China Articles - April 17, 2022
Friends,
This week’s issue starts with an OpEd from former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe recommending that in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the shifting geopolitical landscape that the United States should end its policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’ and openly commit to the defense of Taiwan. He believes that it is no longer stabilizing for the United States to be ambiguous about its commitment and that in order to deter the Chinese Communist Party, the United States should fully commit to Taiwan’s defense.
ESPN writers Mark Fainaru-Wada and Steve Fainaru describe how Brooklyn Nets’ owner and co-founder of Alibaba, Joe Tsai seeks to influence how the NBA and other U.S. businesses treat issues that the Chinese Communist Party considers sensitive.
As Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine worsens, the PRC continues to use its state media outlets and social media platforms to focus on a single narrative – the guilt and irresponsibility of the United States for the tragedy in Ukraine. If we want proof of the Party’s complicity with Moscow, we need look no further than this comprehensive and well-resourced information warfare campaign.
World Bank President David Malpass doubts whether the PRC will ever be a part of the value system shared by other countries in the global trading system and that diversifying supply chains and economic activity away from the PRC would be “probably good for everyone.”
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. The U.S. must make clear to the world it will defend Taiwan against Chinese invasion
Shinzo Abe, Los Angeles Times, April 12, 2022
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reminded many people of the fraught relationship between China and Taiwan. But while there are three similarities between the situation in Ukraine and Taiwan, there are also significant differences.
The first similarity is that there is a very large military power gap between Taiwan and China, just as there was between Ukraine and Russia. Moreover, that gap is growing larger every year.
Second, neither Ukraine nor Taiwan has formal military allies. Both countries are forced to confront threats or attacks alone.
Third, because both Russia and China are permanent, veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council, the U.N.’s mediation function cannot be relied upon for conflicts in which they are involved. This has been the case with the current Russian attack on Ukraine, and it would also be the case in any crisis over Taiwan.
But the situation surrounding Taiwan is even more uneasy. While Taiwan has no allies, it does have the Taiwan Relations Act, a 1979 U.S. law requiring the United States to provide Taiwan with the military equipment and supplies “necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.” This law has functioned as a form of compensation for America’s unwillingness to say explicitly that it will “defend Taiwan” should it be attacked. This arrangement should now change.
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the U.S. stated early on that it would not deploy its troops in Ukraine’s defense. But when it comes to Taiwan, the U.S. has adopted a policy of strategic ambiguity. This is the second point of difference: it remains unclear whether the U.S. would intervene by force in a crisis involving Taiwan.
Because the United States prefers to leave undefined its position on how it would respond to an assault on Taiwan, China has (at least up to now) been discouraged from military adventurism. This is so because China’s rulers must account for the possibility that the U.S. would indeed intervene militarily. At the same time, American ambiguity has forced Taiwan to consider the possibility that the U.S. will not intervene militarily, and this has deterred radical pro-independence groups on the island.
The U.S. has maintained its Janus-faced policy for decades. But the third, most important difference between Ukraine and Taiwan suggests strongly that it is time for the U.S. to reconsider its approach. Simply put, whereas Ukraine is an independent state beyond any doubt, Taiwan is not.
Russia’s invasion is not only an armed violation of Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty, but also an attempt to overthrow the government of a sovereign state with missiles and shells. On this point, there is no controversy in the international community over the interpretation of international law and the U.N. Charter. While the extent to which countries participate in sanctions against Russia has differed, no country has claimed that Russia is not in serious violation of international law.
By contrast, China claims that Taiwan is “part of its own country,” and the U.S. and Japanese position is to respect this claim. Neither Japan nor the U.S. has official diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and most countries around the world do not recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state. Unlike in Ukraine, Chinese leaders could claim that any invasion of Taiwan that China launches is necessary to suppress antigovernment activities in one of its own regions and that such acts, therefore, would not violate international law.
When Russia annexed Crimea, the international community ultimately acquiesced, even though Russia had violated Ukrainian sovereignty. Given this precedent, it is not surprising that Chinese leaders may very well expect the world to be more tolerant should they, too, adopt the logic of “regional” — rather than national — subjugation.
This logic has made strategic ambiguity untenable. The policy of ambiguity worked extremely well as long as the U.S. was strong enough to maintain it, and as long as China was far inferior to the U.S. in military power. But those days are over. The American policy of ambiguity toward Taiwan is now fostering instability in the Indo-Pacific region, by encouraging China to underestimate American resolve, while making the government in Taipei unnecessarily anxious.
Given the change in circumstances since the policy of strategic ambiguity was adopted, the U.S. should issue a statement that is not open to misinterpretation or multiple interpretations. The time has come for the U.S. to make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion.
Whenever I met President Xi Jinping during my time as prime minister, I always made it a rule to convey clearly to him that he should not misjudge Japan’s intention to defend the Senkaku Islands, and that Japan’s intentions were unwavering. The human tragedy that has befallen Ukraine has taught us a bitter lesson. There must no longer be any room for doubt in our resolve concerning Taiwan, and in our determination to defend freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Shinzo Abe was prime minister of Japan from 2006-07 and 2012-20.
2. Brooklyn Nets owner Joe Tsai is the face of NBA's uneasy China relationship
Mark Fainaru-Wada and Steve Fainaru, ESPN, April 14, 2022
Joe Tsai, the billionaire owner of the Brooklyn Nets, made his fortune in China. His company, Alibaba, began in a Hangzhou apartment and has since been described as "Amazon on steroids." When Tsai bought into the NBA, commissioner Adam Silver predicted he'd be "invaluable" to the league's expansion in the world's largest market.
Two and a half years later, Tsai personifies the compromises embedded in the NBA-China relationship, which brings in billions of dollars but requires the league to do business with an authoritarian government and look past the kind of social justice issues it is fighting at home.
3. VIDEO – Business Confidence Fading in Shanghai: Schoen-Behanzin
Bloomberg, April 7, 2022
Bettina Schoen-Behanzin, vice president at EU Chamber of Commerce in China, discusses the member’s concerns about China’s Covid-Zero policy, what the lockdown is doing to business confidence in Shanghai and how the lockdown is impacting the rest of China. She speaks on “Bloomberg Markets: China Open.”
4. Supply Chains Widely Tainted by Forced Labor in China, Panel Is Told
Ana Swanson, New York Times, April 8, 2022
Human rights activists and others urged the Biden administration to cast a wide net to stop imports of products made with forced labor in Xinjiang.
Human rights activists, labor leaders and others urged the Biden administration on Friday to put its weight behind a coming ban on products made with forced labor in the Xinjiang region of China, saying slavery and coercion taint company supply chains that run through the region and China more broadly.
The law, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, was signed by President Biden in December and is set to go into effect in June. It bans all goods made in Xinjiang or with ties to certain entities or programs that are under sanctions and transfer minority workers to job sites, unless the importer can demonstrate to the U.S. government that its supply chains are free of forced labor.
It remains to be seen how stringently the law is applied, and if it ends up affecting a handful of companies or far more. A broad interpretation of the law could cast scrutiny on many products that the United States imports from China, which is home to more than a quarter of the world’s manufacturing. That could lead to more detentions of goods at the U.S. border, most likely delaying product deliveries and further fueling inflation.
The law requires that a task force of Biden administration officials produce several lists of entities and products of concern in the coming months. It is unclear how many organizations the government will name, but trade experts said many businesses that relied on Chinese factories might realize that at least some part or raw material in their supply chains could be traced to Xinjiang.
5. Reframing Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
David Bandurski, China Media Project, April 1, 2022
In recent weeks, as Ukraine and its people have suffered under Russia’s unprovoked aggression, China’s government and state media have sought consistently to pull the focus back to a single central narrative – the guilt and irresponsibility of the United States.
Two weeks ago CMP took a close look at two commentaries in the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper that hammered hard with allegations of US biological weapons programs in Ukraine, a claim based entirely on information provided by the Russian Defense Ministry and Russian government media in early March. Both People’s Daily commentaries were attributed to “Zhong Sheng” (钟声), an official pen name used routinely for important pieces on international affairs on which the leadership wishes to register its view.
While the biological weapons narrative has been widely discredited, it remains the focus of external propaganda and disinformation by the Chinese Party-state and official media. But beyond the direct and full airing of claims by Russian sources through “mainstream” Chinese outlets like China Central Television, China has organized features, interviews and reports on what it has called the “bio-military empire” (生物军事帝国) of the United States.
One week ago, CCTV.com and other outlets re-ran an interview by the overseas edition of the People’s Daily in which three Chinese international relations experts – including from the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) directly under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – seriously addressed the question: “What exactly do US biolabs overseas do?” The experts repeatedly characterized the US labs as proof of US “hegemonism” (霸权主义), and they called for an international investigation into the Russian claims in the interests of a “new view of security” (新安全观).
The broader agenda behind this state media framing of the “bio-military empire” is a simple one. China’s government has seized on the bioweapons story as the most effective means of distraction and misdirection from the serious questions raised by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s deepening alliance with Putin. The wave of official coverage and commentary is an effort to reframe the war in Ukraine, so that the world sees beyond the aggressive actions of Russia and its dictator to the alleged threat posed to global security by the irresponsible and hegemonic behavior of the United States.
Once we are re-focused on the bogeyman of American hegemony, we become receptive to the alternative world view that Putin and Xi Jinping reaffirmed in their February joint statement, that a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” is entirely necessary. This is the conviction that underlies China’s information campaign on Ukraine, and the reason for its information alignment with Russia.
6. AUDIO – Assessing the Risks and Finding Responses to China’s Digital Strategy
Emily de La Bruyère, Greg Levesque, and Matt Turpin, National Bureau for Asian Research, April 8, 2022
This is the second of three episodes in the Asia Insight podcast miniseries China’s Strategic Approach to the Digital Revolution examining the findings of the NBR report “China’s Digital Ambitions: A Global Strategy to Supplant the Liberal Order.” NBR nonresident fellow Emily de La Bruyère, the project’s principal investigator, is joined by two of the report’s authors—Greg Levesque and Matt Turpin—to discuss the security implications of China’s digital rise and potential policy responses for liberal democracies to more effectively mitigate the associated risks and counter China’s ambitions.
7. Diversifying supply chains from China 'probably good for everyone' -World Bank chief
Andrea Shalal and David Lawder, Reuters, April 12, 2022
Countries around the world are working to diversify their supply chains and reduce their dependence on China, which is "probably good for everyone," World Bank President David Malpass said on Tuesday.
Malpass said cross-border trade would remain important to the global economy, and China - already the world's second largest economy and likely to become the largest - had a big role to play as both a consumer and producer of goods.
But, speaking at an event in Warsaw, he said China also needed to be part of a value system shared by other countries in the global trading system, and added, "I don't know that that will happen."
Asked about whether China was headed for a crisis due to severe COVID-19 lockdowns and debt problems in its property sector, Malpass said: "They're having setbacks, major setbacks in various areas, and the forecasts for growth have been brought down."
But he said the World Bank continues to work well with China, which is a major shareholder and a borrower whose use of the lender's financing is shrinking. The bank is also working closely with China to encourage more transparency its lending to developing countries, Malpass said.
"So I guess the way I think of it is that the world needs to interact with China, recognizing that it's important in the world and growing in importance," Malpass said.
He also said he did not believe the world faced a new "Bretton Woods moment," a reference to the 1944 conference that revamped the international financial architecture and created the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund amid the ruins of World War Two.
That system, with the U.S. dollar at its core, "works pretty well," he added.
"My view is we're not at that point now at all. There's not a sense of the world being lost," Malpass said. "There's this sense actually of unity of a great deal of the world in one endeavor, which is to end the war in Ukraine."
AUTHORITARIANISM
8. China’s ‘Zero-Covid’ Mess Proves Autocracy Hurts Everyone
Li Yuan, New York Times, April 13, 2022
9. I live in fear of being extradited to China, says sanctioned British academic
Sophie Yan, The Telegraph, April 9, 2022
Jo Smith Finley from Newcastle University has been on Beijing's watchlist since last year over her research into rights abuses in Xinjiang
10. China’s Choice for Hong Kong’s Chief Executive Reveals Its Own Insecurity
Charles Mok, The Diplomat, April 9, 2022
John Lee’s background is heavy on security, showing Beijing values that over Hong Kong’s economic prosperity.
11. Shanghai lockdown: US warns citizens of arbitrary Covid detention in China
Richard Lloyd Parry, Times of London, April 10, 2022
Shanghai has reported tens of thousands of fresh cases of coronavirus as China reacted angrily to a US statement warning citizens that they faced “arbitrary” confinement under the country’s lockdown rules.
Beijing said it expressed “strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to the groundless accusations” by the State Department, which warned Americans not to travel to Hong Kong, Jilin province and Shanghai “due to Covid-19-related restrictions, including the risk of parents and children being separated”.
12. The Final Blow to Hong Kong
Timothy McLaughlin, The Atlantic, April 7, 2022
The city deftly connected China and the world for decades. That historic balancing act won’t be revived.
13. China Direct: What next after EU summit? — Indo-Pacific plans from Prague — Good job, Viktor
Stuart Lau, Politico, April 7, 2022
DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF: The European Union is increasingly impatient with Beijing. The “April Fool’s Day” summit with President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang, which resulted in no joint statement, no deliverables and no assurance from Russia’s most important global partner, was a moment of awakening for EU leaders, who have now adopted much more critical language on China.
“It was not exactly a dialogue — maybe a dialogue of the deaf,” EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned Xi of a “mass exodus” of European businesses if Beijing came to Moscow’s aid.
Following the summit, the feeling among officials and diplomats is that the EU is “toughening its resolve,” for example by studying ways to scrutinize and punish countries helping Russia circumvent its sanctions.
…
DON’T SAY WE DIDN’T WARN YOU
LO AND BEHOLD: The ordinary vibe of feel-good diplomacy in EU summitry was nowhere to be seen last week, when EU and Chinese leaders gathered online amid Russia’s war on Ukraine. If anything, Xi reaffirmed the EU’s skepticism of Beijing’s role in shoring up Russia diplomatically, if not economically. Here are a few takeaways:
1 — CHINA IS IN THE KREMLIN’S TEAM: The EU has concluded that China won’t actively help end the war. “One of the conclusions of this summit must be that China will, for the time being, not engage actively to bring about an end to Russia’s war against Ukraine. The best we can realistically aim for is that China does not move into a more active pro-Russian stance,” Borrell said in a blog article. “Beijing’s attitude has been one of pro-Russian neutrality … China feels it can avoid fateful choices.”
Two things frustrate the EU in particular: Beijing, says Borrell, “likes to apportion equal blame rather than call out Russian aggression, pleading for ‘all sides’ to find an end to the bloodshed.” Besides, it supports Russia’s justifications of the war, claiming that the root causes “lie in ‘Cold War thinking’ and especially NATO enlargement.”
2 — BEIJING MISREADS THE MOOD: China didn’t see how this war — and its refusal to condemn Russia — is quickly souring EU-China relations from Brussels’ perspective. While EU insisted on focusing on the only international event of real import during the summit, Chinese leaders were more eager to talk about climate and trade — and the EU’s strategic autonomy (translation: Don’t get too close to the U.S.) “China wanted to set aside our differences on Ukraine. They didn’t want to talk about Ukraine. They didn’t want to talk about human rights and other issues, and instead focus on the positive things,” Borrell told the European Parliament on Tuesday. “The European side made clear that this compartmentalization … is not feasible, not acceptable.”
3 — NO ASSURANCE TO THE EU: Asked whether China gave them any assurance about not backing Russia financially or militarily, von der Leyen and Michel repeatedly dodged the question. In a much clearer response, Borrell said: “We talked about a lot about Ukraine, without having any commitment from the Chinese side.” Xi, on the other hand, cautioned about the negative impact on the economy, though he stopped short of criticizing the EU for imposing sanctions. “Many are worried that the current situation may wipe out the fruits of international economic cooperation gained through decades of efforts. Should the situation continue to worsen, it may take years, if not decades, to get things back on track,” he said.
4 — LET’S SEE IF THE WARNING WORKS: The EU played the commercial card in trying to warn Beijing not to help Moscow circumvent its sanctions. “We expect China, if not supporting the sanctions, at least to do everything not to interfere in any kind,” von der Leyen said. “No European citizen would understand any support to Russia’s ability to wage war. Moreover, it would lead to a major reputational damage for China here in Europe — the reputational risks are also the driving forces in the exodus of international companies from Russia.” As if that wasn’t clear enough, she added at the press conference: “Let me remind you that every day China and the European Union trade almost €2 billion worth of goods and services, and in comparison trade between China and Russia is only some €300 million per day.”
CHINA DEFIES SANCTIONS: Wang Lutong, the Europe chief at the Chinese foreign ministry, insisted that Beijing intended to keep trading with Russia. “China is not a related party on the crisis of Ukraine. We don’t think our normal trade with any other country should be affected,” he said a day after the summit.
And no change to CAI stalemate: The Comprehensive Agreement on Investment hasn’t been defrosted, as European Parliament members won’t ratify it unless Beijing revokes its sanctions on the EU. Wang, though, said Brussels should withdraw its sanctions on Xinjiang officials first. “The ball is in the court of Brussels,” Wang said. “I think the Europeans have got to remove the sanctions first, and then we can explore the possibility of removing other retaliation measures, which is reciprocal.” Reuters has more.
Meet DIANA, NATO’s secret weapon against China: NATO is aiming to become one of the biggest investors in deep tech on the planet — with a new body aimed at bringing civilian innovators together with military personnel, NATO’s Assistant Secretary-General David van Weel told my colleague Lili Bayer. NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic — or DIANA — will focus on designing “cutting-edge solutions for our defense and security challenges,” to stay ahead of Russia and China in the tech race, he said.
14. Arrest Data Show National Security Law Has Dealt a Hard Blow to Free Expression in Hong Kong
Eric Yan-ho Lai and Thomas Kellogg, China File, April 5, 2022
15. China Sets Aside Push to Spread Wealth in Pivotal Year for Xi
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, April 12, 2022
Xi Jinping’s rhetoric about redistributing wealth was aimed partly at drumming up public support. But it unnerved entrepreneurs and posed a drag on growth.
16. Clickbait Nationalism Misses the Mark
David Bandurski, China Media Project, April 11, 2022
The serious failings of Covid-19 responses in major cities like Changchun and Shanghai have deepened frustration online with influencers who continue, in the face of real suffering, to pander to China-can-do-no-wrong nationalism.
17. Shanghai warns people against 'rumor-mongering' as online pleas for food grow
Hwang Chum-mei and Fong Tak Ho, Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022
18. U.S. Orders Departure of Consulate Staff and Family from Shanghai Due to Covid-19 Surge
Liza Lin and Vivian Salama, Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2022
19. From the U.S. to China: A 3-Month Quarantine Horror Story
Vivian Wang, New York Times, April 12, 2022
A lawyer flew home to China hoping to see his family for the first time since the pandemic began. Instead, he was trapped in three months of quarantine.
Jacob Fromer and Finbarr Bermingham, South China Morning Post, April 12, 2022
Chinese leaders get a look at what can be possible when Western allies unite to hobble the economy of a major power
Beijing has failed to convince the West of its self-proclaimed neutrality on the Ukraine war as political winds shift rapidly
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS
21. China’s Role in the Exploitation of Global Fisheries: Issues for Congress
Bruce Vaughn and Ben Dolven, Congressional Research Service, April 12, 2022
China has emerged as the world’s largest exploiter of fisheries on a global, not just regional, scale.
Chinese fleets are active in waters far from China’s shores, and the growth in their harvests threatens to worsen the already dire depletion in global fisheries. China leads the world in seafood production from aquaculture, inland (freshwater) fisheries, and marine fisheries. The expansion and modernization of fisheries is a key part of China’s broader industrial policy goals of upgrading their agricultural industries and improving domestic food security. China has developed the world’s largest fishing fleet of vessels operating in domestic and neighboring coastal inshore and offshore areas, as well as a distant-water fleet (DWF) active in many parts of the world. China is a major hub for value-added processing in seafood supply chains and it is the world’s largest seafood processor; much of what China processes is exported to other countries. China is also the largest importer and producer of fishmeal for use in aquaculture. The magnitude of China’s seafood production and consumption has implications for international trade, fisheries conservation and management, and allocation of fishery resources among fishing and coastal nations. Many in Congress are interested in China’s involvement in fisheries around the world because of efforts to conserve marine resources globally, and the fishing industry’s intersection with regional conflicts and transnational criminal activities that impact U.S. national security.
China’s fishing fleets have been implicated in illegal fishing activity in many parts of the world, and China is a leading country responsible for Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. The decline in China’s own coastal fisheries from overfishing and habitat degradation has led, in part, to Beijing developing the world’s largest aquaculture industry and DWF. Limits to China’s inshore fisheries also contributed to an increase in aquaculture production, measures to constrain domestic inshore fisheries (increased regulation and curtailment of some subsidies), an increase in fishing in disputed areas and adjacent nations’ waters, and an expansion of the DWF to other parts of the world. The expansion of the marine sector in China is also driven by China’s broader industrial policy and efforts to improve domestic food security. China also uses its fishing fleet to further geopolitical objectives. The expansion of China’s fishing interests is contributing to conflicts between China and other countries who seek to protect their national fishing interests and to conserve fish stocks.
Congress and successive administrations have taken a number of actions to combat IUU fishing. These actions attempt to influence the behavior of fishing fleets through international agreements and trade because most IUU activities occur outside of U.S. jurisdiction. Many of these actions are applied to IUU fishing generally and applicable to illegal activities associated with Chinese fleets and fishing companies. U.S. efforts to combat IUU fishing have included enforcement agreements, trade monitoring, international treaties and agreements, and efforts to promote resource sustainability.
As Congress considers China’s maritime ambitions and the depletion of global fisheries, it may consider the ways in which Chinese fishing—both legal and illegal—has affected global fisheries stocks. The U.S. policy response to IUU fishing and China involves two general areas: the review of existing laws and administration efforts to improve efficacy, and the identification of additional authorities that may be needed to combat IUU fishing activities. Given the prominent role of the Chinese DWF in many regional and global fisheries, some have questioned whether U.S. actions should focus on the behavior of China’s fishing fleets or continue to take a more general approach to combating IUU activity. Some potential lines of effort to bolster global fisheries management and combat IUU fishing include improving coordination of U.S. agency efforts, seafood traceability, surveillance and enforcement, and supporting existing international agreements. Related efforts may include providing assistance to countries to enforce regional fishery management organization agreements and national laws related to IUU fishing, and supporting efforts at the World Trade Organization (WTO) to negotiate reductions in fisheries subsides.
22. Chinese oil giant CNOOC to raise $4.4 billion in Shanghai listing
Harshita Swaminathan and Samuel Shen, Reuters, April 11, 2022
23. China energy goals a problem as U.N. report calls for deeper coal cuts
David Stanway, Reuters, April 7, 2022
24. China Coal Hub Approves Mega-Mine That Can Produce for 97 Years
Bloomberg, April 7, 2022
Ordos licenses mine that can produce 15 million tons a year
China wants miners to boost output and enhance energy security
Officials in the key Chinese coal mining hub of Ordos approved a massive mine that can produce 15 million tons annually and operate for nearly 97 years.
The city’s natural resources bureau on April 2 gave a license to Lianhai Coal Industry Co. to operate the Baijiahaizi mine, which covers about 170 square kilometers, contains 2.03 billion tons of coal reserves and has an estimated service life of 96.8 years, China Coal Resource reported.
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND COERCION
25. Twitter users are exposing pro-Russian sentiment in China, and Beijing is not happy
Simone McCarthy, CNN, April 13, 2022
Anonymous Twitter users are exposing the extreme nationalism and pro-Russian sentiment circulating online in China -- and Beijing is not happy about it.
Scores of screen-grabbed posts from China's most popular social media platforms have been translated and shared on Twitter in recent weeks, offering Western audiences a rare glimpse into the Chinese internet.
Among those posts: a prominent military blog falsely claiming a Russian attack on a train station in Kramatorsk was actually carried out by Ukraine, a well known media commentator dismissing the atrocities in Bucha, and a vlogger with hundreds of thousands of followers using a misogynistic term for Ukraine.
The posts appear courtesy of anonymous Twitter users who say their aim is to expose Western audiences to the true extent of pro-Russian or nationalistic content on China's heavily censored platforms.
26. China’s Echoes of Russia’s Alternate Reality Intensify Around the World
Paul Mozur, Steven Lee Myers and John Liu, New York Times, April 11, 2022
China’s officials and state media are increasingly parroting Russian propaganda organs on the war in Ukraine, undercutting U.S. and European diplomatic efforts, even after the killings in Bucha.
27. President Who?
David Bandurski, China Media Project, April 1, 2022
Through the buzz of coverage in China about the “Russia-Ukraine conflict,” the conspicuous absence of Zelensky from the Party’s flagship newspaper is a salient illustration of China’s alignment with Russia.
28. Italy to set up unit to scrutinise takeovers of strategic firms -sources
Giuseppe Fonte, Reuters, April 11, 2022
Italy policing changes to ownership structure of key firms
PM Draghi has blocked four Chinese forays in 14 months
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
29. Deciphering a Tibetan pop star’s self-immolation
The Economist, April 2, 2022
The story of Tsewang Norbu is shrouded in mystery. The Tibetan pop star set himself on fire in Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, on February 25th. Fans have spent the past month mourning his death. But on March 28th the Chinese foreign ministry suggested Mr Norbu might still be alive. In response to questions about him, the ministry said a man in Tibet had “attempted suicide by self-immolation”—and that he had been taken for treatment immediately. The man had long been “troubled by mental illness” and “had attempted suicide multiple times”, claimed the authorities. Activists are unconvinced.
Fans were shocked by Mr Norbu’s action. Over the past decade, scores of Tibetans have burnt themselves to death in protest at Chinese rule. But Mr Norbu did not appear to be a dissident. The 25-year-old had competed on a popular reality show, “Sing! China”, only months earlier. The judges called him luobo (radish), a Mandarin homophone for Norbu. In videos he would rap about love. Sometimes he would play piano or guitar as he sang tunes by Camila Cabello and Frankie Valli. With his pierced ears and groomed eyebrows, he could have been a Gen Z-er from anywhere.
30. UK and the Uyghur Forced Labor: Another Day, Another Place, Another Clause, Another Vote
Ruth Ingram, Bitter Winter, April 8, 2022
Lords outvoted the government, once again. The battle to prevent National Health Service from purchasing Xinjiang-made PPE continues.
31. Prominent Hong Kong journalist Allan Au reportedly held on sedition charge
The Guardian, April 10, 2022
A veteran Hong Kong journalist has been arrested by national security police for allegedly conspiring to publish “seditious materials”, a police source and local media said, in the latest blow against press freedom.
Allan Au, a 54-year-old reporter and journalism lecturer, was arrested in a dawn raid on Monday by Hong Kong’s national security police unit, multiple local media outlets reported.
A senior police source confirmed Au’s arrest on a charge of “conspiracy to publish seditious materials”. Police have yet to release an official statement.
32. Peyzulla Utuq and Sayragul Sauytbay: Two Escaped Xinjiang, One Died and One Survived
Kok Bayraq, Bitter Winter, April 7, 2022
33. Henan rights activist in secret 'defamation' trial after visit to rights lawyer
Gao Feng, Radio Free Asia, April 8, 2022
34. Former Xinjiang prisoner arrives in U.S. as key witness to abuses
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Lachlan Markay, Axios, April 12, 2022
35. From a Chinese Internment Camp to the U.S., a Former Xinjiang Detainee Makes a Rare Escape
Chao Deng, Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2022
When a former Xinjiang detainee and his family stepped off the plane at Dulles International Airport in Washington, D.C., where U.S. officials were waiting to greet them, it marked the exultant end to a long—and rare—escape from the most tightly controlled region in China.
Ovalbek Turdakun, his wife and 12-year-old son arrived in the U.S. on Friday night after fleeing authorities in Xinjiang, a remote swath of mountains and deserts on China’s Central Asian frontier where the government has been carrying out a yearslong campaign of forced assimilation against Turkic minorities.
The family’s ordeal began in 2018, when Mr. Turdakun, an ethnic Kyrgyz, was taken to an internment camp, where he says he spent 10 months being subjected to political indoctrination and was injected with an unknown substance that caused his limbs to go numb.
Released unexpectedly, the 43-year-old left for Kyrgyzstan with his son and his wife, a Kyrgyz national. Once there, text messages from Chinese officials back in China made him fear he would be deported back to the country, until a Canadian surveillance analyst and an unlikely assortment of Americans hatched a plan to get the family out.
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
36. China’s Quest for Self-Reliance: A Case for America Reshoring Key Industries
David Schneider, National Development, April 8, 2022
The time has come for China to “travel the road of self-reliance,” President Xi Jinping declared in September of 2018 in a speech to the China First Heavy Industries factory.[1] Spurring China to develop its own cutting-edge technology, with the goal of reducing dependency on the West, is a key component of Xi’s sweeping plans to promote his nation’s place in the world and to secure his legacy as one of its greatest leaders.
Many have assumed that U.S.-China trade relations, and the decision to decouple, is up to America. But what if Beijing’s leadership is already in the process of strategic planning for wresting control? If you think we have supply chain problems now, wait until China decouples from the U.S. The Chinese are creating an option to do just that. Their plans for self-sufficiency pre-date the pandemic and the war in Ukraine.
This quest for self-reliance and reduced vulnerability to the West is not a new phenomenon. Chinese leadership has a deep appreciation for history and engages in long-term planning that is often rooted in this knowledge. In contrast to U.S. presidents, Chinese leaders — for all their many plans — are less event-driven, more strategic, and tend to look to the decades ahead. From an American lens, their actions may appear illogical, but we forget that China does not plan around election cycles. Understanding their mentality, and the deep roots of this concept of self-reliance in Chinese culture, can provide a heightened sense of urgency for the United States to prepare accordingly.
37. Decision on Chinese takeover of Newport Wafer Fab delayed
James Titcomb, The Telegraph, April 8, 2022
38. China scrambles for cover from West's financial weapons
Cissy Zhou, Nikkei Asia, April 13, 2022
39. 'Tip of the iceberg': Taiwan's spy catchers hunt Chinese poachers of chip talent
Yimou Lee and Sarah Wu, Reuters, April 8, 2022
Taiwan's spy catchers have launched probes into around 100 Chinese companies suspected of illegally poaching semiconductor engineers and other tech talent, a senior official at the island's Investigation Bureau told Reuters.
That comes on top of seven prosecuted since the start of last year and includes 27 which have either been raided or whose owners have been summoned for questioning by the bureau, the official said.
40. Taiwan’s premier calls for chip protection laws to be passed ‘at earliest date’
South China Morning Post, April 12, 2022
Su Tseng-chang says the ‘red supply chain’ is using various methods to ‘infiltrate’ the island, take its talent and steal its technology
41. U.S. fines 6 companies linked to Chinese metals tycoon $1.8bn
Zach Coleman, Nikkei Asia, April 12, 2022
42. Chinese Developers Suspend Shares After Missing Annual Results Deadlines
Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2022
Several large Chinese property stocks stopped trading Friday as part of a wave of share suspensions for Hong Kong-listed companies that couldn’t publish annual results on time.
The city’s exchange operator, Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd., said 32 companies had suspended their stocks after failing to meet a reporting deadline at the end of March. The companies made the suspensions to comply with the city’s listing rules. Companies involved include major real-estate companies like Sunac China Holdings Ltd., China Aoyuan Group Ltd., Shimao Group Holdings Ltd. and Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd.
CYBER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
43. Mystery of alleged Chinese hack on eve of Ukraine invasion
Gordon Corera, BBC, April 8, 2022
Allegations of Chinese cyber activity as the recent conflict broke out in Ukraine have been emerging.
The details appear unusually murky but one Western intelligence official believes the aim was espionage - and the cyber-attack may have been broader than previously reported.
The Times first reported that hackers, alleged to be based in China, began targeting Ukrainian websites on 23 February, the day before the invasion.
That led to questions as to whether they had advance notice of Moscow's plans and if their intention was somehow to support Russia.
A broad set of Ukrainian government and commercial organisations were said to have been targeted by hackers, including organisations linked to nuclear power.
44. BeiDou is ready to take on GPS
Barry van Wyk, SupChina, April 6, 2022
45. China uses AI software to improve its surveillance capabilities
Eduardo Baptista, Reuters, April 8, 2022
MILITARY AND SECURITY THREATS
46. China Is Accelerating Its Nuclear Buildup Over Rising Fears of U.S. Conflict
Alastair Gale, Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2022
47. Most Australians regard Taiwan as a sovereign state
Anthony Galloway, Sydney Morning Herald, April 9, 2022
A clear majority of Australians regard Taiwan as an independent country, in direct contradiction of the Australian government’s own position, and more than two-thirds want Australia to do something if China attacks the island.
48. Taiwan Issues War Response Handbook Over China Invasion Threat
Cindy Wang, Bloomberg, April 12, 2022
Defense ministry pamphlet gives details of air raid shelters
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine stoked fears Beijing will strike
Taiwan issued its first war handbook advising citizens how to respond in the wake of an attack, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine raises fears of a Chinese incursion at home.
The document released Tuesday by the Ministry of National Defense provides QR codes for locating air raid shelters, a list of items to stockpile for wartime and mobilization information for military reserves.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 7, 2022
Because the implications of Russia’s invasions are global, and will be long-lasting. And what is happening in Ukraine is being closely watched around the world.
We have seen that China is unwilling to condemn Russia’s aggression. And Beijing has joined Moscow in questioning the right of nations to choose their own path.
This is a serious challenge to us all. And it makes it even more important that we stand together to protect our values.
NATO and our Asia-Pacific partners have now agreed to step up our practical and political cooperation in several areas. Including cyber, new technology, and countering disinformation.
50. LDP commission mulls stronger wording regarding China, Russia in defense documents
Yomiuri Shimbun, April 12, 2022
51. Japan, Italy to lift defense ties amid China, Russia worries
Mari Yamaguchi, Associated Press, April 12, 2022
52. China makes semi-secret delivery of missiles to Serbia
Dusan Stojanovic, Associated Press, April 10, 2022
Russian ally Serbia took the delivery of a sophisticated Chinese anti-aircraft system in a veiled operation this weekend, amid Western concerns that an arms buildup in the Balkans at the time of the war in Ukraine could threaten the fragile peace in the region.
Media and military experts said Sunday that six Chinese Air Force Y-20 transport planes landed at Belgrade’s civilian airport early Saturday, reportedly carrying HQ-22 surface-to-air missile systems for the Serbian military.
The Chinese cargo planes with military markings were pictured at Belgrade’s Nikola Tesla airport. Serbia’s defense ministry did not immediately respond to AP’s request for comment.
The arms delivery over the territory of at least two NATO member states, Turkey and Bulgaria, was seen by experts as a demonstration of China’s growing global reach.
“The Y-20s’ appearance raised eyebrows because they flew en masse as opposed to a series of single-aircraft flights,” wrote The Warzone online magazine. “The Y-20′s presence in Europe in any numbers is also still a fairly new development.”
53. China Is Challenging NATO Over Russia's Ukraine War: Jens Stoltenberg
David Brennan, Newsweek, April 7, 2022
NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said China's failure to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine represents a "serious challenge" to the entire North Atlantic alliance.
Stoltenberg spoke with journalists on Thursday after NATO foreign ministers met in Brussels, joined by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba. NATO's Asia Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—were also in attendance.
The NATO chief said the attendance of Asia Pacific partners was important "because the crisis has global ramifications," not least due to the role of China in giving tacit support for Moscow's invasion.
54. Japan, Philippines to step up security ties amid China worry
The Independent, April 7, 2022
The defense ministers of Japan and the Philippines have agreed to bolster security cooperation and expand joint drills between their forces, and shared concerns about China’s increasingly assertive military actions in the region.
Dominique Catton, The Guardian, April 10, 2022
A prominent New Caledonian indigenous party has said that if France wants to have an economic and political stake in the Pacific – as China’s influence in the region rises to “omnipresence” – it needs to grant New Caledonia a fourth referendum on independence and treat the Pacific island as a partner, rather than a colony.
The calls come after a contentious referendum on independence last year which was boycotted by pro-independence parties, after they said holding a referendum during a severe Covid outbreak that disproportionately hit indigenous Kanak and Pasifika populations would not return a fair result.
“We ask for a fourth vote on self-determination,” said Charles Washetine, a spokesman for the pro-independence Palika party. “We would like this consultation to be organised by the UN’s special committee on decolonisation.”
“We are aware of the great influence of China in the region, and France’s interest in maintaining this strategic geopolitical and economic position.”
Palika proposes independence for New Caledonia, while maintaining an external privileged relationship with France, and negotiating agreements on justice, security, military and commercial relationships.
“Despite all, we are linked to France… since France seems to want to be here, lets talk and discuss it together,” he said.
“[This] is an exceptional opportunity for France to decolonise differently compared to Algeria or the other African colonies. The world was expecting France to decolonise differently,” Washetine said.
“The omnipresence of China in the region poses a problem. France is using the ‘No’ of the last vote to stay. If they want to keep their economic and political influence, let’s talk as two sovereign nations and not in this unilateral way which is the continuation of the colonial power relations.”
Washetine said last year’s scrapping of a submarine deal with France by Australia – which resulted in a diplomatic rift between the two countries – had isolated France in the region. “For this reason, let us engage in discussions bilaterally and let us work to make sure that we are protecting both our interests.”
56. Thailand's purchase of first Chinese submarine runs aground
Yohei Muramatsu, Nikkei Asia, April 12, 2022
The Thai government's plan to procure its first Chinese submarine has run aground after Germany refused to supply an engine that the subs use.
ONE BELT, ONE ROAD STRATEGY
57. Negotiating Local Business Practices with China in Benin
Folashade Soule, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 6, 2022
Beninese officials have shown how even small countries can use close coordination between ministries and other negotiating tactics to strike deals with Chinese counterparts that better protect their own interests.
58. China Hesitates on Bailing Out Sri Lanka, Pakistan as Debt Soars
Bloomberg, April 13, 2022
OPINION PIECES
59. Social media shouldn’t let China do Russia’s dirty work
Editorial Board, Washington Post, April 11, 2022
U.S. social media sites’ steps to ban Russian state media might have stymied President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to seed propaganda abroad — that is, if the Kremlin hadn’t found someone else to do the job for it.
Ever since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China has portrayed itself as a neutral party to the conflict and possibly even an honest broker in resolving it. This performance has always been unconvincing, but now Beijing has shown its hand: President Xi Jinping’s regime has committed itself to sowing disinformation on Moscow’s behalf. A foreign ministry spokesman made that clear from the podium last week when he adopted a baseless Russian talking point about Ukraine developing biological weapons with the U.S. government’s help.
The Post reports that China’s government-controlled outlets have been hawking similarly ludicrous narratives far and wide, including on sites such as Facebook and YouTube. But at least when it comes to these platforms, there’s a way to stop the spread.
60. To be effective, US policy on PRC must be actioned early and often – Interview with Dave Stilwell
Cleo Paskai and Dave Stilwell, The Sunday Guardian, April 9, 2022
61. Taiwan's Great Balancing Act
Sam Olsen, What China Wants, April 14, 2022
62. If you thought Russia was bad, just try China
Edward Lucas, Times of London, April 11, 2022
Beijing’s wealth and ambitions make it a far more complex adversary than Putin’s Kremlin
If you think confrontation with Vladimir Putin’s Russia is alarming, consider how much worse it could be. Imagine our academic, media, political and showbiz elites were all deeply in hock to Moscow, based on decades of assiduous schmoozing, and that its propaganda, far from being splenetic and contradictory, was subtle, patient and effective. Suppose our supply chains, export markets and critical infrastructure were crucially dependent on Russia, which, far from being sideswiped by sanctions, had spent years preparing to foil them.
Those are just some of the problems we face with China: a far more potent and serious adversary than the flailing, ramshackle and stagnant system run by Putin.
63. Making Sense of China’s Interests in the War in Ukraine
Sophia Gaston, British Foreign Policy Group, April 7, 2022
64. China Turns Covid Victory into Defeat
Holman W. Jenkins, Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2022
What exactly is the function of China’s zero-Covid lockdowns, which individually and cumulatively now are far bigger than even the Wuhan lockdown in early 2020, when the disease was poorly understood, treatments hadn’t been identified, and vaccines were still months away?
The current lockdown in Shanghai and a recently relaxed one in Shenzhen forced 43 million people to remain in their homes and rely on government food deliveries. These were the biggest shutdowns the country has yet tried, aimed at two vital entrepôts of the global economy.
The data China publishes are hard to make sense of. Daily reports indicate upward of 95% of cases discovered in relentless mass testing have been asymptomatic. Of the 130,000 or so cases reported in Shanghai since March 1, 5,000 were said to have been serious enough to require medical treatment. Two people were reported to have died. Government officials say the ratio applies nation-wide. Why lock down for a disease that is so mild?
The puzzle is both nagging and urgent given damage to China’s and the global economy over a disease that is cold-like, not even flu-like, in most cases. One theory, bruited even on Chinese social media, is that the government is bending over backward, whatever the cost, to preserve a zero-Covid talking point that Xi Jinping has adopted as proof of the superiority of Chinese governance.
The alternative explanation is that China’s leaders are still genuinely terrified of a potential healthcare meltdown. Though 90% of citizens have been vaccinated, 40% of 80-year-olds have yet to receive a shot—27 million of the most vulnerable people. In Shanghai, a city of 26 million, if Omicron were to spread as rapidly as it did through some highly vaccinated Western populations, the result might be Covid patients and others dying for want of care in a jammed-up, broken hospital system.
This would shower disgrace on the Chinese Communist Party and Mr. Xi, who, in his eagerness to be the next Mao, has made himself the locus of all responsibility and therefore all blame. And yet the logic is inescapable: At some point the risk must be taken because there’s no other way to escape the zero-Covid trap. Add the fact that vaccine protection wanes, and the question pointedly becomes, “If not now, when?” Is Beijing holding out for the day when 1.4 billion Chinese can be hooked up to a continuous vaccine drip?
By every report, Shanghai healthcare is already strained by a government requirement that anyone testing positive and their close contacts be hospitalized or, more recently, placed in a special quarantine facility staffed with doctors and nurses. Exhausted medics are standing guard over tens of thousands of healthy patients who have nothing to do but share their aggravation on social media.
Another problem has finally begun sneaking out of the corner of Chinese officials’ mouths: 24 months of zero-Covid propaganda has caused millions of Chinese not only to exaggerate Covid’s deadliness, but to be on the edge of panic about potential lockdowns, having heard repeated reports of hunger, missed medical treatments and the inability to bring help to loved ones.
So we’re left with a perplexity. Is China telling us it has failed and cannot succeed at protecting its healthcare system as the West has done, by vaccinating, by shielding the most vulnerable, and so permitting zero Covid to end? Or has the Communist Party trapped itself in a double bind because it made a national trophy out of not allowing transmission to happen and now can never allow transmission to happen as part of a sensible endgame?
Shanghai’s eight-day lockdown recently was extended indefinitely. And then what? Some 26 million people will be as vulnerable as they were when it started. A lesson the West has learned, Omicron will spread even in fully vaccinated and boosted populations, a description that Shanghai may never get closer to fitting than it does right now.
The irony is more than sad, it’s a diagnosis of authoritarian madness. Holding off Covid’s spread for two years while vaccines and treatments were developed should be a great achievement. The trophy should be going on the shelf by now. An appreciative public should be returning to normal life reconciled to a now-tamed new coronavirus.
The sane outcome may be impossible because the regime has caused its zero-Covid ideology to morph into something insane. If transmission must be suppressed and anything else is a defeat, then the Communist Party has set a game for itself in which no victory is possible.
65. No, China is not a winner from the war in Ukraine
Katie Stallard, The New Statesman, April 6, 2022
The conventional wisdom as to how China stands to gain from the war in Ukraine goes like this: the United States will be distracted and bogged down in Europe for years to come, unable to focus on the strategic rivalry with Beijing as planned, while Russia will be reduced to a Chinese dependency. An isolated and increasingly desperate Vladimir Putin will be forced to sell his natural gas, coal and oil to China on whatever terms it offers, and Beijing will be able to watch from a safe distance as the old Cold War battle lines are redrawn and Moscow and Washington tear each other apart.
“China is clearly the victor of this whole affair,” the former Kremlin adviser Sergey Karaganov told the New Statesman columnist Bruno Maçães in an interview on 28 March. “I think the biggest loser will be Ukraine; a loser will be Russia; a great loser will be Europe; the United States will lose somewhat… and the big victor is China.”
Prominent Chinese scholars have also argued that the country stands to benefit from the crisis. Russia’s war in Ukraine marks the end of the international order established after the Second World War, wrote Zheng Yongnian of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen in an article on 25 February, the day after the conflict began. “As long as we don’t commit terminal strategic blunders, China’s modernisation will not be cut short,” he reasoned. “On the contrary, China will instead have the ability to play a more important role in the process of building a new international order.”
But China has done a poor job so far at positioning itself as a credible, neutral observer. The spectacle of Chinese officials repeatedly urging both Russia and Ukraine to exercise restraint, as though the latter was not fighting for its very survival, would be laughable if the circumstances were not so tragic. Likewise, the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s praise on 30 March for Moscow’s efforts to “prevent a large-scale humanitarian crisis” in Ukraine sounded absurd – to put it charitably – given that Russia has so clearly caused that crisis. Its military was bombing Ukrainian cities and killing civilians even as he spoke.
“China cannot pretend to be a responsible great power but close its eyes or cover its ears when it comes to a conflict that obviously makes it uncomfortable,” said Josep Borrell, the European Union’s high representative for foreign affairs, on 5 April. “It knows very well who the aggressor is, although for political reasons, refuses to name them.”
66. Why Most of the Indo-Pacific Tiptoes Around Russia
Derek Grossman, Foreign Policy, April 6, 2022
With Beijing and Moscow working so closely together, countries find it risky to support the West on Ukraine.