Déjà vu, All Over Again
Friends,
Xi Jinping was in Europe last week and a photo from the Élysée left me with a sense of déjà vu.
It has been almost nine years since Xi visited a center-right European leader who thought that taking Xi out for a drink at the local watering hole (dumping their ties and loosening their top buttons) would ease the tensions in the Sino-European relationship.
It didn’t work for (then) Prime Minister David Cameron in October 2015, and I doubt it will work for President Macron today.
Obviously, a lot has changed since then.
Britain has left the European Union, we’ve had a global pandemic and a fracturing of globalization, the PRC has formed an entente with Russia, Iran, and North Korea to overthrow the post-WWII international order, and there is now rising concern among financial elites that a Great Power conflict may be on the horizon (see the latest Geopolitical Risk Report from BlackRock below, Article #6).
To expand that last point, I looked up and read BlackRock’s 2015 Annual Report. Conflict with Beijing or Moscow seemed like such a distance possibility in 2015 that it didn’t register as a risk (despite the fact that Putin annexed Crimea the year before and invaded eastern Ukraine).
What did Larry Fink find most concerning in 2015?
“Particularly worrying is the adoption of negative interest rates by central banks attempting to spark economic growth.”
How quaint.
For some more nostalgia, here is John Fogerty on Austin City Limits in 2004 performing “Déjà vu, All Over Again.”
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. UHRP Analysis Finds 1 in 26 Uyghurs Imprisoned in Region with World’s Highest Prison Rate
Uyghur Human Rights Project, April 25, 2024
A new UHRP analysis of official figures indicates that Uyghurs, Turkic and other non-Han peoples in the Uyghur Region account for more than a third (34 percent) of China’s estimated prison population, despite making up only one percent of China’s overall population. When accounting for the total regional population, the Uyghur Region has the highest prison rate in the world at an estimated 2,234 per 100,000.
The prison population refers specifically to formal imprisonment under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, and is separate from the unknown number of people still interned in the region’s camps and other forms of arbitrary detention.
Statistics released by the state prosecution in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR)—known as East Turkistan to many Uyghurs—suggest that Uyghurs, Turkic and other non-Han peoples in the region are imprisoned at a rate of 3,814 people per 100,000.
In comparison, Han people throughout China are estimated to be imprisoned at a rate of 80 per 100,000. In other words, Uyghurs and other non-Han people in the Uyghur Region are estimated to be imprisoned at just over 47 times the rate of Han people.
COMMENT – It amazes me that for all the protests in support of Palestine, there is still very little attention shown to the most abused population on the planet: Uyghur Muslims living in the PRC.
The faux-news outlet Babylon Bee had a headline this week that hits a little too close to the truth: “Uighur Slaves Struggling To Keep Up With Demand For Palestinian Headscarves”
2. Hong Kong court bans protest anthem, says it can be used as weapon
Jessica Pang, Reuters, May 8, 2024
Hong Kong's Court of Appeal on Wednesday granted an application by the government to ban a protest anthem called "Glory to Hong Kong", overturning a lower court judgment that had rejected such a ban because of its possible "chilling effects" on free speech.
The ruling comes amid what critics say is an erosion in Hong Kong's rule of law and individual rights amid a security crackdown by Beijing that has seen scores of opposition democrats jailed and shut down liberal media outlets.
COMMENT – In tribute to what Hong Kong used to be, I recommend listening to “Glory to Hong Kong!”
If you’re in Hong Kong, you might not want to play it as it could get you arrested under the National Security Law… after all, it is subversive to celebrate what made that city unique and a beacon for the Chinese people.
As the next article shows, you might not be able to hear it much longer.
3. Hong Kong is targeting Western Big Tech companies in its ban of a popular protest song
Zeyi Yang, MIT Technology Review, May 9, 2024
And it's already succeeded in making platforms like YouTube remove it worldwide.
It wasn’t exactly surprising when on Wednesday, May 8, a Hong Kong appeals court sided with the city government to take down “Glory to Hong Kong” from the internet. The trial, in which no one represented the defense, was the culmination of a years-long battle over a song that has become the unofficial anthem for protesters fighting China’s tightening control and police brutality in the city. But it remains an open question how exactly Big Tech will respond. Even as the injunction is narrowly designed to make it easier for them to comply, these Western companies may be seen as aiding authoritarian control and obstructing internet freedom if they do so.
Google, Apple, Meta, Spotify, and others have spent the last several years largely refusing to cooperate with previous efforts by the Hong Kong government to prevent the spread of the song, which the government has claimed is a threat to national security. But the government has also hesitated to leverage criminal law to force them to comply with requests for removal of content, which could risk international uproar and hurt the city’s economy.
Now, the new ruling seemingly finds a third option: imposing a civil injunction that doesn’t invoke criminal prosecution, which is similar to how copyright violations are enforced. Theoretically, the platforms may face less reputational blowback when they comply with this court order.
“If you look closely at the judgment, it’s basically tailor-made for the tech companies at stake,” says Chung Ching Kwong, a senior analyst at the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, an advocacy organization that connects legislators from over 30 countries working on relations with China. She believes the language in the judgment suggests the tech companies will now be ready to comply with the government’s request.
A Google spokesperson said the company is reviewing the court’s judgment and didn’t respond to specific questions sent by MIT Technology Review. A Meta spokesperson pointed to a statement from Jeff Paine, the managing director of the Asia Internet Coalition, a trade group representing many tech companies in the Asia-Pacific region: “[The AIC] is assessing the implications of the decision made today, including how the injunction will be implemented, to determine its impact on businesses. We believe that a free and open internet is fundamental to the city’s ambitions to become an international technology and innovation hub.” The AIC did not immediately reply to questions sent via email. Apple and Spotify didn’t immediately respond to requests for comment.
But no matter what these companies do next, the ruling is already having an effect. Just over 24 hours after the court order, some of the 32 YouTube videos that are explicitly targeted in the injunction were inaccessible for users worldwide, not just in Hong Kong.
While it’s unclear whether the videos were removed by the platform or by their creators, experts say the court decision will almost certainly set a precedent for more content to be censored from Hong Kong’s internet in the future.
“Censorship of the song would be a clear violation of internet freedom and freedom of expression,” says Yaqiu Wang, the research director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House, a human rights advocacy group. “Google and other internet companies should use all available channels to challenge the decision.”
Erasing a song from the internet
Since “Glory to Hong Kong” was first uploaded to YouTube in August 2019 by an anonymous group called Dgx Music, it’s been adored by protesters and applauded as their anthem. Its popularity only grew after China passed the harsh Hong Kong national security law in 2020.
With lyrics like “Liberate Hong Kong, revolution of our times,” it’s no surprise that it became a major flash point. The city and national Chinese governments were wary of its spread.
Their fears escalated when the song was repeatedly mistaken for China’s national anthem at international events and was broadcast at sporting events after Hong Kong athletes won. By mid-2023 the mistake, intentional or not, had happened 887 times, according to the Hong Kong government’s request for the content’s removal, which cites YouTube videos and Google search results referring to the song as the “Hong Kong National Anthem” as the reason.
The government has been arresting people for performing the song on the ground in Hong Kong, but it has been harder to prosecute the online activity since most of the videos and music were uploaded anonymously, and Hong Kong, unlike mainland China, has historically had a free internet. This meant officials needed to explore new approaches to content removal.
To comply or not to comply
Using the controversial 2020 national security law as legal justification to make requests for removal of certain content that it deems threatening, the Hong Kong government has been able to exert pressure on local companies, like internet service providers. “In Hong Kong, all the major internet service providers are locally owned or Chinese-owned. For business reasons, probably within the last 20 years, most of the foreign investors like Verizon left on their own,” says Charles Mok, a researcher at Stanford University’s Cyber Policy Center and a former legislator in Hong Kong. “So right now, the government is focusing on telling the customer-facing internet service providers to do the blocking.” And it seems to have been somewhat effective, with a few websites for human rights organizations becoming inaccessible locally.
But the city government can’t get its way as easily when the content is on foreign-owned platforms like YouTube or Facebook. Back in 2020, most major Western companies declared they would pause processing data requests from the Hong Kong government while they assessed the law. Over time, some of them have started answering government requests again. But they’ve largely remained firm: over the first six months of 2023, for example, Meta received 41 requests from the Hong Kong government to obtain user data and answered none; during the same period, Google received requests to remove 164 items from Google services and ended up removing 82 of them, according to both companies’ transparency reports. Google specifically mentioned that it chose to not remove two YouTube videos and one Google Drive file related to “Glory to Hong Kong.”
Both sides are in tight spots. Tech companies don’t want to lose the Hong Kong market or endanger their local staff, but they are also worried about being seen as complying with authoritarian government actions. And the Hong Kong government doesn’t want to be seen as openly fighting Western platforms while trust in the region’s financial markets is already in decline. In particular, officials fear international headlines if the government invokes criminal law to force tech companies to remove certain content.
“I think both sides are navigating this balancing act. So the government finally figured out a way that they thought might be able to solve the impasse: by going to the court and narrowly seeking an injunction,” Mok says.
That happened in June 2023, when Hong Kong’s government requested a court injunction to ban the distribution of the song online with the purpose of “inciting others to commit secession.” It named 32 YouTube videos explicitly, including the original version and live performances, translations into other languages, instrumental and opera versions, and an interview with the original creators. But the order would also cover “any adaptation of the song, the melody and/or lyrics of which are substantially the same as the song,” according to court documents.
The injunction went through a year of back-and-forth hearings, including a lower court ruling that briefly swatted down the ban. But now, the Court of Appeal has granted the government approval. The case can theoretically be appealed one last time, but with no defendants present, that’s unlikely to happen.
The key difference between this action and previous attempts to remove content is that this is a civil injunction, not a criminal prosecution—meaning it is, at least legally speaking, closer to a copyright takedown request. A platform could arguably be less likely to take a reputational hit if it removes the content upon request.
Kwong believes this will indeed make platforms more likely to cooperate, and there have already been pretty clear signs to that effect. In one hearing in December, the government was asked by the court to consult online platforms as to the feasibility of the injunction. The final judgment this week says that while the platforms “have not taken part in these proceedings, they have indicated that they are ready to accede to the Government’s request if there is a court order.”
“The actual targets in this case, mainly the tech giants, may have less hesitation to comply with a civil court order than a national security order because if it’s the latter, they may also face backfire from the US,” says Eric Yan-Ho Lai, a research fellow at Georgetown Center for Asian Law.
Lai also says now that the injunction is granted, it will be easier to prosecute an individual based on violation of a civil injunction rather than prosecuting someone for criminal offenses, since the government won’t need to prove criminal intent.
The chilling effect
Immediately after the injunction, human rights advocates called on tech companies to remain committed to their values. “Companies like Google and Apple have repeatedly claimed that they stand by the universal right to freedom of expression. They should put their ideals into practice,” says Freedom House’s Wang. “Google and other tech companies should thoroughly document government demands, and publish detailed transparency reports on content takedowns, both for those initiated by the authorities and those done by the companies themselves.”
Without making their plans clear, it’s too early to know just how tech companies will react. But right after the injunction was granted, the song largely remained available for Hong Kong users on most platforms, including YouTube, iTunes, and Spotify, according to the South China Morning Post. On iTunes, the song even returned to the top of the download rankings a few hours after the injunction.
One key factor that may still determine corporate cooperation is how far the content removal requests go. There will surely be more videos of the song that are uploaded to YouTube, not to mention independent websites hosting the videos and music for more people to access. Will the government go after each of them too?
The Hong Kong government has previously said in court hearings that it seeks only local restriction of the online content, meaning content will be inaccessible only to users physically in the city. Large platforms like YouTube can do that without difficulty.
Theoretically, this allows local residents to circumvent the ban by using VPN software, but not everyone is technologically savvy enough to do so. And that wouldn’t do much to minimize the larger chilling effect on free speech, says Kwong from the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China.
“As a Hong Konger living abroad, I do rely on Hong Kong services or international services based in Hong Kong to get ahold of what’s happening in the city. I do use YouTube Hong Kong to see certain things, and I do use Spotify Hong Kong or Apple Music because I want access to Cantopop,” she says. “At the same time, you worry about what you can share with friends in Hong Kong and whatnot. We don’t want to put them into trouble by sharing things that they are not supposed to see, which they should be able to see.”
The court made at least two explicit exemptions to the song’s ban, for “lawful activities conducted in connection with the song, such as those for the purpose of academic activity and news activity.” But even the implementation of these could be incredibly complex and confusing in practice. “In the current political context in Hong Kong, I don’t see anyone willing to take the risk,” Kwong says.
The government has already arrested prominent journalists on accusations of endangering national security, and a new law passed in 2024 has expanded the crimes that can be prosecuted on national security grounds. As with all efforts to suppress free speech, the impact of vague boundaries that encourage self-censorship on potentially sensitive topics is often sprawling and hard to measure.
“Nobody knows where the actual red line is,” Kwong says.
4. The three big questions still unanswered on foreign interference
The Editorial Board, The Globe and Mail, May 3, 2024
It’s no second coat of whitewash. The initial report from the public inquiry into foreign interference is necessarily incomplete, vague in some places and inconclusive in others. But already, Justice Marie-Josée Hogue has gone further than the earlier effort by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s hand-picked special rapporteur, David Johnston.
In light of Justice Hogue’s findings, it’s clear that Mr. Johnston’s report amounted to a coverup, or at the very least an attempt to smother the controversy over China’s meddling in the 2019 and 2021 elections by taking aim, not at the government, but at the media and those who bravely chose to expose Beijing’s efforts by leaking classified information.
Justice Hogue has eschewed such nonsense. Instead, her first report delivers insight into what transpired in the 2019 and 2021 elections and raises serious questions about how intelligence officials and other senior bureaucrats responded to the threats posed by China’s malevolent actions.
Her analysis sweeps away the smokescreen that the Liberals have attempted to cast around key issues in the debate over foreign interference by China. The biggest such diversion was the Liberal line that, sure, foreign interference is a problem, but it’s a longstanding one, and a number of other state actors also pose a threat.
The initial report demolishes that notion, underscoring that China “stands out as the most persistent and sophisticated foreign interference threat to Canada,” and that the resources it devoted outstripped those of any other state.
The Liberals have also continuously pointed to the idea that the meddling did not affect which party formed government in the 2021 election as a way of implying that foreign interference had no effect at all. Mr. Trudeau went so far as to say that no riding results were affected, and that former Conservative Leader Erin O’Toole’s concerns that China’s efforts cost his party up to nine seats was a case of sour grapes.
This report punctures that rhetoric. Justice Hogue concludes that the ultimate result was not changed. But she goes on to say there is a “reasonable possibility” that results in Steventon-Richmond East in British Columbia were impacted, and that it is possible that a small number of other ridings were affected. She praises Mr. O’Toole and the Conservatives for not calling into question the overall election results.
Even more crucially, Justice Hogue acknowledges two hard truths: foreign interference undermined “the right of voters to have an electoral ecosystem free from coercion or covert influence”; and, as a result, Canadians’ confidence in our democracy has been eroded. “This is perhaps the greatest harm Canada has suffered as a result of foreign interference,” she writes.
In remarks accompanying the report, she called foreign interference “a stain on our electoral process.”
COMMENT – Will Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau suffer any consequences for trying to cover up PRC interference in two Canadian national elections that clearly benefited his Liberal Party?
5. Chinese warplane fired flares, put Australian Navy helicopter in danger, Canberra says
Brad Lendon, CNN, May 7, 2024
Australia has accused a Chinese fighter jet of firing flares into the path of a naval helicopter last weekend over international waters of the Yellow Sea, an action that Prime Minister Anthony Albanese blasted as “completely unacceptable.”
The Australian MH-60R Seahawk helicopter was on patrol enforcing United Nations sanctions on North Korea at the time of the incident, the Defense Ministry in Canberra said, adding the move put the lives of the helicopter crew in danger.
“This was an unsafe maneuver which posed a risk to the aircraft and personnel,” the statement from Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said.
The Chinese jet “dropped flares about 300 meters (984 feet) in front of the Seahawk helicopter and about 60 meters (197 feet) above it,” Marles said in an interview with CNN affiliate Nine News on Monday.
COMMENT – The Australians were in the international waters of the Yellow Sea enforcing United Nations sanctions against North Korea that Beijing originally supported and now undermines on a routine basis.
The responsible thing for Beijing to do is to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea… instead the Chinese Communist Party acts aggressively against other UN Member States seeking to uphold international law.
6. Geopolitical risk dashboard
BlackRock Investment Institute, April 2024
The BlackRock Investment Institute’s report on geopolitical risks lists the top three highest risks as “U.S. China strategic competition,” “Global technology decoupling,” and “Russia-NATO conflict.” All three are already happening and having a significant influence on global markets, investment patterns and business models.
Risk #1 – U.S. China strategic competition – High
Tensions escalate meaningfully over Taiwan or in the South China Sea.
The U.S. and China have settled into a long-term and intensely competitive posture. Increased working-level dialogue and senior visits since last November’s meeting between President Biden and President Xi reflect a serious effort on both sides to bring an improved tone and stability to the relationship. Yet we see the shift as tactical rather than structurally altering the competitive dynamics of the relationship. Persistent and large-scale exporting of excess industrial capacity by China could be the next wave of tension – as could U.S. allegations of support by Chinese financial institutions of the Russian war effort. Although not a near-term concern, in our view, a conflict over Taiwan would have a significant global impact. Tensions in the South China Sea have increased significantly and pose a meaningful risk of miscalculation or accident.
Risk #2 – Global technology decoupling – High
Technology decoupling between the U.S. and China significantly accelerates in scale and scope.
The U.S. and China are engaged in a long-term, zero-sum technological competition. They are pursuing targeted decoupling, focused especially on advanced technologies like AI, semiconductors, and quantum computing, as well as technologies with military application. We monitor potential increased U.S. tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles and other frontier tech including sensitive bulk data, digitally connected vehicles, crane technology, pre-positioned cyber-attacks, and biotech. U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are discussing similar measures. China is responding by investing in its own capabilities. We expect ongoing tension and parallel, competing tech stacks, as a result.
Risk #3 – Russia-NATO conflict – High
The war in Ukraine becomes protracted, raising the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the largest, most dangerous military conflict in Europe since World War Two. The conflict has become a battle between the two sides’ industrial bases, and Ukraine enters the war’s third year in a vulnerable position. Recently approved additional military aid from the U.S. will likely allow Ukraine to improve its posture during 2024. Russia is receiving significant supplies from countries like Iran and North Korea as well as major financial backing from China. We see a ceasefire or diplomatic solution as unlikely in the near term, with the conflict likely to continue this year and into the next.
7. Philippines calls for expelling Chinese diplomats as South China Sea row escalates
Karen Lema, Reuters, May 10, 2024
The Philippines' national security adviser called on Friday for Chinese diplomats to be expelled over an alleged leak of a phone conversation with a Filipino admiral in a significant escalation of a bitter row over the South China Sea.
China's embassy in Manila had orchestrated "repeated acts of engaging and dissemination of disinformation, misinformation and malinformation", with the objective of sowing discord, division and disunity, Eduardo Ano said in a statement.
Those actions "should not be allowed to pass unsanctioned without serious penalty", he said.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lin Jian called the comments provocative and said Chinese diplomats in the Philippines had to be allowed to do their job.
"China solemnly requests the Philippine side to effectively safeguard the normal performance of duties by Chinese diplomatic personnel, stop infringing and provoking, and refrain from denying the facts," Lin said at a regular press briefing in Beijing.
COMMENT – I don’t think Beijing or Manila will back down.
8. How to Use and Misuse History in Cold War II with China
Niall Ferguson, Bloomberg, May 5, 2024
Eight examples — from the triumphs of populism to failures of economics — show how analyzing past experience can improve your forecasting and decision-making.
9. Biden to Quadruple Tariffs on Chinese EVs
Andrew Duehren and Andrew Restuccia, Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2024
The Biden administration is preparing to raise tariffs on clean-energy goods from China in the coming days, with the levy on Chinese electric vehicles set to roughly quadruple, according to people familiar with the matter.
Higher tariffs, which Biden administration officials are preparing to announce on Tuesday, will also hit critical minerals, solar goods and batteries sourced from China, according to the people. The decision comes at the end of a yearslong review of tariffs imposed by former President Donald Trump on roughly $300 billion in goods from China.
Whether to adjust the Trump-era levies divided Biden economic advisers for years, with trade officials pushing for higher duties and others, such as Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, calling for lowering tariffs on consumer goods while focusing duties on strategic sectors. But signs that China was ramping up exports of clean-energy goods prompted concern in Washington, where officials are trying to protect a nascent American clean-energy industry from China.
Officials are particularly focused on electric vehicles, and they are expected to raise the tariff rate to roughly 100% from 25%, according to the people. An additional 2.5% duty applies to all automobiles imported into the U.S. The existing 25% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles has so far effectively barred those models, often cheaper than Western-made cars, from the U.S. market. Biden administration officials, automakers and some lawmakers worry that wouldn’t be enough given the scale of Chinese manufacturing.
Bloomberg earlier reported that the administration is planning to announce higher tariffs next week. Administration officials cautioned that the timing of the announcement could change. A White House spokesman declined to comment.
A spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry denounced the Biden administration’s plans in a briefing on Friday, saying the tariffs have disrupted trade between the two countries. “China will take all necessary measures to defend its rights and interests,” the spokesman said.
The coming presidential rematch is shaping Biden’s decision. As Trump campaigns for a return to the White House, the former president has said he is considering imposing tariffs of 60% or more on all Chinese imports—a move likely to escalate the trade war with Beijing he started in his first term. Trump has warned that the U.S. auto industry would face a “bloodbath” if he loses in November, and he has pledged to impose stiff tariffs on Chinese-made vehicles that are imported into the U.S.
Authoritarianism
10. Uyghurs have highest rate of imprisonment in world: report
Radio Free Asia, May 2, 2024
An estimated 1 in 26 Uyghurs have been jailed, accounting for a third of China’s prison population.
11. China’s revised state secrets law has come into force. Here’s what to know
Al Jazeera, May 1, 2024
A revised state secrets law has come into force in China, prompting Taiwan to warn its citizens against travelling to China and rattling foreign companies amid fears the legislation could be used to punish regular business activities.
The changes to the Law on the Guarding of State Secrets, enacted on Wednesday, come as President Xi Jinping’s government steps up the focus on national security, including by updating China’s anti-espionage law and increasing the scrutiny of firms with foreign ties.
COMMENT – No one should travel to the PRC.
12. Patriotism for Sale: WeChat Channels’ Information Ecosystem
Doublethink Lab, May 9, 2024
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s tactics in promoting its propaganda have evolved with the prevalence of social media. Amid the aggressive censorship the CCP continues to impose on all social media platforms, the CCP, China-based tech companies as well as platform users form an ecosystem that serves as a vehicle for the CCP’s broader propaganda campaigns.
WeChat, also known as Weixin, is an app that is considered an essential social media for everyday life for residents living within China and Chinese diasporas overseas. As there is a large Chinese population using the app, it provides an abundance of information and a foundation for outsiders to learn more about life inside the country, as well as how the CCP operates its censorship system and promotes propaganda inside the ‘Great Firewall’. However, due to the deliberate non-transparent design of the platform, there are a lot of limitations in conducting research on WeChat.
In this exploratory research report, Doublethink Lab focuses on what role Chinese patriotism plays in the information ecosystem among primarily Taiwan-based self-media content creators, WeChat, and the CCP. We attempt to better understand the content creators’ motivations and intentions, the extent to which they are incentivised by a desire to develop their business or simply to leverage WeChat Channels — public feeds of video and photo content searchable via hashtags — as a platform to share their everyday life. We experiment with different research approaches such as conducting social listening through open sources, actively monitoring content, undercover investigations, and content testing.
Our research found a batch of accounts with very similar operating profiles. We infer that the similarity of the operating profiles is related to audience building and engagement strategies, mediated by WeChat’s algorithms. We found that part of the similarity of these operating profiles is spreading CCP propaganda. This propaganda on WeChat is then reused by the CCP in its propaganda campaigns, and constitutes participatory propaganda. Therefore, we saw how the CCP’s algorithms (i.e. WeChat’s algorithms) and participatory propaganda strategy, and the commercial interests of self media, intersect dynamically to reinforce the CCP’s propaganda.
Key Findings
A growing number of WeChat Channels content creators based in Taiwan are pushing soft culture content on their Channels accounts. They mainly use ‘lifestyle’ content to connect with their audiences. They share a similar pattern of account names, their content covers similar themes, they use similar sets of hashtags, and share similar narratives echoing the CCP’s propaganda about Taiwan. That said, it appears that they are mainly incentivised for commercial reasons. These content creators don’t necessarily have strong political opinions and don’t seem to intend to influence their target audience ideologically.
Based on our observations, we suspect that WeChat’s algorithms are more likely to recommend content that mention particular narratives that are (in the CCP’s framing) ‘pro Taiwan reunification’. By using frameworks that echo or mirror CCP language, it seems that the content creators are rewarded by the system, as these types of content usually receive more engagements compared to others. As such, a self-perpetuating cycle emerges as content creators continue to use these tropes to widen audience reach.
From our findings, while most content generated on the platform is either for individual users to record and share creators’ day-to-day life with the public or for commercial purposes, some of the content from these creators has been reused by CCP-controlled media for their propaganda campaigns.
We infer that the target audience is Chinese who are interested in Taiwanese culture. The creators usually use topics related to Taiwan as an entry point for them to communicate with their audience, which then becomes part of the ecosystem for the CCP’s internal propaganda campaign.
13. Xi Bristles at Criticism of China Over the War in Ukraine
Roger Cohen, New York Times, May 6, 2024
14. China sends ‘message to NATO’ with Xi’s visit to Belgrade embassy bombing site
Shi Jiangtao, South China Morning Post, May 7, 2024
15. Xi Says China Will ‘Never Forget’ the US Bombing of Its Embassy
Bloomberg, May 6, 2024
President Xi Jinping vowed to “never forget” NATO’s deadly bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, during a European trip that’s amplifying fissures in the region’s support for the US.
“Twenty-five years ago today, NATO flagrantly bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, killing three Chinese journalists,” Xi said, in a Tuesday article published in Politika, Serbia’s oldest daily newspaper. “That we should never forget,” he added. “We will never allow such tragic history to repeat itself.”
COMMENT – Perhaps the United Nations should hold annual memorials for the hundreds of thousands of Koreans and tens of thousands of UN troops who were killed by the Chinese Communist Party when they sent “volunteer” troops to attack the United Nations in Korea.
South Koreans suffered enormous casualties due to the PRC’s attacks with 17 other countries suffering loses as well (Republic of Korea – 1,313,000; USA – 36,516; UK – 1,078; Australia – 340; The Netherlands – 120; Canada – 516; France – 262; New Zealand – 23; The Philippines – 112; Turkey – 966; Thailand – 129; South Africa – 36; Greece – 192; Belgium – 99; Luxembourg – 2; Ethiopia – 122; Colombia – 213).
Over 2,800 Americans died in PRC POW camps during the Korean War.
16. Xi Jinping praises Hungary’s ‘independent’ foreign policy ahead of Orbán meeting
Joe Leahy, Wenjie Ding, Marton Dunai, and James Kynge, Financial Times, May 7, 2024
17. Hong Kong court bans protest anthem deemed seditious by city officials
Chan Ho-him and William Langley, Financial Times, May 7, 2024
James Lee, Hong Kong Free Press, May 1, 2024
A Hong Kong court has upheld a lower judge’s decision that the city’s courts do not have jurisdiction over the national security committee, effectively barring media mogul Jimmy Lai from challenging the government after it forbid him from hiring a British lawyer for his trial.
COMMENT – The Chinese Communist Party is terrified to allow foreign lawyers to defend individuals facing national security charges in their kangaroo courts. Only lawyers who are under the complete control of the Chinese Communist Party (as lawyers in the PRC are) can be intimidated into not mounting an effective defense for their clients.
Foreign businesses should flee for the exits.
19. U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Companies for Aiding Russia’s War Effort
Alan Rappeport, New York Times, May 1, 2024
20. In rapidly ageing China, millions of migrant workers can't afford to retire
Tingshu Wang, Laurie Chen, Kevin Yao and Farah Master, Reuters, May 8, 2024
21. China trying to develop world ‘built on censorship and surveillance’
Al Jazeera, May 2, 2024
Rights group warns the Digital Silk Road is enabling China to export its brand of digital authoritarianism across the word.
China is exporting its model of digital authoritarianism abroad with the help of its far-reaching tech industry and massive infrastructure projects, offering a blueprint of “best practices” to neighbours including Cambodia, Malaysia and Vietnam, a human rights watchdog has warned.
In 2015, two years after kicking off its massive Belt and Road initiative, China launched its “Digital Silk Road” project to expand access to digital infrastructure such as submarine cables, satellites, 5G connectivity and more.
Environmental Harms
22. Europe faces up to China's EV dominance as carbon-zero targets loom
Mailys Pene-Lassus, Rhyannon Bartlett-Imadegawa, and Kyra Jaeger, Nikkei Asia, May 8, 2024
23. Chinese EV makers risk tougher duties over failure to cooperate with EU probe
Koen Verhelst, Politico, May 2, 2024
24. Environmental Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative
IRI, April 2, 2024
Foreign Interference and Coercion
25. GCSB spy agency knew China-backed cyber-attack targeted former MPs and didn’t tell them
Adam Pearse, New Zealand Herald, April 30, 2024
26. Russia and China co-ordinate on disinformation in Solomon Islands elections
Albert Zhang and Adam Ziogas, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 1, 2024
27. Truth and reality with Chinese characteristics
Samantha Hoffman, Tilla Hoja, Yvonne Lau, and Lilly Min-Chen Lee, ASPI, May 2, 2024
Executive Summary
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is leveraging its propaganda system to build a toolkit to enable information campaigns. Its objective is to control communication and shape narratives and perceptions about China in order to present a specific version of truth and reality, both domestically and internationally. Ultimately, the CCP aims to strengthen its grip on power, legitimise its activities and bolster China’s cultural, technological, economic and military influence.
The CCP seeks to maintain total control over the information environment within China, while simultaneously working to extend its influence abroad to reshape the global information ecosystem. That includes not only controlling media and communications platforms outside China, but also ensuring that Chinese technologies and companies become the foundational layer for the future of information and data exchange worldwide.
This research report finds that the CCP seeks to harvest data from various sources, including commercial entities, to gain insights into target audiences for its information campaigns. We define an information campaign as a targeted, organised plan of related and integrated information operations, employing information-related capabilities (tools, techniques or activities) with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt or manipulate information — including the individual or collective decision making based on that information — and deliberately disseminated on a large scale. The party also invests in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and immersive technologies that shape how people perceive reality and engage with information. The aim is to gain greater control, if not dominance, over the global information ecosystem.
To understand the drivers, tools and outcomes of that process, this report and its accompanying website (ChinaInfoBlocks.aspi.org.au) examine the activities of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the information domain, particularly its investments in technology and research and development (R&D) companies that might serve as ‘building blocks’ for the party’s information campaigns.
Specifically, this research comprehensively maps the CCP’s propaganda system, highlighting the linkages between the Central Propaganda Department, state-owned or -controlled propaganda entities and data-collection activities, and technology investments in Chinese companies, many of which now operate globally.
This research illustrates the various ways in which the party-state is leveraging the propaganda system and commercial entities to gain access to data that it deems strategically valuable for the propaganda system and its ongoing information operations. It also shows how the propaganda system uses new and emerging technologies, including generative AI, mobile gaming and immersive technologies, to establish and maintain control of the narrative and continuously refine its toolbox and techniques.
It’s imperative that policymakers develop robust defences and countermeasures against future disruptive information campaigns from Beijing and to ensure an open and secure global information environment. In mapping those companies linked to China’s propaganda system that are seeking market dominance in key technologies, and how their activities may support CCP efforts to shape the global information environment, this project aims to inform government and industry decisions on digital supply-chain security, supporting policies for safer and more secure digital technologies.
The first section of this report lays out the fundamentals of CCP theory that have, over decades, defined the party-state’s strategy in the information domain. A theoretical understanding of how the CCP conceptualises its goals is important in unpacking the different tools used to achieve them. The second section outlines the CCP’s complex and vast propaganda system and how it works. Later sections expand on the ways in which CCP theory underpins the propaganda system and its activities, including through practical examples and case studies.
This report is accompanied by a website that offers detailed network diagrams of the relationships between China’s propaganda system and the companies associated with it: directly, through a state-ownership structure linking back to the propaganda system, or indirectly, through significant state support. The website also hosts case studies relevant to the report findings. The map can be explored on the website, Identifying The Building Blocks of China’s Information Campaigns.
28. China publicizes for the first time what it claims is a 2016 agreement with Philippines
Christopher Bodeen, Associated Press, May 3, 2024
29. As China and Iran hunt for dissidents in the US, the FBI is racing to counter the threat
Eric Tucker, Didi Tang, and Nathan Ellgren, The Independent, May 6, 2024
American officials say foreign countries like China and Iran intimidate, harass and sometimes plot attacks against political opponents and activists in the U.S.
A series of cases brought by the Justice Department shows the frightening consequences that geopolitical tensions can have for ordinary citizens as governments historically intolerant of dissent inside their own borders are increasingly keeping a threatening watch on those who speak out thousands of miles away.
After a student leader of the historic Tiananmen Square protests entered a 2022 congressional race in New York, a Chinese intelligence operative wasted little time enlisting a private investigator to hunt for any mistresses or tax problems that could upend the candidate's bid, prosecutors say.
“In the end,” the operative ominously told his contact, “violence would be fine too.”
As an Iranian journalist and activist living in exile in the United States aired criticism of Iran's human rights abuses, Tehran was listening too. Members of an Eastern European organized crime gang scouted her Brooklyn home and plotted to kill her in a murder-for-hire scheme directed from Iran, according to the Justice Department, which foiled the plan and brought criminal charges.
The episodes reflect the extreme measures taken by countries like China and Iran to intimidate, harass and sometimes plot attacks against political opponents and activists who live in the U.S. They show the frightening consequences that geopolitical tensions can have for ordinary citizens as governments historically intolerant of dissent inside their own borders are increasingly keeping a threatening watch on those who speak out thousands of miles away.
30. VIDEO – Chinese dissidents living in U.S. endure harassment campaigns they claim come from Beijing
Associated Press, May 6, 2024
31. China’s Xi Shouldn’t Expect an Easy Ride in Europe This Time
Noemie Bisserbe, Laurence Norman, and Austin Ramzy, Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2024
32. Xi's trip to Europe may lay bare West's divisions over China strategy
Laurie Chen and Michel Rose, Reuters, May 2, 2024
33. What to Know About Xi Jinping’s Trip to Europe
Emma Bubola, New York Times, May 6, 2024
34. China and EU-candidate Serbia sign an agreement to build a ‘shared future’
Dusan Stojanovic and Jovana Gec, Associated Press, May 8, 2024
China and European Union candidate Serbia signed an agreement on Wednesday to build a “shared future,” making the Balkan country the first in Europe to agree on such a document with Beijing.
After meeting in Belgrade, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic announced they would “deepen and elevate the comprehensive strategic partnership between China and Serbia,” and “build a new era of a community with a shared future between China and Serbia.”
Xi launched the term “community for shared future” over 10 years ago. While it may not denote a specific initiative, experts believe it has an underlying significance as another term for an alliance.
“Eight years ago, Serbia became China’s first comprehensive strategic partner in the Central and Eastern European region, and today Serbia is the first European country to build a community of destiny with China, fully reflecting the strategic, special and high level of China-Serbia relations,” Xi said during a press conference after signing the agreement.
35. Canadian government proposes new foreign influence registry as part of wide-spanning new bill
Rachel Aiello, CTV, May 6, 2024
36. James Paterson responds to IPAC breach, calls for sanctions against APT31
Daniel Croft, CyberDaily.au, May 8, 2024
In 2021, the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), a group of officials critical of China, was targeted in a cyber attack which has been attributed to Chinese state-sponsored hacking group APT31.
The hackers sent a number of pixel tracking emails to high-profile politicians disguised as a news outlet as part of a cyber espionage campaign.
“The apparent intention was to garner sufficient information to mount more sophisticated follow-on attacks, escalating in severity,” said the affected Australian IPAC members in a statement issued today.
Additionally, it became apparent that despite the attack occurred in 2021, and the FBI notifying Australian authorities in 2021 and again in 2022, the affected Senators and MPs did not find out about the attack until last month after the US issued an indictment.
Responding to request for comment from Cyber Daily, Paterson has condemned the actions of Beijing and APT31, and called for Australia to join the US and UK in imposing sanctions on the group.
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
37. Number of writers jailed in China exceeds 100 for first time, says report
Amy Hawkins, The Guardian, May 1, 2024
38. A disappearance in Xinjiang
Edward White, Financial Times, April 25, 2024
39. Shenzhen, 4,000 Villagers Confront the Police After Destruction of an Ancestral Hall
Qi Junzao, Bitter Winter, May 8, 2024
The 300-year old monument in Futian District has been demolished due to a combination of official disregard for spiritual traditions and land speculation.
In an unprecedented public protest, some 4,000 villagers confronted the police on April 24 in the Shuiwei and Huanggang villages in Futian District, part of metropolitan Shenzhen, protesting the destruction of an ancestral hall. Some came with chairs and blocked the entrance of the C2 Shenzhen subway station, which is near where the ancestral hall once stood. They hold signs such as “Resolutely oppose the demolition of the ancestral hall, defend the authentic ancestral hall, and never give up. The forced demolition of the ancestral hall goes against the Zhuang family and is not tolerated by Heaven.”
This is a complicated story, local villagers told “Bitter Winter.” “The old ancestral shrine did not disturb anybody and stayed there for 300 years,” one woman said: “Although the incident shows disrespect for our sacred traditions, the story is mostly about money. There is a project of new construction in the area, one of the largest real estate developments in the district. The authorities couldn’t care less about the destruction of the most historical buildings in the area, if they believe they can all profit from the development.”
40. Hong Kong ranks low on global press freedom index as watchdog cites ‘unprecedented’ setbacks
Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, May 3, 2024
41. Number of writers jailed in China exceeds 100 for first time, says report
Amy Hawkins, The Guardian, May 1, 2024
The number of writers jailed in China has surpassed 100, with nearly half imprisoned for online expression.
The grim milestone is revealed in the 2023 Freedom to Write index, a report compiled by Pen America, published on Wednesday.
With the total number of people imprisoned globally for exercising their freedom of expression estimated to be at least 339, China accounts for nearly one-third of the world’s jailed writers. There are 107 people behind bars because of their published statements in China, more than any other country on the index.
It is the first time that Pen America’s count of writers jailed in China has surpassed 100. Other databases, such as the Reporters Without Borders’ tally of journalists and media workers detained in China, passed that milestone in 2020.
COMMENT – The PRC accounts for nearly a third of the world’s imprisoned writers and journalists.
42. Bao Zhuoxuan: When the 709 Crackdown Happened to a Fifteen-Year-Old
Sloane Song, Human Rights in China, May 4, 2024
Bao Zhuoxuan was fifteen years old when his human rights lawyer parents Wang Yu and Bao Longjun were arrested by the police. That year, he was beaten by the police, underwent brutal interrogations, attempted to leave China and failed, and had a gun pointed to his head in Myanmar.
The year was 2015, two years after president Xi Jinping assumed office. On July 9, the Chinese government launched a nationwide crackdown on human rights lawyers and activists, now known as the “709 crackdown,” and over 300 individuals were illegally detained, interrogated, and imprisoned.
According to Front Line Defenders, Bao Zhuoxuan’s mother, Wang Yu, is a commercial and human rights lawyer that defended feminists, Falun Gong believers, and Ilham Tohti, a renowned Uyghur scholar who was sentenced to lifetime in prison for “inciting separatism.” Wang was the first to be detained on the night of July 9. Later, she was charged with “subversion of state power.” Bao Longjun, his father, was detained on the same day, with the charge of “inciting subversion of state power.” From July 2015 to August 2016, Wang and Bao were detained incommunicado, while Bao Zhuoxuan was forcefully sent back to his grandparents’ place in Inner Mongolia and lived under heavy police surveillance.
Today, Wang and Bao still live in China. Their son, Bao Zhuoxuan, left China for Australia in 2018 and now lives in the United States.
Last summer, I met Bao Zhouxuan at a human rights workshop in New York. Not knowing who he was beforehand, I found him to be an ordinary Chinese boy in high school who was tall and thin, with a little acne on his face, shy but polite in front of strangers, and had a strong interest in Japanese animation. The night we went to the bar together with other workshoppers, he shouted “I want strong liquor! Give me the strongest!” when he barely knew the names of any cocktails. In the end, he quietly ordered a glass of apple juice. I felt there was a kind of childish innocence with him, almost as if he was unhurt, untainted, yet to be sophisticated by the world. What is this kid doing here at a serious, almost depressing human rights workshop?
It was the next day, when the workshop organizer invited him to share his experience during the 709 crackdown, that I learned his name is Bao Zhuoxuan, and had been through the unimaginable as a fifteen-year-old kid in 2015. He looked nervous as he spoke about that period of time, occasionally stuttering and tightly clutching his own arms. When he finished, many in the audience had tears in their eyes. For the rest of the night, people walked up to him to express their sympathy and admiration.
“If you’re willing, I’d really love to write down your story,” I asked him, “and let the world see what 709 crackdown meant to a kid.”
“Of course, it would be my honor.” He still maintained that shy, polite manner. “But I’m worried that I won’t tell it well. I still get nervous just thinking about that period of time. Every time I talk about it, I end up losing sleep and having nightmares for days.”
This story will be compiled from the self-narration provided by Bao Zhuoxuan during the interview process. For more background information, please refer to existing reporting by international media, such as New York Times, for this story will not attempt to explain the709 crackdown itself. Our sole purpose is to let the world see how a 22-year-old remembers his experience at 15, and how he still struggles to tell this story today.
COMMENT – Worth reading the full story… the Chinese Communist Party is a bunch of thugs.
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
43. China’s CICC Demotes Senior Bankers, Cuts Pay to Slash Costs
Pei Li and Cathy Chan, Bloomberg, May 5, 2024
44. China Moves to Cool Battery Boom Amid Overcapacity Concerns
Danny Lee, Bloomberg, May 8, 2024
45. China makes cheap electric vehicles. Why can't American shoppers buy them?
Camila Domonoske, National Public Radio, May 6, 2024
46. Call it Cognac diplomacy. France offered China’s Xi a special drink, in a wink at their trade spat
Associated Press, May 6, 2024
47. China’s Thrifty Travelers Show Consumer Confidence Is Weak
Bloomberg, May 6, 2024
48. China’s C919 aircraft to roll off the line faster as developer expands capacity, but reliance on engine imports risks ‘bottleneck’
Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, May 8, 2024
49. French Cognac Producers Push for Deal on China Dumping Probe
Andy Hoffman and Angelina Rascouet, Bloomberg, May 2, 2024
50. China’s overcapacity dilemma solvable with ‘painful’ industrial revamp, scholars say
Amanda Lee, South China Morning Post, May 8, 2024
51. Why Chinese PE and VC Firms Are Chasing Middle East Money
Yue Yue, Wang Jing, Wang Liwei, and Qing Na, Caixin, May 7, 2024
52. A Tesla rival in China is eyeing a $5 billion IPO in the U.S.
William Gavin, Quartz, May 6, 2024
53. The Rocket Fuel Behind China Shock 2.0: Weak Currency, Deflation
Jason Douglas, Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2024
54. Bonhomie and hardball: Xi Jinping visits Europe to avert trade war
James Kynge, Joe Leahy, Sarah White, and Marton Duna, Financial Times, May 5, 2024
55. Joe Biden’s China probe throws lifeline to South Korean and Japanese shipyards
Chan Ho-him, Joe Leahy, Song Jung-a, Kana Inagaki, and Robert Wright, Financial Times, May 4, 2024
56. China Is Buying Gold, Sending Prices to Record Highs
Daisuke Wakabayashi and Claire Fu, New York Times, May 5, 2024
57. Macron, von der Leyen press China's Xi on trade in Paris talks
Elizabeth Pineau, John Irish, and Ingrid Melander, Reuters, May 6, 2024
58. Germany's Scholz calls on China to play bigger role in poor nations' debt
Reuters, May 7, 2024
59. China's CICC may cut investment banking headcount by at least 10% this year, sources say
Reuters, May 7, 2024
60. South Korea Plans $7 Billion Push to Pivot EV Battery Industry Away from China
Kwanwoo Jun, Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2024
61. Elon Musk proposed to launch robotaxis in China during April visit, state media report says
Reuters, May 7, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
62. Chinese unicorn Zhipu AI to launch Sora rival as early as 2024 amid local race to catch up with OpenAI: report
Kelly Le, South China Morning Post, May 8, 2024
63. Saudi Arabia’s $100 Billion AI Fund Will Divest China If US Asks
Marion Halftermeyer and Mackenzie Hawkins, Bloomberg, May 7, 2024
64. GM-Backed Self-Driving Firm Momenta Said to File for IPO in US
Pei Li, Bloomberg, May 5, 2024
65. China Launches Rockets from Sea in Bid to Win the Space Race
Bloomberg, May 1, 2024
66. Commerce Department revokes more export licenses to China’s Huawei
Eva Dou and Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post, May 7, 2024
67. US revokes licences for supply of chips to China’s Huawei
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, May 8, 2024
68. Europe is nowhere close to banning TikTok
Pieter Haeck, Politico, May 3, 2024
69. Despite international hires, TikTok is Chinese at its core
Caiwei Chen and Viola Zhou, Rest of World, May 7, 2024
70. TikTok under U.S. ownership makes sense, Jake Sullivan says
Ken Moriyasu, Nikkei Asia, May 5, 2024
71. The iPhone Is Losing Its Cutting-Edge Appeal in China
Yang Jie, Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2024
72. TikTok sues to challenge law forcing sale or ban
Rebecca Kern, Politico, May 7, 2024
73. A New Diplomatic Strategy Emerges as Artificial Intelligence Grows
David E. Sanger, New York Times, May 6, 2024
74. US eyes curbs on China's access to AI software behind apps like ChatGPT
Alexandra Alper, Reuters, May 8, 2024
75. Infineon to supply advanced power chips for Xiaomi EVs
Cheng Ting-Fang, Nikkei Asia, May 6, 2024
Military and Security Threats
76. Chinese jet put helicopter at risk by releasing flares, says Australia
Shaun Turton, Nikkei Asia, May 6, 2024
77. China accuses Australian helicopter of aerial 'provocations'
Shaun Turton, Nikkei Asia, May 7, 2024
78. Albanese rejects China’s argument that Australia was at fault in dangerous aircraft encounter
Rod McGuirk, Associated Press, May 8, 2024
79. China's next defense buildup: mandatory military training for students
Yukio Tajima, Nikkei Asia, May 7, 2024
80. China criticizes US for ship’s passage through Taiwan Strait weeks before new leader takes office
Christopher Bodeen, Associated Press, May 9, 2024
China’s military criticized a U.S. destroyer’s passage through the Taiwan Strait less than two weeks before the island’s new president takes office and while Washington and Beijing are making uneven efforts to restore regular military exchanges.
Navy Senior Capt. Li Xi, spokesperson for China’s Eastern Theater Command, accused the U.S. of having “publicly hyped” the passage of the USS Halsey on Wednesday. In a statement, Li said the command, which oversees operations around the strait, “organized naval and air forces to monitor” the ship’s transit.
The U.S. Navy’s 7th Fleet said the Halsey “conducted a routine Taiwan Strait transit on May 8 through waters where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight apply in accordance with international law.”
The guided-missile destroyer transited through a corridor in the strait that is “beyond the territorial sea” of any coastal state, the fleet said in a statement.
COMMENT – Hundreds of ships transit this international waterway everyday with almost half of the world’s global container fleet passing through the Taiwan Strait each year. According to International Law, which Beijing is a signatory to, military ships have a right to use this waterway.
The PRC’s criticism of the United States (and other countries that exercise the freedoms associated with international law) is that Beijing claims sovereignty over Taiwan and asserts that the Taiwan Strait, like much of the South and East China Seas are the PRC’s territory and that other countries must get Beijing’s permission to operate there.
81. Xi Urges Macron to Help China to Avoid a ‘New Cold War’
William Horobin, Samy Adghirni, and Li Liu, Bloomberg, May 6, 2024
82. Russia warns Britain and plans nuclear drills over the West’s possible deepening role in Ukraine
Associated Press, May 6, 2024
Russia on Monday threatened to strike British military facilities and said it would hold drills simulating the use of battlefield nuclear weapons amid sharply rising tensions over comments by senior Western officials about possibly deeper involvement in the war in Ukraine.
After summoning the British ambassador to the Foreign Ministry, Moscow warned that Ukrainian strikes on Russian territory with U.K.-supplied weapons could bring retaliatory strikes on British military facilities and equipment on Ukrainian soil or elsewhere.
COMMENT – Beijing’s support for Moscow gives Putin the confidence to make these threats.
83. Philippines Summons China Envoy After Water Cannon Incident
Manolo Serapio Jr and Cliff Harvey Venzon, Bloomberg, May 1, 2024
84. US Spies See China, Russia Militaries Working Closer on Taiwan
Daniel Flatley, Bloomberg, May 2, 2024
85. China’s attacks on critical infrastructure ‘tip of the iceberg’
Simon Hendery, SC Media, May 1, 2024
David A. Shlapak, Chad Ohlandt, and Jon Schmid, RAND, April 24, 2024
The United States might get very little early warning of the specific science and technology (S&T) programs that China could use to create important new military capabilities that the U.S. military might confront in the future. For this reason, a tool that could identify activity to develop these capabilities early in the pipeline is of immense interest to the military and intelligence communities.
The authors developed the Military Advances in Science & Technology framework for gaining insights in these areas. Its top-down, analytic approach begins with the China's leadership's strategic aspirations for China, works through the military missions implied by those goals, and identifies new or improved capabilities required to execute those missions. The authors specified the technological bases for these capabilities and explored Chinese S&T activity as far back as the basic research phase. This resulted in a graphical dashboard, backed by qualitative and quantitative data, which indicates the status and trends of China's progress in these S&T domains.
The indicators supplied by this framework can focus U.S. research and development objectives and shape modernization priorities, point the intelligence community to new areas of China's S&T activity and assist in allocating intelligence assets and resources effectively, facilitate combatant commands and Pentagon planners in assessing the potential results of China's S&T undertakings, and help the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) inform its governmental, academic, and industrial partners about S&T areas in which caution should be exercised in both Chinese investment in U.S. firms and collaboration with Chinese researchers.
Key Findings
RAND researchers developed a framework that can measure S&T progress of foreign competing nations to help determine what should warrant the attention of DoD decisionmakers.
The four phases of the framework progress in a structured and transparent way—from the subject country's highest-level strategic goals to the critical technologies supporting its military capabilities to achieve those goals—identifying requirements, screening S&T activity, comparing baseline historical progress, and supporting decisionmakers.
A prototype of the framework, which was applied to three cases studies in China, demonstrated that it can generate timely and useful insights.
87. Senator Rick Scott Letter
Rick Scott, United States Senate, May 3, 2024
88. China hacked Ministry of Defence, Sky News learns
Sam Coates, Sky News, May 7, 2024
89. UK suspects China behind cyber-attack on military personnel data
Lucy Fisher, Financial Times, May 7, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
90. Pakistan’s military says March attack that killed Chinese engineers was planned in Afghanistan
Munir Ahmed, Associated Press, May 7, 2024
Pakistan’s military on Tuesday said a suicide bombing that killed five Chinese engineers and a Pakistani driver in March was planned in neighboring Afghanistan and that the bomber was an Afghan citizen.
At a news conference, army spokesman Maj. Gen. Ahmad Sharif said four men behind the March 26 attack in Bisham, a district in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, had been arrested.
Sharif said the attack that killed the Chinese engineers, who were working on Pakistan’s biggest Dasu Dam, was an attempt to harm the friendship between Pakistan and China. Thousands of Chinese are working on projects relating to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
Sharif also said Pakistani Taliban who have sanctuaries in Afghanistan were behind a surge in attacks inside Pakistan since January that killed 62 security forces nationwide, and that Pakistan had solid evidence of the group’s involvement in the rising violence.
91. China woos Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru to advance Belt and Road
Yukio Tajima and Niki Mizuguchi, Nikkei Asia, May 2, 2024
92. VIDEO – Why a Surge in Chinese Construction in Bhutan Is Threatening India
Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2024
93. China’s Advance in Central America and Its Strategic Importance
R. Evan Ellis, The Diplomat, May 8, 2024
A China-dominated cluster is emerging among the three regimes in Central America not friendly toward the U.S.
94. Kishida talks up bolstered Latin American ties as China cements position
Gabriel Dominguez, Japan Times, May 5, 2024
Opinion Pieces
95. Defending Taiwan by Defending Ukraine: The Interconnected Fates of the World’s Democracies
Jaushieh Joseph Wu, Foreign Affairs, May 9, 2024
The Russian invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call: it was time to move past the vision of a post‒Cold War world in which regimes in Moscow and Beijing would become responsible stakeholders in a rules-based international order. What has emerged, instead, is an increasingly contentious world plagued by authoritarian aggression, most dangerously exemplified by the “no-limits partnership” between China and Russia, through which the two countries have bolstered each other’s repressive, expansionist agendas.
This remains, however, a globalized world of interconnected economies and societies: a single, indivisible theater in which the security of every country is intimately linked to the security of every other. That is particularly true of the world’s democracies, whose alliances and partnerships have come under assault by authoritarian powers intent on splitting and dividing the democratic world.
Some have argued that international support for defending Ukraine from Russian aggression is draining attention and resources away from the task of standing up to Chinese aggression. According to this view, the defense of Ukraine has left democracies such as Taiwan more vulnerable.
But that argument underestimates the extent to which the geostrategic interests of the world’s democracies are linked—as are the agendas of Moscow and Beijing. U.S. officials have concluded that since at least the second half of 2023, China has been providing military support short of lethal arms to Russia, a significant shift since the initial phase of Russia’s war on Ukraine, when Beijing took a somewhat more neutral stance. China has clearly decided that it has a strong interest not just in propping up Russia but in reshaping the geopolitical landscape in Europe.
With China and Russia in such close alignment, it is all the more imperative for democracies to act in coordination. To that end, the democracies of the world, led by the United States, must sustain their military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. The objective of this support goes beyond returning to the status quo ante in the European continent. By helping Ukraine, democracies can increase their relative strength against the Chinese-Russian coalition.
In this spirit, Taiwan welcomes the U.S. Congress’s recent decision to continue American military support for Ukraine. Such a display of unabated and unquestionable resolve to safeguard democracy does not detract from the defense of places such as Taiwan: in fact, it is a key deterrent against adventurism on Beijing’s part.
COMMENT – This article is a rejection of the arguments that certain Republicans have been making for months now that the United States should abandon Ukraine (and Europe) to focus solely on Taiwan.
96. Xi Jinping's vision of war seen in creation of 'Information Force'
Anushka Saxena, Nikkei Asia, May 2, 2024
97. America’s China Strategy Has a Credibility Problem
Emily Kilcrease, Foreign Affairs, May 7, 2024
98. The Wrath of Khan: How Antitrust Policy Can Undermine U.S. National Security
William Alan Reinsch, Foreign Affairs, May 6, 2024
99. VIDEO – The Erosion of Hong Kong’s Autonomy since 2020: Implications for the United States
Scott Kennedy, Lily McElwee, and Jude Blanchette, CSIS, May 7, 2024
100. China Has 350 Warships. The US Has 290. That's a Problem.
James Stavridis, Bloomberg, May 1, 2024
101. Lessons from Tiananmen for Today’s University Presidents
James A. Millward, ChinaFile, April 29, 2024
102. ‘Blazing Furnace’ Turns Vietnam into Another Chinese Province
Shuli Ren, Bloomberg, May 5, 2024
103. Risk of a renminbi devaluation is real
George Magnus, Financial Times, May 5, 2024
104. This Isn’t the China I Remember
Gish Jen, New York Times, April 29, 2024
105. Xi Jinping Has Learned a Lot from the War in Ukraine
Alexander Gabuev, Wall Street Journal, May 6, 2024