Commerce tightens restrictions, Beijing retaliates
Friends,
This week in Beijing, Xi Jinping hosted the third Belt and Road Forum (better known, the BaRF). His guest of honor was Russian President Putin, marking his first trip outside the borders of the former Soviet Union since the start of his invasion of Ukraine. While Xi and Putin put on a strong show of solidarity, it must grate on Xi that fewer and fewer world leaders show up to his summit for a new world order.
Most China watchers I’ve spoken to expect Xi Jinping to visit San Francisco for the APEC Summit a little less than a month from now. During that visit, Xi will most likely have a face-to-face meeting with President Biden and most assume the two will agree to some sort of stabilization in the relationship.
But of course, that is what the two leaders agreed to do last year at the APEC Summit in Bali when they met face-to-face.
A year after the U.S. Commerce Department imposed blanket restrictions on the export to the PRC of advanced semiconductor chip and the tools to make them, Commerce unveiled new restrictions to close the loopholes. Before the week was out, the PRC’s Ministry of Commerce announced their export restrictions (this time on graphite products).
Below in the comments for article #3, I provide some details from what I can glean from reading the announcements and what I suspect will happen next.
Lastly, I recommend everyone watch #10, Matt Pottinger’s remarks at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation’ China Forum. He makes a strong argument for humor as a weapon against authoritarian regimes.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
David Sachs, Council on Foreign Relations, October 17, 2023
High-level attendance at this year’s Belt and Road forum is down, but BRI still has support in the Global South and will be used by Beijing to strengthen the Global South as a counterweight to the U.S.-led international order.
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In parsing the list of attendees, there are a few things worth highlighting. First, Russian President Vladimir Putin has attended all three Belt and Road forums, this time traveling to Beijing for his first international trip outside the former Soviet Union since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest, a testament to the growing alignment between Beijing and Moscow. Indeed, in the photo of all the leaders who are attending this year’s Belt and Road forum, Putin is standing next to Xi in the front row.
Second, as a result of Putin’s attendance and China’s continued support for Russia, Western European countries nearly unanimously chose to sit this one out. Whereas the leaders of the Czech Republic, Greece, and Italy attended the first two Belt and Road forums, they did not travel to Beijing for this iteration. In the case of Italy, the only G7 country to join BRI, its absence likely confirms that it will formally withdraw from the initiative in the coming months. The only leader of a European Union (EU) member state who is attending the third Belt and Road Forum is Viktor Orban, who has attended every Belt and Road forum. According to China’s readout, in his meeting with Xi, Orban stated that Hungary “will continue to be China’s trusted friend and partner in the European Union” and “opposes any decoupling and breakage of supply and industrial chains or the so-called ‘de-risking’ practices,” marking a break with the European Commission’s economic security strategy. Overall, however, China has largely failed to make inroads with BRI in Western Europe, and the absence of European leaders from this year’s forum highlights growing European skepticism of Beijing.
Third, the strong attendance from the Global South reveals where BRI has (unsurprisingly) found the most purchase and where Beijing is likely to increasingly focus in the coming years. Notably, the leaders of Pakistan, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka—the latter two after skipping the previous forum in 2019—attended the festivities in Beijing. This comes under two months after Xi attended a BRICS Summit in South Africa, successfully lobbying the grouping to admit an additional six members (Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates).
COMMENT – those optics can’t make Chairman Xi very happy.
2. Tweet from U.S. Ambassador to Japan
Rahm Emanuel, X (Twitter), October 16, 2023
“As the BRI marks its ten-year anniversary, the legacy it leaves is a cautionary tale of lofty rhetoric and unwelcome results. China's BRI casts long shadows of debt and dependency. When the bill comes due, China leaves developing countries dangling in a sea of debt, with their sovereignty in doubt. Let Djibouti, with one of the highest Chinese debt-to-GDP ratios, be a stark reminder to nations considering signing on the dotted line.”
COMMENT – As usual Ambassador Emanuel is spot on… interestingly, after attending the 2nd BaRF in 2019, Djibouti’s leaders were a no-show this year. Might this be a reason why - Djibouti-China marriage ‘slowly unravelling’ as investment project disappoints, France 24, September 4, 2021.
U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, October 17, 2023
Today, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released a package of rules designed to update export controls on advanced computing semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, as well as items that support supercomputing applications and end-uses, to arms embargoed countries, including the PRC, and to place additional related entities in the PRC on the Entity List.
COMMENT – The implications of this latest set of restrictions will likely take weeks or months to play out, but I wanted to provide a quick look at what the changes are and what we should watch out for.
The announcement on October 17 represents a tightening of restrictions that the U.S. Government put in place a year ago (restrictions that are often referred to simply as the “October 7th export controls”). If you remember back a year ago, the U.S. Commerce Department and the National Security Council announced a far-reaching change: the U.S. Government would seek to block China’s ability to gain access to and manufacture the most advanced semiconductor chips that are used in artificial intelligence and supercomputing.
In doing so, they blocked the export of certain advanced semiconductors to the PRC, as well as the complex tools, machines, and software that a company would need to make their own advanced semiconductors.
Over the past year, the U.S. Government has watched how those October 7th export controls took effect, spoke with the companies that were impacted, and negotiated with other countries which also have advanced semiconductors and the tools to make them.
The updated restrictions unveiled this week are an attempt to close some of the loopholes in the original restrictions and as well as relief for companies when those restrictions had unintended consequences.
On the restriction of advanced semiconductor chips, the Commerce Department tightened the technical parameters for what would constitute a chip that cannot be shipped to countries in which the United States maintains an arms embargo (this includes the PRC, Russia, North Korea, and Iran… along with 17 other countries). The Commerce Department also added specificity to prevent circumvention of these restrictions by forcing companies to pay greater attention to who their customers are and the ownership structure of those companies.
On the restriction of tools, machines, and software that make advanced semiconductors, the Commerce Department expanded the list of equipment that cannot be shipped to those restricted companies. It clarifies what U.S. persons can and cannot do when it comes to assisting the PRC semiconductor industry. Finally, the new rules expand the requirements for receiving a license to export these advanced tools, machines, and software anywhere in the world, making in more difficult to find loopholes around the restrictions.
Lastly, the Commerce Department added some additional PRC companies and their subsidiaries to the Entity List. This means that if chip-making foundries want to produce semiconductors for these companies, the company owning the foundry will have to get a license from the Commerce Department to do so.
If you think that sounds confusing, it is.
The semiconductor industry is incredibly complex and it has a globalized supply chain. The Commerce Department is attempting to leverage the significant chokepoints in that supply chain that fall under U.S. jurisdiction to deny advanced capabilities to the PRC and to raise the costs on the PRC of achieving its objectives in becoming an independent producer of advanced semiconductors.
The Commerce Department, and the wider U.S. Government, is also trying to persuade its allies and partners, who also control important chokepoints, to use their leverage. A year ago it looked like the Commerce Department wouldn’t have much luck persuading those other countries, but by the Spring of 2023, Japan and the Netherlands had taken important steps of their own.
So what can we predict for the future?
The restrictions announced on October 17th won’t be the last in this action-reaction cycle. The nature of this technology competition means that for every action the United States takes to deny or complicate the PRC’s efforts, we should expect that the PRC will try to adapt and overcome the latest restrictions.
This adaptation will manifest in three ways, likely all at once: 1) Beijing will seek to circumvent the restrictions; 2) Beijing will try to break the partnership between the United States and its allies to enforce these restrictions; and 3) the PRC will try to go it alone by attempting to manufacture advanced semiconductors WITHOUT the tools and technology the U.S. and its partners control.
It will be very difficult to detect how successful the PRC is with these efforts. It will require the Commerce Department and the rest of the U.S. Government to establish a detailed information collection and analysis system. That system can only work if the companies in this complex supply chain cooperate in good faith with the U.S. and other partner governments.
We should also keep in mind that Beijing will wage its own information campaign by portraying American efforts as both unfair and ineffectual… but the more that Beijing makes these complaints, the more that we should conclude that they are having a significant effect. There is an old Air Force bomber pilot saying: “The flak only gets heavy when you are over the target.”
Rare Mineral Retaliation
The other thing that will happen is that the PRC will seek to respond in kind with its own export control restrictions… and as if on cue the PRC Ministry of Commerce released this on Friday: Announcement of the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs on Optimizing and Adjusting the Temporary Export Control Measures for Graphite Items.
Similar to the Ministry of Commerce’s restrictions on gallium and germanium, this restriction on graphite is meant to employ the PRC’s “chokepoint” over critical mineral processing to impose cost on the United States and its partners. But as we covered a few months ago when the gallium and germanium export controls were announced, these are ‘shallow moats’ for the PRC.
China’s dominance of critical minerals springs from their decision to overproduce these commodities. Companies in countries outside the PRC cannot make a profit in processing critical minerals because the PRC has established incentives that encourage Chinese companies to overproduce these commodities, meaning that the cost to make them exceeds the price the can be sold at.
As soon as the PRC restricts the export of these commodities (that are neither rare, nor technologically difficult to produce), then producers in third countries will have ready buyers in the markets that Beijing is trying to punish. In an interview with Reuters, Andy Leyland, CEO of Supply Chain Insights, remarked: “Graphite markets have been in oversupply, with falling prices, so the export licences don’t make sense from a market standpoint. They will worry the West, however, and be a boon to up-and-coming producers outside China.”
The PRC’s unilateral export controls on commodity goods will likely be ineffective, though they may serve as domestic political purpose as the PRC Government seeks to show its people that it isn’t impotent.
4. America's Strategic Posture
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture, October 2023
The militarily troubling and increasingly aggressive behaviors of Russia and China over the past decade led Congress to direct a review of the strategic posture of the United States, including nuclear weapons policy, strategy, and force structure. We have the privilege to serve as the chair and vice chair of this second Strategic Posture Commission (SPC).
Much has happened since the first SPC released its report in 2009. China’s rapid military build-up, including the unprecedented growth of its nuclear forces, Russia’s diversification and expansion of its theater-based nuclear systems, the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion in February 2022, have all fundamentally altered the geopolitical landscape. As a result of China’s and Russia’s growing competition with the United States and its Allies and partners, and the increasing risk of military conflict with one or both, as well as concerns about whether the United States would be prepared to deter two nuclear peers, Congress determined it was time for a new look at U.S. strategic policy, strategy, and force structure.
The first SPC had a charge like ours: “to conduct a review of the strategic posture of the United States and to make a recommendation on how to move forward.” The vision of a world without nuclear weapons, aspirational even in 2009, is more improbable now than ever. The new global environment is fundamentally different than anything experienced in the past, even in the darkest days of the Cold War. Today the United States is on the cusp of having not one, but two nuclear peer adversaries, each with ambitions to change the international status quo, by force, if necessary: a situation which the United States did not anticipate and for which it is not prepared. While the risk of a major nuclear conflict remains low, the risk of military conflict with either or both Russia and China, while not inevitable, has grown, and with it the risk of nuclear use, possibly against the U.S. homeland.
We started our work with extensive intelligence briefings to understand this new, rapidly changing security environment. These briefings underpin our conclusion that as a nation we need to urgently prepare for the new reality, and that measures need to be taken now to deal with these new threats. We believe that prompt actions are needed to provide future decision-makers viable options to credibly deter conflict. Being unprepared for the reality of two nuclear peers, who are dedicated to and focused on undermining the post-Cold War international order that has served the United States and its Allies and partners so well, is, in our view, not an option.
We had extensive discussions and briefings on the problems we face as a nation, including workforce shortages, supply chain limitations, and inadequate physical, scientific, technical, and experimental infrastructure at the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA). These shortcomings resulted from years of inattention and if not addressed promptly, will continue to limit the U.S. ability to prepare and respond to the new challenges.
As we discussed this new normal, we also concluded that the United States does not truly have, but must commit to, a “whole-of-government” approach to be more efficient and effective.
Keeping up with technology is also a challenge. Whereas in the past, when U.S. government research was uniformly on the cutting edge, that role has shifted to the private sector in many areas. As a result, the DOD and DOE/NNSA will have to change traditional procurement practices to work effectively with the private sector to rapidly develop and deploy new cutting-edge technology.
Allies and partners are important as together we are stronger. Greater cooperation, coordination and integration with our Allies and partners is essential to deter conflict and prosper economically. National leaders must communicate to U.S citizens the benefits and importance of U.S. global leadership, Allies and partners and extended deterrence, if they are to gain the support of the American people for the associated policy and costs.
Our review sought to address and respond to this new, more dangerous, and more competitive environment, while looking for ways to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. We know that this will be difficult on many levels, but we believe that our recommendations can help shape needed future strategy and posture decisions.
For the most part the Commission deliberately avoided making specific force structure recommendations; instead, we identified capabilities beyond the existing program of record (POR) that will be needed. We believe it is appropriate to leave specific material solution decisions to the Executive Branch and Congress. We were clear, however, that the nuclear force modernization POR is absolutely essential, although not sufficient to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China, and that the elements of the POR should be completed on time, expedited wherever possible, and expanded as needed.
We also found that adopting new technologies faster, and working with smaller innovative companies will be necessary to support a modern, flexible, force structure and infrastructure in the future.
While we did not conduct a cost analysis of our recommendations, it is obvious they will cost money. We do recognize budget realities, but we also believe the nation must make these new investments and U.S. leaders must communicate to U.S. citizens both the need and urgency to rebuild the nuclear infrastructure and modernize the nuclear forces. These investments in the nuclear enterprise are a relatively small portion of the overall defense budget but provide the backbone and foundation of deterrence and are the nation’s highest defense priority. The investments the Commission recommends in both nuclear and conventional capabilities will provide a safe, secure, reliable, effective, and credible deterrent, which is essential to reduce the risk of conflict, most importantly nuclear conflict.
From the outset the Commissioners understood that our most valuable contribution to U.S. national security would be a consensus report. There were certainly differences of opinion and a multitude of views expressed amongst our members during our many robust debates and discussions. No doubt some commissioners might have stated some things differently. For example, a number of commissioners believe it is inevitable that the size of the U.S. nuclear stockpile and the number of delivery systems should increase. We all agreed, however, on the findings and recommendations in this report and the need for actions now to better position the United States for the future and ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and credible deterrent.
We believe that sustained bipartisan consensus is possible and necessary to secure a strong future and credible deterrent for the United States. Moreover, we hope this report illustrates to policy- and decision-makers that even with different opinions, people of good faith can work together for the common good on fundamentally important matters.
This report would not have been possible without the excellent work of the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) leadership and staff. We extend a sincere thank you to our Executive Director, Maj. Gen. William Chambers (USAF retired) and the IDA staff.
COMMENT – It is worth reading this report, from the second Strategic Posture Commission. The first Strategic Posture Commission completed their report in 2009… needless to say, much has changed since then.
Two key take-aways:
“The vision of a world without nuclear weapons, aspirational even in 2009, is more improbable now than ever. The new global environment is fundamentally different than anything experienced in the past, even in the darkest days of the Cold War. Today the United States is on the cusp of having not one, but two nuclear peer adversaries, each with ambitions to change the international status quo, by force, if necessary: a situation which the United States did not anticipate and for which it is not prepared.”
“[T]he nuclear force modernization POR [Program of Record] is absolutely essential, although not sufficient to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China, and that the elements of the POR should be completed on time, expedited wherever possible, and expanded as needed.”
5. How the Israel-Hamas War Is Tilting the Global Power Balance in Favor of Russia, China
Yaroslav Trofimov, Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2023
Moscow and Beijing seek to ride the wave of solidarity with Palestinians while taking advantage of American distraction.
The war between Israel and Hamas isn’t just risking a regional conflagration. It is also affecting the global balance of power, stretching American and European resources while relieving pressure on Russia and providing new opportunities to China.
The long-term effect of the Middle East flare-up is hard to predict. It depends, first of all, on whether Israel is ultimately successful in its stated goal of eliminating Hamas as Gaza’s main military and political force. Another critical issue is whether Israel’s diplomatic relationships in the region and the global standing of its Western supporters can survive the rising civilian casualties in Gaza and the looming horrors of urban warfare in the densely populated enclave.
But, for now, the war launched by Hamas on Oct. 7 with a brutal attack on Israeli towns and villages that killed some 1,400 people, mostly civilians, is proving a boon for America’s main geopolitical rivals. China, Russia and Iran have long sought to undermine the U.S.-backed international system and are now taking advantage of America’s distraction.
“What we are seeing is part of a shifting and moving world order,” said former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who is currently running for Finland’s presidency. “When the U.S. leaves power vacuums, someone is going to fill those vacuums.”
COMMENT – I covered this in detail last week, but Yaroslav Trofimov’s article is worth reading in full.
6. In China’s Calls for Mideast Peace, Hamas Assault Goes Unmentioned
James T. Areddy, Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2023
Ambiguity in official statements echoes tiptoeing over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Since the start of the recent turmoil in the Middle East, one word has been absent from China’s official statements: “Hamas.”
China has called for peace and de-escalation in the region but has avoided any condemnation of the deadly assault on Israel by the Gaza-based militant group, which shocked the world on Oct. 7. China’s tiptoeing around the brutality echoes its avoidance of terms such as “invasion” to describe Russia’s military assault on Ukraine and highlights both Beijing’s longstanding Palestinian leanings and its efforts to challenge Western geopolitical narratives.
The U.S. and its allies immediately condemned the assault as evil terrorism by Hamas. Beijing, by contrast, has blamed historic factors and expressed generalized concern “over the current escalation of tensions and violence between Palestine and Israel.”
Rather than scenes of carnage in Israel, China’s government-run media have spotlighted the Israeli military’s forceful response in Gaza, set against a backdrop of deepening hardships for Palestinians, often aired alongside video and photos of U.S. warships as if to suggest the reaction is American-led.
COMMENT – Another point that was made last week, Beijing’s response to Hamas’ attack on Israel rhymes with Beijing’s response to Russia’s attack on Ukraine.
Authoritarianism
7. New Global Divisions on View as Biden Goes to Israel and Putin to China
Steven Erlanger, New York Times, October 18, 2023
8. Assistant Secretary Geoffrey Pyatt says China is sole U.S. adversary
Matthew Turk, Stanford Daily, October 18, 2023
Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources Geoffrey Pyatt projected a 50% growth in American export capacity by 2026 and described a new “post-post Cold War” era of ideological conflict with the Chinese government at a Stanford energy seminar hosted by the Hoover Institution on Monday.
Pyatt, who was born in California, arrived on campus this week as part of his itinerary for the U.S.-Japan Energy Security Dialogue. This initiative provides a space for the U.S. and Japan to strengthen natural resource cooperation and receive updates on academic research that could drive the transition to clean energy in public and private sectors, according to a State Department press release.
In a seminar hosted by U.S. Admiral James Ellis Jr., Pyatt spoke on topics ranging from plans for responsibly sourcing minerals to the geopolitics of China’s growing sphere of influence and questions of state financing mechanisms raised by the audience.
“Economic competition is good … but what’s more insidious is this political model, which denies individual freedom,” Pyatt said in reference to Chinese surveillance practices and what he views as a “lack of rule of law” and general sense of political opacity. “It’s the larger political and values competition where we want to make sure we prevail.”
COMMENT – So glad to see Biden Administration officials leaning forward on this issue. It is critical for the American public to hear these messages.
9. China and Russia harden positions on Gaza as war stirs geopolitical tensions
Jason Burke, The Guardian, October 16, 2023
10. VIDEO – Remarks by Matt Pottinger at Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation’s China Forum 2023
Matt Pottinger, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, October 18, 2023
A small but telling example: Today, typing the name of China’s supreme leader on social media can be almost impossible without getting censored. As a result, a cat and mouse game requiring ever more ingenious nicknames for Xi Jinping has ensued. Some referred to him as bao zi, or Steamed Bun, after he made a choreographed visit to a food stall early in his tenure. Now “steamed bun” is a illicit term that can suddenly vaporize from the sentences you write, even when you’re not referring to Xi.
Winnie the Pooh, or Wei Ni Xiong, became so popular a moniker for Xi that old Pooh Bear is now virtually extinct on the Chinese Internet.
Lately, Xi has been referred to as “that person” (na ge ren), and “a guy in Beijing” (Beijing mou nanzi), and as “You Know Who” (Shei). He’s even called simply, if somewhat ambiguously, “him” (ta). Some netizens tried to get around censors by substituting numbers for letters, calling Xi “Eleven,” because that’s what his surname would spell if it were a roman numeral. That worked, until it didn’t. Then people used “2-4-2,” because it represents the Mandarin-language tones that accompany the Chinese characters for his name. Think about that. This would be the equivalent of writing Morse Code to approximate the number of syllables for “Joe Biden.” Even so, the Chinese censors eventually caught on and banned those numbers.
Writing numbers online in China can be quite risky, since so many combinations add up to the dates of atrocities committed by the Chinese Communist Party. Just a few weeks ago, China had to expunge from the Internet a nice photo of two Chinese athletes hugging each other to celebrate a victory at the recent Asian Games, because the numbers on their uniforms combined to make “6-4”—which is also shorthand for June 4th, the date in of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre. Even writing “89” can get you in choppy waters.
When I think of Chinese censors, I’m reminded of the Syrian officials who, early in Assad’s war against his own citizens, had to scurry around picking up hundreds of ping pong balls that protestors would roll down hilly streets in Damascus. The balls had anti-regime slogans written on them. There’s a comic symmetry: In an Arab dictatorship, officials run around hiding ping pong balls, while in China, censors run around hiding Arabic numerals.
COMMENT – Brilliant remarks by Matt Pottinger.
11. Defying U.S. Pressure, China Rolls Out Red Carpet for Putin
Brian Spegele and James T. Areddy, Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2023
12. In Beijing, Xi and Putin Double Down on Path to New World Order
Brian Spegele and Wenxin Fan, Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2023
13. Xi Jinping hails ‘deep friendship’ with Vladimir Putin as leaders meet in Beijing
Joe Leahy and Max Seddon, Financial Times, October 18, 2023
14. Putin Visits China to Bolster Ties With ‘My Friend,’ Xi
David Pierson, Anatoly Kurmanaev and Keith Bradsher, New York Times, October 16, 2023
15. Biden-Xi summit possible if 4 conditions are met: Chinese envoy
Ken Moriyasu, Nikkei Asia, October 18, 2023
16. US Says China Has Stepped Up ‘Risky’ Behavior in South China Sea
Anthony Capaccio and Roxana Tiron, Bloomberg, October 17, 2023
17. Government Interventions in Initial Public Offerings and Firm Innovation in China
Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, Stanford University, October 15, 2023
18. China bans new offshore brokerage accounts to prevent 'bypassing' of forex controls
Selena Li and Summer Zhen, Reuters, October 12, 2023
19. China’s recruiters report drop-off in confidence among companies, jobseekers alike
Chuqin Jiang, South China Morning Post, October 15, 2023
20. Former Bank of China boss arrested on corruption charges
Jasper Jolly, The Guardian, October 16, 2023
21. Risk-Advisory Firms Decide Hong Kong Isn’t Worth It
Selina Cheng and Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2023
22. Law firm Wilson Sonsini explores Singapore office as China dealmaking slows
Mercedes Ruehl and Tabby Kinder, Financial Times, October 15, 2023
23. How Evergrande’s Chief Tried to Turn Things Around—and Failed
Rebecca Feng and Cao Li, Wall Street Journal, October 15, 2023
24. China Property Bonds Looked Cheap at 20 Cents on the Dollar. They Weren’t.
Frances Yoon and Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2023
25. Apple’s compliance with China app rules plugs hole in Great Firewall
Dylan Butts, South China Morning Post, October 15, 2023
26. Apple CEO Tim Cook makes second China visit in 2023 amid tough iPhone 15 market and App Store controversy
Dylan Butts, South China Morning Post, October 17, 2023
Environmental Harms
27. Russia-China energy cooperation in focus as Putin visits Xi
Reuters, October 15, 2023
28. Xiaomi Is Likely to Upstage Apple with a Tech-Laden EV
Steve LeVine, Information, October 16, 2023
29. Despite diplomatic tension, Newsom is going to China to promote cooperation on climate change
Hayley Smith, Tony Briscoe, and Laurel Rosenhall, Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2023
Foreign Interference and Coercion
30. Argentina must rethink China relationship, says presidential candidate Patricia Bullrich
Michael Stott and Ciara Nugent, Financial Times, October 16, 2023
31. Fearing China, South Korea targets firms building Taiwan navy submarines
Ju-min Park, Reuters, October 16, 2023
32. U.S. Navy Service Member Pleads Guilty to Transmitting Sensitive U.S. Military Information to Chinese Intelligence Officer
U.S. Department of Justice, October 10, 2023
33. Chinese boycott beauty products after Fukushima water discharge
Madeleine Speed and Kana Inagaki, Financial Times, October 16, 2023
34. AUDIO – How India and China compete in non-aligned South Asia and the Indian Ocean
Darshana Baruah, Tanvi Madan, and Constantino Xavier, Brookings, October 18, 2023
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
35. China repatriates N Korean escapees after Asian Games: source
Mok Yongjae and Kim Ji Eun, Radio Free Asia, October 12, 2023
36. China Forcibly Returns More than 500 to North Korea
Lina Yoon, Human Rights Watch, October 12, 2023
37. Uyghur inmates forced to work on farmland leased to Chinese
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, October 13, 2023
38. Police round up Uyghurs from 2 villages before China’s National Day
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, October 11, 2023
39. Australian Journalist Says China Jailed Her for Sharing Document
Ben Westcott, Bloomberg, October 17, 2023
Marco Respinti, Bitter Winter, October 18, 2023
September 26, 2023, marked 1,000 days in prison for Jimmy Lai. The fashion and media mogul, a Roman Catholic who was born in Canton, China, 75 years ago (and moved to Hong Kong at a young ag,) has been detained for so long in Stanley Prison, one of the six maximum security facilities in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a matter of fact, he has been in and out of jail several times at the order of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which now openly and tyrannically rules also the former British colony. Lai is guilty of one fault only: a supporter of democracy, he stands for freedom of expression with his courage, initiatives, and money.
Lai’s life changed on June 4, 1989, when the CCP ordered the massacre in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. From that moment, Lai sided publicly with pro-democracy protesters, especially in his native city. In 1995 he founded the “Apple Daily,” a pro-freedom paper and online journal published in Mandarin Chinese, with an online digest edition in English, which soon became an important bastion of liberty. “Apple Daily” ended its intrepid adventure on June 24, 2021, when it could no longer resist the aggressions of the pro-PRC police force. Its offices had in fact been attacked several times by thugs. The police raided them too. And its journalists were repeatedly intimidated.
In the meantime, Lai, the publisher, suffered continuous false accusations of sedition that eventually brought him under arrest several times. He had already got into trouble for supporting the 2014 “Umbrella Movement” in Hong Kong (the nickname came from the fact that pro-democracy protesters had only yellow umbrellas to protect themselves from the police tear-gas) as well as the new 2019‒2020 protests against the liberty-killing law bills proposed by the puppet Hong Kong government. And when that puppet government was officially overstepped on June 30, 2020, by the National People’s Congress in Beijing, which imposed the notorious new security law in Taiwan, Lai became its first VIP victim.
When his term in prison, merely for his opinions, turned 1,000 days, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and 10 press freedom and human rights groups, wrote to British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak asking for immediate and decisive action on his behalf. The Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong Foundation, a coalition of 67 organizations, did the same by writing to US president Joe Biden. But a man in Australia is carrying on an original and tireless campaign of solidarity in a world that, apart from a few dedicated and hardcore defenders of justice, seems not to care about Lai, cynically considering Hong Kong another dead issue not to bother about anymore.
Mark A. Tarrant, a lawyer in Sydney who grew up in Hong Kong, thinks that abandoning Lai means surrendering to evil, and says it in so many words in the streets. He designed and commissioned a life-size neon sign “Jimmy Lai in Chains” that Melbourne neon artist Steven Cole produced in his workshop.
Source: Bitter Winter
COMMENT – Unfortunately, Beijing has been extremely effective as at silencing criticism of it abuses of power in Hong Kong and Xinjiang.
In this case they have imprisoned a 75 year old for a thousand days on charges that he organized and participated in “unauthorized assemblies.”
41. Scottish Water admits solar farms could use parts linked to China’s forced labour camps
Severin Carrell, The Guardian, October 18, 2023
Scottish Water has admitted that its solar farms could use components linked to forced labour camps in China, “in clear conflict” with its anti-slavery policies.
Scottish Water, a state-owned monopoly, has installed tens of thousands of solar panels it suspects are linked to Chinese slave labour at 66 sites around the country, bought for tens of millions of pounds.
They include a “super solar” scheme at its large water treatment works that supplies 565,000 people in the Glasgow area with drinking water. It said the 8,448 panels at Balmore in East Dunbartonshire, which treats water taken from Loch Katrine and Loch Lomond, cost £5m.
The company, which supplies nearly all Scotland’s drinking water, said it will ban Chinese-made solar panels from its future projects, and strengthen its modern slavery rules, but it admitted that additional projects using them which are already under way will go ahead.
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
42. China’s banks may be loaded up with hidden bad loans
The Economist, October 15, 2023
43. China’s Economy Gets Boost from Stimulus, but Headwinds Grow
Jason Douglas, Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2023
44. China's growth surprise is not tempting investors
Rae Wee and Summer Zhen, Reuters, October 18, 2023
45. China tells banks to roll over local government debts as risks mount - sources
Reuters, October 17, 2023
46. Apple’s iPhones Off to Disappointing Start in China, Study Shows
Bloomberg, October 16, 2023
47. China Tells Gas Suppliers to Fill Storage Tanks Ahead of Winter
Bloomberg, October 18, 2023
48. US to Tighten Curbs on China’s Access to Advanced Chip Tech
Jenny Leonard, Mackenzie Hawkins, Ian King, and Debby Wu, Bloomberg, October 15, 2023
49. TSMC expects permanent U.S. approval to supply chip tools to its China factory
Sarah Wu and Ben Blanchard, Reuters, October 13, 2023
50. Biden eyes adding AI chip curbs to Chinese companies abroad
Alexandra Alper and Karen Freifeld, Reuters, October 13, 2023
51. ASML Says New US Curbs Risk Hitting China Sales in Medium Term
Cagan Koc, Bloomberg, October 17, 2023
52. U.S. Tightens China’s Access to A.I. Chips
Ana Swanson, New York Times, October 17, 2023
53. Analysis: IMF warning on China puts 'Japanization' risk in spotlight
Leika Kihara, Reuters, October 16, 2023
54. U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement
Congressional Research Service, October 16, 2023
55. CNAS Responds: Export Controls on China
Paul Scharre, Emily Kilcrease, Vivek Chilukuri, Thomas Krueger, Tim Fist, Bill Drexel, and Sam Howell, CNAS, October 17, 2023
56. Beijing’s Emerging Assessment of De-risking
Lily McElwee, CSIS, October 17, 2023
57. U.S. and Europe Clash Over Trump-Era Tariffs
Kim Mackrael and Laurence Norman, Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2023
Cyber & Information Technology
58. Flying taxi obtains 'world's first' type certification from China
Shizuka Tanabe, Nikkei Asia, October 17, 2023
59. China has a new plan for judging the safety of generative AI—and it’s packed with details
Zeyi Yang, MIT Technology Review, October 18, 2023
60. America’s GPS Falls Under the Rival EU and China Satellites’ Shadow
Drew FitzGerald, Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2023
61. China expected to attend UK summit on artificial intelligence next month
Anna Gross, George Parker, Cristina Criddle, Qianer Liu, and Nian Liu, Financial Times, October 18, 2023
62. Doubts linger over Biden’s industrial push
Peter Barber, Financial Times, October 18, 2023
Military and Security Threats
63. Putin filmed in China accompanied by officers with Russian nuclear briefcase
Reuters, October 18, 2023
64. China’s Leaders Are Directing Jet-Fighter Harassment of U.S. Aircraft, Pentagon Says
Alastair Gale, Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2023
65. Pentagon accuses China’s fighter jets of ‘coercive’ acts in Indo-Pacific
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, October 17, 2023
66. Rapid Technological Change and Its Impact on U.S. National Security Strategy
Aspen Strategy Group, October 18, 2023
COMMENT – A series of essays describing the outlines of a U.S. defense strategy for a rapidly changing international environment.
67. China’s march to military modernisation still has barriers to overcome: from US tech curbs to Beijing’s own distrust of private sector
Seong Hyeon Choi, South China Morning Post, October 18, 2023
68. Vanguard funds invest in China military groups, report says
James Kynge, Demetri Sevastopulo, and Hudson Lockett, Financial Times, October 12, 2023
69. When China’s military lagged behind US, it pursued an ‘assassin’s mace’ tactic. Smart weaponry and AI are changing that
Jack Lau, South China Morning Post, October 14, 2023
70. China Continues to Exploit Commercial Shipping for Sealift
Gordon Arthur, Naval News, October 12, 2023
71. Russian, Chinese ships spotlighted by Finnish police after pipeline damage, are now pairing up outside northern Norway
Thomas Nilsen, The Barents Observer, October 18, 2023
72. Chinese military jet intercepts Canadian Forces plane in ‘aggressive manner’
Neetu Garcha, Global News, October 16, 2023
73. Across U.S., Chinese Bitcoin Mines Draw National Security Scrutiny
Gabriel J.X. Dance and Michael Forsythe, New York Times, October 13, 2023
74. Israeli Embassy Employee Stabbed in Beijing by Foreign National
Brian Spegele, Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2023
75. U.S. Should Prepare to Expand Its Nuclear Forces, Expert Panel Says
Michael R. Gordon, Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2023
76. Five Eyes spy chiefs warn Silicon Valley over Chinese threat
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, October 18, 2023
One Belt, One Road Strategy
77. China Reboots Its Belt and Road Initiative
Jason Douglas, Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2023
78. China Got a Big Contract. Nepal Got Debt and a Pricey Airport.
Daisuke Wakabayashi, Bhadra Sharma, and Claire Fu, New York Times, October 16, 2023
79. Belt and road forum ‘a showcase’ for China’s growing global influence
Dewey Sim, South China Morning Post, October 16, 2023
80. China's Belt and Road came at 'right time' for Africa, says AU official
Sinan Tavsan, Nikkei Asia, October 16, 2023
81. All Russia’s civilian drones come from China, minister says
South China Morning Post, October 17, 2023
82. China Invested $1 Trillion to Gain Global Influence. Can That Go On?
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, October 16, 2023
83. China's Belt and Road Initiative: Kenya and a railway to nowhere
Anne Soy, BBC, October 14, 2023
Opinion Pieces
84. BRI is only first step in China's strategy for a new world order
Niva Yau, Nikkei Asia, October 16, 2023
85. US Private Sector Must Team with Government to Counter China
Greg Levesque, Warrior Maven, October 5, 2023
86. Misreading China
Aaron Sarin, Persuasion, October 13, 2023
87. Robert Daly on Keeping Close to China
Scot Savitt and Robert Daly, The Wire China, October 15, 2023
88. Ping An Real Estate Is China Property's New Hot Potato
Shuli Ren, Bloomberg, October 15, 2023
89. China must immediately end unfair detention of foreign nationals
Nikkei Asia, October 18, 2023
90. The Optimists' Case for China's Economy
Bob Davis, Foreign Policy, October 17, 2023
91. A Coalition Against Atrocity in the Middle East Can Also Undermine China
Dan Blumenthal, 19FortyFive, October 17, 2023
92. America finds there is more to the world than China
Janan Ganesh, Financial Times, October 17, 2023
93. Xi and Putin Think They’re Winning — and Maybe They Are
Marc Champion, Bloomberg, October 17, 2023