positively about China in public, while employees said they sought to hide their links to the party when applying for US work visas, denying membership when asked.
China’s orders have been imposed on its party members all over the world. But they have created particular concern in the US amid increasing scrutiny about China’s intentions, a potential ban on short-form video platform TikTok and fears of economic, industrial and national security espionage.
Neil Thomas, a fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, said the CCP’s global propaganda push and US laws against foreign influence may put party members in a “legal conundrum” in the world’s wealthiest capitalist economy as they struggle with conflicting rules.
“Communist party members must by party discipline follow orders from the central authority,” said Thomas. “But they may be banned by American laws from following those orders.”
2. The Underground Network Sneaking Nvidia Chips into China
Raffaele Huang, Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2024
A 26-year-old Chinese student in Singapore was packing suitcases last fall to return home for vacation. Besides his clothes and shoes, his luggage included six of Nvidia’s advanced artificial-intelligence chips.
A connection from college asked him to bring the chips because the U.S. restricted their export to China. Each chip was roughly the size of a Nintendo Switch game console, and the student didn’t flag any suspicions at the airport.
Upon arrival, the student said he was paid $100 for each chip he carried, a fraction of the underground market worth.
The student is part of a barely concealed network of buyers, sellers and couriers bypassing the Biden administration’s restrictions aimed at denying China access to Nvidia’s advanced AI chips, The Wall Street Journal has found. Nvidia’s chips are highly coveted for their ability to handle the massive computations needed to train AI systems that are critical to China-U.S. tech rivalry.
More than 70 distributors are openly advertising online what they purport to be Nvidia’s restricted chips, and the Journal got in direct contact with 25 of them. Many of the verified sellers said they have supplies amounting to dozens of the high-end Nvidia chips each month.
The flow of Nvidia chips is so steady that most of those sellers take preorders and promise delivery in weeks, the Journal found. Some also sold entire servers—costing upward of roughly $300,000—with each containing eight high-end Nvidia chips.
These merchants don’t sell enough of the powerful Nvidia processors to satiate a single tech giant’s demands. But for AI startups or research institutions with more modest needs, procurement can be done. Every Nvidia chip matters to China, which wants to stay competitive with the U.S. in an AI race seen as increasingly crucial to tech sovereignty and national security.
The Chinese sellers could be advertising Nvidia chips they don’t actually have or offering refurbished ones from older processors. But counterfeits would be nearly impossible to make, both in physical or performance terms, given the uniqueness of Nvidia’s top-end products.
The Journal’s review includes verifying purchases with Chinese buyers who used the underground channels, as well as access to transaction records, customs filings and photos of the Nvidia chips up for sale. The Commerce Department, which oversees enforcement of the U.S. restrictions, didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Tracking troubles
Nvidia globally doesn’t sell its powerful data-center chips individually or provide them directly to its AI customers. Instead, it ships them to third parties, such as Dell Technologies and Super Micro Computer SMCI -0.05%decrease; red down pointing triangle, which deliver fully-built AI servers or systems to those customers. These equipment providers often order more Nvidia chips than they need, in case demand unexpectedly surges or they run into manufacturing snags, according to industry participants. The equipment providers’ visibility would also be limited if the end buyer chooses to route the servers—and the Nvidia chips inside them—to elsewhere, the participants added.
Dell and Super Micro said they comply with U.S. export controls and act if illicit behavior is discovered.
Nvidia says it doesn’t sell its restricted advanced chips to China, in accordance with the U.S. export controls, and it works primarily with well-known partners to comply with the rules. “We apply the same standard to all transactions, large or small, and expect our partners to do the same,” an Nvidia spokesperson said.
Enforcement of the Biden administration’s export curbs on Nvidia chips largely rests with the Commerce Department and the myriad companies along the semiconductor supply chain. Many foreign governments and jurisdictions aren’t legally required to impose the U.S. controls, and such chip sales to China aren’t generally considered a criminal offense in those places, according to international trade lawyers.
For instance, the student transporting the Nvidia chips didn’t break any Singaporean laws, according to the lawyers, as the tech components aren’t subject to any local export restrictions.
“Whether these transactions occur through distributors or intermediaries is very difficult to track,” said Frank Kung, an analyst at TrendForce who focuses on semiconductors and cloud data centers.
The free flow of Nvidia’s top-end chips in China began to dry up in late 2022 after Washington imposed a first round of export restrictions. Nvidia offered scaled-down versions for Chinese buyers, but Washington further limited access to such chips in October. That move led to the cancellation of hundreds of thousands of Nvidia orders, worth at least $5 billion.
Some Chinese companies have considered temporary solutions that can help them survive the U.S. restrictions until local chip makers such as Huawei Technologies are capable of making better alternatives, people familiar with the matter say.
The precise scale of the informal market for Nvidia’s advanced chips couldn’t be learned but is believed to be relatively small compared with the overall market. One estimate put the median number of AI chips smuggled annually at 12,500, according to an analysis by the Center for a New American Security, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. However, Nvidia sold worldwide last year an estimated more than 2.6 million A100 and H100 chips, along with their scaled-down versions, according to tech research firm Omdia.
COMMENT – For more on the efforts to sidestep U.S. export controls on advanced AI chips and smuggle them into the PRC listen to James Kynge’s FT podcast Tech Tonic from June 11, 2024, “China’s Race to Tech Supremacy: Chatbots and Chips.”
One thing I’ve learned from the last dozen years focused on the PRC is that Beijing’s leaders are deeply committed to the idea that technology will solve the country’s problems and make them powerful.
In one sense it’s the kind of techno-utopianism that a Silicon Valley VC would drone on about at the Milken Institute or some Bloomberg conference held in the Gulf. Spinning yarns about the endless frontiers of technology.
But unlike the Silicon Valley VC, the PRC’s form of techno-utopianism is married to a reinvigorated Leninism, which exercises complete control over the second largest economy and the world’s largest manufacturing base. We can see the effects of this techno-utopianism in the individuals Xi picked as his subordinates during the 20th Party Congress in late 2022 (WSJ, “China’s Xi Stacks Government With Science and Tech Experts Amid Rivalry With U.S.”, November 18, 2022). And we can see it reflected in the industrial policies the country pursues and its obsession with pouring money into the latest technological fad. As the Party begins their Third Plenum in a week, don’t be surprised if instead of addressing economic reforms head-on that the Party’s solution is more technology.
I’m sure that Xi and his cadres see all of this as an enormous strength (it is certainly critical to their strategy of overcoming the United States), but I suspect that they have over-indexed on technology as a solution and its extremely difficult to see how they could self-correct.
It reminds me of the cognitive bias that Abraham Maslow pointed out in his famous line: “if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”
3. Decoding China: How Beijing is Sinicizing Islam
Dang Yuan, DW, June 28, 2024
Around 17 million Muslims currently live in China, according to the Washington-based think tank Pew Research. Most of them are Shiites. The largest Muslim communities are those of the Hui and the Uyghurs, each with just under eight million people.
Like the Christian churches, Muslims in China are not allowed to maintain direct contacts with foreign countries. "Only the 'patriotic' religious associations are allowed to become legally active within their temples, churches, mosques and registered meeting places, in accordance with detailed administrative regulations. To do so, they must adapt to the socialist state," writes the German Federal Agency for Civic Education.
The last big mosque in China that still retained Arabic-style features lost its domes in February, the British daily The Guardian reported. The minarets of the mosque in Shadian in the southwestern province of Yunnan were also radically altered to a Chinese architectural style.
"In Chinese history, there have been many emperors and statesmen who focused on controlling and ruling the people. That's why they put all religions under state supervision," said historian and philosopher Qin Guoshang.
"They took measures to weaken the influence of divine power by suppressing heretical ideas and beliefs, introducing state-controlled religions and restricting religious activities." It is no different in China today, Qin added.
Islam yes, but controlled
The mosque in Xian strikes a distinct visual appearance, marking it apart from traditional Islamic architecture.
Its defining element — the minaret — is designed like a pagoda. The prayer hall also follows the traditional Chinese style.
The compulsion to renovate and redesign mosques shows how freedom of religion is massively restricted in China.
In Chinese history, the demand for adaptation was always a political requirement.
According to a popular saying, for instance, nine out of 10 Huis have the surname "Ma."
The surname is common in China and goes back to the Prophet Muhammad.
For the first emperor of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang (1328-1398), the surname Mu Han Mu De (Muhammad) was not Chinese enough.
He decreed that people of other faiths had to adopt a Chinese surname, marry locals and renounce their own traditional customs and costumes. This meant that the Hui had to shorten their surname and bow to imperial power.
4. New Tactic in China’s Information War: Harassing a Critic’s Child in the U.S.
Steven Lee Myers and Tiffany Hsu, New York Times, June 27, 2024
A covert campaign to target a writer critical of the country’s Communist Party has extended to sexually suggestive threats against his 16-year-old daughter.
Deng Yuwen, a prominent Chinese writer who now lives in exile in the suburbs of Philadelphia, has regularly criticized China and its authoritarian leader, Xi Jinping. China’s reaction of late has been severe, with crude and ominously personal attacks online.
A covert propaganda network linked to the country’s security services has barraged not just Mr. Deng but also his teenage daughter with sexually suggestive and threatening posts on popular social media platforms, according to researchers at both Clemson University and Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram.
The content, posted by users with fake identities, has appeared in replies to Mr. Deng’s posts on X, the social platform, as well as the accounts of public schools in their community, where the daughter, who is 16, has been falsely portrayed as a drug user, an arsonist and a prostitute.
“I tried to delete these posts,” Mr. Deng said of the attacks online, speaking in Mandarin Chinese in an interview, “but I didn’t succeed, because today you try to delete and tomorrow they just switch to new accounts to leave attacking text and language.”
Vulgar comments targeting the girl have also shown up on community pages on Facebook and even sites like TripAdvisor; Patch, a community news platform; and Niche, a website that helps parents choose schools, according to the researchers.
The harassment fits a pattern of online intimidation that has raised alarms in Washington, as well as Canada and other countries where China’s attacks have become increasingly brazen. The campaign has included thousands of posts the researchers have linked to a network of social media accounts known as Spamouflage or Dragonbridge, an arm of the country’s vast propaganda apparatus.
China has long sought to discredit Chinese critics, but targeting a teenager in the United States is an escalation, said Darren Linvill, a founder of the Media Forensics Hub at Clemson, whose researchers documented the campaign against Mr. Deng. Federal law prohibits severe online harassment or threats, but that appears to be no deterrent to China’s efforts.
“There’s no question that this crosses a line that they hadn’t previously crossed,” Mr. Linvill said. “I think that suggests that the lines are becoming meaningless.”
China’s propaganda apparatus has also stepped up attacks against the United States more broadly, including efforts to discredit President Biden ahead of the presidential election in November.
5. Satellite Images Show Expansion of Suspected Chinese Spy Bases in Cuba
Warren P. Strobel, Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2024
Images captured from space show the growth of Cuba’s electronic eavesdropping stations that are believed to be linked to China, including new construction at a previously unreported site about 70 miles from the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, according to a new report.
The study from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank, follows reporting last year by The Wall Street Journal that China and Cuba were negotiating closer defense and intelligence ties, including establishing a new joint military training facility on the island and an eavesdropping facility.
At the time, the Journal reported that Cuba and China were already jointly operating eavesdropping stations on the island, according to U.S. officials, who didn’t disclose their locations. It couldn’t be determined which, if any, of those are included in the sites covered by the CSIS report.
COMMENT – Last year when an unnamed Biden Administration official admitted that the PRC had been operating a spy base in Cuba since 2019, the same unnamed official stated that the Administration had stepped up efforts to thwart the PRC’s spying efforts.
I guess that didn’t work.
6. France asks two Chinese spies to leave after attempt to forcibly repatriate man
Jacques Follorou, Le Monde, July 3, 2024
The top official in Paris of the Ministry of State Security, the Chinese intelligence agency, and his deputy have been asked to leave the country.
The order came from the Elysée Palace but had to remain secret so as not to offend Beijing. The head of the Paris office of the Ministry of State Security (MSE, or Guoanbu), the Chinese intelligence agency, and his deputy were asked to leave France. Paris had accused them of orchestrating an attempt to forcibly repatriate a political dissident in March. Chinese officials said it was a misunderstanding and worked hard to demonstrate their good faith. To no avail. The information was confirmed to Le Monde by the French Foreign Ministry, which explained that the process being used in this case was "by mutual agreement."
On March 22, an unusual scene drew the attention of France's border police, the DNPAF, at Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle airport. As the police looked on, a man was being restrained by a group of seven individuals who were leading him toward the boarding gates despite his resistance. The intervention of the border police put an end to a plan to forcibly repatriate back to China 26-year-old Chinese dissident Ling Huazhan, described by France DGSI domestic intelligence agency as "a psychologically fragile person."
After an investigation, it emerged that the leader of the kidnapping group was none other than the head of the MSE post in France. Like all foreign liaison officers, he was registered as such with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and holds an official passport which guarantees him diplomatic immunity. His deputy enjoys similar protection.
'Pressure'
Ling lived a solitary and precarious existence near the Saint Lazare train station, having fled to Europe as a refugee. He'd been targeted by China for "actions offensive to the Chinese president," for anti-Xi Jinping graffiti and for defacing posters bearing Xi's likeness. He also shared articles critical of the Chinese regime on social media. His passport was withheld as a means of pressure to get him to the airport.
COMMENT – Trying to keep this stuff secret so as not to offend Beijing is a losing strategy. The only way to deter these kinds of activities is to shine a bright public spotlight on them. The Party will hate it and complain bitterly, likely retaliate as well, but it will force them to recalculate the costs and benefits of going after critics in foreign countries.
7. China Is Finally Starting to Do Something About the U.S. Fentanyl Crisis
Brian Spegele, Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2024
China is taking tentative new steps to help disrupt the global supply chain fueling the opioid crisis after intensifying criticism from the U.S. that its chemical factories are partly responsible for the deadly scourge.
After a long freeze in joint counternarcotics work between the countries, President Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping pledged to resume cooperation at a summit in California last November. Since then, Chinese authorities have quietly shut down some sellers of precursor chemicals used by Mexican cartels to make fentanyl and say they are close to imposing new regulations sought by the U.S. on three additional chemicals.
Meanwhile, Chinese police, acting on U.S. intelligence, recently arrested a suspect the U.S. says was involved in money laundering for Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel.
“We are seeing some meaningful steps,” a senior Biden administration official said. “There is a lot more to do. But we are encouraged particularly by the actions of the last couple of weeks.”
COMMENT – Another frustrating and poorly researched article on this problem.
Just unnamed officials saying its getting better with no acknowledgement of Beijing’s culpability through tax rebates and subsidies for exporting fentanyl precusors.
Authoritarianism
8. Xi and Putin set out ambitions for Eurasian security club
Pavel Mikheyev, Reuters, July 4, 2024
China's President Xi Jinping and Russia's Vladimir Putin pressed their case on Thursday for closer security, political and economic cooperation between countries of the vast Eurasian region as a counterweight to Western alliances.
They were speaking on the second and final day of a summit in the Kazakh capital Astana of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a club launched in 2001 by Russia, China and Central Asian states and now including India, Iran and Pakistan.
"SCO members should consolidate unity and jointly oppose external interference in the face of the real challenges of interference and division," Xinhua news agency quoted Xi as saying, warning against the West's "Cold War mentality".
President Putin, in his address to the SCO, reiterated Russia's call for "a new architecture of cooperation, indivisible security and development in Eurasia, designed to replace the outdated Eurocentric and Euro-Atlantic models, which gave unilateral advantages only to certain states".
He once again blamed the West for the war in Ukraine and said Russia was ready to freeze the conflict if Kyiv and its backers accepted Moscow's terms for talks.
Putin said last month the proposed new Eurasian security pact should be open to all countries across the region, including current NATO members. But the aim, he said, should be to gradually remove all external military presence from Eurasia, a clear reference to the United States.
COMMENT – As soon as I saw this photo from the SCO meeting, I immediately thought of this.
My apologies to Peter Scolari and Tom Hanks.
Xi and Putin really have become quite close, they look genuinely happy to be together. For all the talk about underlying tensions between the two countries and the long history of suspicion across the Sino-Russian border, I think we have to understand that personal relationships between dictators are extremely important and can overcome enormous historical obstacles.
9. A growing club led by Xi and Putin to counter the US is adding a staunchly pro-Russia member
Nectar Gan, CNN, July 2, 2024
A club of Eurasian countries spearheaded by China and Russia to advance their leaders’ vision of an alternative world order is set to expand again this week – this time adding a staunch Russian ally that has openly supported Moscow’s war on Ukraine.
The expected admission of Belarus to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) at its annual leaders’ summit in Astana, Kazakhstan is another push by Beijing and Moscow to transform the grouping – from a regional security bloc into a geopolitical counterweight to Western institutions led by the United States and its allies.
Belarus, which helped Russia to launch its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, will become the latest authoritarian state to join the club, after Iran became a full member last year.
COMMENT – Of note, Indian Prime Minister Modi skipped this year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit.
The SCO now numbers 10 countries, with Belarus joining this year (members since 2001: PRC, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; members since 2017: India and Pakistan; member since 2023: Iran; member in 2024: Belarus).
Will North Korea join next year?
10. VIDEO – The Organization That Xi and Putin Use to Oppose the West
Reid Standish, Radio Free Europe, July 2, 2024
11. Putin and Xi to meet at SCO summit to bolster security and counter the US
Pavel Mikheyev, Reuters, July 3, 2024
12. Italy seizes Chinese-made military drones destined for Libya
Alvise Armellini, Reuters, July 2, 2024
Italian authorities intercepted and seized two Chinese-made military drones that were destined for Libya and disguised as wind turbine equipment, Italy's customs police and customs agency said on Tuesday.
The disassembled drones were found in six containers at the port of Gioia Tauro in the southern region of Calabria, concealed among replicas of wind turbine blades, a joint statement said.
The material was impounded given that civil war-stricken Libya is subject to an international arms embargo, it added.
13. US Allies Say China Is Developing Attack Drones for Russia
Alberto Nardelli, Jennifer Jacobs, and Alex Wickham, Bloomberg, July 2, 2024
Chinese and Russian companies are developing an attack drone similar to an Iranian model deployed in Ukraine, European officials familiar with the matter said, a sign that Beijing may be edging closer to providing the sort of lethal aid that western officials have warned against.
The companies held talks in 2023 about collaborating to replicate Iran’s Shahed drone, and started developing and testing a version this year in preparation for shipment to Russia, said the officials, who asked not to be identified to discuss private information.
14. China begins smartphone inspections as part of espionage law
Yukio Tajima, Nikkei Asia, July 1, 2024
Chinese national security authorities will have greater power to inspect smartphones and other electronic devices beginning Monday, one year after a stronger anti-espionage law took effect, raising fears that foreigners will face such inspections upon entering the country.
The new espionage law broadens the information covered to anything involving "national security and interests." National security authorities now are permitted to inspect baggage and electronic devices simply on suspicion of espionage.
15. Firms weigh removing Taiwan staff from China after death penalty threat
Laurie Chen, Reuters, July 4, 2024
Some foreign companies are considering moving Taiwanese employees out of China after Beijing said it could impose the death penalty on "diehard" Taiwan independence separatists, said four people familiar with the matter.
The new guidelines have caused some Taiwanese expatriates and foreign multinationals operating in China to scramble to assess their legal risks and exposure, said the people, who include a lawyer and two executives with direct knowledge of the discussions.
COMMENT – Probably a good idea for foreign companies to move all their operations outside the PRC, not just their Taiwanese staff.
16. Ex-Bar Association chair says he left Hong Kong after being warned by nat. sec. police of possible sedition charge
Hans Tse, Hong Kong Free Press, June 28, 2024
The former chairperson of the Hong Kong Bar Association has said he left the city two years ago after being warned by national security police that he could be charged for sedition over his past comments in a book and on a social media platform.
Paul Harris, who was a senior counsel in the city who served as the association’s chair in 2021, said his decision to leave Hong Kong was expedited by an interview under caution with the national security department of the police in early-March 2022, in which he was told that the force was considering charging him for sedition.
In his first media interview since leaving Hong Kong soon after that interview, Harris said he was told by the police that his book Freedom’s Banner: How Peaceful Demonstrations Have Changed the World contained “seditious” comments about the 2019 protests and unrest, according to a video uploaded on Wednesday by UK-based Green Bean Media.
17. Jailed Hong Kong protester files first legal challenge against new security law after early release axed
Hans Tse, Hong Kong Free Press, June 25, 2024
18. Handover Day: New security law a ‘sharp sword’ says Hong Kong’s John Lee, as leader hails 1 Country, 2 Systems
Kelly Ho, Hong Kong Free Press, July 1, 2024
19. A pivotal moment for China’s Communist Party
The Economist, June 27, 2024
Will the Communist Party save China’s storm-blown economy? That is the question on the minds of investors, analysts and businessfolk—as well as ordinary Chinese. It is being asked with increasing urgency, as the sectors that powered the country’s long economic boom look ever more vulnerable. Doubts are growing whether China’s rulers are willing to design and execute an effective response. When the party’s 376-member Central Committee convenes on July 15th, it will be a chance for China’s leaders to ease such concerns. It seems as likely, though, that the meeting will only highlight the gap between the party’s lofty rhetoric and its disappointing actions.
The meeting in July will have all the same trappings of past party conclaves. Amid red carpets and party standards, men in drab suits (over 90% of the committee is male) will honour the latest party-speak about “high-quality development” and “new productive forces”. The outcome will then be summarised in a cryptic communiqué that will be pored over by analysts and party apparatchiks.
20. Solo demos, heavy police presence as Hong Kong sees 5th year without protest march on Handover anniversary
Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, July 2, 2024
21. 'Silver' protest democracy activist keeps marching for Hong Kong
Alice Yam and Matthew Leung, RFA, June 26, 2024
22. Hong Kong officials want louder singing of national anthem in schools
Matthew Leung and Lee Heung Yeung, RFA, June 27, 2024
Hong Kong's Education Bureau has criticized the city's schoolchildren for their "weak" singing of China's national anthem, the "March of the Volunteers," at flag-raising ceremonies that are now compulsory as part of patriotic "national security" education from kindergarten through to universities.
In an annual report published last month, the Bureau commented on schools' staging of the ceremonies, which it said were part of "enhancing national identity."
"When participating in flag-raising ceremonies, flag-bearers were skilled and energetic," the assessment said. "Most of the students behaved solemnly and showed appropriate etiquette."
But the scene was apparently lacking a certain je ne sais quoi, according to the inspection team.
"Teachers and students sang the national anthem together, but the singing was slightly weak," the report found. "Schools must strengthen students’ confidence and habit of singing the national anthem and continue to make progress through multiple means."
Hong Kong passed a law in 2020 making it illegal to insult China's national anthem on pain of up to three years' imprisonment, following a series of incidents in which Hong Kong soccer fans booed their own anthem in the stadium.
Being able to sing the national anthem with more enthusiasm would "deepen students' understanding of and identification with their country," the Education Bureau inspectors said.
Schools for learning disabilities
While criticizing the overall program of patriotic "national security education" in schools could land people in trouble in today's Hong Kong, the inspectors did spark a backlash over their complaint that there was insufficient national security education at schools for children with learning disabilities.
The inspectors had singled out the Po Leung Kuk Laws Foundation School, which provides special education for children with severe intellectual disabilities.
"While the school has set up a flag-raising team ... they were only able to connect a small number of subjects with national security education," the school's evaluation said of the school.
Another special school, Caritas Lok Kwan School in Shatin for children with moderate intellectual disabilities, was criticized for failing to fully cover the Chinese constitution and Hong Kong's Basic Law in general knowledge classes. The report requested a "full review of national security education" at the school, which provides education, therapy, boarding facilities and family support service for children aged 6 to 18 with severe intellectual disability, according to its listing on the Education Bureau website.
COMMENT – Nothing says desperate and paranoid quite like complaining that children with severe learning disabilities aren’t patriotic enough.
Hong Kong is becoming a dystopian hellscape.
23. An Uproar Over a Chinese Doping Case, Except in China
David Pierson, New York Times, July 3, 2024
Chinese state news and social media has been virtually silent about 23 swimmers secretly testing positive in 2021, even as the issue is being debated widely abroad, including in Congress.
In past years, when athletes from China have been accused of doping, the government has mobilized its propaganda apparatus of state-owned newspapers, television commentators and social media accounts to defend the athletes and deflect criticism of China’s sports system.
This time, faced with anger from rival Olympians and charges of a coverup over the revelation that 23 elite Chinese swimmers had tested positive for a banned substance before competing in the 2021 Olympic Games, China is taking a different approach: virtual silence.
Even as the issue is being debated widely abroad, including in Congress last week, Chinese domestic media coverage has been limited to a handful of terse official statements. Censors have meticulously scrubbed and limited online discussions of the dispute — a level of censorship experts say is rare outside the most politically sensitive topics.
The change of tactic, experts say, reflects what is at stake for China weeks before the Olympic Games start in Paris. Eleven of the 23 swimmers who tested positive in 2021 have been named to the squad heading to Paris. Swimming is one of China’s most high-profile sports, which Beijing invested heavily in over the decades to turn the country into an Olympic powerhouse.
China has denied the accusations of wrongdoing. It has long sought to clean up its sports sector, stepping up testing after doping scandals in the 1990s and early 2000s. That makes suggestions of a cover-up highly embarrassing for China, where athletic competition has an outsize role in burnishing the image of the ruling Chinese Communist Party.
“There is basically zero media coverage of this in China, which is very different from before when other Chinese athletes have been accused of doping,” said Haozhou Pu, an associate professor at the University of Dayton who studies sports in China.
Mr. Pu said officials are most likely hoping the story, which was reported by The New York Times in April, dies down before the start of the Olympics so that it does not distract the Chinese public or China’s swim team. That may explain China’s restrained response, Mr. Pu said.
“No news could be good news,” Mr. Pu said.
When China’s most famous swimmer, Sun Yang, was accused of doping in 2018, state media scrutinized the fairness of the investigation with extensive coverage, and social media users were allowed to leave hundreds of thousands of comments voicing support for Mr. Sun.
24. Bain’s new boss says consultancy pulling back from work in China
Simon Foy and Stephen Foley, Financial Times, June 29, 2024
25. Global investment banks cut jobs in China retreat
Kaye Wiggins, Cheng Leng, and Thomas Hale, Financial Times, July 1, 2024
26. Censorship and isolation as China bans thousands of mobile apps
Oiwan Lam, Global Voices, June 25, 2024
Environmental Harms
27. ‘Wartime’ situation as worst flooding in 70 years hits county in central China
Coy Li, South China Morning Post, July 2, 2024
28. China sets up new state body to drill deep for oil and gas reserves
Reuters, July 1, 2024
29. LNG is not displacing coal in China's power mix
Sam Reynolds, Christopher Doleman, and Ghee Peh, Institute for Energy Economics, June 25, 2024
One of the most common arguments to justify investments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and promote consumption globally is that LNG provides a “bridge” to clean energy by displacing carbon-intensive coal usage. Proponents often point to China — the world’s largest coal consumer and LNG importer — as a key example of where LNG can supplant coal-fired generation, while life-cycle assessments associated with natural gas and LNG typically focus on coal displacement in the power sector.
This report examines claims about the role of LNG in displacing coal in China’s power mix — the country’s largest coal-consuming sector — by focusing on national energy sector developments over the past decade. It finds little evidence to support arguments that LNG imports to China will meaningfully displace coal usage in the country’s power mix due to the following reasons:
#1 - Rising LNG imports to China over the last decade have not reduced or slowed the country’s coal consumption.
#2 - The growth of renewables generation, not gas or LNG-fired power, has eroded the share of coal generation in China’s power mix.
#3 - China relies on domestically produced resources, rather than LNG, for energy security and reliability.
#4 - On a cost basis, LNG is too expensive to materially displace coal in power generation.
30. China Stops Publishing Data Highlighting Solar Power Constraints
Bloomberg, June 30, 2024
China appears to have stopped publishing data that highlight the extent to which power generated by solar and wind plants is being wasted as rapid renewable energy expansion runs up against constrained grids.
The National Energy Administration typically publishes a monthly power report that includes a section detailing average utilization for each generating source. For much of this year, the figures had pointed to reduced solar panel usage, as overloaded networks forced them to shut down during peak generating hours.
Foreign Interference and Coercion
31. How Taiwan fights the disinformation war
Huynh Tam Sang, Tong Thai Thien, Le Thi Yen Nhi, Lowy Institute, June 20, 2024
32. China Is Afraid of International Law—And Planning a Counter-Offensive
Jill Goldenziel, Forbes, June 30, 2024
33. China seizes Taiwan boat with crew for illegal fishing
Rupert Wingfield-Hayes and Fan Wang, BBC, July 3, 2024
China has said it seized a Taiwanese boat, which had five crew members on board, for illegally fishing in its territorial waters on Tuesday night.
Taiwan has asked China to release the vessel - and the men, two Taiwanese and three Indonesians - which is being held at Weitou, a port in the south-east.
Taiwanese officials have confirmed to the BBC that the boat was seized inside China’s territorial waters, about 2.8 nautical miles (5.1km) off its coast. It was also operating during China's annual summer-time fishing ban from May to August.
"The fishing vessel violated the fishing moratorium regulations and trawled illegally within the... prohibited area," Liu Dejun, spokesperson of the China Coast Guard, said.
COMMENT – The hypocrisy that the PRC, of all countries, would complain about illegal fishing.
34. Japan confirms China set up buoy over its southern continental shelf
Kyodo News, July 5, 2024
The Japanese government said Friday it has confirmed China has installed a buoy in the high seas over Japan's southern continental shelf in the Pacific Ocean, in a move that could further strain bilateral relations.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi told a news conference it was "regrettable" that China has set up a small buoy in the waters off Japan's western main island of Shikoku and north of the southernmost Okinotori Island "without explaining its purpose and other details."
The government has urged China not to undermine Japan's maritime interests, with Beijing responding that it installed the buoy to monitor tsunami and does not intend to infringe upon Tokyo's sovereignty over the continental shelf, the top government spokesman said.
Japan confirmed that the Chinese survey ship Xiang Yang Hong 22 set up the buoy in mid-June while monitoring the vessel as it sailed through Japan's exclusive economic zone in the East China Sea, a government source said. The open-sea area in question is surrounded by Japan's EEZ.
Hayashi said the Japanese government will continue to collect related information and analyze it.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said the buoy, which is to monitor tsunami, was set up in the high seas "for the purposes of scientific research and serving public good" and doing so is "a well-established international practice" based on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.
"Japan has no right to interfere in such activities," she told a press conference in Beijing.
Last July, China installed another buoy inside Japan's EEZ near the Tokyo-controlled, Beijing-claimed uninhabited Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, prompting Japan to lodge a protest and demand its immediate removal.
Mao said that as the islands, which Beijing calls Diaoyu, are part of China's territory and its surrounding waters are under the country's jurisdiction, it is "legitimate and lawful for China to set up hydrological and meteorological data buoys in those areas."
China has been intensifying its military activities and maritime assertiveness in the regional waters, with Japan protesting against repeated intrusions by Chinese ships into Japanese waters around the Senkakus.
COMMENT – It is as if Beijing is purposefully antagonizing all of its neighbors simultaneously.
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
35. NCA failure to investigate imports linked to forced Uyghur labour unlawful, court rules
Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, June 27, 2024
36. China rejects key Western calls for human-rights reforms at U.N. meeting
Emma Farge, Reuters, July 4, 2024
China on Thursday rejected Western-led recommendations for human-rights reforms including calls for greater freedoms in Hong Kong and for Uyghurs in Xinjiang, but accepted others from allies, as it sought to defend its record at a U.N. meeting.
The U.N. Human Rights Council session in Geneva caps off a review process in which Beijing has strived to fend off criticism following a 2022 U.N. report which said the detention of Uyghurs and other Muslims in China's Xinjiang region may constitute crimes against humanity. China denies any abuses.
The council's president, Omar Zniber, said China had accepted nearly 70% of the more than 400 reform recommendations it received as part of the U.N. review.
"Progress and development on human rights is achieved in China with each passing day," China's ambassador, Chen Xu, told the meeting, alongside a large delegation of Chinese diplomats and officials. He said it rejected recommendations that were "politically motivated based on disinformation, ideologically biased or interfering in China's traditional sovereignty" and condemned what he called an attempt to "smear and attack" it.
Yet China's critics say its high acceptance rate is misleading, with one Western diplomat alleging the country had "stacked the deck" by investing political capital in quelling criticism.
Reuters previously reported that China had lobbied non-Western countries to praise its record by asking them to make "constructive recommendations."
British ambassador Simon Manley complained to the council that China had rejected each and every one of its recommendations, including a call for an end to persecutions of Uyghurs and for the Hong Kong security law to be repealed.
U.S. Human Rights Ambassador Michèle Taylor also voiced disappointment at what she called China's refusal to take action.
"China's abuses constitute a rejection of U.N. assessments and recommendations and violate or undermine international commitments," she said. Other countries were more upbeat, including Russia's envoy who praised China's "constructive approach" and Gambia's envoy who lauded the country's progress.
The U.N. review of China is not unique and all countries undergo the process every few years at the council - the only intergovernmental body designed to protect human rights worldwide.
An attempt to hold a debate about the U.N. High Commissioner's China report was voted down by mostly non-Western members later in 2022 - a result seen as a diplomatic victory for Beijing.
COMMENT – Interesting tactic by Beijing, lobby friendly countries to make “recommendations” to the Human Rights Council that Beijing agrees with and can “accept” so that the PRC is perceived as “accepting” a majority of the UN’s recommendations.
For example, Iran had the audacity to make this recommendation: “continue to protect the cultural rights of ethnic minorities.”
37. Oral statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council
International Federation for Human Rights, July 4, 2024
FIDH is disappointed by the fact that, once again, China’s government has used the UPR to rebuff international concern over serious human rights violations, issue blanket denials, and make blatantly false statements.
The government accepted - wholly or partially - 70% of the UPR recommendations China received in January 2024. This represents a 12% drop in the proportion of recommendations the government accepted compared to the previous UPR in 2018.
In a worrying sign of the government’s outright refusal to heed the mounting international concern over key human rights issues, of the 130 recommendations it did not accept, an unprecedented number - 98 - were categorized as “rejected.”
The government accepted only one third of the recommendations it received on human right issues in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang - in many cases claiming they were based on “false information,” despite many verified reports, including by UN experts. For example, the government had the audacity to call “illegal” the 2022 OHCHR assessment on Xinjiang.
Despite well-documented evidence to the contrary, the government claimed that many of the recommendations it accepted were being implemented or had already been implemented. Such was the case regarding the accepted recommendations related to human rights in Hong Kong, Tibet, and Xinjiang, and the situation of human rights defenders, lawyers, civil society, media, and journalists. The government also made the false claim that it protected “freedom of speech, association and assembly” and “the lawful rights of all citizens as equals.”
We are equally disappointed by the government’s refusal to accept all recommendations concerning the death penalty and protection of North Korean refugees and most of the recommendations on LGBTIQ+ rights.
FIDH urges the government to reverse course and use the fourth UPR to address the concerns voiced by numerous UN member states without delay by implementing all the recommendations that are consistent with its obligations under international human rights law.
COMMENT – Every country in the United Nations is required to go through a review of its human rights record every four years, called a Universal Periodic Review (UPR). This year was the PRC’s turn and it was held back in January, the event held in Geneva on Thursday was the “adoption event” in which the PRC responded to the recommendations from the report in January.
Here is how PRC state media outlet, Xinhua, reported the session: China completes 4th Universal Periodic Review at UN Human Rights Council.
According to Xinhua:
“At the adoption meeting, many countries such as Russia, Venezuela, Uzbekistan, Gambia, and Vietnam gave positive evaluations of China's efforts and achievements in advancing human rights.
They commended China's open and sincere participation in the 4th round of the UPR and acknowledged that China had accepted the majority of the recommendations in line with its national conditions and the desires of its people.
After the adoption of China's report, the meeting hall erupted in enthusiastic applause, and many country representatives extended their congratulations to the Chinese delegation.
China attended the 4th round of the UPR this January. Over 120 countries actively praised the progress in China's human rights endeavors and fully recognized China's persistent efforts in promoting and protecting human rights.
UPR serves as a crucial platform for countries to engage in equitable and candid discussions on human rights matters within the framework of the UN, fostering constructive dialogue and collaboration.”
38. Latest UN review displays China’s disregard for human rights, UN findings
International Service for Human Rights, July 4, 2024
At the adoption of the report of its fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR), China ignored calls to implement UN findings and dismissed all serious criticism of its human rights record, refusing to budge on the documented plight of Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, human rights activists, lawyers, and more. We urged China to genuinely engage with the UN to enact meaningful reforms.
39. Chinese Feminist Activists in Nine Cities Rally in Support of Imprisoned Rights Activists Huang Xueqin and Wang Jianbing
Cindy Carter, China Digital Times, June 26, 2024
40. ‘Malicious’ conviction of #MeToo and labour activists shows Beijing’s growing fear of dissent
Amnesty International, June 14, 2024
41. China still arresting ‘thousands’ each year for practicing faith
Alex Willemyns, RFA, June 26, 2024
42. Tibetan political prisoner hospitalized following severe illness
RFA, June 28, 2024
43. Activists slam Euro 2024 for Chinese sponsors’ links to Uyghur forced labor
RFA, June 26, 2024
44. Roxie, one of China’s few lesbian bars, closes its doors
The Economist, June 27, 2024
45. U.S. Deports Chinese Migrants in First Large Flight Since 2018
Yan Zhuang, New York Times, July 3, 2024
COMMENT – If any group were deserving of refugee status its Chinese citizens fleeing an increasingly authoritarian regime in Beijing.
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
46. China says rare earths belong to state in new regulation
Shunsuke Tabeta, Nikkei Asia, June 29, 2024
47. Biden revoked 8 licenses for China's Huawei in 2024, document shows
Alexandra Alper, Reuters, July 2, 2024
The Biden administration has revoked eight licenses this year that had allowed some companies to ship goods to Chinese telecoms equipment giant Huawei, according to a document first reported by Reuters, as it seeks to pressure the resurgent company.
The Commerce Department, which oversees U.S. export policy, said in May it had revoked "certain" licenses, as first reported by Reuters, but did not specify the name or number of suppliers that were impacted. Licenses for Qualcomm and Intel were among those revoked, Reuters reported at the time.
"Since the beginning of 2024, (the Commerce Department) has revoked eight additional licenses involving Huawei," the agency said in the document, prepared in response to an inquiry by Republican Congressman Michael McCaul.
According to the document, license approvals for Huawei include "exercise equipment and office furniture and low-technology components for consumer mass-market items, such as touchpad and touchscreen sensors for tablets," which are widely available in China from Chinese and foreign sources, the Commerce Department said.
COMMENT – Would have been nice to see these licenses revoked three years ago, but I guess better late than never. My sense is that these would not have been revoked had it not been for significant and constant Congressional pressure on the Commerce Department who had been dragging their feet.
48. China cognac probe is a reaction to EU car tariffs, says Hennessy owner LVMH
Helen Reid, Reuters, July 6, 2024
China's anti-dumping probe into Europe's cognac industry is a tit-for-tat reaction to European Union tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles, the finance chief at Hennessy cognac owner LVMH said on Saturday.
China announced plans on Friday for a hearing on European brandy imports, ramping up tension on the same day the European Commission's provisional tariffs on Chinese-made electric vehicles took effect.
"You can be a regional player with a very particular role in globalisation, as in our case, and regardless find yourself hostage to a number of conflicts that have nothing to do with your activities," said Jean-Jacques Guiony, chief financial officer of the luxury conglomerate.
"Every time there is a stray bullet in a trade conflict somewhere […] there's a good chance that we end up having to negotiate, having to explain that we are not dumping, that the price of cognac is right," Guiony said.
COMMENT – One of the least surprising statements of the year.
49. Troubled Chinese developers face unprecedented wave of liquidation suits in Hong Kong
Yulu Ao, South China Morning Post, July 1, 2024
50. China ‘at risk’ of wider decoupling after US, EU as ASEAN trade partners balk at imports flood
Orange Wang, South China Morning Post, July 2, 2024
51. China’s Plastics Boom Is Set to Create Another Trade Headache
Bloomberg, July 1, 2024
52. Indonesia Seeks to Guard Textile Industry from Chinese Goods
Eko Listiyorini and Grace Sihombing, Bloomberg, July 2, 2024
Indonesia is preparing to impose tariffs and use other means to protect its textile industry from imports from China, the latest in a series of nations which are responding to the flood of goods out of the world’s largest manufacturing nation.
Local textile associations requested the government step in after imports surged, hurting their business. The trade safeguards committee is investigating the issue and once they report the government will decide how to respond, Budi Santoso, the trade ministry’s director-general of foreign trade, said on Monday.
It’s unclear whether the government is considering imposing only safeguard duties or also other tariffs, but last Thursday the head of fiscal policy at the finance ministry said that they were planning to bring back safeguard duties on some fabric products which had expired in November 2022. On Friday, Trade Minister Zulkifli Hasan said that Indonesia could impose up to 200% tariffs on imports to protect local industries from cheap goods from countries like China.
Southeast Asia’s largest economy has to balance the need to attract more foreign investment and trade from China and other countries while also ensuring local businesses remain competitive. China is the biggest source of imports and largest customer for Indonesian exports, and a substantial increase in levies could prompt a reaction from Beijing and damage those ties.
Earlier this year, the government in Jakarta was forced to roll back some import restrictions which had led to shortages and a backlog of imports at ports. Now, protests from thousands of textile workers are pushing the government to introduce new curbs, after the nation imported almost 29,000 tons of imports of woven fabrics made from artificial filament yarn last year. Goods from China accounted for most of that.
“We have actually provided many fiscal instruments to protect the textile industry, including safeguard duties and anti-dumping duties, which are usually related to unfair trade that harm the domestic industry,” said Febrio Kacaribu, head of fiscal policy agency at the finance ministry. The ministry would need to discuss with other ministries on any other import duties, he added.
“There has been no formal discussion with the Coordinating Ministry regarding any new import duty,” Haryo Limanseto, spokesman of Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, said on Tuesday. “Import duty policy, including any tariffs, may still be worked out by the Ministry of Trade and that will need to be discussed further across ministries.”
Indonesia has maintained an overall trade surplus for the last four years. However, the surplus with China flipped to a deficit in May, driven by imports of machinery and plastic goods.
COMMENT – As an economy that is completely dependent on exports to provide for economic growth, it is amazing how Beijing has antagonized its trading partners and continues to endanger its own future with beggar thy neighbor trade policies.
Indonesian leaders want to help their citizens move up the value chain of manufacturing and they can’t do that when the PRC dumps subsidized textiles on the Indonesian market and makes it hard for Indonesian workers and businesses to sell their own products in Indonesia (to say nothing of the other products Beijing is dumping which has flipped an Indonesian trade surplus with the PRC into a trade deficit).
Beijing is going to run into these same problems all across the developing world, as countries don’t want to be the dumping ground for the PRC’s massive overcapacity problem. As countries like Indonesia impose tariffs, Beijing will send more of its excess production to other developing markets and those countries will impose similar tariffs.
A quarter century of disregarding the global trading system is coming back to bite the PRC.
The bright spot is that the United States and the European Union would likely be happy to accept more exports from Indonesia if it meant reducing their trade dependence on the PRC.
53. China’s Investment Bankers Join the Communist Party as Morale (and Paychecks) Shrink
Cathy Chan, Bloomberg, July 2, 2024
54. Tesla's China-made EV sales fell for the third month in a row
William Gavin, Quartz, July 2, 2024
55. Elon Musk is giving India the cold shoulder and ghosting officials on Tesla investments
Kwan Wei Kevin Tan, Business Insider, July 5, 2024
India may no longer be a priority for Tesla and its CEO Elon Musk.
The mercurial billionaire's team hasn't engaged with the country's officials since he canceled his trip to India in April, Bloomberg reported on Thursday, citing people familiar with the matter.
"Unfortunately, very heavy Tesla obligations require that the visit to India be delayed, but I do very much look forward to visiting later this year," Musk said in an X post on April 20.
Bloomberg's sources also said India's government doesn't expect Tesla to make any investments anytime soon as the company is experiencing capital issues.
Tesla and India's heavy industry, finance, and commerce ministries did not respond to the outlet's requests for comment.
The report comes as a surprise, considering Tesla has long been eyeing India as a potential area for expansion.
In April, Reuters reported that the EV giant was planning to build a new factory in India as part of a $2 to $3 billion investment into the country. Musk was expected to announce the expansion plans during his planned visit to India.
But Musk did still end up traveling to another Asian country in April. The Tesla CEO made a surprise trip to China just a week after scrapping his trip to India, where he met the country's second-highest-ranking politician, Li Qiang.
COMMENT – I wonder if the next article has anything to do with Elon’s sudden disinterest in India. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
56. Tesla is now an official Chinese government car
Laura He, CNN, July 5, 2024
57. China’s trade landscape a battleground, as data shows tariff duels to escalate with WTO hamstrung
Mia Nulimaimaiti, South China Morning Post, July 3, 2024
58. Sara Hsu on China’s Economic Policy Under Xi Jinping
Shannon Tiezzi, The Diplomat, July 1, 2024
59. VIDEO – Chinese Imports Are Rising Again. Here’s What It Means for U.S. Jobs
Wall Street Journal, July 3, 2024
60. Microsoft Shuts Physical Stores in China in Shift to Online-Only Sales
Zhang Erchi and Han Wei, Caixin, July 2, 2024
61. The foreign investors left stranded in Evergrande’s web of Chinese debt
Thomas Hale, Wang Xueqiao, and Kaye Wiggins, Financial Times, June 30, 2024
62. Investors shy away from China’s ‘Taiwan Town’ as tensions rise
William Langley, Financial Times, June 29, 2024
63. Philippines courts investors for ‘China-free’ nickel supply chain
A. Anantha Lakshmi, Financial Times, June 29, 2024
64. Shein keeps option of Hong Kong IPO as back-up plan
Ivan Levingston, James Kynge, Eleanor Olcott, and James Fontanella-Khan, Financial Times, June 28, 2024
65. Shein, Temu Are Swamping Airfreight Capacity, Sending Rates Soaring
Paul Berger, Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2024
66. Amazon Takes on Chinese Rivals Temu and Shein with Plans for New Discount Service
Tracy Qu and Sherry Qin, Wall Street Journal, June 27, 2024
67. Chinese Rocket Crashes After Accidentally Launching During Test
Yan Zhuang and John Liu, New York Times, July 1, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
68. Huawei, semiconductor firm Wuhan Xinxin to develop high-bandwidth memory chips
Che Pan, South China Morning Post, July 1, 2024
69. Pentagon Has a Huawei Dilemma Congress Doesn’t Want to Solve
Daniel Flatley, Bloomberg, July 3, 2024
Military pushes to waive ban on anyone using Huawei equipment; ‘They’re lazy,’ a China hawk said of the Pentagon’s reluctance.
The Pentagon has a problem: How does one of the world’s largest employers avoid doing business with companies that rely on China’s Huawei Technologies Co., the world’s largest telecommunications provider?
So far, the Defense Department is saying that it can’t, despite a 2019 US law that barred it from contracting with anyone who uses Huawei equipment. The Pentagon’s push for an exemption is provoking a fresh showdown with Congress that defense officials warn could jeopardize national security if not resolved.
COMMENT – I suspect this reluctance resides within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (not the “military”)… the law has been on the books for more than five years.
70. AUDIO – China's race to tech supremacy: Chatbots & chips
James Kynge, Financial Times, June 11, 2024
Since the emergence of chatbots like ChatGPT, China has made building its own advanced AI a priority. But to build AI it needs the most advanced computer chips, and the US has banned companies from selling them to China.
The FT’s James Kynge visits China to find out how the country is turning to smuggling to get its hands on high-end chips for AI research. And he visits Chinese tech giant Huawei — one of the companies at the vanguard of China’s efforts to start making its own advanced AI chips.
71. A Hacker Stole OpenAI Secrets, Raising Fears That China Could, Too
Cade Metz, New York Times, July 4, 2024
72. UN adopts Chinese resolution with US support on closing the gap in access to artificial intelligence
Edith M. Lederer, Associated Press, July 2, 2024
73. China AI Startups Head to Singapore in Bid for Global Growth
Jane Zhang and Saritha Rai, Bloomberg, June 30, 2024
74. China’s National Power and Artificial Intelligence
Mercy A. Kuo, The Diplomat, July 1, 2024
75. China Plans Broader Push to Develop Tech Like Musk’s Neuralink
Foster Wong, Bloomberg, July 1, 2024
76. Competing for the Frontier: Benchmarking the US-China Technology Competition
Force Distance Times, June 27, 2024
77. China’s AI industrial chain: How does it stack up against other countries?
Force Distance Times, July 6, 2024
78. Huawei exec rejects idea that advanced chip shortage will hamper China's AI ambitions
Casey Hall, Reuters, July 4, 2024
A senior executive at Chinese technology giant Huawei (HWT.UL) on Thursday dismissed the idea that a shortage of the most advanced artificial intelligence chips will hinder the country's aim to be a leader in AI, but said innovation is needed to address the issue.
The comments by Zhang Ping'an, CEO of Huawei Cloud, comes amid tighter U.S. restrictions on advanced AI chip shipments to China including a ban on sales there by companies such as U.S. giant Nvidia.
79. Huawei's Harmony aims to end China's reliance on Windows, Android
David Kirton, Reuters, June 27, 2024
Military and Security Threats
80. Why China’s latest corruption probes hint at fury, betrayal over political disloyalty
William Zheng, South China Morning Post, June 28, 2024
81. How ready is China’s military? Dramatic downfall of two defense ministers raises questions
Nectar Gan, CNN, July 1, 2024
82. China anchors 'monster ship' in South China Sea, Philippine coast guard says
Neil Jerome Morales, Reuters, July 6, 2024
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said on Saturday that China's largest coastguard vessel has anchored in Manila's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea, and is meant to intimidate its smaller Asian neighbour.
The China coastguard's 165-meter 'monster ship' entered Manila's 200-nautical mile EEZ on July 2, spokesperson for the PCG Jay Tarriela told a news forum.
The PCG warned the Chinese vessel it was in the Philippine's EEZ and asked about their intentions, he said.
"It's an intimidation on the part of the China Coast Guard," Tarriela said. "We're not going to pull out and we're not going to be intimidated."
China's embassy in Manila and the Chinese foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment. China's coast guard has no publicly available contact information.
The Chinese ship, which has also deployed a small boat, was anchored 800 yards away from the PCG's vessel, Tarriela said.
COMMENT – Territorial aggression on the part of Beijing.
83. The Looming Crisis in the Taiwan Strait
Bonnie S. Glaser and Bonny Lin, Foreign Affairs, July 2, 2024
84. Japan’s Enhanced Security Engagement with the Pacific Islands
Céline Pajon, The Diplomat, July 1, 2024
85. Chinese Warships Sail Near U.S. Ally in Show of Force
Ryan Chan, Newsweek, July 2, 2024
As the United States military-led Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) drills—the world's largest international maritime exercise—kicked off in Hawaii on Friday, China sent three groups of naval vessels including destroyers and a spy ship to the Pacific Ocean through major waterways near U.S. ally Japan.
North of Hokkaido island on Monday, two Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy vessels transited the La Perouse Strait headed east from the Sea of Japan into the Sea of Okhotsk, a marginal sea in the Western Pacific.
86. Taiwan reports more Chinese military activity, calls for de-escalation
Ben Blanchard, Reuters, July 4, 2024
Taiwan on Friday reported renewed Chinese military activity nearby with another "combat patrol" as the government called on Beijing not to escalate tensions after the seizure of a Taiwanese fishing boat.
China, which views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory, has stepped up its pressure over the past four years, both militarily and politically.
On Tuesday, Chinese officials boarded and detained a Taiwanese fishing boat for illegally operating in the country's waters, in what a senior Taiwan official said may be act of psychological warfare.
87. Cambodia Denies Hosting Chinese Naval Base, but Two Ships Raise Suspicions
Austin Ramzy, Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2024
88. Beijing and Manila hold talks to defuse South China Sea tensions
Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, July 2, 2024
89. Chinese Navy Holds Rare Twin Carrier Exercise in Contested Waters
Ryan Chan, Newsweek, July 3, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
90. US intervened in Congo mine sale to Chinese arms group
Tom Wilson and Harry Dempsey, Financial Times, July 5, 2024
The US has intervened in the sale of a Congolese copper mine to a Chinese arms manufacturer in an effort to prevent Beijing from further increasing its control of critical minerals, according to people familiar with the matter.
US officials encouraged the Democratic Republic of Congo’s state-owned miner Gécamines to review the sale, announced last week, of Trafigura-backed Chemaf Resources to Norin Mining, a subsidiary of China’s state-owned defence company Norinco, the people said.
The move is part of Washington’s efforts to improve access to metals for US-friendly companies amid increasingly fierce competition between the west and China for control of the minerals needed for clean energy infrastructure. The US state department did not respond to a request for a comment.
Chemaf leases the permit for its flagship project Mutoshi from Gécamines. The state-owned miner claimed that it should have been informed of the deal in advance and that any change in “direct or indirect” control could not take place without its approval.
Gécamines said in a statement on Monday that its board vetoed the deal after learning of it through the media.
91. Xi Jinping meets Russia's Putin, backs Kazakhstan joining BRICS
Ck Tan, Nikkei Asia, July 3, 2024
92. China gifts South Pacific nation Vanuatu new presidential palace in move likely to ignite concerns over Beijing's reach
Hong Kong Free Press, July 2, 2024
Opinion Pieces
93. As China backslides on women’s rights, the U.S. can step up
Raja Krishnamoorthi and Kathy Castor, Washington Post, July 1, 2024
94. Goodbye Shanghai: reflections on five years at China's gateway
CK Tan, Nikkei Asia, July 3, 2024
95. Asia is set to embrace protectionism in face of China's overcapacity
Sonal Varma, Nikkei Asia, July 2, 2024
96. Have China’s Wolf Warriors Gone Extinct?
Tyler Jost, Foreign Affairs, June 27, 2024
97. China-European Union relations: Expectations for 2024 and beyond
Charles Parton, Council on Geostrategy, June 25, 2024
98. Making Sense of Xi’s Claim That the US Is ‘Goading’ China to Invade Taiwan
Corey Lee Bell, The Diplomat, June 27, 2024