China Articles - August 7, 2022
Friends,
Today is the fourth day of the PRC’s live-fire exercises in retaliation for Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. On top of these military threats, the island nation has been subjected to increased economic coercion through the halting of more than a thousand imports and the embargo of some critical materials that are necessary for Taiwanese companies.
In addition to these actions against Taiwan, the PRC has expanded its threats and coercion to the Japan and the United States. Of the 11 short range ballistic missiles launched on Thursday, five landed within Japan’s exclusive economic zone. The PRC also cut off dialogues with the United States on issues including law enforcement, drug trafficking, military-to-military crisis management, and climate change.
As the PRC lashes out, an interesting trend is forming. Policy analysts and political leaders are beginning to question the efficacy of observing the ‘One China’ policy. For decades, leaders understood that respecting Beijing’s fantasy of ownership of Taiwan would maintain peace and stability. The assumption was that over time, the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait could find a political settlement, perhaps akin to the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ afforded to Hong Kong in 1997.
When the Chinese Communist Party destroyed ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in the summer of 2020 by violating its treaty with the United Kingdom and breaking its promise to the people of Hong Kong, the ‘One China’ spell began to unravel.
My prediction is that one of the consequences of the destruction of Hong Kong’s democracy will be the end of accommodating the Party’s demands for ‘One China’ and the recognition of Taiwan as an independent country. This will outrage the Party and could lead to military aggression by the PRC, but the rationale for appeasing the Party has all but disappeared.
If the Chinese Communist Party continues to prepare for an invasion of Taiwan though a massive military buildup, aggressive incursions against Taiwan along with efforts to isolate them diplomatically and economically, while refusing to offer an acceptable alternative to the Taiwanese people, the Taiwanese people have no real choice but to defend themselves and seek outside support. Sympathy for and affinity with Taiwan’s prosperous democracy will grow and put pressure on leaders to provide that support (one needs look only as far as the Ukraine example).
These strong-arm tactics against Taiwan, which pre-date any shift in U.S. policy towards the PRC, provide persuasive evidence that the Party has no intention of resolving it’s ‘Taiwan problem’ peacefully and through mutual negotiation. If the PRC intends to change the status quo unilaterally (as it did in Hong Kong), then why should Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and others continue to hold up their end of the ‘One China’ bargain. What was once seen as a wise and prudent policy of ambiguity and compromise is increasingly seen as a Faustian Bargain, which democracies compromise their principles to appease an increasingly aggressive PRC.
I don’t take these developments lightly and I fully appreciate what the abandonment of ‘One China’ could mean. I am more concerned now than at any point that there will be a significant military conflict in the Western Pacific. If it happens, that conflict will have global ramifications far beyond what we are seeing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many analysts have expressed their fear that the conflict could erupt with an accident or through the mistakes of leaders on both sides: I don’t share that fear.
I believe that the conflict will only begin if the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party believes they have an opportunity to succeed at an acceptable cost. The best way to avoid this conflict is to persuade the Party’s leadership that the cost of initiating the conflict will greatly exceed the benefits. For that reason, I welcome the announcement this week by the Swiss Government that they would match EU sanctions on the PRC should Beijing invade Taiwan (#51). I also welcome President Biden’s multiple public statements that the United States WOULD intervene if the PRC attacked Taiwan.
I covered these issues in a paper I submitted last year to the Aspen Institute’s Congressional Retreat on “Long-Term Strategic Competition with China” titled “Competition and Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait” (pages 71-88). I argued that the Party’s perception of relative costs is the critical determinant of whether there is a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and I dismiss the notion that Taipei or Washington can “force” Beijing to attack Taiwan. The CCP will certainly seek to portray rhetoric and actions by Washington or Taipei as causing the crisis (just as they are doing with Speaker Pelosi’s visit). However, we should view these self-serving justifications as pretexts for a strategy the Party has been employing for years.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. I’m Taiwanese and I Want to Thank Nancy Pelosi
Yu-Jie Chen, New York Times, August 5, 2022
As a Taiwanese, I’m sometimes asked what it’s like living in “the most dangerous place on earth.”
That’s what The Economist labeled Taiwan last year, and not without reason. Taiwan’s people have lived for decades under Chinese rhetorical threats to absorb the island. And as our huge Communist-ruled neighbor has developed into a military power, those threats now have teeth, which China has repeatedly bared in recent years through military exercises and violations of our air space in an escalating bullying campaign.
We are bracing for more pressure now after House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s whirlwind visit to Taipei. China often reacts furiously when any U.S. official visits Taiwan, but this time feels different. Beijing has a special loathing for Ms. Pelosi because of her frequent criticism of the Chinese Communist Party’s political repression and human rights violations, and President Xi Jinping of China, in a call with President Biden, had earlier warned the United States not to intervene in Taiwan.
We are not afraid. After years of constant threats by Beijing, Taiwan’s people do not panic easily.
But we also cannot stand alone. Ms. Pelosi’s visit was a welcome expression of U.S. solidarity with Taiwan and I, for one, am deeply grateful to her for shrugging off Beijing’s threats of retaliation. But other democracies must also summon the courage to stand with us.
Taiwan is critical to the entire democratic project. We are a vibrant democracy, the first place in Asia to legalize same-sex marriage, and one of the first to elect a female leader — our current president Tsai Ing-wen — who won office in her own right without the aid of family political connections. We are a successful economy, with some of the highest living standards in Asia and a center of the global semiconductor industry. We have maintained one of the world’s lowest Covid death rates without resorting to the harsh lockdowns imposed by China.
If Taiwan were brought to heel by China, the world would lose a shining example of democracy and the liberal international economic order at a time when the authoritarian tentacles of the likes of Russia and China are expanding.
In fact, it is precisely for these reasons that China threatens Taiwan: because China is afraid of us. Each of Taiwan’s 23 million people is a living, breathing rebuttal of the Communist Party’s insistence that its repressive, authoritarian model is superior to democracy and the only mode of government suitable for Chinese society. Seizing Taiwan would not only fulfill Mr. Xi’s nationalistic goal of annexing the island but would also destroy the evidence that glaringly disproves Beijing’s Communist propaganda.
These critical points are often overlooked. Taiwan is usually treated as a marginalized pawn on the chessboard of the big powers and portrayed as such by the global media. Ms. Pelosi’s trip was a perfect example. Most media coverage focused on the tension that her trip created between the United States and China. Rarely does anyone bother to ask what the Taiwanese want. The answer: To live our democratic way of life without outside interference, just as any democracy would.
When Mao Zedong’s Communist forces won the Chinese Civil War in 1949, China’s Nationalist regime, led by Chiang Kai-shek, fled to Taiwan and ruled with martial law. Civil liberties were curtailed, and regime opponents suffered greatly.
Growing up in the 1980s, my fellow classmates and I were forbidden at school from speaking in the Taiwanese dialect that we spoke at home. Chiang died in 1975 but his regime still clung to the fantasy that it would someday “recover the mainland.” Our Taiwanese identity was viewed as a threat and was suppressed.
That seems so long ago. Through the efforts of democracy advocates and pragmatic post-Chiang leaders, Taiwan evolved peacefully into a firm democracy with its own political system, judiciary and military. We freely elect our own leaders and openly criticize them. People no longer talk about “recovering the mainland.”
Many Taiwanese grew up in a time of democracy and prosperity, and all of us — young and old — cherish our homeland just the way it is. China’s threats only make us appreciate it more.
This is not to say that we are completely sanguine about our situation.
We watched with shock and sadness as Beijing cracked down on Hong Kong’s freedoms — a disturbing glimpse of our own possible future. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted fears that China could do the same to us. Beijing insists that there is no comparison between Taiwan and Ukraine, repeating its tired old gospel that Taiwan is an ancient and inseparable part of the Chinese motherland. But we have never been ruled by Communist China for a single day.
The majority of Taiwanese are pragmatic. We do not want a war with China. But we are ready to protect our home if attacked. There are now discussions of defense reform and extending the military conscription period from four months to one year. Some reservists are attending weapons boot camps to refresh their combat training. Others share information on how to pack an emergency kit and on where to shelter if the island is shelled.
A poll in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showed that 73 percent of Taiwan’s people were willing to take up arms to defend against a Chinese invasion. Our determination to safeguard our beloved homeland should not be underestimated.
Not everyone in Taiwan supported Ms. Pelosi’s visit. Many just want Taiwan to keep its head down and refrain from rocking the boat. But that’s one more reason Taiwan should be protected: In a democracy, such differences can be expressed, debated openly and compromises reached. That doesn’t happen on the other side of the Taiwan Strait.
China’s militaristic menacing of Taiwan is a threat to freedom everywhere. Drawing a line in the sand here will require genuine, meaningful support from like-minded democracies, including signing bilateral economic agreements with Taiwan, allowing it to join regional trade organizations to diminish Taiwan’s economic overreliance on China, supporting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations and more gestures like Ms. Pelosi’s visit.
Not all these gestures will be easy, and they carry great risks, often because of China’s infliction of economic pain. After Taiwan opened a representative office in Lithuania last year, for example, China used its economic clout to retaliate with a crippling boycott of Lithuanian products. China applies “divide and conquer” tactics to isolate countries that oppose it. But when democracies, including Taiwan, band together economically, diplomatically and militarily, they stand a better chance of holding their ground against China’s capricious retribution, which is not cost-free for itself either.
Freedom is worth fighting for, and all democracies will be strengthened by standing with Taiwan.
2. Nancy Pelosi: Why I’m leading a congressional delegation to Taiwan
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Washington Post, August 2, 2022
“[The Taiwan Relations Act] made a solemn vow by the United States to support the defense of Taiwan. Today, America must remember that vow.”
3. This Is How the U.S. Will Stand with Taiwan
Senator Bob Menendez, New York Times, August 3, 2022
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee argues for strategic clarity in order to deter the PRC from attacking Taiwan.
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 2022
In an effort to update the Taiwan relations Act of 1979, Senator Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) introduced new legislation to promote the security of Taiwan.
5. Democratic deterrence: Why Europeans should challenge China’s narrative on Taiwan
Janka Oertel, European Council on Foreign Relations, August 4, 2022
Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is no deviation from established protocols as China claims. Rather, it is a sign of a fundamental change in lawmakers’ ability to support democracy.
US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi just completed her visit to Taiwan. She was on a tour of Indo-Pacific countries, visiting Washington’s friends and allies in the most important region for global growth and the decisive theatre in the intensifying confrontation between the United States and China. The trip met with fierce pushback from Beijing, as the Chinese leadership claims sovereignty over the island and has left no doubt about its desire to gain control over what it sees as a renegade province. Were the Chinese Communist Party to achieve this aim, one of the most economically dynamic and progressive democracies in Asia would come under its rule – and, as China’s ambassador to France recently declared, “after reunification will come re-education”.
By framing Pelosi’s visit as the ultimate provocation, Beijing is attempting to justify a further increase in its military pressure on Taiwan and to change the status quo and established protocols. Beijing is also reinforcing the narrative that it merely resists the aggressive behaviour of others – that it is the victim of a US unwilling to accept a diminished role in the world and that China needs to defend its own interests. This corresponds with the rhetoric in the Sino-Russian joint statement of 4 February, which argues that “certain States, military and political alliances and coalitions” attempt to seek “military advantages to the detriment of the security of others … intensify geopolitical rivalry, fuel antagonism and confrontation, and seriously undermine the international security order and global strategic stability“.
Beijing claims that the provocation comes from US attempts to strip away Taiwan’s agency and the fact that both the Taiwanese government and the opposition welcomed the visit. Chinese diplomats warn that the US will come to regret its “interference” in cross-strait relations and will bear the consequences of subsequent developments, conveniently blaming any further escalation on Washington.
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As part of this, Taiwan has in recent months seen visits from dozens of lawmakers, including those from EU member states and the vice-president of the European Parliament. In this light, Pelosi’s trip is not an unacceptable deviation from established protocols as China claims. The visit has been a matter of controversy in the US domestic debate, drawing criticism from various parts of the US government – including, as widely reported in the US media, senior members of President Joe Biden’s national security team. But it received broad support from her fellow lawmakers, in a rare show of bipartisan agreement in an otherwise deeply divided Congress.
Therefore, Pelosi’s trip is also a sign of a fundamental change in lawmakers’ willingness and ability to rally support for democratic principles, and to demonstrate their resolve against the use of coercive force – at a time of growing systemic rivalry with China and heightened pressure on Taiwan. It is a peaceful and expressly unprovocative form of democratic deterrence.
6. What to Expect from a Bolder Xi Jinping
Yun Sun, Foreign Affairs, July 28, 2022
Yun Sun expects that Xi Jinping will be emboldened further after the 20th Party Congress to challenge the rules-based international order.
7. China on the Offensive
Bonny Lin and Jude Blanchette, Foreign Affairs, August 1, 2022
In the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing was on the back foot. For weeks after Russian troops crossed Ukraine’s border, China’s messaging was stilted and confused as Chinese diplomats, propagandists, and foreign ministry spokespeople themselves tried to figure out Chinese President Xi Jinping’s line on the conflict. Xi’s “no limits” partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin was incurring growing reputational costs.
Almost six months after the war’s outbreak and with no end in sight, Beijing has largely regained its footing. Its early concerns that the war would significantly increase overall European defense spending have yet to materialize. Although China would prefer the war to end with a clear Russian victory, a second-best option would be to see the United States and Europe exhaust their supplies of military equipment in support of Ukraine. Meanwhile, rising energy costs and inflation are threatening the resolve of European governments to hold the line on sanctions, signaling to Beijing a potential erosion in transatlantic unity. And even though in advanced democracies public opinion about China has clearly deteriorated, throughout the “global South,” Beijing continues to enjoy broad receptivity for its development assistance and diplomatic messaging.
At the same time, Beijing has concluded that regardless of the war’s outcome, its own external environment has become more dangerous. Chinese analysts see a growing schism between Western democracies and various nondemocratic countries, including China and Russia. China is concerned that the United States may leverage this growing fault line to build economic, technological, or security coalitions to contain it. It believes that Washington and Taipei are intentionally stirring up tension in the region by directly linking the assault on Ukraine to Taiwan’s safety and security. And it is concerned that growing international support for Taiwan will disrupt its plans for “reunification.”
These perceptions of Western interference have put Beijing once again on the offensive. Moving forward, China’s foreign policy will increasingly be defined by a more bellicose assertion of its interests and the exploration of new pathways to global power that circumvent chokepoints controlled by the West.
Authoritarianism
8. China’s Ultra-Rich Are Losing Their Favorite Escape Route to Europe
Blake Schmidt, Devon Pendleton, and Henrique Almeida, Bloomberg, August 2, 2022
9. Why Britain Changed Its China Stance
Tom McTague, The Atlantic, August 2, 2022
10. Chinese military drills circling Taiwan set up a potential standoff.
Paul Mozur and Amy Chang Chien, New York Times, August 03, 2022
China’s military has said it will conduct a series of live-fire drills beginning on Thursday. A New York Times map of the planned drills shows how in some places they will occur within 10 miles of Taiwan’s coast, well past areas that previous live-fire drills have targeted and within areas Taiwan designates as its territorial waters.
11. China Puts Minister in Charge of Tech Regulation Under Investigation
Chun Han Wong and Keith Zhai, Wall Street Journal, July 28, 2022
12. For America’s future China experts, challenges go beyond language and access
Kinling Lo, South China Morning Post, August 01, 2022
13. Weibo reacts to Pelosi’s Taiwan visit: ‘No quarantine for the old witch?’
Zhao Yuanyuan, Sup China, August 3, 2022
14. Jack Ma Plans to Cede Control of Ant Group
Jing Yang and Raffaele Huang, Wall Street Journal July 29, 2022
15. Biden and Xi Conduct Marathon Call During Time of Rising Tensions
Peter Baker and Jane Perlez, New York Times, July 28, 2022
President Biden and President Xi Jinping of China confronted each other over Taiwan during a marathon phone call on Thursday, but neither side reported any concrete progress on that longstanding dispute or any of the other issues that have flared between the two powers in recent months.
Environmental Harms
16. China ESG funds bleed $1.4bn in Q2 as Asian growth slows sharply
Peter Ortiz, Financial Times, August 03, 2022
17. Debris From Uncontrolled Chinese Rocket Falls Over Southeast Asian Seas
Kenneth Chang, New York Times, July 30, 2022
Foreign Interference and Coercion
Lin Li and James Leibold, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, July 6, 2022
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has committed well-documented and large-scale human rights abuses against the Uyghurs and other indigenous minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) that amount to crimes against humanity. Through its complex united front system, the CCP is actively monitoring members of the diaspora, including Uyghurs, creating databases of actionable intelligence, and mobilising community organisations in the diaspora to counter international criticism of its repressive policies in Xinjiang while promoting its own policies and interests abroad. These organisations are powerful resources in Beijing’s ongoing efforts to reshape the global narrative on Xinjiang, influence political elites abroad, and ultimately control the Chinese diaspora, but they’re also poorly understood.
These organisations purport to represent and speak on behalf of ‘Xinjiang’ and its indigenous peoples.
They subsume Uyghur and other minority cultures and identities under a nebulous yet hegemonic ‘Chineseness’, which is defined by and connected to the Han-dominated CCP. In reality, these organisations and their leaders play important roles in muting alternative and independent voices from the community while amplifying CCP messaging and spreading disinformation. They exploit the openness of democratic and multicultural countries while assisting the CCP and its proxies to surveil and even persecute members of the Xinjiang diaspora community or individuals who are critical of the CCP’s Xinjiang policies.
Like united front work more broadly, the activities of these groups and their links to the Chinese Government are often overlooked and can be difficult to parse. While human rights abuses in Xinjiang are being exposed internationally, the mechanisms and tactics developed by united front agencies to co-opt overseas Xinjiang-related community groups have gone largely unnoticed. Our research demonstrates how these groups can sow distrust and fear in the community, mislead politicians, journalists and the public, influence government policies, cloud our assessment of the situation in Xinjiang, and disguise the CCP’s interference in foreign countries.
19. USAID Chief Urges China to Restructure Debts for Fragile Economies
Tripti Lahiri and Gabriele Steinhauser, Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2022
20. China’s role at the heart of Kenya’s election campaign
Andres Schipani, Financial Times, August 2, 2022
21. China suspends 2,000 food products from Taiwan as Nancy Pelosi visits
Kathrin Hille and Willaim Langley, Financial Times, August 2, 2022
22. Trade and Investment Controls: The Transatlantic Toolkit
Emily Benson, Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2, 2022
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
23. Uyghur Poems from a Chinese Prison
Yasmeen Serhan, The Atlantic, July 16, 2022
24. U.S. Generals, Diplomats Want Chinese Companies Out of Their Retirement Plan
Angel Au-Yeung, Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2022
25. Seeking Sanctuary in the Old Empire
Timothy McLaughlin, The Atlantic, July 28, 2022
26. In Visiting Taiwan, Pelosi Capped Three Decades of Challenging China
Carl Hulse, New York Times, August 2, 2022
27. Pelosi and China: The making of a progressive hawk
Andrew Desiderio, Politico, July 28, 2022
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
28. Alibaba Added to SEC List of Chinese Firms Facing Delisting
Coco Liu and Lydia Beyoud, Bloomberg, July 29, 2022
29. Many US-listed Chinese firms may not meet HKEX’s bar, bank finds
Iris Ouyang, South China Morning Post, August 3, 2022
30. Evergrande Creditors Demand Further Explanation for Billions in Seized Cash
Alexander Saeedy, Anna Hirtenstein, Cao Li, Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2022
31. China’s Manufacturing Sector Unexpectedly Contracts Amid Weak Demand, Covid Lockdowns
Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2022
32. Stellantis CEO says 'breach of trust' broke alliance with China's GAC
Kenji Kawase, Nikkei Asia, July 29, 2022
33. The Battery King
Henry Sanderson, The Wire China, July 31, 2022
34. Biden to sign bill to boost chipmakers, compete with China Aug. 9
David Shepardson, Reuters, August 3, 2022
35. Samsung and SK Hynix rethink China exposure following US chips act
Song Jung-a, Financial Times, August 3, 2022
36. US Quietly Tightens Grip on Exports of Chipmaking Gear to China
Debby Wu, Ian King, and Jenny Leonard, Bloomberg, July 29, 2022
37. Korea in bind over US-led chip alliance
Kang Seung-woo, Korea Times, July 22, 2022
38. The US Throws $52 Billion at Chips—but Needs to Spend It Wisely
Will Knight, WIRED, July 28, 2022
39. Securing Semiconductor Supply Chains: An Affirmative Agenda for International Cooperation
William Alan Reinsch, Emily Benson, and Aidan Arasasingham, CSIS, August 2, 2022
40. India could surpass China as world’s biggest minerals buyer, says economist
Nic Fildes, Financial Times, August 1, 2022
Cyber & Information Technology
41. TikTok spends record amount on lobbying blitz targeting House, Senate, and White House
Jerry Dunleavy, The Washington Examiner, July 27, 2022
42. Chinese Government Asked TikTok for Stealth Propaganda Account
Olivia Solon, Bloomberg, July 29, 2022
43. Inside TikTok's Attempts to ‘Downplay the China Association’
Chris Stokel-Walker, Gizmodo, July 27, 2022
44. China’s New Organization Could Threaten the Global Internet
Justin Sherman, Slate, July 29, 2022
45. The overworked humans behind China’s virtual influencers
Meghan Tobin and Viola Zhou, Rest of World, July 28, 2022
46. Who is APT41?
Garrett O’Brien, The Wire China, July 31, 2022
47. UK parliament closes TikTok account a week after launch
Jasmine Cameron-Chileshe and Cristina Criddle, Financial Times, August 3, 2022
Military and Security Threats
48. Military Civil Fusion in China
Maj Gen P K Mallick, Vivekananda International Foundation, August 1, 2022
49. Seoul wary of 'Pelosi effect' on ties with Beijing
Kang Seung-woo, Korea Times, August 3, 2022
50. Chinese invasion of Taiwan may come sooner than expected
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, and Dave Lawler, Axios, July 29, 2022
51. Swiss set to match EU sanctions if China invades Taiwan - agency chief
Reuters, July 30, 2022
52. China and NATO’s Strategic Concept
Mercy A. Kuo, The Diplomat, August 3, 2022
53. Relations between China and Europe grow more tense
The Economist, July 28, 2022
54. Pelosi jabs at Xi before leaving Taiwan
Kelly Hooper, Politico, August 3, 2022
55. Satellite photos show China's new nuclear test site in Xinjiang
Nikkei Asia, August 1, 2022
56. Nancy Pelosi vows US support for Taiwan as officials warn of China military blockade
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, August 3, 2022
57. China issues alert warning airlines to avoid airspace near Taiwan as Pelosi visits Taipei
Rebecca Falconer and Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Axios, August 3, 2022
One Belt, One Road Strategy
58. Sino-forming of Global South passes point of no return
David P Goldman, Asia Times, July 29, 2022
China’s trade with the Global South, plus South Korea and Taiwan, is now as large as its combined exports to the United States and Europe.
59. How China Took Latin America
Mary Anastasia O’Grady, Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2022
Jay Newman and Matthew D McGill, Financial Times, August 3, 2022
Unlike past debt crises, this one will involve two major new challenges.
First, the terms of most sovereign bond contracts have been so dramatically degraded over the last 20 years that the bonds have become functionally unenforceable. Among other challenges, creditors will face the prospect of working through a thicket of onerous collective action clauses that enable debtors to manipulate the restructuring negotiations.
But even more threatening to recovery values is the fact that this will be the first debt crisis in which China holds the whip hand. Since 2014, Chinese institutions have become a major lenders and investors in over 130 countries through the mercantilist One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Those bills are now coming due.
Notwithstanding the recent, breathless announcement that China will co-operate with the G-20 and IMF to restructure Zambian debt, there’s no objective indication of China’s true intentions toward Zambia, much less elsewhere. Historically, China has been secretive about the scope and terms of its dealings with countries that owe it money. It is imperative that OBOR transactions be fully and transparently made part of restructurings — and Chinese interests be explicitly bailed in — to protect the interests of everyone else.
61. Biden Touts Saudi 5G Open Radio Access Network Deal, but Huawei Still Dominates the Middle East
Claude Barfield, American Enterprise Institute, August 1, 2022
Through the Belt and Road and other independent initiatives, Beijing—and Huawei—has established strong economic and technological relations, particularly with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. All GCC members have signed massive contracts with Huawei over the past few years.
Huawei has capitalized on the special needs of the Gulf nations and other economic realities in the Middle East, spending large sums to develop cloud services and 5G applications in energy, health care, and transportation—particularly aviation. Neither the aforementioned Middle East nations nor other developing regions are likely to heed US warnings about the security and spying risks associated with Huawei (and ZTE) kits.
As noted previously, however, the US export ban on advanced chips and equipment to Huawei has had a real impact. The company remains the worldwide leader in network equipment sales (26 percent—about equal to that of its chief rivals Ericsson and Nokia combined). But when the large Chinese market is excluded, Ericsson and Nokia come out slightly ahead of Huawei with 20 percent each, with Huawei dipping to 18 percent.
Opinion Pieces
62. Leaked Data Show China's Population Is Shrinking Fast
Yi Fuxian, The Wire China, July 31, 2022
63. Chinese Leaders Know They Have No Claim to Taiwan
Michael Rubin, The National Interest, July 29, 2022
Julian Ku, a law professor at Hofstra University and perhaps the world’s top expert on sovereignty issues involving China and Taiwan, pointed out that on July 28, Xi called the three communiques “political commitments,” a status that falls short of legally binding treaties. While such commitments might have served American and Chinese purposes in the 1970s when Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter wanted to peel China away from the Soviet Union, with the Chinese Communist Party now aligning itself with Russia, Washington is under no obligation to abide by outdated arrangements. That Xi phrases his statement in this manner suggests that he knows just how shaky China’s claims are.
64. The Gamble of Nancy Pelosi’s Visit to Taiwan
Michael Schuman, Atlantic, August 3, 2022
65. Taiwan/Pelosi: push to pick US or China leaves TSMC in dire straits
Financial Times, August 2, 2022
Kaush Arha, Krach Institue for Tech Diplomacy, July 28, 2022
67. Uncertainty Over Pelosi’s Taiwan Visit Exposes American Weakness
Ellen Cork and Gary Schmitt, The Dispatch, July 30, 2022