China Articles - April 3, 2022
Friends,
Just about two weeks ago, the Chinese Communist Party completed their annual exercise in performative democracy called the ‘two sessions.’ These are the National People’s Congress (NPC), which is the PRC’s rubber-stamp legislature, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a political advisory group controlled by the CCP and populated with the Party’s eight legally authorized satellite parties and organizations under the banner of the ‘United Front.’ In all the massive reports and lengthy speeches, there was no mention of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and hardly any mention of the pandemic that is raging across multiple Chinese cities.
The NPC also made it clear that the PRC would make full use of coal in its energy strategy in contradiction to Beijing’s international commitments to reduce carbon emissions (Reuters, “Coal still at heart of China energy strategy after parliamentary gathering”).
This continues a pattern that we should all be familiar with (and no longer fooled by): the Chinese Communist Party makes promises to fulfill international pledges, while simultaneously undermining those commitments with contradictory policies that seek to boost the Party’s power.
Among democracies, we feel constrained from criticizing the Party for fear that the ‘liberal’ faction of the Party, who supposedly negotiated these commitments with us under considerable domestic political pressure from so-called ‘hardliners,’ will be further marginalized by these hardliners who never wanted to make the international commitments to begin with (we are told this in hushed tones by our ‘liberal’ friends in Beijing).
This is a convenient strategy for the Party as it gains the international benefits of making highly publicized commitments (market-economy rules at the WTO, carbon emissions reduction targets at Paris, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, etc.) and creates allies who will perpetuate the Party’s fictions, while taking advantage of the situation by implementing contradictory policies.
In many cases, leaders from democracies that spearheaded the negotiations help maintain the fiction of the Party’s compliance: to admit that Beijing is NOT complying reflects poorly on those who put their reputation behind the agreement (side-eye at you Hank Paulson, George Osborne, Tim Geithner, Steve Mnuchin, Angela Merkel and John Kerry).
All of this could be revealed for what it is (broken promises) if the Party permitted open debate and a free press, but of course that is forbidden as it would raise uncomfortable questions in the minds of Chinese citizens about the Party’s exclusive hold on power.
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This week, we have a number of excellent pieces that I encourage you to read, watch and listen to.
First comes from the German Marshall Fund and examines the decades-long effort by the Chinese Communist Party to distort UN Resolution from 1971 as the justification to deny the country of Taiwan any of the protections and rights granted under the United Nations Charter. The neo-imperialist impulses that drive Party leaders to subjugate a nation of 23 million to their rule is exactly the kind aggression that the UN Charter was developed to prevent.
PREDICTION: As this new cold war takes shape and the geopolitical landscape shifts, the Faustian bargain we made in the 1970s over Taiwan’s status as a country, but not a country, will not hold. The rationale we had for acquiescing to the Party’s fantasy of imperial annexation of Taiwan no longer exists as the conditions have changed drastically. And if the experience of Georgia and Ukraine teach us anything (as well as the Korean Peninsula in 1950), it is that ambiguous security commitments encourage military adventurism by autocrats.
As a bit of shameless self-promotion, I’ve included a panel discussion I participated in at AEI with my friends Liza Tobin, Eric Sayers and Ivan Kanapathy in which we discuss the past, present and future of U.S.-PRC relations.
Also included is an analysis from Ananth Krishnan on India-PRC relations, an OpEd by Jude Blanchette on the likely trajectory of the PRC’s support for Moscow, the resignation of UK judges from Hong Kong’s highest court, and more.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. The Distortion of UN Resolution 2758 to Limit Taiwan’s Access to the United Nations
Jessica Drun and Bonnie Glaser, German Marshall Fund, March 2022
There is a campaign underway by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to reinterpret UN Resolution 2758 as based on its “One China” Principle and spread the fallacy that, through the resolution, UN member states came to a determination that Taiwan is a part of the PRC. Yet, in passing the resolution in 1971, the countries solely intended to grant the seat occupied by the Republic of China in the General Assembly and the Security Council to the PRC. This is reflected in the official historic record and meeting minutes as well as in the resolutions raised at the time for the General Assembly’s consideration
The PRC understood then that the resolution did not contain the Taiwan conclusions it wanted. Prime Minister Zhou Enlai noted that, if Resolution 2758 passed, “the status of Taiwan is not yet decided.” Beijing, through its proxies at the UN, expressed its unwillingness to join the organization if it allowed “‘two Chinas,’ ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ or ‘the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined.’” However, given that Beijing did not enjoy the same level of international influence then as it does today, it did not reject the resolution when it passed. Instead, PRC officials assumed the “China” seat and only later began to leverage their position to promote Beijing’s stance on Taiwan at the UN level.
2. VIDEO – The past, present, and future of US-China relations
Eric Sayers, Ivan Kanapathy, Liza Tobin and Matt Turpin, AEI, March 29, 2022
3. Why Wang Yi's visit may not mean a reset for India-China relations
Ananth Krishnan, The India China Newsletter, March 28, 2022
In this newsletter, I'll explain why a major "reset" -- that much beloved and overused but usually misleading prism! -- is an unlikely scenario. I'll lay out what the likely road ahead is for the relationship and where India-China ties stand after Wang's visit.
4. The worse things go for Putin in Ukraine, the more China will back him
Jude Blanchette, Washington Post, March 24, 2022
China has tried to have it both ways since Russia invaded Ukraine a month ago. It abstained from key votes at the United Nations criticizing Russia’s actions, avoided directly labeling President Vladimir Putin’s assault on Ukraine an “invasion,” amplified Russian disinformation and repeatedly laid blame for the war at the feet of the United States and NATO. At the same time, Beijing has also largely complied with sanctions against Russia, made repeated, if vague, calls for a negotiated settlement to the hostilities and provided humanitarian assistance to Ukraine.
But make no mistake: The worse it goes for Russia in Ukraine, the more China will step up its support for the Putin regime.
Beijing’s uneven diplomatic strategy may seem to stem from a desire to achieve multiple, often conflicting aims, most notably to forestall a deterioration in relations with Europe. Not all objectives are weighted equally, however, and as the war enters a more protracted and destructive phase, China’s primary goal is coming into focus: to ensure that Russia retains its status as Beijing’s key strategic partner, even if this necessitates paying serious economic and diplomatic costs. Beijing will see the prospect of a Russian defeat as a direct threat to its own territorial security and ability to compete head-to-head in the geopolitical rivalry with the United States — and China simply can’t allow that to happen.
To see why Beijing has a direct stake in the war’s outcome, it’s critical to understand how its relationship with Russia has evolved since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and how China views the global security environment evolving over the next three to five years. Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China and Russia have experienced significant friction and mutual mistrust. The nadir of the relationship came in 1969, when the two communist powers nearly engaged in a nuclear war. Since 1989, however, Beijing and Moscow have systematically addressed the major points of contention in their relationship, including any lingering territorial disputes. In 2001, the countries signed the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, and after Chinese leader Xi Jinping assumed power in 2013, cooperation has expanded to include joint military exercises, efforts to reform global governance and technology sharing. For example, the two countries continue to develop a satellite navigation system to rival the United States’ GPS, and in January, Russia and China, along with Iran, held a series of naval drills in the Indian Ocean.
This growing symbiosis was formalized on Feb. 4 in a joint statement issued during Putin’s visit to Beijing at the start of the Winter Olympics (Xi’s meeting with Putin then was his first with a world leader since February 2020, when he appeared with the Mongolian prime minister in Beijing). Stretching more than 5,000 words, the joint statement encapsulated a shared worldview between two authoritarian powers and two autocratic leaders. The global order is undergoing “momentous changes,” the statement read, which include a “transformation of the global governance architecture and world order” and “global challenges and threats growing from day to day.” But perhaps more important, the joint statement articulated a shared grievance that the United States and its allies threaten Chinese and Russian interests and global aspirations. NATO, the document states, promotes an “ideologized cold war approach,” while the U.S. “Indo-Pacific strategy” endangers the “peace and stability in the region.”
Before Russia had even invaded Ukraine, then, Beijing had come to see Moscow as a critical security and strategic partner in the growing power rivalry with the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. More to the point, Russia is China’s only real military and strategic partner. Although tensions exist in the bilateral relationship, not least because of the growing economic gap between their economies, the broader geopolitical chessboard draws Moscow and Beijing together. What’s more, Putin and Xi have a close relationship — they’ve met in person or virtually nearly 40 times in the decade that Xi has been in power.
The war in Ukraine has undoubtedly thrown Beijing off balance, and Chinese officials certainly didn’t want Putin to invade in the first place, but the basic math underlying this strategic partnership with Moscow has not changed. Indeed, the war has only consolidated Beijing’s central logic for supporting Russia, given the recent demonstration of Western diplomatic unity, the overwhelming power of U.S.-led sanctions and the reinvigoration of NATO. The former editor of the Chinese nationalist Global Times newspaper, Hu Xijin, argued in recent commentary that “if the U.S. pursues extreme strategic coercion against China, with Russia as a partner, China will not fear a U.S. energy blockade, our food supplies will be more secure, as will [our supplies] of many other raw materials.” In a speech last weekend, China’s vice foreign minister Le Yucheng drew a straight line between NATO in Europe and China’s own security concerns, warning that just as Moscow’s actions in Ukraine were a direct consequence of NATO expansion, any actions by NATO in the Asia-Pacific region would provoke similar consequences, and thus, the “crisis in Ukraine is a stern warning.”
Beyond the substantive reasons underlying China’s support for Russia, there is also Beijing’s unwillingness to be seen as submitting to the U.S. demand that it back away from Moscow. As one Chinese Russia expert at the Shanghai International Studies University observed, “If China goes along with the U.S. against Russia, it will not only greatly strengthen the anti-Russian camp, but will also be a huge boost to the U.S. ‘leadership.’ ”
The key question now is just how far Beijing will go to support Moscow. While Xi would like to maintain good relations with Europe and avoid a further deterioration in the U.S.-China relationship, the fate of Putin and the Russian state directly implicates China’s core security interests. Not only would the prospect of a beaten and broken Russia activate China’s fears of instability along their shared 2,500-mile border, but it would also create uncertainty about the future leadership and geopolitical orientation of the Russian government. If Putin were eventually to fall from power, would his successor remain aligned with Beijing? So the more anxious Beijing becomes about the war and Putin’s personal position in power, the more likely it is to step up support by providing direct economic assistance, mitigating the impact of sanctions and even supplying military equipment.
Clearly, China’s preference is to avoid secondary sanctions in response to any support — access to the international market and the U.S. dollar remains critical for China’s economy and its continued rise. But Beijing could pursue means of support that are difficult to track, such as facilitating Russia’s access to U.S. dollars via offshore accounts, or by directing state-owned enterprises and even private companies to increase their purchases of non-sanctioned Russian goods and services. If China does decide to supply Russia with military assistance, it would likely seek to avoid equipment and hardware that would flagrantly violate international law and sanctions or be easily traceable, and instead provide spare parts, ammunition or certain dual-use items that aren’t yet sanctioned.
But critically, the decision to provide aid to Russia would be driven primarily by Beijing’s assessment of how Russia is faring in the war, rather than a desire to avoid paying economic or diplomatic costs. Unfortunately, it is difficult to imagine that Beijing is watching the conflict unfold without growing more nervous by the day: Russia has failed to achieve any of its major military or political objectives. In just the past week, the Russian military has escalated its offensive to include a wider number of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, and President Biden is also now warning of “clear signs” that Putin is considering using chemical weapons. Domestically, Putin has begun to purge his inner circle, arresting some within the security services and senior officials in the national guard. Beijing will see this as a sign that Putin’s grip is weakening, and as the sanctions continue to decimate Russia’s economy, anxiety in China is only likely to grow.
Some analysts suggest that China may well see Russia’s recent weakening in the wake of sanctions as a net positive, as it shifts the balance of power in the relationship in Beijing’s favor. A tangible benefit of such a shift would be Beijing’s ability to demand more favorable terms in buying Russian energy. While it’s true that Beijing leveraged Moscow’s economic and diplomatic isolation after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 to gain better terms in several large energy deals, the security environment for China in 2022 is far more contentious than it was in 2014, and Moscow’s true value is its ideological orientation and military capabilities as much as its energy stores. Xi does not want a weak Russia for a security and strategic partner.
If Beijing turns toward and not away from Moscow as the war grinds on and the extent of human suffering increases, the basic trajectory of China’s relations with the West will undergo a profound shift toward open rivalry. It would be comforting to think that the prospect of such a disastrous turn would be enough to dissuade the Chinese leadership from traveling down this path. Unfortunately, though, Beijing’s geopolitical outlook for the next decade — much like Washington’s — includes conflict and friction as defining features.
UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, March 30, 2022
The Foreign Secretary supports the withdrawal of serving UK judges from the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal. Following discussions with the Deputy Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor and the President of the Supreme Court, it was agreed that it is no longer tenable for serving UK judges to sit on Hong Kong’s top court.
British judges have played an important role in supporting the judiciary in Hong Kong for many years. However, since the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, China has continued to use this legislation to undermine the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong.
These rights and freedoms were set out in the Joint Declaration agreed between the UK and China in 1984. China’s actions include restrictions on freedom of expression, the stifling of opposition voices, and the criminalising of dissent.
The National Security Law also violates the high degree of autonomy of executive and legislative powers and independent judicial authority, provided for in the Joint Declaration.
The UK Supreme Court has continued to assess the situation in Hong Kong carefully in consultation with the UK Government. As National Security Law cases proceed through the Courts – and we see the far-reaching chilling effect of the legislation – it has become increasingly untenable for the UK government to endorse UK serving judges sitting on the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal.
6. US says hopes of resolution of audit impasse with China ‘premature’
Eleanor Olcott and Michael O’Dwyer, Financial Times, March 24, 2022
Beijing’s ban on foreign access to audits could cause delisting of $2tn of shares in US-listed Chinese companies.
US regulators have warned that investor hopes that it was close to an agreement with Beijing that would allow audit inspections of US-listed Chinese companies and avert the delisting of $2tn of shares were “premature”.
The US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board on Thursday said it “remains unclear” whether Beijing will “permit and facilitate” access for its officials to inspect the audits of US-listed Chinese companies, as required by US law. The statement threatens to reverse gains made by US-listed Chinese equities over the past week.
In an email to the Financial Times, the regulator said negotiations were ongoing, but that “full access to relevant audit documentation” was “not negotiable” for the PCAOB.
The statement comes after people familiar with its position said Beijing was preparing to make concessions on its prohibition of foreign access to Chinese audit information. It is likely to temper hopes of a deal to resolve the impasse between Beijing and Washington.
During negotiations, Beijing floated the idea of permitting limited access for foreign accounting regulators, with a “red light, green light” system on financial audit information that can be disclosed, according to people familiar with the details.
The proposed concession would still block access to “sensitive” information that Beijing deems relevant to national security. The PCAOB said its demand for full access applied to companies “in sensitive industries”.
The China Securities Regulatory Commission was not immediately available for comment.
Chinese companies listed in the US have been caught up in the wider geopolitical tensions between the countries. Beijing’s prohibition on foreign access to Chinese audit information is incompatible with the US Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, which requires companies to allow the PCAOB to examine their audits.
Companies whose audit papers cannot be accessed by the PCAOB for three years are set to be delisted. Earlier this month, the Securities and Exchange Commission began to publicly name Chinese companies that would be delisted if they did not comply.
Stocks of US-listed Chinese companies plunged after the SEC named five groups set to be delisted if they did not grant access to their books. But share prices of Chinese internet giants including Alibaba and Baidu recovered on reports that Beijing was preparing to soften its stance.
The PCAOB also said on Thursday that any agreement would be only a “first step” towards satisfying legal requirements. “An agreement without successful execution will not satisfy US law,” it said.
7. How Kissinger became an asset of China
Isaac Stone Fish, The Spectator, March 26, 2022
It started with Henry Kissinger. Before Intel apologised to China for attempting to remove forced labor from the company's supply chains in December, before Disney thanked a Chinese public security bureau that rounded up Muslims and sent them to concentration camps, before LeBron James criticised the Houston Rockets’ general manager for supporting democracy in Hong Kong, before Marriott fired an employee for supporting Tibet, before Sheldon Adelson personally lobbied to kill a bill condemning China’s human rights record, even before Ronald Reagan called China a ‘so-called Communist country,’ the men whose relationship became a blueprint for everything that came after sat with Premier Zhou Enlai in a Chinese government guesthouse in July 1971, discussing philosophy.
By his flattery, persistence, and charm over dozens of hours of conversation over five years, Zhou initiated US National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger as a friend of China. The friendship wasn’t merely diplomatic, or coldly strategic. The former assistant secretary of state Richard H. Solomon, in a formerly classified study about Chinese negotiating behavior, described Kissinger’s memoirs of the time as ‘replete with almost awestruck recollections of the personal escorts, elaborate tours, and lavish banquets meticulously arranged by his Chinese hosts during his nine visits between 1971 and 1976,’ the year that Chairman Mao Zedong and Zhou died. It was during these years that Kissinger helped bring isolated China back into the world order, and it’s when he became known as a friend by Zhou. Kissinger’s admiration persisted. ‘In some 60 years of public life,’ Kissinger writes in his 2011 book On China, ‘I have encountered no more compelling figure’ than Zhou.
Kissinger’s trips to China in the early 1970s were monumental not only for reestablishing a relationship between the two countries. They also inaugurated two distinct but interrelated phenomena that still shape America – and the United Kingdom, among other countries – today. The first is how Beijing employed tactics of the United Front – a Leninist concept of cultivating friends and weakening enemies of Communism – to shape American politics and business. The second is the rise of what could be called diplomat consultants – like former US secretaries of state Alexander Haig Jr. and Madeleine Albright, and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair – who fit into the long-standing Chinese tradition of trading access for accommodation. Increasing exposure to China did bring immense benefits to America’s economy and helped encourage millions of Americans to spend time in China. These are very real upsides, and they should not be ignored.
The best agents, in other words, are the ones who don’t know they are agents
At the same time, these diplomat consultants are like field agents of Party influence, especially in the business world, where they help global firms compete and cohere to Party standards while instructing these same firms on how to chill anti-Party speech. And in the years since Kissinger established his consulting firm Kissinger Associates in 1982, Kissinger began to open doors for American companies in China – while actively dampening criticism of the Party amongst his massive network. Starting in the early 1980s, Kissinger would frequently adopt a reverential and sentimental tone towards China, out of character for the textbook realist. From the George HW Bush administration, where he argued for a lighter response to the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, to the Trump administration, which he reportedly convinced not to meet with the Dalai Lama – Trump was the first president since Reagan to not meet with the Tibetan spiritual leader – Kissinger used his considerable government influence to weaken policies that targeted Beijing. Kissinger declined multiple interview requests. One of his representatives denied that Kissinger was an agent of Chinese influence, and called the allegation libellous. Kissinger’s relationship with China, he said, ‘is in the highest and best tradition of American statesmanship.’
All intelligence agencies recruit foreign agents. But the Party’s relationship with its American friends, Kissinger included, is different, because of the Party’s expansive attitude toward espionage. There are two major differences between Washington’s and Beijing’s views on intelligence gathering. The first involves the deeply political nature of the Party’s intelligence and security services. In China’s intelligence agencies, like in many branches of its government, political commissars and Party secretaries work with their more technocratic counterparts to ensure the agency and its staff follow the correct political lines. ‘The Ministry of State Security People’s Police are red troops loyal to the Party,’ a ministry spokesperson said in January 2021, in reference to an internal Chinese police force.
The second is Beijing’s reliance on a wide range of nontraditional allies – including students, academics, businesspeople, and employees of nonprofits, both Chinese and foreign – to further its intelligence goals. During the Cold War, the CIA helped fund the literary magazine Encounter co-founded by the influential neoconservative Irving Kristol. Edward Snowden’s 2013 revelations showed some of the links between the National Security Agency and American companies like Verizon. In China, these links are the rule, not the exception.
Beijing still conducts normal espionage and spycraft: infiltrating enemy organisations, hacking into rival governments, and cultivating foreign agents—sometimes by sending them messages on LinkedIn. But it does a whole lot else, too.
In 2018 the Party History Research Center, an important institution that helps drive and reflect the Party’s view on history, published an essay on Zhou’s views on spying. Zhou believed the Party had a ‘remarkably’ different stance toward espionage from that of other countries, because it linked espionage with United Front work. ‘Zhou advocated making many friends, using United Front work to drive intelligence work, and nestling United Front work within intelligence work,’ the essay said. Before running the Chinese government as its premier, Zhou founded the Party’s intelligence unit and built its first espionage cells. Zhou, in other words, was the Party’s first spymaster. And in this Chinese sense of ‘espionage’, Kissinger was Zhou’s most important American asset. In Chinese parlance: a friend.
The annals of spycraft are replete with people who likely had no idea they were being fooled. ‘Any unwitting agent is more effective when left in the belief that they are genuinely holding the moral high ground, not representing an authoritarian intelligence agency,’ Thomas Rid, a professor of security studies at King’s College London, testified to Congress in March 2017. The best agents, in other words, are the ones who don’t know they are agents.
Because of the mismatch between the Party’s expansive view of espionage (that includes what American targets often perceive simply as friendship) and the more constrained Western view, Americans often don’t understand the deal they are taking when they ‘accept’ the friendship. Indeed, few friends have ever expressed any public awareness of what friendship actually means: support not of China but of the Party. The Party expects friends to silence their criticism, so as not to ‘embarrass’ or ‘offend’ China, and to praise and advance the Party’s policies. ‘Being a “friend” of China means you’re politically in tune with the Communist Party,’ said the longtime China scholar Perry Link, ‘whether you know it or not.’
Kissinger is one of the most brilliant thinkers of the twentieth century and has more experience dealing with the Party than any American, alive or dead. Why not just take what he said about China at face value? In other words, why not assume that Kissinger’s words and actions reflect his intellect and experience? To answer that, it’s helpful to quote some of Kissinger’s contemporaries about his character. A man as powerful as Kissinger will always create enemies. But Kissinger incited an astonishing amount of invective, especially from those who worked with him directly. ‘I admire Henry,’ said Richard V. Allen, who served as Ronald Reagan’s first national security adviser. ‘What is troubling about him is why he needs to be so devious and manipulative—he’s so brilliant, he works so hard. He sees connections before everyone else. He could rise just as high if he played straight. But for some reason, he just can’t play straight. He has to manipulate.’ In a January 1989 phone call with the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, George H. W. Bush thanked him for meeting with Kissinger and said he looked forward to the briefing on the meeting. But ‘they would not necessarily believe everything because this was, after all, Henry Kissinger,’ Bush said, according to a transcript of the meeting.
In his decades-long reign as arguably the world’s most famous living statesman, Henry Kissinger has been called many things. Senator John McCain called him the world’s most respected individual. The novelist Joseph Heller called him an ‘odious schlump who made war gladly.’ Xi Jinping calls him an ‘old friend of the Chinese people.’ But the most accurate way to describe Kissinger, from the time he started his consulting company in 1982 to the present, is as an agent of Chinese influence. He may be one of the most brilliant Americans of the twentieth century—and a former intelligence agent himself—but he should have been more vigilant.
AUTHORITARIANISM
8. Russia crisis gives EU a grim sense of what’s to come with China
Stuart Lau, Politico, March 30, 2022
9. The war makes China uncomfortable. European leaders don’t care
The Economist, March 31, 2022
Chinese leaders wanted the mood to be “business as usual”. But the summit between China and the European Union on April 1st will be anything but normal. That is because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and China’s cold-blooded response to it, have exposed the limitations of Europe’s old trade-first China policies.
EU leaders approached the summit, which is being held by video-link, with low expectations. They hoped at least to send a message to China’s leader, Xi Jinping, that the Ukraine war is a defining moment for relations, and for China’s image if it refuses to use its influence to end the killing.
10. China tightens restrictions and bars scholars from international conferences
Emily Feng, NPR, March 30, 2022
The international conference was supposed to gather some of the most promising and most established Asia studies scholars from across the world in lush Honolulu.
Instead, at least five Chinese scholars based in the People's Republic of China (PRC) were prevented from attending virtual events via Zoom, according to four people with direct knowledge of the matter.
They said Chinese security officers and education officials directly intervened, citing education regulations published during a global coronavirus pandemic which require all Chinese scholars to receive university permission to attend any international event in-person or online.
"After years of encouraging and funding PRC scholars to participate internationally, the intensifying controls of recent years are now full-scale, and academic work, at least on China, is to be quarantined from the world," said James Millward, a history professor at Georgetown University who attended the conference. "The doors have slammed shut fast."
The conference, which ended last weekend, was an annual gathering organized by the Association for Asian Studies (AAS), one of the largest membership-based organizations in the field. For emerging scholars as well as more senior academics, the conference is an opportunity to network and to hear the latest research on Asian countries across a variety of disciplines.
Because of the ongoing COVID pandemic, AAS decided this year to hold a mix of in-person events and online-only panels.
In one case, a group of police officers visited the home of a scholar in China after they had presented their research paper to an online Zoom panel earlier in the week, questioning the scholar for hours, in part because they considered the title of the paper "incorrect."
"It was deeply frightening," said one academic who attended the panel but requested anonymity to protect the identity of the scholar involved.
NPR reviewed the paper but is not publishing its title or subject to protect the identity of the writer. The paper did not touch on subjects which Chinese authorities normally consider sensitive, such as human rights, Tibet, Xinjiang or Hong Kong.
Chinese scholars on a separate virtual panel were also told by Chinese university administrators to cancel their presentations. Eventually, they emailed the other attendees to withdraw from the panel due to "medical reasons" but hoped to partake in AAS events again "in less sensitive times," according to two people with direct knowledge of the incident.
"Topics that have seemingly been considered nonpolitical are now being yanked or deemed not permissible to be exchanging with international colleagues," said another academic who attended the panel who also did not want to be named so as not to identify the Chinese scholars impacted.
Strict COVID prevention policies had already stymied the volume of intellectual exchanges between the PRC and the rest of the world. Those who study China have found themselves isolated by border closures that have made travel to and from China nearly impossible, rendering archives and field sites in China inaccessible for the last two years and counting.
Since 2016, China's education ministry has required its academics to seek university approval for all overseas trips and collaborations. In September 2020, universities began applying these rules for online events held by international organizations, as well, though such rules had not been extensively enforced until now.
Academics say these controls will further deplete the already-sparse exchanges between China and the rest of the world while hobbling the careers of young Chinese scholars.
"We have already been anxious, because for those of us in modern China studies, it's been two years with no end in sight about when we might be able to return to the archives," said a third academic who went to the AAS conference. "You keep thinking maybe things will get better, so after the [Winter] Olympics, after [October's Chinese Communist] Party Congress, there will be a loosening of restrictions, but unfortunately it continues to worsen."
The AAS said it was aware some PRC-based scholars were prevented from attending and now is trying to ascertain exactly how many scholars were impacted. "The AAS firmly supports the right of scholars worldwide to take part in the free exchange of ideas and research through conferences and other forms of academic cooperation," the association said in a statement posted on its website Wednesday.
AAS has previously come under heightened scrutiny within China. In March 2021, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sanctioned a member of one of AAS' governing councils because of her research examining Chinese state policy in the region of Xinjiang, where authorities had detained hundreds of thousands of mostly ethnic Uyghurs. The academic, Joanne Smith Finley, had organized two panels on Xinjiang for the annual AAS conference just days earlier.
11. VIDEO – China, Russia and the war in Ukraine
James Kynge and Alexander Gabuev, Financial Times, March 24, 2022
The FT's global China editor James Kynge talks to Alexander Gabuev from the Carnegie Moscow Center about China's 'no-limits' friendship with Russia, the relationship between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, and how the war in Ukraine changes the geo-political landscape
12. Russia pledges to create 'just, democratic world order' with China
Nataliya Vasilyeva, The Telegraph, March 30, 2022
Sergei Lavrov warns that the world faces a 'very grave stage in the history of international relations' as he embarked on a trip to China
13. China, Russia 'more determined' to boost ties- Chinese foreign min
Ryan Woo, Reuters, March 30, 2022
China and Russia are "more determined" to develop bilateral ties and boost cooperation, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Wednesday following a meeting in China with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov.
14. Russia’s war on Ukraine: China schools its teachers with classroom guide to Beijing’s messaging
Mimi Lau, South China Morning Post, March 30, 2022
More than a dozen universities and vocational schools are taking part in the campaign to guide students’ understanding of the conflict
Political education teachers are required to attend lectures and online briefings as part of ‘collective class-preparation’ used to nurture patriotism
Beijing’s messaging on the war in Ukraine is being taken into Chinese classrooms with teachers attending lectures on how to “unify thoughts and correctly guide students’ understanding” of the conflict.
Tertiary teachers of ideological political education across multiple provinces are reportedly required to attend lectures or online briefings under a “collective class-preparation over the Russia-Ukraine situation” campaign to strengthen ideological control in classrooms.
Based on school notices posted online, it appears the campaign has been organised by provincial governments, local education departments and Marxism colleges in tertiary institutions where experts on Russia-Ukraine politics were invited to speak on the subject.
15. Australian journalist Cheng Lei to be tried in Beijing next week
Kristy Needham, Reuters, March 25, 2022
16. Ambassador barred from Beijing spy trial of Australian journalist Cheng Lei
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, March 31, 2022
17. China’s Push to Isolate Taiwan Demands U.S. Action, Report Says
Edward Wong and Amy Qin, New York Times, March 24, 2022
18. Beijing Tells Chinese in Russia to Help Fill Economic Void
Bloomberg, March 22, 2022
19. China exit? Russia crisis has businesses thinking the unthinkable
Ryushiro Kodaira, Nikkei Asia, March 22, 2022
Capital flight may have already begun as investors fear Taiwan contingency
20. GCHQ spy chief in warning to China over Ukraine invasion
Gavin Cordon, Evening Standard, March 30, 2022
21. Hong Kong leader rejects barrister nominee to sensitive judges panel, appoints another
Greg Torode, Reuters, March 25, 2022
Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam rejected a Bar Association nominee to a discreet panel that selects the city's judges and appointed the Bar's new chairman instead, the barristers' body said on Friday, announcing what was an unprecedented switch.
22. Hong Kong: Top UK judges resign from highest court
Leo Sands, BBC, March 30, 2022
The UK has announced that two of its Supreme Court judges will no longer be sitting on Hong Kong's top court.
The judges said the threat to civil liberties had made their role on Hong Kong's Court of Final Appeal untenable.
Hong Kong's Chief Executive Carrie Lam has responded with "regret and disappointment" to the resignations.
But the UK government supports the decision, and says the situation in the territory has now reached "a tipping point".
In 2020 China introduced a national security law that curtailed freedom of speech and made it easier to punish protesters in Hong Kong.
UK Supreme Court President Lord Robert Reed said he and Lord Patrick Hodge were resigning from the court over the threat to civil freedoms posed by the new law.
U.S. Department of Justice, March 31, 2022
U.S. Department of Justice, March 30, 2022
A Chinese national is charged in a criminal complaint, which was unsealed today in the Southern District of New York, with conspiring to act in the United States as an illegal agent of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
According to court documents, Sun Hoi Ying, aka Sun Haiying, 45, of the PRC, from at least February 2017 through February 2022, acted in the United States as an agent of the PRC government, without notifying the U.S. Attorney General as required by law.
“This case demonstrates, once again, the PRC’s disdain for the rule of law and its efforts to coerce and intimidate those it targets on our shores as part of its Operation Fox Hunt,” said Assistant Attorney General for National Security Matthew G. Olsen. “The defendant allegedly traveled to the United States and enlisted others, including a sworn law enforcement officer, to spy on and blackmail his victims. Such conduct is both criminal and reprehensible.”
“The PRC government launched a campaign dubbed ‘Operation Fox Hunt,’ a global plot to repress dissent and to forcibly repatriate so-called ‘fugitives’ – including citizens living legally in the United States – through the use of unsanctioned, unilateral and illegal practices,” said U.S. Attorney Damian Williams for the Southern District of New York. “We allege Mr. Sun, as part of that campaign, attempted to threaten and coerce a victim into bending to the PRC’s will, even using a co-conspirator who is a member of U.S. law enforcement to reinforce that the victim had no choice but to comply with the PRC government’s demands. Today’s charges reflect this office’s continued commitment, working hand in hand with our partners at the FBI, to combat transnational repression and bringing to justice those who perpetrate it.”
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS
25. Energy Security Vies with Green Goals in China’s New Five-Year Plan
Manyun Zou, Chen Xuewan, Bai Yujie and Luo Guoping, Caixin, March 25, 2022
Big boosts for hydrogen and nuclear, more hydropower dams, and no caps on coal.
That’s the message from Chinese policymakers after the release of the nation’s latest comprehensive energy plan this week, with two clear goals: to secure the energy-hungry nation’s supply, and to gradually tilt the mix of sources toward long-term green ambitions.
26. China-linked wildlife poaching and trafficking in Mexico
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Brookings, March 2022
Wildlife trafficking from Mexico to China receives little international attention, but it is growing, compounding the threats to Mexican biodiversity posed by preexisting poaching for other markets, including the United States.
Since Mexican criminal groups often control extensive territories in Mexico which become no-go-zones for government officials and environmental defenders, visibility into the extent of poaching, illegal logging, and wildlife trafficking in Mexico is limited.
It is likely, however, that the extent of poaching and trafficking, including to China, is larger than commonly understood.
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND COERCION
27. Understanding Chinese Engagement with Latin America and its Effects on the Region
Evan Ellis, IndraStra, March 25, 2022
28. China’s Threats Target Regime Opponents Worldwide
Jemimah Steinfeld, Foreign Policy, March 29, 2022
Legal tools and anonymous threats are used against dissidents.
Benedict Rogers lives in a leafy, quiet suburb of southwest London. Shortly after he founded the human rights nongovernmental organization and website Hong Kong Watch in 2017, he returned home to find an unusual letter on his doorstep. It was postmarked from Hong Kong and simply addressed to “resident.” Inside was a photograph of himself emblazoned with the words “watch him.” It had been sent to everyone on his street.
I spoke to Rogers close to the time, and he joked that until then, none of his neighbors knew who he was. The harassment nevertheless left a bad taste in his mouth, especially when subsequent letters were directed to his mother’s house.
But this March, the threats expanded, when a letter arrived from the Hong Kong Police Force. They accused Rogers of “collusion with foreign forces to endanger national security,” a punishable crime under the draconian national security law. If Rogers returns to Hong Kong, he could face three years in prison.
Rogers is the first known British citizen targeted under the national security law. The threats against him represent an escalation in China’s ambitions to control conversations far beyond its borders.
29. Lobbyists for hostile states such as Russia and China to be registered
George Grylls, Times of London, March 28, 2022
30. Chinese agent targeted dissidents in United States, U.S. prosecutors say
Luc Cohen, Reuters, March 30, 2022
31. U.S. Charges Chinese Agent in Alleged Schemes to Forcibly Repatriate U.S., Canadian Residents
Kate O’Keeffe and Aruna Viswanatha, Wall Street Journal, March 30, 2022
32. HSBC cuts references to Ukraine ‘war’ from its analyst reports
Jasper Jolly, The Guardian, March 28, 2022
HSBC has reportedly removed references to a “war” in Ukraine from research reports, amid calls for the British bank to close its operations in Russia.
Russia’s government refers only to a “special military operation” in Ukraine, and Vladimir Putin’s regime has criminalised reporting on its invasion that contains any information from non-official sources, with prison sentences of up to 15 years.
The bank’s committees that review all research sent to clients have amended multiple reports to soften the language used on the subject, including changing the word “war” to “conflict”, according to the Financial Times, which cited two people with direct knowledge of the matter.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
33. NHS accused of exploiting forced labour
The Spectator, March 28, 2022
There’s a mutiny underway in Westminster. After years of revelations about the conditions of Uighur Muslims in China’s Xinjiang province, momentum is building behind plans to stop the government buying health goods made in the region. On Wednesday, MPs will vote on an amendment to the health and social care bill, tabled by former Tory chief whip Lord Blencathra. It would ban NHS procurement from regions where the government believes there to be a ‘serious risk of genocide’. Ministers have already tried to buy off the rebels by proposing a review of health supply chains but ringleaders fear these don’t go far enough.
And now Mr S has seen evidence which suggests that the NHS has indeed been purchasing products made in the Xinjiang province. Research compiled by Professor Laura Murphy, one of the world’s leading expert on Xinjiang supply chains, and Nyrola Elimä shows that at least one NHS hospital has bought protective equipment from Zhende Medical Products, one of China’s leading suppliers. In 2015, Zhende built two factories in Alashankou, Xinjiang. In 2017, after the factories began production, the company announced that it would participate in the Chinese government’s ‘surplus labour’ program through which they accepted 300 transferred labourers.
34. Uyghur Genocide: Why Most Muslim Countries Remain Silent
Abdulhakim Idris, Bitter Winter, March 28, 2022
As confirmed at the Islamabad Organization of Islamic Cooperation meeting, they need China’s money, its protection at the UN, and its surveillance technology.
The world is talking about the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The effects of the invasion, which created a shock wave in the international arena, will be on the agenda for many years to come. The country whose attitude towards this invasion was most striking was China. Under the name of the principle of neutrality, China takes a silent stance against the invading Russian regime. Like as if nothing had happened, it continues its diplomatic and economic pressure in the regions it targets for its own colonial ambitions.
The most striking example of this has emerged in the meeting of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), which was held last week in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. In the meeting attended by the foreign ministers of 57 Muslim member countries, the only state official who was invited although he was not from a Muslim country was Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. It is remarkable that Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan, who hosted the meeting, praised the Chinese regime, which is conducting genocide on Uyghur Muslims.
After the meeting of the organization, a joint statement was issued pointing out the persecution of Muslims in every possible geographical location from Afghanistan to Kashmir, from Yemen to Syria, from Palestine to Myanmar. Except for Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, the Uyghurs who are subjected to genocide by the Chinese Communist Party in East Turkestan were ignored. What is the main reason why the Uyghur Genocide, which has been defined as such by many countries and international human rights organizations, is not acknowledged by Muslim countries?
There are three basic elements in the denial of the oppression of the Uyghurs, even though they belong to the same religion, by the Muslim states. These are economic dependency, the need for China’s diplomatic power in the international arena, especially the UN, and security. In this article, these issues will be examined briefly.
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
35. The Supply Chain Crisis Is About to Get a Lot Worse
Will Knight, Wired, March 28, 2022
36. U.S. to Probe Tariff-Dodging Claim Against Chinese Manufacturers
Josh Zumbrun and Katy Stech Ferek, Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2022
The Department of Commerce said Monday that it will investigate whether Chinese solar producers are illegally circumventing solar tariffs by routing operations through four countries in Southeast Asia.
37. Big Four under growing pressure as Chinese developers delay audits
Thomas Hale and Tabby Kinder, Financial Times, March 30, 2022
International auditors are resigning from China's heavily indebted property developers as a wave of delayed financial results has increased uncertainty over the full scale of the sector's worst-ever crisis and raised the threat of hidden money owed.
38. Nearly 50% of European Firms in Hong Kong Plan to Relocate Staff
Iain Marlow, Bloomberg, March 24, 2022
Grim results come as city sees runaway omicron outbreak Recent relaxation is ‘too little, too late,’ chamber head says
39. Stocks in China Suffer Worst Quarter in Years
Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2022
CYBER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
40. Douyin’s New Rules: More Control Under the Pretext of “Protecting Minors”
Tan Liwei, Bitter Winter, March 29, 2022
The Chinese version of TikTok will implement stricter rules and prohibit “deviant” and “anti-government” discussions. All justified with the fight against teen cyberaddiction.
Here we are. New rules for Douyin, the Chinese version of the video-based social networking service TikTok, are ready, and they promise more control. The matter is not unimportant. Every day, 600 million users access Douyin, and controlling it is like controlling several large Chinese provinces.
As Bitter Winter revealed last week, the QingLang (清朗, “[making the Internet] cleansed and uncontaminated”) campaign, launched personally by Xi Jinping, is targeting the large social media, one of the few places where some independent comments may still be posted in China, although to a limited extent. Xi has personally commented that these media are not controlled enough and are in a situation of “chaos,” which should be urgently rectified.
41. EU Analysis Suggests China May Send Tech Hardware to Help Putin
Chiara Albanese, Bloomberg, March 24, 2022
MILITARY AND SECURITY THREATS
42. China and Solomon Islands Draft Secret Security Pact, Raising Alarm in the Pacific
Damien Cave, New York Times, March 24, 2022
The leaked agreement, if signed, could help the Chinese Navy block shipping routes that played a vital role in World War II.
43. China and Solomon Islands strengthen ties
Bernard Lagan, Times of London, March 29, 2022
Deal will bring Chinese warships close to Australian border
44. China gains a foothold in Australia's backyard
Frances Mao, BBC, March 30, 2022
Late last week, a proposed security treaty between China and a tiny chain of islands in the Pacific sent shock waves across the ocean.
The leaked draft signalled that China could deploy troops to the Solomon Islands - and potentially establish a naval base there.
Nowhere was more alarmed than the Solomons' neighbour to the south, Australia - the bedrock regional partner of the Aukus alliance, a new security pact in the Pacific Ocean with the US and UK.
"The details of this deal are still uncertain. But even if it's smaller than the feared military base, it would be China's first foothold in the Pacific," says Prof Alan Gyngell from the Australian Institute of International Affairs.
45. Pacific leader urges Solomon Islands to rethink China security deal
The Guardian, March 31, 2022
President of the Federated States of Micronesia says he fears Pacific islands ‘would be at the epicentre of a future confrontation’ between China and the US
46. Pull back, de-escalate in Ladakh, NSA Doval tells Wang Yi. But Chinese FM plays hardball
Snehesh Alex Philip, The Print, March 25, 2022
The disengagement and de-escalation at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, which has been witnessing a stand-off for the past nearly two years, was the primary focus of India during talks with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi Friday.
Sources in the defence and security establishment told ThePrint that while Wang was pitching for closer Sino-India ties, especially in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine crisis, while also seeking Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s participation in the proposed BRICS summit to be hosted by China later this year, India stuck to its own demands — easing of tensions at the LAC.
NSA Ajit Doval and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar made it clear to Wang that for normalisation of relationship, peace and tranquility has to prevail at the LAC, said the sources.
However, there has been no word yet from the Chinese on the LAC situation.
47. Chinese minister seeks normal India ties, Delhi says ease border tension first
Krishna N. Das and Sanjeev Miglani, Reuters, March 25, 2022
48. Taiwan, Cross-strait Stability and European Security: Implications and Response Options
Henry Boyd, Franz-Stefan Gady, Oskar Glaese, Meia Nouwens, Ben Schreer, IISS, March 30, 2022
The European Union and European capitals are increasingly looking to the Indo-Pacific as the central arena for future economic growth and competition over the rules-based international order. However, China’s ambition to unite Taiwan with the mainland, including potentially through the use of force, risks destabilising the region.
While interest in cross-strait stability and Taiwan’s security has increased in Europe, there is still little clarity about what role individual countries and the EU envision for themselves in deterring a cross-strait conflict, or indeed what role they could play in case of a conflict.
This report therefore examines the evolution of the Europe–Taiwan relationship through political, economic and security lenses. It demonstrates that, contrary to conventional wisdom, European capitals could leverage political, economic and even some limited military means for deterrence ahead of or during a Taiwan contingency if there is the political will to do so.
49. China builds up blue-water presence as world focuses on Ukraine
Tsukasa Hadano, Nikkei Asia, March 29, 2022
Beijing fully militarizes three reefs in South China Sea, U.S. commander says
50. NATO leaders warn China: Don’t act as Russia’s enabler
Stuart Lau, Politico, March 24, 2022
ONE BELT, ONE ROAD STRATEGY
51. The Transitional World Order: Implications for Latin America and the Caribbean
Evan Ellis, Global Americans, March 29, 2022
OPINION PIECES
52. China’s repression of Hong Kong makes British judges’ position untenable
Liz Truss, UK Foreign Minister, Times of London, March 30, 2022
As the United Kingdom rallies the international community in support of Ukraine, we remain vigilant about threats to freedom and democracy elsewhere around the world.
We have seen a systematic erosion of liberty in Hong Kong. This is the result of the Chinese Communist Party seizing nearly every lever of power and asserting its autocratic values in an increasingly muscular way. It is a creeping, calculated assault on the fundamental freedoms we take for granted here at home and which the people of Hong Kong have enjoyed for years.
53. Is China helping the Kremlin stash away billions in offshore accounts?
Ben Wright, The Telegraph, March 31, 2022
54. Europe and China at a Crossroads
Dingding Chen, Nadine Godehardt, Maximillian Mayer and Xin Zhang, The Diplomat, March 29, 2022
4 scenarios for China-EU relations amid the war in Ukraine.
55. We need to prepare for the Great Split between China and the West
Sam Olsen, What China Wants, March 29, 2022
56. Eileen Gu: One Winter of Happiness—Or of Chinese Propaganda?
Kok Bayraq, Bitter Winter, March 25, 2022
57. The Solomon Islands deal with China isn’t about security – and it will hurt the Pacific
Matthew Wale, The Guardian, March 29, 2022
58. The U.S. Can’t Afford a Double Cold War
Mathew Burrows and Robert Manning, Foreign Policy, March 28, 2022