Friends,
This is just a guess, but I suspect that most readers are focused on the November 5th election, and less focused on the election taking place today, Sunday, October 27th.
I’ll go even further out on a limb and speculate that few know who is running, what the parliamentary details are, or what’s at stake in this election.
The election in question is of course the general election for the lower house of the Japanese National Diet (Japan’s parliament). For those interested in China policy, Japanese politics have been critical over the past dozen years since former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe became the country’s leader for a second time in December 2012.
Let me make a case for why you should pay attention to the election happening today… and it is not just because important things happen in places other than Washington DC.
But first, let’s do a recap on the details of Japan’s Government and why the brand new Japanese Prime Minister, Shigeru Ishiba, dissolved the Japanese House of Representatives on October 1st (his first day on the job) and called for a snap election today.
As with other parliamentary systems, executive power (the head of government and the ability to form a cabinet) derives from democratic legitimacy of commanding the confidence of a majority of the legislature. In Japan the legislature is called the National Diet, and it is composed of two chambers: a lower house, the House of Representatives, and an upper house, the House of Councilors.
The lower house is more powerful, it has 465 members from both direct and proportional voting, and those members serve up to four-year terms (though the Prime Minister can dissolve the House of Representatives and call a snap election, as PM Ishiba did early this month or it can be dissolved through a vote of no confidence).
The upper house has 248 members who serve six-year terms that are staggered so that only half of its membership is up for election every three years. Unlike the lower house, the House of Councilors cannot be dissolved.
To form a Cabinet and Government, Japanese leaders must maintain a majority of support in both houses of the National Diet. Once the National Diet designates a Prime Minister, the Prime Minister presents their commission and is formally appointed by the Emperor.
The last general election for the lower house took place almost exactly three years ago (October 31, 2021) under very similar circumstances.
On October 4, 2021, Fumio Kishida was elected by his party as leader and became Prime Minister, replacing an unpopular Yoshihide Suga (who a year before in September 2020, replaced an ailing Shinzo Abe as party leader and Prime Minister). Kishida called for a snap election and his party won a majority in the lower house (while maintaining a majority in the upper house). But eight months later with the election of the upper house (July 10, 2022), the ruling party failed to win an outright majority, and the Government had to enter a coalition with another party.
With the next upper house election scheduled for July 2025, Ishiba faces a similar prospect today but with much weaker polling numbers. While an upset is not certain or necessarily expected… it is possible, which would send shockwaves across the region. Even if Ishiba meets the expectations of his party and win a majority of seats, the current government will likely be in a weaker position to push through its defense and economic policies.
The Magic Number is 233…
Going into today’s election, the ruling party (the Liberal Democratic Party, LDP) holds 258 seats, and its coalition partner, Komeito, holds 32 seats, giving the Government a solid 290-seat majority (a party needs 233 seats out of 468).
The main opposition party (the Constitutional Democratic Party, CDP) holds 98 seats (gaining two since the 2021 election). The CDP is joined in opposition by five smaller parties spread across the political spectrum, as well as a handful of independents, some of whom vote with the Government and some with the opposition.
By announcing a snap election at the start of the month, Prime Minister Ishiba hoped to capitalize on his party’s own leadership reshuffle and prevent the CDP (who had swapped out their leader on September 23, 2024) from fully mobilizing.
Over the last two years, the LDP has been wrecked by scandals and its popularity has suffered. Though not directly implicated in the scandals, Kishida became the face of them to the Japanese people and the selection of Ishiba in late September as the Party’s new leader (and hence Prime Minister) was an attempt to shore up the LDP’s electoral support.
But when Ishiba won the party vote to become leader, his public approval rating was the worst for a new Government since 2002, suggesting that the LDP’s scandals have done significant damage and the outcome of the election isn’t certain.
The prediction I’m hearing from friends in Tokyo are that the LDP will lose a lot of seats.
If its 20 seats, it will be uncomfortable for the LDP, but they will be able to maintain the Government they just set up.
If its 40 seats (and Komeito maintains its position), then the LDP will be forced to enter into serious renegotiations with its coalition partner which has been much more critical of increased defense spending.
If its 60 seats (and/or Komeito loses big), then things get really dicey. An LDP-Komeito coalition wouldn’t be sufficient to get a majority in the lower house. The LDP might be able to pull the more conservative Ishin (Japan Innovation Party) into a coalition, but that might alienate its centrist Komeito partners which it must have to maintain its majority in the upper house. The LDP might also pursue a smaller party like the right of center DPFP (Democratic Party for the People), but it gets really complex, really fast.
For the main opposition party, the center-left CDP, to win an outright majority, they would need to win an additional 135 seats above what they already hold. The only other left party for them to partner with is the Japanese Communist Party, which has only held 10 seats.
It seems unlikely (famous last words) that we will see an outright CDP victory.
We will probably see a much weaker LDP Government that has to compromise with various partners to maintain power meaning it will be difficult to carry forward any bold policies in the economic, defense, or foreign policy domains.
I’m writing this post on Saturday afternoon Eastern Time with the polls in Japan just opening, but by the time you are reading this post, the polls should be closing across Japan.
As I wrote in late July in my post titled, “What’s the vibe going into Beidaihe?”, how the PRC judges the political strength of its rivals is extremely important (more important than how they judge their economic or military strength). Behind the United States (which CCP leaders view as politically very weak and divided), Japan is the PRC’s most important rival.
A weak and divided Japan will have ramifications.
Here is what I wrote in July… and I feel even more strongly about this assessment today:
What has Xi and his cadres learned since the last Beidaihe and what might they expect for the next year?
…
Rival #2 (Japan) is slowly coming out of its economic malaise and beginning to build military power, but the assassination of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo two years ago has fractured the ruling LDP party in ways that make them weak and divided. With Abe out of the picture and with no one to fill his shoes, the most worrying geopolitical scenario for Beijing has passed. When Abe was assassinated, he was a year younger than Xi and arguably played a more important role than Xi of putting forward a vision for Asians. Abe’s concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” was a direct rebuke to the Sino-centric Asia Pacific that Xi and his cadres envisioned. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan stitched together the G7 and the Quad (Japan, India, Australia, and the United States) to focus on countering the CCP (this is often attributed to Washington, but having watched it up close, Abe and Tokyo played the most important role).
Abe’s successors, Prime Ministers Suga and Kishida, tried to continue these efforts, but they aren’t Abe. Prime Minister Kishida will likely be driven from power in the next two months by his own party as they search for a leader to rescue them in the eyes of the Japanese public. Perhaps a new, strong leader will emerge in Tokyo to pick up the mantle of Abe, but Beijing likely feels confident that won’t happen.
[Yes, I’m quoting myself… if you want to quote yourself, write your own Substack]
I fear that a weak and politically divided Japan (with the United States in the same condition) emboldens Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang to embark on adventurism.
In connection with a reference, I’ll make below about baseball, we are in a pickle.
Speaking of feeling emboldened…
The U.S. Government revealed publicly this week evidence that North Korea has thousands of troops in Russia that are posed to join the fight against Ukraine.
US says evidence shows North Korea has troops in Russia, possibly for Ukraine war (Reuters, October 24, 2024)
Crossing the Rubicon: DPRK Sends Troops to Russia (CSIS, October 23, 2024)
If someone told me five years ago that thousands of North Korean troops would soon launch infantry assaults on Ukrainian positions alongside their Russian allies, I would have dismissed that individual as looney.
Combine that with the massive material support that Beijing continues to provide the Russians for their war in Europe (along with rhetorical, diplomatic, economic, and political support… as witnessed this week at the expanded BRICS Summit in Kazan), and maybe we should put to rest any doubts that Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang have a real alliance against the “Global West” (as I described in an earlier post, “The Blocs are Back in Town”).
As if to conjure up the starkest contrast, this week was “Bank Week” in Washington DC, the annual meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The folks at JP Morgan invited me to speak on a panel about U.S.-China relations with my friends Paul Haenle (JP Morgan’s Managing Director and Head of Asia Pacific Policy and Strategic Competitiveness), Scott Kennedy (Senior Advisor and Trustee Chair in China Business and Economics at CSIS), and Ambassador Craig Allen (President of the U.S.-China Business Council). We discussed future trajectories in light of the U.S. election and in summary, we agreed things look pretty bleak and it is likely to get worse.
I made the case that we are already in a new cold war with Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran whether we want to admit it or not. I also contrasted our gathering in Washington with what was unfolding simultaneously in Kazan.
Xi and Putin share center stage this week in Kazan, Russia for the expanded BRICS Summit.
As an indicator of shift in influence from the Global West to the Global East, the United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, did NOT attend the annual meetings of the World Bank and the IMF this week in Washington… he decided to attend the 16th BRICS Summit as a guest of President Putin.
I watched the opening press conference that World Bank President Ajay Banga held and it was like watching someone from an alternative reality where international institutions work smoothly, climate change is the only real threat, and there are no serious geopolitical divisions.
One of the reporters asked what I thought was the most obvious question: how will the World Bank adapt to a more dangerous and politically divided world… Ajay dismissed these as routine challenges the World Bank has always dealt with.
When asked how the World Bank was thinking about the U.S. election, Ajay responded that the bank “doesn’t spend any time discussing the outcome of the U.S. election before it happens.” “It [the U.S. Presidential Election] is actually not a topic at our senior leadership meetings, or even in private conversations because there is no point speculating on something where you don’t know what the outcome will be.”
Isn’t it the most basic job of a banker to “speculate” on uncertainty?!? When banks provide loans and set interest rates, they are SPECULATING about something they don’t know the outcome of. Their entire raison d’être is managing risk and uncertainty.
Does he actually expect us to believe that an institution like the World Bank isn’t discussing or planning for things they don’t know the outcome of?
Listening to him made me deeply depressed and to put it diplomatically, his remarks struck me as detached from reality.
I tried to elaborate on these dynamics to the audience at the JP Morgan event and explain that given our situation, political and commercial leaders of the financial community had better start planning for these trends as seriously as they had about climate change over the past decade.
To be honest, I felt it fell on deaf ears…
***
Viva Valenzuela!
This week we lost Fernando Valenzuela, the legendary Los Angeles Dodgers lefty who electrified baseball in the 1980s.
Born in Etchohuaquila, Mexico, Valenzuela mastered his left-hand screwball in his teens and was scouted and signed by the Dodgers at age 20. Within a year, he was the hottest pitcher in the MLB.
I moved to Southern California in the summer between my sophomore and junior years in High School, near the end of Valenzuela’s time at the Los Angeles Dodgers, so I experienced a touch of Fernandomania. It wasn’t quite the excitement of his first season (1981) when he became the only pitcher to win both the Cy Young and the Rookie of the Year awards, but he had a no hitter in the summer of 1990 which showed he still deserved the nickname El Toro.
In the 1990s, he would move to a few other teams in the MLB (and play back in Mexico), but he will always be associated with the Dodgers, who in 2023, retired his number (34). Valenzuela inspired millions across Mexico and Central America, and some have claimed that he brought more new fans to the game of baseball than any other player in history.
As if in tribute to Valenzuela, the Dodgers beat the Yankees in Game 1 of the World Series this week with a walk-off grand slam, the first ever in World Series history.
We will miss you, Fernando!
ABBA’s Fernando… strangely a bit of a tribute to Valenzuela when you listen to the lyrics closely.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. The US is electing a wartime president
Frederick Kempe, Atlantic Council, October 19, 2024
Americans on November 5 will be electing a wartime president. This isn’t a prediction. It’s reality.
Neither candidate has yet spoken plainly enough to the American people about the perils represented by the growing geopolitical and defense industrial collaboration among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This axis of aggressors may be unprecedented in the potential peril it represents.
Neither candidate has outlined the sort of generational strategy that will be required by the United States to address this challenge. Irrespective of whether former President Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris is elected, this will be the unavoidable context of their presidency. One will become commander-in-chief at the most perilous geopolitical moment since the Cold War—and perhaps since World War II.
In that spirit, Washington Post columnist George F. Will this week compared the 2024 US elections to the 1940 US elections, when the United States hadn’t yet formally declared war on Imperial Japan, Hitler’s Germany, or Mussolini’s Italy.
What was different then was that one of the two candidates, incumbent President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, sensed he was about to become a wartime president and was acting like it. FDR, wrote Will, “was nudging a mostly isolationist nation toward involvement in a global conflict” with his 1937 “quarantine speech” on aggressor nations and through his subsequent military buildup.
FDR’s opponent was Republican businessman Wendell Willkie, who like FDR was more internationalist than isolationist, in the tradition of his party’s elites of that time. “In three weeks,” Will writes, “Americans will not have a comparably reassuring choice when they select the president who will determine the nation’s conduct during World War III, which has begun.”
COMMENT – Great piece by Fred Kempe, which also appeared in The Atlantic. This is the issue that concerns me the most as we head into this election: there seems to be zero realization by both candidates how serious in the international situation is.
2. China’s Central Bank is Becoming the Developing World’s “Payday Lender”
Benn Steil and Elisabeth Harding, Council on Foreign Relations, October 22, 2024
With the developing world’s growing use of costly and opaque “payday loans” from China’s central bank, the IMF and World Bank need to demand far greater transparency from Beijing.
In our recent op-ed for Barron’s, we argued that China’s central-bank currency swap lines have become a hidden lifeline for poor, heavily indebted nations. It is also a costly one, with rates well in excess of those charged on Fed swaps or IMF and World Bank loans.
Our CFR Central Bank Currency Swaps Tracker shows that the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has signed an estimated 40 swap-line agreements since 2009, giving its partner central banks access to some $600 billion worth of Chinese currency (RMB). Last year’s total amount outstanding hit a new high of almost $33 billion.
Though PBoC swap lines are marketed as a means to facilitate trade settlement in RMB, more than three-quarters of its partners have drawn on them to address individual solvency problems—those related to balance of payments and sovereign debt. Permanent Fed swap lines, in contrast, have been issued to only a handful of the world’s richest countries in order to meet short-term liquidity needs during times of global financial stress—such as during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and 2022 Covid-19 pandemic.
Fed and PBoC swap-line usage differs not only in purpose but also in effective maturity. As shown in the left-hand figure, the amount drawn on Fed swap lines peaks during global-liquidity squeezes, while the amount outstanding remains low due to rapid unwinding of the transactions. Many PBoC swap-line partners, in contrast, roll over their debt each year, prolonging loan maturities and keeping the amount outstanding high—and typically rising. This can be seen clearly in the right-hand figure. Most notably, heavily indebted Pakistan and Mongolia have been rolling over their RMB swaps continuously for over a decade.
PBoC swap lines complicate debt monitoring, as the agreements often have ambiguous usage restrictions that confound the determination of reserve adequacy. Further, the World Bank does not require countries to report swap-line loans with maturities of less than a year, producing inconsistencies in measures of foreign reserves and debt obligations. With the growing use of these costly and opaque “payday loans,” the IMF and World Bank—the developing world’s biggest creditors—need to demand far greater transparency from Beijing.
COMMENT – Years ago folks coined the term “debt trap” to describe Beijing’s lending practices across developing economies. I think the term “payday loans” is just as apt.
All of this is designed to build coercive power over the leaders of these countries and bind them to Beijing’s policy preferences. It has the added benefit (from Beijing’s perspective) of making these countries unattractive places to do business for firms and investors that require transparency. It is as if, the Chinese Communist Party desires corrupt and opaque conditions in these countries as a method to bind them even tighter to the PRC’s “loving” embrace.
Mix in a hefty dose of surveillance technology, internet control, and “police training” and one might conclude that the PRC is pursuing a concentrated policy of “authoritarianism promotion” to counteract decades of “democracy promotion.”
3. Volkswagen Official Deported from China for Cannabis Use
Greg Kable, WardsAuto, October 22, 2024
Volkswagen’s chief marketing officer and head of product strategy for China, Jochen Sengpiehl, has been deported from the country after testing positive for cannabis.
The test, mandated by the Chinese government as part of a customs procedure, was conducted after Sengpiehl’s return from a recent holiday in Koh Samui, Thailand.
The incident unfolded two weeks ago when Sengpiehl landed back in Beijing, where Volkswagen Group China is headquartered, following his vacation. He was subjected to a routine drug test, which revealed traces of cannabis in his system, a substance strictly forbidden under Chinese law, even if consumed abroad.
Following the test results, Chinese authorities detained Sengpiehl for questioning, reportedly holding him for over 10 days.
Sengpiehl’s situation quickly escalated. German media reports suggest the Volkswagen Group China and the German embassy worked to secure his release. However, he is claimed to have been deported from the country at the behest of Chinese President Xi Jinping with a strict order never to return.
COMMENT – I’m sure this just a coincidence after the decision by the EU to impose tariffs on Chinese EVs.
Nothing to see here.
4. The Effectiveness of U.S. Economic Policies Regarding China Pursued from 2017 to 2024
Keith Crane, Timothy R. Heath, Alexandra Stark, and Cindy Zheng, RAND, October 22, 2024
Although U.S.-China trade tensions have waxed and waned for decades, they have remained persistently high since 2017. In this report, the authors assess the effectiveness of more-restrictive U.S. economic policies adopted toward China and pursued between 2017 and 2024. These policies include those aimed at addressing the U.S. dependence on imports from China, preventing U.S. technologies from being transferred to China, and supporting investment and production in domestic industries that are deemed critical for U.S. national security and technological leadership.
The authors identify two main goals of these recent policies: promoting fairer trade and defending U.S. economic interests. In their policy review, they find that U.S. economic policies achieved limited progress in promoting fairer trade but a higher degree of success in defending U.S. economic-related interests. Finally, the authors present several policy recommendations to better achieve these two goals related to trade, industry, controls on technology, economic diplomacy, foreign investment, and diversification of supply chains away from China.
Key Findings
Recent U.S. economic policy aimed at promoting fairer trade with China has achieved limited success
Policies intended to reduce imports from and the bilateral trade deficit with China have been successful.
Policies aimed at increasing U.S. exports to China, diversifying supply chains away from China, and shaping international trade rules and norms have had mixed success.
Policies designed to persuade China to treat U.S. companies the same as Chinese companies and to stop its unfair trade practices have failed.
Recent U.S. economic policy aimed at defending U.S. interests and the interests of U.S. allies and partners has been more successful
Policies designed to control the transfer of key technologies (such as advanced semiconductors) have been successful.
Policies aimed at reducing excessive dependence on Chinese suppliers have had mixed success.
COMMENT – I don’t agree with all of the authors’ recommendations, but I’m very, very pleased to see this kind of analysis.
We need more of this AND we need a series of academic conferences for analysts to present their methodologies and findings on this topic… it is the only way we will get better at designing policies in the field economic statecraft to achieve our desired results.
Keep up the great work RAND!!!
5. In a Malaysian Pop-Up City, Echoes of China’s Housing Crash
Alexandra Stevenson, New York Times, October 22, 2024
Forest City was an audacious $100 billion project by a top Chinese developer. Today, the project is a fraction of what had been planned and the developer is broke.
It was an audacious real estate project undertaken a decade ago by a Chinese developer: a $100 billion city in Malaysia built on sand and shrubby mangroves and sold as a luxury “dream paradise” for China’s middle class.
Many of Forest City’s residents today are transient — the caretakers of the grounds who sweep the empty roads and pick up the garbage, trim the hedges and water the plants.
“I see so many new faces,” said Thana Selvi, who works at KK Supermart, a brightly lit convenience store that stands out among the mostly boarded-up, empty spaces on the street level. She rents a room in an apartment above the shop, month to month, for $118.
At a distance, Forest City’s rows of high-rises tower over the Johor Strait between Singapore and Malaysia like a monument to China’s economic triumphs. Up close, the streets are quiet, most apartments are dark and large stone slabs demarcate the lush forest from the “land to be developed.”
The giant Chinese property developer Country Garden dreamed up Forest City as a “green futuristic city” spanning 12 square miles and four man-made islands. There were supposed to be 700,000 apartments. Only one island, with 26,000 apartments in several dozen towers, was built.
Since Country Garden defaulted on its debt last year, it has become an emblem of the excesses of China’s housing boom, a corporate deadbeat unable to pay its bills or build the apartments it promised. Hundreds of thousands of home buyers and projects like Forest City are in limbo. Creditors that are suing Country Garden in Hong Kong could eventually seize Forest City.
COMMENT – Last week, the New York Times had two great pieces of investigative journalism (the abusive Panda “rental” program and the PRC’s encroachment on Nepal), this week they have this piece on the kind of property development failures that the PRC is pushing on its neighbors.
The Times comes under fire a lot, but they are on a roll when it comes to uncovering malign behavior by the Chinese Communist Party… keep up the great work!
6. How German Drone Engines Landed in Russian Hands via China
Noah Berman, The Wire China, October 22, 2024
Fujian Delong Aviation Technology acquired a family-owned German enginemaker. Now its subsidiary is selling drone engines to Russia.
Concern about China’s role in supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine deepened last week as the U.S. government for the first time sanctioned two Chinese companies for “directly developing and producing complete weapons systems in partnership with Russian firms.”
The restrictions came on the heels of a Reuters report that said Russia was relying on Chinese-made drones, as well as data showing that Russia’s use of drones in Ukraine spiked in September.
But what was not clear from the sanctions is that one of the companies involved has close links to Germany, a U.S. ally and fervent backer of Ukraine, raising further questions about how China may be using technology developed by Ukraine’s supporters to fuel the Russian war machine.
According to the U.S. Treasury, both Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine Co., Ltd and Redlepus Vector Industry Shenzhen Co Ltd have helped facilitate the supply of parts for the Garpiya, a long-range attack drone that the U.S. says Russia has used to destroy Ukrainian civilian and military infrastructure.
Xiamen Limbach, which makes engines for the Garpiya drone, is a 94-percent-owned subsidiary of Fujian Delong Aviation Technology Company Limited, data from Wirescreen shows. In December 2011, a man named Shuide Chen, who was described in German-language news reports at the time as German-Chinese, fully acquired Limbach Flugmotoren GmbH, a German company which makes piston engines for drones and other aircraft. Five years later, he transferred the company’s ownership to Delong Aviation, according to documents filed with the North Rhine-Westphalia district court.
COMMENT – Every time we turn around and find a new way that Moscow is receiving sanctioned technology to kill more Ukrainians, it seems there is always a China nexus… it is as if the PRC were actively and materially aiding Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine.
Seems to me we should stop wagging our finger at Beijing and impose severe secondary sanctions on broad swaths of the Chinese economy… unless of course, we aren’t serious about driving up the costs on Moscow (and Beijing), then sure let’s just issue another stern diplomatic warning.
7. Bots Linked to China Target Republican House and Senate Candidates, Microsoft Says
Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, October 23, 2024
Chinese influence operations have focused less on this year’s presidential race and more on down-ballot races.
Dozens of inauthentic accounts on X linked to China have been assailing Republican members of Congress running for re-election in Alabama, Tennessee and Texas, accusing them of corruption and promoting their opponents, according to a report released on Wednesday by Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center.
Those targeted include Representatives Barry Moore in Alabama and Michael McCaul in Texas and Senator Marsha Blackburn of Tennessee. All have been critics of China and its policies, though the posts also criticized Mr. Moore for supporting Israel, frequently using antisemitic language, the report said.
The accounts are part of a coordinated influence operation known as Spamouflage.
While Chinese influence operations have sought to denigrate the American political process broadly, they have focused less on this year’s presidential race and more on down-ballot races, presumably in hopes of blunting anti-Chinese sentiment in the House and Senate. The accounts also attacked Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, who is not up for re-election this year, the report said.
Mr. McCaul, the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, called the Communist Party of China “the greatest generational challenge we face today,” in a 2020 report. China barred him from visiting the country after a visit to Taiwan last year.
One bot said he was “abusing power for personal gain,” accusing him without detailing evidence of insider trading.
A new ad for Ms. Blackburn’s re-election campaign shows her smashing plates decorated with China’s name and flag. “We’re going to have to break a lot more China to save America,” she says in it.
One account on X flagged by Microsoft suggested she accepted $700,000 in campaign donations from opioid manufacturers, referring to a six-year-old accusation from a liberal political action committee, American Bridge 21st Century. Since early October, the bots have been promoting her opponent, Representative Gloria Johnson, according to Microsoft’s report.
None of the posts went viral, even though the accounts often shared one another’s content. “While not always resulting in high levels of engagement, these efforts demonstrate China’s sustained attempts influence U.S. politics across the board,” Clint Watts, who heads the Threat Analysis Center, wrote in a post accompanying the report.
COMMENT – If Republicans lose the House, or fail to take the Senate, don’t be surprised to see individuals aligned with the GOP claim that CCP interference swayed the election in the same ways that Democrats claimed that Putin’s interference swayed the election in 2016.
This will further a meta-narrative that is already taking shape: Russians are aligned with and aid Republicans, while the Chinese are aligned with and aid Democrats.
This will drive an even deeper wedge between the two parties on foreign policy and national security even as Beijing and Moscow become closer allies.
8. Sinologist Li Cheng: ‘America is not in the mood to study China’
Edward White, Financial Times, October 25, 2024
The political expert on the breakdown of US-Sino relations, what Xi Jinping’s fourth term might hold — and why neither Harris nor Trump makes him hopeful of change.
Early in our lunch I ask the sinologist Li Cheng what comes to his mind when he closes his eyes and returns to the Cultural Revolution. The answer snaps back at me: “Violence.”
Li was born in 1956, the youngest of seven children in a wealthy Shanghai family — a deadly place to be during Mao’s murderous social cleansing campaign.
So it was for his eldest brother — on whom the younger children had climbed about like monkeys. The brother, the family was initially told, took his own life, a smashed wristwatch given as proof that he had thrown himself under a train. Later, they discovered he had been beaten to death by Red Guards, his body discarded on the tracks.
Today Li is among the pre-eminent scholars of elite Chinese politics and a long-serving bridge between Washington and Beijing. He spent much of the past four decades in the US, including 17 years at the Brookings Institution, a leading think-tank, steering western officials and China-watchers through the murky labyrinth of the Chinese Communist party.
We are meeting at the China Club, on the 13th floor of the Old Bank of China building in downtown Hong Kong. Though the restaurant’s more discreet side room is empty of other guests, it still feels crowded thanks to the cornucopia of decorative antiques, stylings of colonial Shanghai and Hong Kong synonymous with the club’s late founder (and FT columnist) David Wing-cheung Tang.
From our small window-side table we look across Victoria Harbour towards Kowloon, and beyond that the Chinese mainland. As we sip white peony tea out of small porcelain cups, Li leans forward and explains how he has ended up here, in something of self-imposed exile from Washington.
Sickly in his youth, Li was spared hard labour in the countryside. After schooling, he worked as a physician, poorly trained and ill-equipped, before learning English in his early twenties. In 1985 he got his ticket out of China, helped by a sister who had moved to America.
Li’s early academic life in America — Berkeley, then Princeton — coincided with halcyon days of China studies in the US and Deng Xiaoping’s opening of the Communist-led country to the world. “I almost cry when I think about my wonderful treatment . . . now it is completely different,” he says.
He made his mark with a series of stunningly accurate predictions of the composition of the Chinese Communist party politburo and its standing committee — the country’s top leadership groups. He fell into the close orbit of Henry Kissinger, the US statesman who opened ties with China. He advised presidential campaigns. He taught, and wrote books.
But a few years ago, Li began telling friends in Washington of his intention to leave. Despite America’s glaring — and increasing — need for knowledge of China as the country rises to become one of the world’s true superpowers, the role Li had carved out for himself in the US, as a bridge to promote understanding, had become “very limited”.
Looking back, he says attitudes towards China had been darkening for years — “much earlier” than most people realise.
Around 2015, towards the end of Barack Obama’s second term and in the early years of the rule of Xi Jinping, Li’s mentor and boss at Brookings, the late Jeffrey Bader, came to him with a warning: “He said, we are no longer the mainstream centre of China studies, we will be marginalised. The reason is so many people started to fear China, and they will shift the policy, largely driven not by rational [thinking] but by ungrounded fear.”
Today, Li says bluntly, “America is not in the mood to study China.” But there is a deeper pessimism over changes he has witnessed. “Economics has become mathematics. Political science has become statistics. There’s no appreciation for history, or culture. That mindset, do you think that serves US interests?”
In his late sixties, Li is both trim and animated, with an unflinching gaze. Adding to an aura of youthful energy is a cheerful disposition, a short crop of improbably jet-black hair and the enigmatic, ageless complexion of a man who keeps in good health.
We briefly discuss the menu, settling on the duck and dim sum the restaurant is known for. And we agree with our gruff though good-natured waiter that a whole bird is unnecessary, half will be more than enough.
I want to know if Li was personally attacked in Washington.
At first he dances around the question. He talks of how in the “revolving door” between government and business in the US there is a long tradition of former officials, and their families, “directly or indirectly” doing business with China. And yet, he says, it is the Chinese-Americans, including Elaine Chao, the former transportation secretary, who are most often “singled out” for criticism.
Ultimately, he says, there were personal attacks. “When I say ‘we’, people increasingly ask me, ‘What do you mean by we?’ . . . It is a direct challenge, because of your race, your name.”
Li goes on. “I explained my theories of Chinese leadership. I was branded as a spokesperson for China,” he says. “It is sad. The old days of China, the time I grew up, the pendulum swings back.”
Is he saying that the persecution that took place in Maoist China has parallels with the racial attacks he has seen in America? He clarifies: “It is not the same. It is different. But some components are similar, some methods, some intentions . . . McCarthyism, it is not uniquely American.”
Six dumplings have arrived and a glorious fragrance rises from the table. We pause to eat. The first two offerings, one vegetable and one har gau of shrimp and bamboo shoot, are unremarkable. But for me the test of any good dim sum is the xiaolongbao, the king of soup dumplings. This one is superb, well balanced and moreish, with its delicate skin housing a hot, aromatic soup and pork mince. I regret not ordering more.
Since the days of Mao, westerners have tried, usually without success, to understand the inner workings of the Chinese Communist party, the thoughts of its leader and, around him, whose influence is rising, whose is falling.
Li’s innovation has been a razor-sharp focus on the upbringing, personal networks and lines of loyalty among those at the very top. This approach led to the grouping of leaders, including the taizidang, or “princelings”, who were children of the party’s elders and revolutionary leaders; the tuanpai, or Communist Youth League faction; and the Shanghai bang, or clique, of leaders who owed their advancement to Jiang Zemin, with whom they had worked in China’s business capital in the 1980s.
Impenetrable to most foreigners, China’s system is, for Li, “not so opaque”. To make his predictions, he says, he coupled his theories of factional politics with his “obsession” with the institutional rules and precedents of the party, including the age requirements for retirement and term limits. “You will very quickly find out who the rising stars are.”
Such study is extremely dangerous in China, so the US was for years a refuge for Li. He became an American citizen in 2003. I’m wondering how Li’s public voice might be compromised now that he is working in Hong Kong. Critics say the city’s academic independence, along with other democratic freedoms, has been eroded.
The “irony”, Li says, is that just a year after opening a new China-focused institute at the University of Hong Kong, he is already “much busier” and feels less pressure to self-censor than in DC.
We are interrupted briefly as our waiter appears at my shoulder to present “the duck” like a bottle of wine. It is then returned to the kitchen to be sliced for our pancakes. I change tack from Hong Kong, and start asking about Xi Jinping.
Li says he first became aware of Xi in the early 1990s. He had returned to China to research the rise of technocrats in the Chinese leadership, focusing on Beijing’s elite Tsinghua university, where Xi had studied in the late 1970s. He has since met Xi on several occasions and still has access to Beijing insiders.
I ask whether Li underestimated Xi, his ruthless manoeuvring to crush rivals and ascend to the top of the party. He nods in agreement. But he notes that by 2012 — when Xi became general secretary of the party and head of the military — there were no illusions: “You can say [manoeuvring]. I say it is a political operation, so effective, so strategic.”
Our Beijing kaoya has arrived and as Li speaks we go about our work with chopsticks. I am haphazard with my pancakes. Li is meticulous. He adds a spoonful of the plum-brown fermented sauce before building a neat stack of duck slices, strips of cucumber and spring onion. Either way, they are delicious: the duck breast is tender, not fatty, the skin is crispy, not chewy. There is a reason the dish has survived since the 13th century.
We delve deeper into the psychology of Xi. The 71-year-old, who is now considered China’s most powerful leader since Mao, shattered the post-Deng precedent of two five-year terms for the party’s leader, bulldozed the once-dominant factions and stacked key positions with his loyalists.
Xi, according to many foreign critics, is personally responsible for China’s regression into authoritarianism, crackdowns on freedoms of speech and association, mass electronic surveillance and repression of minorities, as well as military assertiveness over Taiwan and the South China Sea and a destabilising friendship with Russia’s Vladimir Putin, among other faults.
Li says Xi is driven by three key beliefs which may not be well understood in the west. Xi’s greatest fear, Li says, is repeating the mistakes of Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union; he worries, above all, of a “slow marginalisation” of the party. He has a deeply rooted view that the “terrible” political and social divisions in countries such as the US and France are due to economic disparity. And he believes that the east — China — is on the rise and the west — the US — is in decline.
Li insists he is clear-eyed about Xi’s unpopularity among some key sections in Chinese society: liberal intellectuals, wealthy entrepreneurs and some middle- and low-level officials.
But Li attempts to place Xi in the context of his times. “It is easy to blame everything on him,” he says. He points out that Xi took over after about two decades of so-called collective leadership. The factions, warring behind the scenes, provided a force of checks and balances. Yet corruption was rife, and the party was crippled by infighting, culminating with the operatic downfall of Bo Xilai, the former party chief of Chongqing.
“That system, Edward, was not perfect,” he says. “The narrative [in China] is: Mao made China stand up, Deng made China rich, Xi made China strong . . . That narrative is not necessarily wrong.”
The “reality”, which those at the top of the political establishment in China understand, is far removed from western perceptions, Li says. “I think he saved the Chinese Communist party.”
We are down to the final few slices of duck. The restaurant is busier with business lunches. Fearful of losing even a syllable, I slide my voice recorder closer to Li’s side of the table.
Xi Jinping cannot live for ever. The question is whether he, like Deng and Mao, will rule China until death. Li predicts Xi will have another five-year term in power — potentially extending his leadership to 2032, at which point he would be 79. But he says that Xi’s preparations for succession are already under way.
Xi’s plan, Li believes, should become clearer as he starts his fourth term, in 2027. “Things will change. There is a reason that he justified his continuation [into a third term], you may not agree, but the establishment accepted. But it does not give [him] an open cheque for ‘president for ever’. The people surrounding Xi are loyalists, but the degree of loyalty is different,” he adds.
Our plates are cleared. I order a coffee, Li sticks to tea. It is high time to make the counter-argument. I run through a long list of grievances against Xi.
On the one hand, Li stresses he is personally “a liberal” and a friend of the Dalai Lama. Some of the crackdowns, he says, have been “really excessive, a mistake”. But on the other, he points to the odious use of the security apparatus by earlier Chinese leaders. And when I ask about repression and mass detentions of Uyghurs and other Muslim groups in Xinjiang, he questions the US government’s official description of the events as genocide.
“Human rights — how can you persuade Chinese people when they see what is happening around the world? . . . Unfortunately, we do not live in a liberal era.”
Li leaves several thoughts unfinished. I sense that we have arrived at his own personal predicament. As debate over China becomes increasingly bereft of nuance, Li is nervous that any criticism he directs at either side will be taken out of context and used as “ammunition” by hawks in Washington.
“For me, the worst thing is to ask me to take a position. Of course there are principles, there is justice. But sometimes things should not be ideological, should not be binary thinking.”
“Empathy”, he says, “is so crucial at this point.”
Worsening US-China relations appear to be only exacerbating military tensions. The flashpoints of Taiwan — which China claims as its own and has not ruled out using force to control — and the disputed South China Sea are both worrying Li.
He is unsparing in his criticism of those in Washington — a group that includes Republican senators — who seem to advocate the pursuit of regime change in Beijing. And he believes the US election offers little optimism for improving relations between the two sides.
Kamala Harris has scant China experience and appears set to follow Joe Biden’s approach of coalition building, isolating Beijing. Donald Trump is more domestic-orientated but unpredictable. “So really both are bad . . . I don’t think China has a preference.
“We’re entering a period that is very, very dangerous . . . The stakes are so high. There would be no winners.”
Two fortune cookies sit unopened between us.
The conversation returns to Li’s childhood home in the heart of Shanghai’s leafy former French concession. I comment that he has had a remarkable life so far, working in one of the most interesting fields I can think of. And yet, I venture, there is something tragic about seeing him here in Hong Kong. He nods again and tells a quick story.
About 10 years ago, he found himself at the hospital where he worked before emigrating to the US. He saw a security guard who had been there at the time. As they recognised each other, and exchanged pleasantries, Li thought to himself: “I wonder which one, he or I, had a more enjoyable life? Who could judge?”
COMMENT – With all due respect to Li Cheng, I think he is wrong.
Americans are deeply curious about China and have spent years consuming media, books, and reporting on the PRC… probably more than any other country.
Nearly every major U.S. news outlet has a large China bureau and spends enormous resources pursuing journalism involving the PRC (see my comments above about the New York Times). Technology reporting has a huge China component. Economic and financial reporting has a huge China component. Foreign policy and national security reporting has a huge China component. Cultural and social reporting has a huge China component.
Media outlets respond to what their readers want… and based upon that demand signal, they publish countless reports on China as this newsletter has demonstrated week-in, week-out for nearly six years.
[NOTE: I routinely find 120+ unique news articles and think tank reports on China in English each WEEK… and I end up culling that down to about 70-80… that trend has been in place for at least five years.]
When I walk down to my neighborhood bookstore (the famous Politics and Prose on Connecticut Avenue), books on China feature prominently in their new releases section… just last week I tried to buy Ambassador Kevin Rudd’s latest book, On Xi Jinping, and it was sold out, the only book out of 30 or so in the new releases section that had an empty slot and a note saying they would have a new copy in shortly.
Try perusing the list of Podcasts or Substacks or YouTube channels… China figures prominently either with standalone offerings on the PRC (like this Substack or Bill Bishop’s Sinocism that has over a quarter million subscribers, making it the #2 rated Substack) or as a routine topic of nearly every economic, foreign policy, technology, or national security show out there. Far more than anything on India or Indonesia (the first and fourth most populous countries on the planet), and most certainly more than any individual European country or Korea or Japan.
If Americans were “not in the mood to study China,” as Li asserts, then none of that would be true.
Americans have studied China a LOT.
I suspect that the issue is that Americans are not at all happy with what they have learned about China from all this “study.”
Americans see that there is a vast gulf between Chinese Communist Party rhetoric about peace, harmony, and “win-win” outcomes, and the reality of their behavior (Americans, like other humans, despise hypocrites and Chinese Communist Party leaders are masters of hypocrisy).
I’m sure he is a fine fellow and I’m empathic that he has felt persecuted in Washington, but Li seems unable to grasp this distinction (or at least Edward White’s reporting of their conversation fails to mention it).
Li’s perspective reflects a common Chinese Communist Party talking point I’ve heard used to explain away the negative opinions Americans routinely report holding about China: “Americans have a poor opinion of the People’s Republic of China because they are ignorant of the PRC.”
Various CCP leaders have claimed that strengthening people-to-people ties (with the kinds of “bridges” that Li once sought to build) will fix this because Americans will rid themselves of their ignorance.
I think that is objectively false.
Americans have a poor opinion of the PRC because they know a LOT about the country, and they don’t like what they see. The inversion of Favorable versus Unfavorable views of China happened in 2012… the year Xi Jinping came to power… and as knowledge of the PRC’s activities expanded in the United States, those unfavorable views expanded as well.
I suspect that Li is frustrated that Americans understand China too well for his liking and are unwilling to accept unquestioningly his meritocratic sketches of Chinese elite politics and rose-colored glasses he uses to present Xi Jinping. No one is censoring him (as he seems to allege)… it is just that his perspectives no longer have the hold that they once did.
Americans have a deep curiosity about China and an affinity for its people (as John Pomfret displayed in his 2016 book, The Beautiful Country and the Middle Kingdom: America and China, 1776 to the Present). The behavior of the Chinese Communist Party has soured what could be a close relationship.
The problem isn’t ignorant Americans… the problem is a spiteful and selfish Chinese Communist Party.
Authoritarianism
9. Xi Jinping tightens stranglehold on China’s academia
Joe Leahy, Sun Yu, and Kana Inagaki, Financial Times, October 22, 2024
10. Putin Welcomes Xi and Other World Leaders to Russia for BRICS Summit
Valerie Hopkins and David Pierson, New York Times, October 22, 2024
11. The Quarter-Trillion-Dollar Rush to Get Money Out of China
Jason Douglas and Rebecca Feng, Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2024
12. China makes love and war with Taiwan
The Economist, October 17, 2024
13. China cracks down on ‘uncivilised’ online puns used to discuss sensitive topics
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, October 23, 2024
14. Hong Kong’s courts are independent, gov’t says after ex-top court judge says judiciary ‘too partial’ to authorities
Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, October 22, 2024
15. In China, fib online and find out
The Economist, October 17, 2024
16. Responding to Government Censors’ Crackdown on Online Slang and Memes, Chinese Internet Users Protest, “We Want to Speak Properly, but You Won’t Let Us!”
Cindy Carter, China Digital Times, October 21, 2024
17. Exiled Chinese in Japan encounter the long arm of Beijing
Julian Ryall, DW, October 15, 2024
18. Overcrowding reported at China detention centers amid economic downturn
Lin Nai-Chuan, VOA, October 21, 2024
19. For State Media, Copycats are No Joke
Alex Colville, China Media Project, October 21, 2024
20. Hong Kong restricts civil servants from using WhatsApp, WeChat and Google Drive at work
Lo Hoi-ying and Edith Lin, South China Morning Post, October 22, 2024
21. Shanghai police plan crackdown on Halloween cosplayers this year
Qian Lang, RFA, October 21, 2024
Environmental Harms
22. China’s cleantech investment in the US: Leg-up or security threat?
Henry Storey, Lowy Institute, October 24, 2024
23. Who Thinks China’s Not an Economic Powerhouse? China
Dan Murtaugh, Bloomberg, October 21, 2024
One of the hottest topics at the upcoming global climate conference is whether China should still be considered “developing.”
Foreign Interference and Coercion
24. How Beijing Recruited New York Chinatowns for Influence Campaign
James T. Areddy, New York Times, October 21, 2024
A congresswoman’s links to a Communist Party initiative ran through a local ‘hometown association’.
In early April 2019, Rep. Grace Meng was launching into a busy legislative week on Capitol Hill. The same day in the central Chinese province of Henan, two Meng associates were delivering a letter of appreciation from her to the chief of an international influence operation managed by the Chinese Communist Party.
A common denominator in both the China trip and in Meng’s political rise is a New York association of Chinese-Americans like her.
The two travelers to China were leaders of the Henan Association of Eastern America, which has been a fixture of Meng’s life for decades, including the over 15 years the Democrat has represented one of New York’s Chinatowns. The association is central to bombshell federal allegations that Beijing had a mole in the New York governor’s office, and the congresswoman is now distancing herself from a group that for years described her as its vice chair.
Called “hometown” associations because their members often hail from the same place in China, groups like the Henan association are best known across the U.S. for promoting Lunar New Year parades and dragon dances. Over the past decade, Beijing has turned some of them into partners to help influence U.S. political discourse.
The same month Meng was elected to Congress in 2012, Xi Jinping took power in Beijing and breathed new life into a Communist Party instrument known as the United Front Work Department. Xi has called it “an important magic weapon for uniting all Chinese people at home and abroad to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
The strategy positioned organizations like the one Meng’s associates visited in Henan province to engage the Chinese-American community, including hometown group leaders.
Outwardly, the United Front’s mandate is to promote Chinese propaganda and culture internationally.
But under Xi, United Front has cultivated hometown associations to help surveil and harass Chinese activists in the U.S. “The Chinese Communist Party is carrying out a global campaign to silence its critics,” according to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, which advises Congress and has documented how Beijing’s “transnational repression tool kit” also includes suppressing campus free speech and controlling communication across the ubiquitous messaging app WeChat.
Hometown associations, fraternal clans and other kinship organizations have connected ethnic Chinese in the U.S. since the 1850s, initially to combat discrimination like an American law that for 61 years blocked most Chinese immigration into the country, according to research by Renqiu Yu, a historian at State University of New York’s Purchase College.
Today, Chinese hometown organizations across the U.S. are almost as ubiquitous as Chinese takeout restaurants; the Journal examined records of more than 100 Chinese associations in New York City alone, including some that oppose Beijing and many others that appear apolitical. Known as tong xiang hui in Chinese, many simply offer rooms for elderly folks to chat in their native dialects while shuffling mahjong tiles.
Beijing’s fingerprints on some organizations have attracted attention from the Justice Department. In the New York area alone, at least 10 indictments have implicated organization leaders in the past two years. In one case, two Fujian association principals were charged with acting as Beijing agents in setting up a covert Chinese police station on the premises of their Manhattan Chinatown association.
When Xi visited San Francisco last November, Chinese associations from around the U.S. descended on the city. A senior representative of groups affiliated with Fujian province ripped down an anti-Xi banner and the head of a Henan province association from Seattle punched a dissident wearing a sticker that said “Free China,” according to rights groups. In all, the Hong Kong Democracy Council and Students for a Free Tibet documented 34 instances of harassment, intimidation and assault during the visit, including the use of Chinese flags as weapons.
In New York, the former head of a business association for people from Shandong province recently pleaded guilty to federal charges of acting as a foreign agent after being charged with pressuring a U.S. resident to surrender to Shandong prosecutors. The Justice Department alleged the tactics, part of a Chinese government campaign to repatriate Chinese expats sought in investigations, included threatening the target’s family with “endless misery” if he resisted.
Separately, one-time congressional candidate Yan Xiong told The Wall Street Journal that hometown groups torpedoed his election hopes over his 1989 participation in the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy movement. Repeatedly, as he sought to speak to gatherings hosted by hometown associations, Xiong says he was refused a platform.
“The consulate gives its powers to them, and their leaders influence the people,” Xiong says.
After he launched his campaign for a New York City seat, he said Federal Bureau of Investigation agents approached him to warn that he might be at risk of physical attacks. In early 2022, the Justice Department indicted an alleged state-security officer in China for orchestrating a “scheme to undermine the candidacy.”
A more recent case cut close to Meng and implicated the Henan group. The federal indictment unsealed in September charged Linda Sun, a former aide to New York Gov. Kathy Hochul and her predecessor, Andrew Cuomo, with acting as China’s agent. It said Sun coordinated official business with Chinese authorities, using the Henan association leadership as her intermediary.
Sun has denied the charges against her, and her attorney said the allegations remain unproven.
Family ties
Meng, 49 years old, and Sun, 40, have a long history. They were mentored by the same Chinatown immigration-rights leader and Sun worked for Meng before Cuomo tapped her as an Asian community liaison. Both women have been prominent attendees of Henan association banquets.
Sun’s indictment didn’t name Meng or suggest wrongdoing on her part. But it alleged that the two Henan association leaders who carried Meng’s letter to China were at the same time working with Sun and Henan party officials to get then-Lt. Gov. Hochul to visit the province. Such a visit would carry important propaganda value in China, the indictment says.
Because they have get-out-the-vote power in their communities, New York groups like the 10,000-member Henan association have long attracted interest from American politicians. The same elected officials who join Irish and Caribbean parades attend Chinese galas, but with a difference: Some of the most prominent groups, like the Henan association, promote a worldview crafted by America’s chief rival.
“What we’re seeing a lot, but especially in New York City, is there are lots of Chinese associations that have been infiltrated by the Chinese government,” said a U.S. law-enforcement official.
Speaking at Henan association events, Meng has praised its local charity and immigration services. The association also honors Chinese diplomats and plays China’s national anthem at banquets, plus has pushed Beijing’s agenda onto American streets, such as by organizing a demonstration against visiting Taiwanese officials.
For more than a decade, the Henan association displayed side-by-side photos of Meng and the group’s president on its internet home page and described her as a top officer. Meng’s grandmother was a co-founder of the group in the 1970s, and both her parents have had prominent roles at the association.
In an interview, Meng said that while she has known association leaders since childhood, owing to family ties and Henan heritage on her mother’s side, her professional relationship to the group is politician-to-constituent.
Meng denied she has held a title with the association and said any assertion to the contrary may have reflected overzealousness by its officers. “Sometimes these groups get overexcited and may use names of elected officials or VIPs to make them look more credible or important,” she said.
Yet, in a 2008 video the association produced, Meng described herself as its vice chairman. “I have no recollection of making this video 16 years ago before I was in elected office,” she said in a subsequent statement. “My understanding is that this was an honorary title. I didn’t perform any duties as an officer such as serving on a board or making decisions. Any assertion that my attending community organization events is somehow nefarious is absurd, false and xenophobic,” she said.
“Like every American patriot, I am deeply, deeply concerned about the national security threat that the Chinese Communist Party’s government poses to the United States, and I believe we need to protect our nation from it,” Meng said. She expressed disappointment at Sun’s activities as described in the indictment against her and said any wrongdoing by the Henan group’s leaders should be called out.
The congresswoman also cautioned against painting members of hometown associations with a broad brush. “Just like there are groups in other communities, [Chinese immigrants] tend to find people that maybe are from their hometowns, share similar foods and customs and traditions,” she said.
Flushing base
Allegations in the recent federal indictment of New York City Mayor Eric Adams—a frequent honoree at Chinese association galas—illuminated how, in addition to turning out voters, groups like hometown associations can wield financial power in American elections. He is accused of taking illegal foreign campaign contributions that were bundled through large ethnic gatherings. While the Adams charges are grounded in the Turkish community, the law-enforcement official said Chinese groups are suspected of hatching similar schemes.
The official said the Chinese money flows are a focus of investigative efforts, calling the alleged activity “overwhelming in scope.”
Several directors of the Henan association in New York declined to respond to questions, including the two men on the 2019 China trip: Zhang Fuyin, or Frank Zhang, the association’s former president who is described as an unindicted co-conspirator in the charges against Sun, and an association leader and the longtime aide to the congresswoman, Li Xiqing, or Sydney Li, who also wasn’t charged.
China’s embassy in Washington said Beijing abides by a principle of noninterference in the affairs of other nations. It said United Front “aims to promote cooperation with people outside the party” but some people use Beijing’s efforts to unite “the vast number of overseas Chinese and overseas students” as an excuse to smear China’s political system and normal exchanges.
Lumber trade
In Congress, Meng represents a New York City district anchored by Flushing, a major Chinatown in Queens. Meng got her political start in the New York State Assembly four years after her father became the first Asian to serve in the legislature; like successive leaders of the Henan association, he was in the lumber trade.
Meng has won six congressional races by large margins, and each time the Henan association rallied community support, much like a political machine. A local saying: “Flushing’s last name is Meng.”
The congressional legislation Meng has sponsored mentioning China has mostly tackled issues like strengthening immigrant rights, combating Asian-hate incidents and celebrating Lunar New Year.
The congresswoman said her record is similar to that of colleagues in the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus and offered a list of 44 bills and resolutions countering China that she has supported.
Unlike espionage operations to steal American secrets and undermine the nation’s security, the United Front promotes favorable views of China. Its constellation of quasi-diplomatic organizations typically have “overseas,” “friendship,” “patriotic” or “unification” in their names, like the group Meng issued her congratulatory letter to in 2019, the Henan Provincial Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese. In the Sun indictment, the Justice Department refers to New York’s Henan group as “closely associated” with United Front.
Meng said it is beyond the capabilities of a congressional office to know the intentions of every interlocutor. The congresswoman said she is now being more careful to scrutinize and limit her proclamations.
Photo op
Henan, a central province celebrated for its ancient history, Shaolin kung fu and iPhone assembly lines, is mentioned on about a third of the 64 pages in the Sun indictment. A lengthy passage refers to the 2019 trip to the province by the association leaders who delivered Meng’s letter, alleging it included an effort to compel Hochul to visit.
The association president, Zhang, told Sun that if Hochul didn’t go, he and Meng’s aide Li “would be embarrassed to return to Henan province,” the indictment says. Sun assured him, they were all a “team.”
Ultimately, Hochul didn’t visit China, though in 2021 Sun took the then-new governor to meet the Henan association leadership at a Flushing reception. For a commemorative photo, Sun sat between Hochul and Zhang.
The Journal has reported how an earlier photo of Sun and Zhang had already caught the attention of the FBI: In 2019, the two posed in Beijing’s Great Hall of the People to celebrate the Chinese Communist Party’s 70th year in power.
Over the years, Meng, like Sun, has joined numerous Henan association events along with Zhang. The congresswoman said her interactions are benign: “I go there to wish them happy Lunar New Year or whatever the occasion is.”
COMMENT – I wonder what Representative Grace Meng (D-NY) had to say about this article that was posted online on October 21, 2024 and appeared in the print edition of the Wall Street Journal on October 23, 2024:
Interesting, I guess her team missed this article.
Surely, she must have posted about it on social media, perhaps explaining her long and close association with elements of the Chinese Communist Party… or perhaps explaining to voters her association with Linda Sun, the former New York State Official indicted by the Justice Department in September…
Nope, nothing there either.
25. Israel Scrutinizes China’s Position Amid Regional War
Arthur Kaufman, China Digital Times, October 21, 2024
26. Russia and China ramp up covert meddling in Georgian democracy
Hiroyuki Akita, Nikkei Asia, October 13, 2024
Despite massive casualties among his military, Russian President Vladimir Putin continues his invasion of Ukraine, yet the threat posed by Russia to neighboring countries extends beyond its firepower. Moscow engages in various covert operations, including intimidation and misinformation, to manipulate ex-Soviet states with weak democratic traditions.
Russia is not alone; China is also seeking to expand its influence among former Soviet satellites, using its economic clout to infiltrate their power centers. If the West allows the stealth campaigns of the Kremlin and Beijing to go unchecked, the tide of democracy in the former Soviet sphere will recede, increasing the sway of both Russia and China.
The upcoming Oct. 26 parliamentary elections in Georgia -- located in the South Caucasus, a key corridor linking Asia and Europe across the vast Eurasian continent -- will serve as a litmus test for the future of former Soviet states -- and Western democracies.
Public polls indicate that Georgia is one of the most pro-Western countries in the former Soviet sphere, with about 80% of its population eager to join the European Union. The country became an EU candidate last December.
However, its politics are moving in the opposite direction, as the ruling party, Georgian Dream, increasingly leans toward Russia and authoritarian rule.
Campaign promises made by the party leadership in the run-up to the elections represent a blatant challenge to democracy. If it secures a majority, the party has stated its intention to effectively ban all opposition parties. It also plans to initiate "criminal prosecutions" against former government leaders, now in opposition, for their role in the 2008 war with Russia, which led to Moscow recognizing two breakaway Georgian regions as independent states. Such a move would undoubtedly please Putin.
Many experts and officials in Georgia attribute the ruling party's pro-Russian stance and disregard for the public's will to political interventions by the Putin regime. Participants in the Tbilisi International Conference 2024, a regional security forum held from Sept. 2 to Sept. 3 in the Georgian capital, expressed concerns about countries like Georgia being drawn into the Russian sphere through covert operations orchestrated by Moscow.
One key figure pushing Georgia closer toward Moscow is Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire who founded the ruling party and served as prime minister from 2012 to 2013. This shadow power broker, who often influences key appointments and policies for the government and ruling party, is believed to possess wealth equal to just over 30% of Georgia's gross domestic product.
Ivanishvili, who has built a business empire in Russia, holds numerous assets in the neighboring country and reportedly maintains deep ties with the Kremlin through shared interests. He rarely appears in public but delivered a speech at a rally in late April, openly expressing his anti-Western, pro-Russian stance.
As if on cue, the ruling party intensified its crackdown on the public. In early June, parliament enacted a law requiring organizations that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad to register as "agents of foreign influence." "The government is getting desperate to cozy up to Russia," said a local pundit.
"Russia's method of controlling other countries is not only by military force. The Putin regime uses corrupt financial networks to infiltrate the power centers of other countries and effectively take over [their] policy decisions. This is what is currently happening in Georgia," said Batu Kutelia, a former deputy secretary at Georgia's National Security Council and currently a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
"The latter (infiltration strategy) is very dangerous because it is supported by government disinformation and propaganda and is difficult to see from the surface."
Russia frequently employs intimidation as a means of political intervention. In late August, Sergey Naryshkin, head of Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service, warned of alleged U.S. attempts to overthrow the Georgian government. He claimed to possess information suggesting that the U.S. plans to incite a "color revolution" in Georgia following the parliamentary elections. Naryshkin implied that if the ruling party is defeated, Russia might resort to direct intervention to prevent a takeover.
According to undisclosed polls, the ruling party currently has an approval rating of only 30%. Anna Dolidze, founder and chairwoman of the opposition party For the People, has expressed concern about potential vote manipulation by the government.
"Our serious concern is that the election results will be rigged," Dolidze said. "If you look at the polls, the ruling party knows that it will be difficult to win. Because it controls the electoral bureau, it risks manipulating the polling numbers.
"Since the ruling party also controls the courts, the opposition has little hope of winning, even if it files a lawsuit."
Many people in Tbilisi are concerned that if the defeated ruling party refuses to concede, it could lead to large protests, potentially giving Russia an excuse to stage a military intervention.
It is not just Russia attempting to exert influence over Georgia; China is also seeking to make inroads into the country's decision-making process. In a report published in July, the Atlantic Council of Georgia raises concerns about China's behind-the-scenes efforts to influence political and economic policy in the country.
Unlike Russia, which relies heavily on intimidation, China primarily uses its economic clout to penetrate the upper echelons of power. The report indicates that Beijing has started to cultivate relationships with influential local politicians.
One passage in the report, entitled "Global Foreign Policies of Russia and China, Increased Influence in Georgia, and Their Implications," said: "One of the serious accompanying risks of the growing influence of China in Georgia, especially the ongoing cultivation of Chinese influence actors within Georgian political circles, is the realization of China's foreign policy goals at the expense of Georgian national interests."
A notable example of this is the relationship between former Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili and Chinese business interests. According to U.S. government-funded broadcaster Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, before becoming defense minister in 2019, Garibashvili served for 18 months as an adviser to a company managing a project for CEFC China Energy, a rapidly growing oil and finance conglomerate with global assets.
After Garibashvili took office as prime minister in 2021, every infrastructure project valued at over $100 million has involved Chinese companies, according to a report released by the broadcaster in September 2023.
In July of last year, Garibashvili visited China and signed a joint declaration that elevated their bilateral relations to a strategic partnership. In this declaration, Georgia committed to supporting China's Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative -- all strategic projects launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping to counter the Western world order.
A Georgian foreign policy expert said the signing of this declaration is likely to cause Georgia's foreign policy to drift further away from Western countries and tilt toward China and Russia.
In addition, China is rapidly expanding its outreach in Georgia's education and academic sectors. According to the report by the Atlantic Council of Georgia, Confucius Institutes -- Beijing-funded entities aimed at promoting Chinese language and culture abroad -- are now active in four Georgian universities.
While a growing number of such institutes in the U.S. and Europe have been closed due to concerns that they function as propaganda bases, Beijing continues to provide funding to 20 young Georgian researchers annually and is broadening its partnerships with Georgian research institutions, as noted in the report.
More than 30 years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, leading to the emergence of democratic nations in the Caucasus and across Eurasia. If these countries revert to authoritarianism, it could significantly alter the continent's geopolitical landscape. The political situation in Georgia may serve as a crucial test case for assessing how effectively democracy can withstand the "dark power" of Russia and China.
27. China Employs Hackers and Celebrities to Undermine Taiwan
Joyu Wang and Austin Ramzy, Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2024
28. Taiwan says it was snubbed by South Africa, Mongolia under China pressure
Thompson Chau, Nikkei Asia, October 18, 2024
29. India-China Ties May See Thaw Four Years After Border Skirmish Froze Relations
Rajesh Roy, Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2024
30. U.S. Fears Russia Might Be Planning Post-Election Chaos
Steven Lee Myers and Julian E. Barnes, New York Times, October 22, 2024
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
31. Labour backtracks on push for genocide ruling on China’s treatment of Uyghurs
Eleni Courea, The Guardian, October 17, 2024
32. World Uyghur Congress faces harassment ahead of general assembly
Liam Scott, VOA, October 21, 2024
33. China hosts World Media Summit in Xinjiang amid human rights concerns
Kasim Kashgar, VOA, October 17, 2024
34. UK foreign secretary pledges 'consistency' in relations with China
Casey Hall, Reuters, October 19, 2024
35. Vatican and China Extend Agreement on Catholic Bishops
Elisabetta Povoledo, New York Times, October 22, 2024
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
36. US to curb AI investment in China soon
Karen Freifeld, Reuters, October 21, 2024
37. China Carmakers to Double Overseas Capacity to Beat Tariffs
Linda Lew and Jinshan Hong, Bloomberg, October 23, 2024
38. IMF sees global inflation declining, downgrades China growth to 4.8%
Stella Yifan Xie, Nikkei Asia, October 22, 2024
39. Xi Jinping’s Quantitative Easing Unlikely to Save Economy
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Jamestown Foundation, October 11, 2024
40. Sanctions by the Numbers: Comparing the Trump and Biden Administrations’ Sanctions and Export Controls on China
Eleanor Hume and Rowan Scarpino, CNAS, October 23, 2024
41. Chinese Growth Comes in Cooler as Investors Pin Hopes on Stimulus
Jason Douglas, Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2024
42. U.S. Probes TSMC’s Dealings with Huawei
Qianer Liu, The Information, October 17, 2024
43. Elevated China steel exports set to persist, threaten to worsen trade friction
Amy Lv and Tony Munroe, Reuters, October 20, 2024
44. Putin says BRICS, not the West, will drive global economic growth
Gleb Bryanski and Vladimir Soldatkin, Reuters, October 18, 2024
45. Investors pile into emerging-market funds that cut out China
Emma Dunkley, Alan Livsey, and Joseph Cotterill, Financial Times, October 22, 2024
46. Germany bets on India to reduce reliance on China
Christian Kraemer, Reuters, October 23, 2024
47. Europe falls behind China in playing host to clinical drug trials
Daria Mosolova, Reuters, October 21, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
48. Dutch Government Unveils Measure That Curbs Exports of Quantum Technology
Patrick Van Oosterom, Bloomberg, October 18, 2024
49. Apple CEO Vows More China Investment in Meeting with Tech Czar
Debby Wu, Bloomberg, October 22, 2024
50. Huawei Technologies’ Latest AI Chips Were Produced by TSMC
Mackenzie Hawkins, Bloomberg, October 22, 2024
51. TSMC says it alerted US to potential violation of China AI chip controls
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, October 22, 2024
52. US-China tech war seen heating up regardless of whether Trump or Harris wins
Karen Freifeld, Reuters, October 23, 2024
Military and Security Threats
53. Military challenges to Beijing’s South China Sea claims are increasing
Joe Keary, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 22, 2024
54. U.S., Taiwan to upgrade combat data network in face of China threat
Tsukasa Hadano, Nikkei Asia, October 18, 2024
55. China’s Agents of Chaos
Oriana Skylar Mastro, Foreign Affairs, October 22, 2024
56. Xi's revamped army shows China is preparing for war
Miquel Vila, UnHerd, October 23, 2024
57. Families of fentanyl victims ask US for China tariffs over opioid crisis
Laura Gottesdiener and Michael Martina, Reuters, October 17, 2024
58. Can China’s BeiDou radar detect F-22 stealth fighters?
Stephen Chen, South China Morning Post, October 17, 2024
59. China building capacity to rapidly strike Taiwan, senior Taiwanese official says
Yimou Lee, Reuters, October 16, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
60. Meet the mothers in small-town Hungary leading a fight against Chinese EV battery plants
Yvonne Lau, Rest of World, October 18, 2024
61. Xi reaffirms China-Russia ties in 'chaotic' world as BRICS summit opens
Pak Yiu, Nikkei Asia, October 23, 2024
62. Chinese Projects in Peru Fuel Tensions with Local Residents
Arthur Kaufman, China Digital Times, October 16, 2024
Opinion Pieces
63. Xi's lack of succession planning risks China's long-term governance
Andrei Lungu, Nikkei Asia, October 17, 2024
64. Can the Next US President Achieve a Breakthrough in US-China Relations?
Drew Thompson, RSIS, October 24, 2024
Every US presidential election season brings intense speculation around the world about the next administration’s foreign policy. Election rhetoric and themes are primarily domestic, however, as these are the issues voters care most about. The 2024 election is no different, but that does not dampen the desire to know what the election might mean, particularly for those countries closely tied to the US either by alliance, dependence or competition.
The complex US-China relationship is perhaps the most consequential in the world, accounting for the high degree of concern throughout the Asia Pacific about its future. It must be noted that Washington’s China policy is part of an overarching approach to Asia, where relationships with treaty allies take precedence, while strengthening partnerships is the perpetual foreign policy goal. China is critical for US policy and strategy as both a major trading partner and a security challenge, just as it is for other countries in the Asia Pacific.
65. Crises at Boeing and Intel Are a National Emergency
Greg Ip, Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2024
66. China and North Korea boost Russian military ties to uncharted levels
Hiroyuki Akita, Nikkei Asia, October 19, 2024
China and North Korea are deepening military cooperation with Russia to alarming levels. In return for their support in the war in Ukraine, Moscow is helping these countries enhance their military capabilities -- a quid pro quo that could trigger a chain reaction of conflicts around the world.
Particularly concerning is the growing military partnership between Russia and North Korea. According to estimates by Ukrainian authorities, North Korea had supplied Russia with 2.8 million artillery shells and up to 60 ballistic missiles in the period between the start of the conflict and this summer.
Moscow is responding to Pyongyang's assistance by increasing military support for the reclusive communist state. There are signs that Russia has begun offering North Korean military officers opportunities to learn the latest combat tactics through practical training in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine.
According to Ukrainian news outlets, six North Korean officers died earlier this month in Russian-controlled eastern Ukraine. Russian social media reports indicate that the officers were inspecting local combat operations.
"We see an increasing alliance between Russia and regimes like North Korea," Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said in a speech on Oct. 13. "This is no longer just about transferring weapons. It is actually about transferring people from North Korea to the occupying military forces."
Nataliya Gumenyuk, a Ukrainian journalist and chief executive officer at the Public Interest Journalism Lab, which covers alleged Russian war crimes and other issues, condemns North Korea's activities in Ukraine.
"Besides bearing responsibility for the deaths of civilians in Ukraine, North Korea may have been testing its ballistic missiles in Ukraine, and tweak them to perform against Western air defense systems," said Gumenyuk.
"North Koreans may also learn from Russia the latest tactics from the rapidly evolving drone warfare in the Russian war. If North Korea has sent military personnel to Russian occupied territory in Ukraine, they may absorb these on the ground."
Military interactions between Russia and North Korea that carry even more dangerous implications could be on the horizon. Citing an anonymous Ukrainian military source, The Washington Post reported on Oct. 11 that several thousand North Korean infantry soldiers are being trained in Russia and could be deployed to the front lines in Ukraine by year-end.
Russia is also intensifying its military collaboration with China in ways that raise significant strategic and geopolitical concerns. The U.S. is increasingly worried that Russia may have begun transferring advanced technology related to nuclear submarines, missiles and military aircraft to China. If that is indeed the case, it would mark a radical shift for Moscow, which has historically safeguarded strategically important technologies and rejected Beijing's requests for their transfer.
However, the Kremlin is now in no position to refuse Chinese demands, as it relies on Beijing for microelectronics and machine tools essential for mass-producing weapons, according to a former U.S. Defense Department official.
Russia has also intensified joint military exercises and patrols with China. In the first nine months of this year alone, they conducted 11 operations together. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, the two nations had engaged in at least 102 such drills by July, with more than half occurring after the start of 2017, including multilateral exercises with other countries.
These joint activities indicate that power dynamics have been shifting in favor of China in recent years. For instance, during a joint patrol in early October, Russia allowed a China Coast Guard vessel to enter the Arctic Sea for the first time -- an area that the Russian military has long regarded as a secure sanctuary.
Masafumi Iida, a director at Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, points out that many recent joint exercises and patrols have been more beneficial for China than for Russia. "One example is that Russia allowed Chinese military aircraft to use its bases during recent joint patrols around Japan," said Iida. "Going forward, we may see Chinese warships using Russian military ports for maritime training."
Russia's military cooperation with China and North Korea is driven not by mutual trust but by shared anti-U.S. sentiment and pragmatic calculations. Nonetheless, their deepening ties could destabilize not only Europe but also Asia. What steps should be taken to address this situation?
First, Japan, the U.S. and South Korea need to carefully assess the security threats posed by Russia's military cooperation with China and North Korea to the Korean Peninsula and the East and South China seas, ensuring they are adequately prepared to address them. Sharing information with Europe about Russia's actions will be crucial.
Second, surveillance of China's exports of dual-use goods to Russia must be strengthened. If any violations of Western sanctions are detected, the Group of Seven leading democracies should consider countermeasures. Furthermore, maintaining open channels of dialogue with Beijing is essential to prevent unintended military conflicts.
67. Russian Pacific Fleet Redux: Japan’s North as a New Center of Gravity
Yu Koizumi, War on the Rocks, October 22, 2024
68. China Test Drives a Taiwan Blockade
The Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2024
69. Today’s Axis of Evil is bigger and more dangerous than ever
Joseph Bosco, The Hill, October 15, 2024
70. Look Abroad, Presidential Candidates
Dan Quayle, Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2024
71. How Kamala Harris Should Put America First — for Real
Stephen Wertheim, New York Times, October 21, 2024