Friends,
Just over a decade ago and months after Xi Jinping assumed power, the General Office of the Chinese Communist Party published the “Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere,” otherwise known as Document Number 9 (you can find a translation here at ChinaFile).
As we head into an important election in the United States which will likely result in a re-examination of U.S. China policy, and as other countries reconsider their own policies, I thought it would be worthwhile to look back at what Xi demanded of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese people (aka “the masses”) when he entered office, as well as the insight we could gain on his wider worldview.
A 60-year-old Xi Jinping pictured in December 2012 just as he was assuming power of the Chinese Communist Party.
Document Number 9 was released in April 2013, shortly after the Two Sessions (annual plenary meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference) and would leak a few months later after a Chinese journalist, working at a State-owned media outlet, sent it to colleagues working at a U.S.-based Chinese-language magazine.
For some context, let’s remember what else was happening back in April 2013:
The G8 (Group of Eight) still existed… Russia would be expelled a year later when it annexed Crimea and it would revert back to the G7;
President Obama was just starting his second term in office;
Nicolas Maduro succeeded Hugo Chavez as President of Venezuela; and
The Boston Marathon bombings took place on April 15.
Shortly after the document was issued, Xi Jinping traveled to the United States and met with President Obama at the Sunnylands Summit. At the time, both sides presented the relationship in positive terms and while it didn’t resolve any of the main issues of concern, it was billed as creating a “more effective platform for addressing those issues in the future.” Xi Jinping brought up, and Obama appeared to agree, that the U.S. and the PRC should pursue a “new pattern of great power relations” or as it would become known, a “new type of great power relations.”
Xi and Obama strolling together at the Sunnylands compound on June 8, 2013. This is the photo that spawned a thousand memes… and got Winnie the Pooh canceled. Even without putting up the picture of Winnie the Pooh and Tigger, you can visualize it right?
Document Number 9 should be thought of as a secret directive or executive order issued from the Party’s leadership to the entire CCP (and hence, all elements of PRC governance and society) and meant as an instruction for how the Chinese Communist Party should lead and direct Chinese society.
In essence, this document is the declaration of an ideological cold war… the Chinese Communist Party sees itself as under assault by “Western anti-China forces” trying to annihilate the Party through “Westernization.” Xi Jinping is mobilizing the Party (and the Chinese people) for an intense struggle for dominance against an existential threat.
While the preamble of this directive exudes confidence in the unity of the Party, the admiration of the masses for the Party’s leadership, and the wisdom of Xi Jinping… the rest of it reads like a Party that is deeply paranoid of the outside world and beset by existential threats on all sides.
It is a dark and precarious interpretation of the Party’s position. Foreigners and internal “dissidents” lurk and conspire everywhere. The “West” is plotting “Color Revolutions” against the PRC with the intent of driving the Party from power and plunging China into chaos. It provides a road map for what the Party fears most. It argues that the “contest between infiltration and anti-infiltration efforts in the ideological sphere is as severe as ever.”
Document Number 9 identified the main ideological problems confronting the PRC and made it clear that the country was involved in an intense struggle with the West (aka the United States), and it described these “problems” as “false ideological trends, positions, and activities.”
What’s left unsaid is any explanation on why these same “false ideological trends, positions, and activities” have resulted in economic and social prosperity in other countries, including China’s neighbors like Taiwan… but that’s to be expected given the near impossibility of introspection by the Party that might lead to questioning the Party’s legitimacy.
The seven ideological problems:
Problem #1 – Promoting Western Constitutional Democracy: An attempt to undermine the current leadership and the socialism with Chinese characteristics system of governance.
Problem #2 – Promoting “universal values” in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership.
Problem #3 – Promoting civil society in an attempt to dismantle the ruling party’s social foundation.
Problem #4 – Promoting Neoliberalism, attempting to change China’s Basic Economic System.
Problem #5 – Promoting the West’s idea of journalism, challenging China’s principle that the media and publishing system should be subject to Party discipline.
Problem #6 – Promoting historical nihilism, trying to undermine the history of the CCP and of New China.
Problem #7 – Questioning Reform and Opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.
To deal with these “false ideological trends,” the Party demands that CCP members “work in the ideological sphere.” The Party must “[confront] the very real threat of Western anti-China forces and their attempt at carrying out Westernization, splitting, and “Color Revolutions,” and facing the severe challenge of today’s ideological sphere, all levels of Party and Government, especially key leaders, must pay close attention to their work in the ideological sphere and firmly seize their leadership authority and dominance.”
This requires the Party to pursue four simultaneous efforts:
Strengthen leadership in the ideological sphere.
Guide our party member and leaders to distinguish between true and false theories. [NOTE: the definition of a “true theory” is a theory the Party supports, and the definition of a “false theory” is a theory that the Party objects to… no further critical thinking is required]
Unwavering adherence to the principle of the Party’s control of media.
Conscientiously strengthen management of the ideological battlefield.
After reading this self-diagnosis of the problems facing the Party and its prescription on how to cure them, one is left with one conclusion: the Party knows (but can’t admit) that the Chinese people would demand their removal from power if given a real choice… therefore, they must never be given the opportunity to consider that option.
Despite more than six decades in power, the Party’s hold was tenuous in 2013, and at 75 years in power, it remains so.
Regime security depends upon maximum effort by the Party and an unceasing struggle to shield the Chinese people (and Party members) from ideas that challenge the Party.
The Party’s struggle isn’t really with “the West” or the United States, it is in a struggle with human nature and the tendency for humans to question whether absolute rulers deserve their absolute power. The Party cannot admit to themselves this dynamic exists, so it must find an enemy to blame. As rational arguments fail to persuade Chinese citizens (“the masses”) of why the CCP deserves to stay in power, the Party must rely increasingly on ultra-nationalism and Han chauvinism (along with a healthy dose of coercion and fear) to convince the Chinese people that they stand apart and distinct from the rest of humanity.
In many ways, this ideological struggle is a Sisyphean task… the Party can never eradicate these so-called “false ideological trends” because they arise from the Party’s own insatiable quest for power and control. The Chinese people are unlikely to ever fully become “the masses” that the Party needs them to be.
The more resources the Party pours into this ideological struggle, the more they will fuel the development and dissemination of “false ideological trends.” When this directive was issued over a decade ago, it seemed clear that either the Party would exhaust itself or decide to escalate by expanding their “struggle” against their ideological enemy, the West.
While I would have preferred the former, we got the latter.
In the decade since 2013, Xi Jinping has joined forces with Putin, a man who shares much of Xi’s worldview and paranoia. They each view the West as posing an existential threat to their rule. The existential threat is not in the economic or military domains, it is ideological. The continued existence of political systems in which citizens get to choose their leaders is THE threat. This is fear that Chinese and Russian citizens might prefer leaders other than Xi and Putin.
In short, they are stuck.
What makes Beijing and Moscow so dangerous is that they have created for themselves unresolvable security dilemmas based on the pathologies of their domestic political systems.
Some advocate that we should help them out of these self-imposed cul-de-sacs by adopting policies that reassure these leaders that we don’t pose a threat.
This sounds reasonable… perhaps Moscow really did view NATO’s expansion as a threat given past invasions; perhaps Beijing does see U.S. military alliances as a form of containment; perhaps both Beijing and Moscow resent technology restrictions as attempts to constrain their power… but capitulating to their demands would ultimately prove counterproductive. It isn’t NATO or sanctions or export controls that threaten Xi and Putin, it is the example of democracy which threatens them.
They need a foreign enemy to justify their political power domestically.
Reassurance, appeasement, and disarmament will not be viewed as actions to be reciprocated, but as opportunities to be exploited.
In 2024, the Chinese Communist Party and their allies in Moscow, feel emboldened by the expansion of their struggle against their shared enemies. Whereas the Party felt besieged on all sides by “false ideological trends” that were pushed by the West to weaken them a decade ago, they now see their enemies as beset by domestic divisions and falling victim to their own forms of historical nihilism.
They believe their ideological campaigns to “[f]orcefully resist influential and harmful false tides of thoughts” has been successful. From their perspective, the concepts of “Western Constitutional Democracy,” “universal values,” “civil society,” and “Neoliberalism” have been diminished.
But the fight isn’t over and to make the world safe for the Chinese Communist Party, the Party must not go soft now.
With its rivals divided and weakened, Beijing and Moscow likely view this as an opportunity to reset the international order in their favor.
We would do well to reflect on those dynamics, as well as understand the centrality that ideology plays in this new cold war. We can see where Beijing’s vulnerabilities are (they enumerated them in Document Number 9), we should be amplifying the pressure on those vulnerabilities.
***
I suspect many readers are anxious about this Tuesday, I share those anxieties but count myself “lucky as a sinner in heaven” to get the chance to participate in democracy.
So, I figured I’d offer up a few songs about the country that make me smile. As with America itself, there’s something here for everyone:
Dixieland Delight – Alabama
Empire State of Mind – Jay Z and Alicia Keys
I’m Shipping Up to Boston – Dropkick Murphys
Rocky Mountain High – John Denver
My City was Gone – The Pretenders, Live in 1998
California Love – 2Pac, Dr. Dre, and Roger Troutman
Ūlili E – Dennis and David Kamakahi, a Slack Key favorite
Tulsa Time – Don Williams on Austin City Limits (1983)
City of New Orleans – Willie Nelson, Live in 1986
Bob Fudge – Colter Wall (true story of Bob Fudge, Montana Cowboy Hall of Fame)
Georgia on My Mind – Ray Charles
I’ve Been Everywhere – Johnny Cash
For those on Spotify, here’s the playlist with a few more… America, Damn It!
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. FACT SHEET: Addressing U.S. Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern
The White House, October 28, 2024
Cross-border investment flows and the United States’ open investment policy contribute to our economic vitality. Countries of concern, however, are exploiting certain U.S. outbound investments in ways that threaten to accelerate the development of sensitive technologies and products that undermine our national security interests. The Biden-Harris Administration is committed to keeping America safe by preventing countries of concern—namely the People’s Republic of China—from advancing in key technologies that are critical to their military modernization.
Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury issued a Final Rule to implement President Biden’s Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023, “Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern.” The Final Rule provides the operative regulations and a detailed explanatory discussion regarding its intent and application.
As directed in the President’s Executive Order, the Final Rule prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in certain transactions involving a defined set of technologies and products that pose a particularly acute national security threat to the United States. The Final Rule also requires U.S. persons to notify the Department of the Treasury of certain other transactions involving a defined set of technologies and products that may contribute to a threat to the national security of the United States.
Covered technologies fall into three categories: semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and artificial intelligence. This narrow set of technologies is core to the next generation of military, cybersecurity, surveillance, and intelligence applications.
The United States already prohibits or restricts the export to countries of concern of many of the technologies and products covered by the Final Rule. This program complements the United States’ existing export control and inbound screening tools by preventing U.S. investment from advancing the development of sensitive technologies and products in countries of concern.
Today’s announcement follows extensive and thorough consultations with hundreds of stakeholders, bipartisan members of Congress, industry members, and foreign allies and partners and two rounds of formal comments from the public. The announcement is the final step in the process President Biden announced in August of 2023 when he signed the Executive Order.
COMMENT – I’m glad to see this issued before the election.
2. Seismic Strife: China and Indonesia clash over Natuna Survey
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, October 28, 2024
The China Coast Guard (CCG) is in its 12th day facing off against Indonesian law enforcement and naval vessels over oil and gas resources in the northern portion of the latter’s continental shelf in the South China Sea. While the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) has reported multiple times that it succeeded in expelling the CCG, satellite imagery and automatic identification system (AIS) data show that the CCG has returned each time and remains on site.
The tensions center on a seismic survey being conducted by Indonesia’s state-owned oil and gas company PT Pertamina in Natuna D-Alpha, a gas field northeast of the Natuna islands and within the southern edges of China’s nine-dash line.
The survey was contracted to the Geo Coral, a survey vessel owned by Norwegian firm Shearwater GeoServices. The Geo Coral began its survey operations on October 5, but it wasn’t until October 16 that the CCG 5302 entered Indonesia’s continental shelf and began shadowing the survey.
Before it entered Indonesia’s continental shelf, the CCG 5302 had spent four weeks patrolling near Malaysian and Vietnamese oil and gas projects, passing near active drilling at Malaysia’s Silungun-1 field off Sarawak and making multiple tours through Vietnamese oil and gas projects in blocks 06-01, 12W, and 05-03 near Vanguard Bank, where it was shadowed by Vietnamese fisheries surveillance ships.
The CCG 5302 shadowed the Geo Coral for three days before it was relieved by the CCG 5402 on October 19. Bakamla’s KN Tanjung Datu 301 arrived on October 21 and spent the next 24 hours ushering the CCG 5302 across the northern edge of Indonesia’s continental shelf, with the two law enforcement ships at one point coming within 500 meters of each other. But almost as soon as the 5402 left, it crossed back into Indonesia’s continental shelf and headed back toward the survey area.
The KN Tanjung Datu 301 then headed back to the Riau Islands and was replaced on October 23 by the KN Pulau Dana 323. On October 24, the Indonesian Navy got involved, sending tanker ship KRI Bontang and corvette KRI Sutedi Senoputra, though the latter was not visible on AIS. The KRI Bontang was seen on AIS operating from a distance as the KN Pulau Dana 323 shadowed the CCG 5402 and managed to again get it to leave Indonesia’s continental shelf—for a total of 8 hours. The CCG 5402 has remained at the survey location since October 25, continually shadowed by the KN Pulau Dana 323.
This is not the first time Beijing has sent its coast guard to challenge Indonesian oil and gas activity, nor has it been unusual for Indonesia to deploy its navy and maritime law enforcement in defense of those operations more readily than other claimants. But the rapid public release of photos and video of both the CCG’s activities and the Indonesian response is novel, and would seem likely to be at least partially inspired by the Philippines’ transparency strategy. With new Indonesian president Prabowo Subianto having only assumed office on October 20, it is unclear whether this is an indication of a bolder approach to South China Sea issues under his administration or just an evolution in tactics on the part of Indonesian maritime agencies. But given Beijing’s response to Manila’s efforts to publicize maritime frictions, it will be worth watching whether Jakarta’s new tactics attract a more concerted Chinese effort to display dominance at the southernmost reaches of the nine-dash line.
COMMENT – Has President Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s new leader, decided to break with his predecessor’s acquiesce to the PRC’s coercion?
3. The Man Who Shaped China’s Strongman Rule Has a New Job: Winning Taiwan
Chris Buckley, New York Times, October 26, 2024
Xi Jinping’s top adviser, Wang Huning, is credited with shaping the authoritarianism that steered China’s rise. But can he influence Taiwan?
When Xi Jinping held the first-ever talks in Beijing with a former president of Taiwan, seeking to press the island closer to unification, a bookish-looking official stood out for his ease around China’s leader.
While others treated Mr. Xi with stiff formality, the official, Wang Huning, spoke confidently in his presence and sat next to him during the meeting, said Chiu Kun-hsuan, a member of the delegation that accompanied Ma Ying-jeou, the former Taiwanese president.
The scene gave a glimpse of one of the most important, yet little understood, relationships in China: between Mr. Xi, the country’s most powerful leader in decades, and Mr. Wang, the ruling Communist Party’s most influential ideological adviser in decades.
“He has the top leader’s full trust,” Professor Chiu, an emeritus scholar at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan’s capital, said of Mr. Wang. “Wang Huning’s influence has been in ideology, but now in China under Xi Jinping, ideology connects everything.”
Given the opaque nature of Chinese politics, the world often fixates on Mr. Xi, who since taking power in 2012 has centralized control and surrounded himself with loyalists, making it hard to know whose views he most values. In his circle, Mr. Wang stands out for rising to the top despite never having led a province or city, and for advising three successive Chinese leaders across three decades — a rare feat of adaptability and survival.
The New York Times spoke to more than a dozen people who have known Mr. Wang or met him, including during a visit to the United States in the late 1980s, and read dozens of his papers and books. The interviews and writings illuminate how he rose to the apex of power by developing ideas that he put to the service of China’s leaders, with a lasting influence on how the country is ruled.
Mr. Wang is credited with honing the Communist Party doctrines that have guided China’s rise, founded on the conviction that only the unyielding dominance of the party can secure the country’s success in the face of rapid economic change and intensifying competition with Western powers.
More recently, Mr. Xi has entrusted Mr. Wang with handling the fraught political relations with Taiwan, the island democracy that Beijing wants to absorb. Taiwanese officials say Mr. Wang has been overseeing efforts to deepen Chinese influence over the island, through selective displays of good will and covert influence activities.
Yet Mr. Wang, 69, is little known to outsiders. A professor turned party theorist, he stopped giving interviews after he began working at the Communist Party headquarters in 1995, cutting off contact with most former colleagues and staying aloof from foreign visitors.
Since 2012, he has been central to distilling Mr. Xi’s vision for China into an ideological program for a superpower that is technologically advanced, unabashedly authoritarian and increasingly fortified against American-led containment.
Mr. Wang “provided the ideological spirit for authoritarianism over the last 30 years,” said Rush Doshi, a former deputy senior director for China on President Biden’s National Security Council who is now at the Council on Foreign Relations and Georgetown University. “He has helped craft the national narrative.”
Winning Over Taiwan
Now Mr. Wang is turning his ideas, political acumen and influence with Mr. Xi to Taiwan. He appears to be sharpening strategies for reaching deeper into Taiwanese society and rolling back its people’s deepening rejection of China, including Taiwan’s cultural links with the mainland.
“He’s also someone who knows how to use both a soft touch and a hard fist,” said Chao Chun-shan, a professor emeritus at Tamkang University in Taiwan, who has been in meetings with Mr. Wang in the early 1990s and twice since last year.
Mr. Wang has assiduously wooed dozens of members of Taiwan’s opposition Nationalist Party, which favors stronger ties with China, treating them almost as a Taiwanese government in waiting — one that Beijing would rather deal with. He has politely quizzed Nationalist lawmakers: Who has old roots in Taiwan? Who came from families that fled mainland China in 1949? He asked them to describe their concerns, making a point that he was paying close attention, said several members of the delegations.
His overtures to the opposition fit with Beijing’s strategy of isolating Taiwan’s president, Lai Ching-te, and his governing Democratic Progressive Party, which rejects China’s claim of sovereignty over the island.
Behind the scenes, Mr. Wang has overseen Chinese efforts to influence Taiwanese public opinion with online campaigns, which amplify messages that are skeptical of American power, scathing about Mr. Lai and admiring of China, according to two Taiwanese security officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the matter.
At the same time, China has hardened its military approach to Taiwan; it recently held exercises encircling the island. It is also using legal measures to intimidate Taiwanese people, like the recently issued rules calling for execution, in extreme cases, for supporters of independence.
COMMENT – Wang Huning has a tough job. The more he woos members of the KMT, the more he discredits them to large portions of the Taiwanese electorate. The KMT might have won in January 2024, if it hadn’t been for Wang’s interference in domestic Taiwanese politics. No other party has won three presidential elections in a row.
4. China Has Laws Banning Political Activism. Why Charge Critics with Non-Political Crimes?
Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, October 15, 2024
INSIGHTS
Analysis of over 13 million Weibo posts during a crackdown on online dissent reveals China’s government is more likely to charge critics with non-political versus political crimes if the critic is more influential online.
Charging popular critics with overtly political crimes inflamed online dissent against the government more than when using non-political charges.
A survey experiment involving over 1,000 respondents reveals charging hypothetical critics with non-political crimes reduces their public support while also boosting audience self-censorship and tolerance for repressing the critic.
The researchers conclude that compared to overt repression, “disguised repression” using non-political crimes delegitimizes activists, deters criticism, and boosts public support for government actions.
COMMENT – This suggests that greater transparency and amplification of political critics can harm the Chinese Communist party’s standing in the eyes of the Chinese people.
5. As ties with the U.S. worsen, China asks: Who’s the new Kissinger?
Christian Shepherd and Katrina Northrop, Washington Post, October 28, 2024
As the U.S. election approaches, China is on the hunt for the “new Henry Kissinger” — someone who is a friend of Beijing but has the ear of the incoming president. Someone who Chinese officials hope can cut through the bipartisan hostility toward China and encourage Washington to engage — as Kissinger did for five decades.
In Beijing’s foreign policy circles, the race for the White House is often cast as lose-lose, with former president Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris both signaling they will take a tough line on China, despite differing on policy details.
Chinese experts fear Trump’s return would mean a full-blown trade war with blanket tariffs on Chinese goods.
Harris, meanwhile, would probably continue the Biden administration’s fragile stabilization of ties — but also the efforts to counter China’s technological and military rise, an approach Chinese leader Xi Jinping has labeled “containment.”
That’s why a new Kissinger is needed, Chinese experts say, following Xi’s calls for Americans “of foresight” to step forward and improve ties. (There is no suggestion from the Trump or Harris campaigns that they are looking for a Kissinger-style envoy.)
Influential voices in China are openly discussing who could match Kissinger’s gravitas as a statesman, his unwavering advocacy for engagement, and his ability to act as a back channel in times of crisis — regardless of who wins the presidency.
The Paper, a state-run media outlet, recently ran an eight-part series called “Looking for Kissinger,” identifying American business leaders, academics and former officials who could help keep relations stable.
“Searching for the Next Kissinger,” in The Paper. Top row left to right: John Thornton (financier), John Kerry (former Secretary of State), James Steinberg (former Deputy Secretary of State and Dean of the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University, Stephen Schwarzman (CEO of Blackstone). Bottom row left to right: Susan Thornton (former acting Assistant Secretary of State during the Trump Administration), Gavin Newsom (Governor of California), Jessica Chen Weiss (Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins University)… not a contest I’d like to be competing in.
The list included Stephen A. Schwarzman, the CEO of private equity firm Blackstone who launched an elite graduate program at Beijing’s Tsinghua University; John F. Kerry, the former U.S. special climate envoy who has advocated for close cooperation with Beijing to stem global warming; retired American diplomat Susan Thornton, who openly criticized the confrontational China policy adopted by Trump; and California Gov. Gavin Newsom (D), whose visit to Beijing last year fueled Chinese efforts to court local American politicians.
None of the four responded to requests for comment on their inclusion in the list.
Wang Huiyao, a prominent Chinese foreign policy thinker, says Graham Allison, an assistant defense secretary in the Clinton administration and esteemed political scientist at Harvard’s Kennedy School, would be a good Kissinger-style bridge.
“We hope that you will carry on Kissinger’s spirit and be a great supporter and promoter, and of course, great contributor to the America-China relations,” Wang told Allison earlier this year.
Allison’s warnings about a “Thucydides trap” — a theory that rising powers almost always end up at war with incumbent great powers — have been adopted by Xi to urge Western powers to accept China’s rise.
Allison, who met with Xi in Beijing in March, said the Chinese leader was eager to continue discussions he had with Kissinger about lessons from the Cold War.
Allison is a strong advocate for engagement, which he says is in America’s best interest and needed to avert conflict. “China hysteria infects too many Americans,” he said in an interview.
On Chinese social media, people have suggested that Elon Musk could be another candidate, considering the Tesla CEO’s close business ties with China and Chinese officials, as well as his growing alliance with Trump. Musk often makes arguments favored by Beijing: Last year, for example, he called Taiwan an “integral part of China.”
Almost everyone, whether in the United States or China, agrees that Kissinger’s role in the relationship was unique. But many in Beijing advocate for preserving and, to whatever extent possible, replicating his legacy to avoid competition veering into conflict.
“The search for a new Kissinger is not just about locating Kissinger number two. It’s about Chinese passion and Chinese enthusiasm to search for reasonable, forward-looking views on relations,” said Zhu Feng, dean of international studies at Nanjing University.
But it’s also a prescription for how to manage a hostile White House. “Even when Kissinger was getting older, and China grew bigger and stronger, Kissinger’s mentality remained quite accommodating,” Zhu said.
There is great nostalgia in Beijing for the Kissinger years. Leading scholars write op-eds lamenting the difficulties of reestablishing “Kissinger-style engagement” and blaming American politicians for “spoiling the atmosphere” by attacking China for political gain. They still invoke Kissinger as an example of best diplomatic practices.
Kissinger’s reputation as a visionary diplomat began with his clandestine trip to Beijing in 1971 as national security adviser to Republican President Richard M. Nixon, a trip that paved the way for the establishment of diplomatic ties in 1979.
He continued traveling to Beijing through July last year, soon after his 100th birthday, when Kissinger sealed his legacy as a tireless advocate for improved ties. “We never forget our old friends,” Xi told him in the same building where Kissinger met Premier Zhou Enlai 52 years earlier.
In Chinese state media, that visit was heralded as a turning point in a tentative warming of ties that would lead to Xi meeting with President Joe Biden in San Francisco in November, even as the State Department said Kissinger was traveling as a private citizen and not acting on behalf of the United States.
Kissinger’s death in November led to an outpouring of condolences from Chinese officials as well as a flurry of speeches and essays lamenting the Kissinger-size hole in bilateral diplomacy.
The 10-year anniversary edition of Kissinger’s book “On China,” released in April last year, has over 1.45 million reviews on Chinese online book seller Dangdang.com. Only 338 of those are negative.
Beijing prefers to deal directly with the executive branch, but tensions have made that channel more difficult, creating a need for someone like Kissinger who can act as a “direct channel to the captain of the ship,” said Da Wei, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University. “Captains sometimes cannot talk to each other with trust, so you need to find someone in between that both sides can trust.”
Da acknowledged that no one person could replace Kissinger, but there could instead be “smaller Kissingers” — several people with connections to the leadership and policy circles that can help stabilize relations, he said.
Stephen Orlins, president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, a New York-based nonprofit that advocates for more engagement with Beijing, agreed that China’s search reflects concern that “government-to-government channels are no longer working out.”
“Whether it will be Harris or whether it’s Trump, they are going to need nongovernment channels to communicate the way Henry did for decades and decades,” Orlins said.
But Isaac Stone Fish, founder of Strategy Risks, a consulting firm that analyzes companies’ exposure to China, described Beijing’s search for a new Kissinger as one for a “new top useful idiot.”
Chinese leaders “seem to understand how advantageous it is for them to have this be something that only happens on the American side,” Stone Fish said, arguing that it makes the United States more responsible for improving the diplomatic relationship.
“Where’s the Chinese Kissinger?” he asked.
COMMENT – I like Issac Stone Fish’s question at the end: Where’s the Chinese Kissinger?
Given that Xi Jinping has abandoned the reform-minded policies of his predecessors, which made the Kissingerian efforts of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s possible, and embraced fellow dictators like Putin, Chinese leaders have a responsibility to “fix” the problems they have created.
It’s a reasonable position to observe that the entire formulation of U.S.-China relations under the three communiques has been abandoned by Xi Jinping.
The agreement to establish relations in the 1970s and early 1980s, was predicated on Beijing siding with the United States against the Soviet Union. In exchange, the United States ended its defense treaty with Taiwan and withdrew formal diplomatic relations. The Carter and Reagan Administrations did this because Beijing assured the United States that it would seek a peaceful solution to cross Strait relations.
Both of those provisions are now moot: Beijing openly sides with Moscow against the United States and Europe and Beijing has all but abandoned any pretext of resolving their dispute with Taiwan peacefully.
Instead of a new “Kissinger,” perhaps the next Administration should acknowledge the Three Communiques are “dead letters” and stop referring to them as the basis of U.S.-China relations.
6. China's Xi pressed Biden to alter language on Taiwan
Trevor Hunnicutt, Laurie Chen, and Yimou Lee, Reuters, October 28, 2024
Chinese President Xi Jinping asked U.S. President Joe Biden last year to change the language the United States uses when discussing its position on Taiwanese independence, according to two U.S. officials familiar with the private conversation.
During last November's Biden-Xi meeting near San Francisco, Xi and his aides asked Biden and his team to tweak the language in U.S. official statements.
China wanted the U.S. to say "we oppose Taiwan independence," rather than the current version, which is that the United States "does not support" independence for Taiwan, said the people, who requested anonymity to speak about private diplomatic exchanges they participated in or were briefed on.
Xi's aides have repeatedly followed up and made the requests in the months since, according to two U.S. officials and another person familiar with the exchanges.
The U.S. has declined to make the change.
The White House responded to a request for comment with a statement that repeated the line that Washington does not support Taiwan independence. "The Biden-Harris administration has been consistent on our long-standing One China policy," the statement read.
China's foreign ministry said: "You should ask this question to the U.S. government. China's position on the Taiwan issue is clear and consistent."
Taiwan's foreign ministry declined comment.
The defeated Republic of China government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong's communists.
The Republic of China remains Taiwan's formal name and the government says it has no plans to change that given they are already a sovereign, independent state and Beijing has no right to claim Taiwan as its own.
SENSITIVE ISSUE
For several years, Chinese diplomats have pushed the United States to make changes to how it refers to Taiwan's status, which remains the most sensitive area in U.S.-China relations. The unusually direct and renewed push at the leader level has not been reported previously.
The United States severed official relations with the government in Taipei in 1979 but is bound by law to provide democratically governed Taiwan with the means to defend itself. China claims Taiwan as its own territory and has never renounced the use of force to bring the island under its control.
It was not clear why Xi chose to raise the issue with Biden, but he has made opposition to Taiwan independence a focus of his time in office and China's military has significantly ramped up its activities around the island in recent years.
The Biden administration regards the proposed language change as a non-starter.
Taiwan was briefed on the recent overtures at a high level by Washington, said one of the sources.
Leaders in Beijing "would love it if Joe Biden said very different things about Taiwan than he says, no doubt," said one senior Biden administration official, adding that Biden would stick with the standard U.S. formulation for talking about Taiwan independence.
During his time in office, Biden has upset the Chinese government with comments that appeared to suggest the United States would defend the island if it were attacked, a deviation from a long-held U.S. position of "strategic ambiguity."
A CHANGE THAT WOULD REVERBERATE
A change by the U.S. to say that it opposes Taiwanese independence would reverberate through the trade-rich Asia Pacific and with U.S. partners, competitors and adversaries alike.
Officials from two governments in the region told Reuters they would interpret any such change in wording as a change in U.S. policy toward less support for Taipei's defense and diplomatic aspirations at a time when Beijing has ramped up military pressure.
China has over the past five years staged almost daily military activities around Taiwan. Earlier this month, Beijing held a day of war games using what Taiwan said was a record 153 military aircraft as part of drills simulating blockading ports and assaulting maritime and ground targets.
Any switch in language could also be seen signaling a shift in U.S. policy from supporting the resolution of Taiwan's future through peaceful talks to one suggesting the United States stands against Taiwanese aspirations regardless of the circumstances at play.
Opinion polls in Taiwan show most people support maintaining the status quo, neither seeking to join with China nor establishing a new state.
In 2022, the State Department changed its website on Taiwan, removing wording both on not supporting Taiwan independence and on acknowledging Beijing's position that Taiwan is part of China, which angered the Chinese. It later restored the language on not supporting independence for the island.
The two leaders are expected to speak again before Biden's term in office ends in January, talks that may come by phone or on the sidelines of next month's G20 summit in Brazil or APEC summit in Peru. APEC is one of few international forums where both Taiwan and China take part.
The Democratic president will hand over the tense Taiwan issue to his successor, Democratic Vice President Kamala Harris or Republican former President Donald Trump, following the Nov. 5 election.
COMMENT – This will be a point of contention no matter who wins next Tuesday.
Authoritarianism
7. Hong Kong activist Chow Hang-tung barred from calling on overseas witnesses in national security case
Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, October 28, 2024
A Hong Kong court has barred activist Chow Hang-tung from calling on overseas witnesses to testify virtually in her national security trial.
A three-judge panel at the High Court handed down the decision on Monday, around 15 minutes after hearing Chow’s arguments that a new rule barring overseas witnesses from giving evidence in national security trials appeared to target her.
The rule was enacted under Article 23, the city’s homegrown national security law which came into effect in March. In Hong Kong, the prosecution or defence can typically apply for a witness to give evidence via live broadcast. But per an amendment to the Criminal Procedure Ordinance, the court cannot allow this if the trial concerns national security.
Chow, who was the vice-chair of the group that used to organise the city’s annual Tiananmen crackdown vigils, stands accused of inciting subversion of state power under the Beijing-imposed national security law between July 1, 2020 and September 8, 2021.
She was charged in September 2021 alongside Lee Cheuk-yan and Albert Ho, as well as the group itself. Neither Lee nor Ho participated in Chow’s application for overseas witnesses to be allowed to testify, judge Alex Lee confirmed.
All three activists have been detained in the lead up to the trial, which is expected to begin next May and take 75 days.
Chow told the court she intended to summon five people to testify: American political science professor Larry Diamond; the artist behind a well-known Tiananmen crackdown statue Jens Galschiot; and Chinese activists Fang Zheng, Zhou Fengsuo, Wu’erkaixi. Except for Diamond, all had been denied entry to Hong Kong before, she said.
COMMENT – Just like the Mainland, Hong Kong courts only have the veneer of due process and justice.
8. Ex-editor of Hong Kong media outlet Stand News Patrick Lam seeks to overturn sedition conviction
James Lee, Hong Kong Free Press, October 23, 2024
9. No time limit for prosecuting remaining 7,000 arrested over 2019 protests, Hong Kong officials say
Kelly Ho, Hong Kong Free Press, October 29, 2024
10. Local Officials Call Women to Ask: "Are You Pregnant?"
Alexander Boyd, China Digital Times, October 24, 2024
One of the latest trends on Chinese social media platform Xiaohongshu is for women to share complaints about pushy government inquiries on whether they are pregnant or plan to be soon. The Chinese government has responded to two straight years of population decline with a pro-natalist push.
On Xiaohongshu, women have been sharing stories of receiving calls from local government officials asking deeply personal questions such as: “Are you pregnant? Do you plan to be? Do you have a boyfriend?” Some even report officials demanding they stop raising pets and focus on child-rearing instead.
COMMENT – The Handmaid’s Tale with Chinese Characteristics.
11. Reading Red on Cross-Strait Relations
Dalia Parete and David Bandurski, China Media Project, October 23, 2024
12. Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi meet, 2 days after a China-India border deal
Liu Zhen, South China Morning Post, October 24, 2024
13. New US president must send Beijing, Taiwan clear signals to cut ‘escalation risks’: report
Dewey Sim, South China Morning Post, October 23, 2024
European think tank says Washington’s dual deterrence strategy is ‘the only viable basis for preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait’.
The next United States president must make clear that Washington does not seek Beijing’s collapse and should not encourage efforts for Taiwanese independence, a recent think tank report suggested.
The suggestions were made in a report published last week by the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, which warned that the strategic rivalry between the world’s two largest economies was set to intensify, no matter who takes office.
The report suggested that while the candidates – Democrat Kamala Harris and Republican Donald Trump – might differ in their approach towards China, both shared a view that it is a “chief strategic competitor” for the US, and that the next US leader must act to minimise “escalation risks”.
The report described the existing “dual deterrence” strategy on Taiwan as “the only viable basis for preserving peace across the Taiwan Strait”.
COMMENT – A “dual deterrence” approach is foolish and dangerous.
We should be clear about what the Chinese Communist Party wants with regard to Taiwan, they want “regime change” and they threaten to use force to achieve it.
It makes zero sense to deter the victim of aggression from defending itself. All that does is legitimize the CCP’s meta-narrative that Taiwan belongs to them, that the Taiwanese people have no right to make their own decisions about how they govern themselves. Legitimizing the CCP’s “one China” principal only undermines the UN Charter, as well as the foundations of our post-colonial international system.
Instead of legitimatizing Beijing’s coercion and aggression against its neighbor, a vibrant democracy with a fully functioning government and cultural identity, the International Crisis Group should be calling on Beijing to abandon its imperialist desires to annex Taiwan. The Taiwanese people are allowed to choose their own form of government, and the rest of the world should speak with one voice to Beijing that threatening to launch a war of aggression to seize Taiwan will not be tolerated.
“Dual deterrence” is what got us into this dangerous situation.
By pretending that the Chinese Communist Party’s fantasy of “one China” is legitimate, we have encouraged Chinese leaders to believe their own propaganda and provided them with a plausible rationale for using force against Taiwan.
Instead of “dual deterrence,” leaders from around the world should be reminding the PRC of its responsibilities under the UN Charter (namely Article 33 and their responsibility to settle disputes peacefully). The so-called “Taiwan problem” is NOT a domestic matter for Beijing to settle unilaterally, but a matter of international peace and security (no matter how many Anti-Secession Laws Beijing passes).
Since transitioning to democracy in the mid-1990s and over the course of the last eight presidential elections, the Taiwanese people have made one thing crystal clear: they wish to govern themselves.
The concept of self-determination is the bedrock of our post-colonial international system (governing oneself is NOT a threat to peace, declaring independence is NOT a threat to peace), if the Taiwanese people want to govern themselves, then the Chinese Communist Party has no business telling them otherwise and they certainly have no legitimate reason to threaten the use of force.
The reason the CCP wants to annex Taiwan and end its democratic governmence is that the CCP fears that the example of Taiwan might inspire the Party’s own citizens to question the CCP’s monopoly hold on power inside the PRC.
By quibbling on principal, the International Crisis Group perpetuates the threat to peace.
14. Tibetan monks’ phones seized after accusations of sharing news about school closures
Radio Free Asia, October 24, 2024
15. Americans Who Want to Do Business in China Need to Meet This Man
Lingling Wei, Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2024
16. China takes down fake news about its military, closes social media accounts
Phoebe Zhang, South China Morning Post, October 29, 2024
17. How a Chinese high-school student left home for a new life in Italy
Wang Yun, Radio Free Asia, October 26, 2024
People continue to flee China in droves, citing political suppression and lack of economic opportunities.
It was a clear September afternoon with the Alps clearly visible in the distance when 16-year-old Tang crossed the border from neighboring Slovenia into Italy just over a month ago.
“I’m finally free!” he told himself at the time. “I’m going to Italy to see the sea!”
Tang’s journey to “freedom”— as he described it — had taken him thousands of kilometers, through eight countries, across several time zones, before he finally set foot in Italy.
“I went from mainland China to Hong Kong, from Hong Kong to Malaysia, from Malaysia to Singapore, from Singapore to Mumbai, from Mumbai to Abu Dhabi, from Abu Dhabi to Sarajevo; from Sarajevo to Bihać, the border city of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” he told RFA Mandarin’s Newcomers podcast. “From there, I sneaked across the border into Croatia, then to Slovenia, to Milan.”
“Then I moved to this city near the border because there aren’t so many people here, and there weren’t any beds in Milan,” said Tang, who asked to be identified only by a nickname for fear of reprisals.
Tang is just one among hundreds of thousands of Chinese nationals to join the mass exodus from their country, a phenomenon known in China as the "run" movement that took off during the grueling lockdowns, mass incarceration in quarantine camps and compulsory testing under Xi Jinping’s zero-COVID policy. The government abruptly ended the policy following nationwide protests known as the "white paper” movement in 2022.
Many migrants travel first to territories that have visa waiver programs for Chinese passport-holders, before joining people-smuggling operations to get them further towards their ultimate goal, often political asylum in the United States.
COMMENT – So much for the China Dream, huh?
I think it’s difficult to understand just how significant this exodus of young Chinese from the PRC is. We may be dissatisfied with the state of our democracies and CCP propaganda seeks to convince us that the PRC is doing much better, but clearly hundreds of thousands of young Chinese do not believe it.
The more that the Chinese Communist Party tightens its grip for the benefit of the Party and Xi Jinping’s rule, the more that average Chinese citizens will conclude that the Party is leading them into a dead end.
18. China’s Latest Security Target: Halloween Partygoers
Vivian Wang and Muyi Xiao, New York Times, October 29, 2024
Environmental Harms
19. How American Tax Breaks Brought a Chinese Solar Energy Giant to Ohio
Bloomberg, October 28, 2024
Foreign Interference and Coercion
20. Hong Kong offices in U.S. promote Beijing's agenda, report alleges
Kenji Kawase, Nikkei Asia, October 30, 2024
Hong Kong authorities are trying to influence U.S. society and national politics by using their established local network to promote their own narrative and the Chinese Communist Party's agenda, a Washington-based activist group alleges in a report.
In the report, "The S.A.R. Network: Uncovering the Hong Kong Government's Subnational Foreign-Influence Campaign in America," published on Tuesday in the U.S., the Hong Kong Democracy Council documents various activities in the U.S. by the city's government.
Hong Kong Democracy Council, October 2024
This report focuses on attempts by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (S.A.R.) government to build ties with American civil-society actors and local governments, tying these efforts to comprehensive attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) to influence American politics.
The contents of this report are a summary of findings about efforts by S.A.R. government entities and their cutouts to influence the American public and politics at the subnational level.
They cover the activities of three different types of organizations involved in these efforts: S.A.R. government entities, Hong Kong Associations, and C.C.P.-affiliated organizations from mainland China. The relevant entities and activities form the “S.A.R. Network.”
This report expands upon the work in HKDC’s 2023 report, The Counter-Lobby Confidential: How Beltway Insiders Do the Hong Kong Government's Bidding, as well as the documentation outlined in HKDC’s Hong Kong S.A.R. Government Influence Database.
Key Takeaways
Over the past decade, the S.A.R. government has cultivated U.S. ties at the state and local levels using government organizations and astroturf groups (the “S.A.R. network”) as part of a broader national foreign influence campaign.
The three Hong Kong Economic and Trade Offices in New York, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. have played a central role in the formation of the S.A.R. network, financially supporting astroturf groups and hiring American political consultants to spread propaganda at the local level.
The S.A.R. network strategically targets media, think tanks, and business communities at the subnational level, where the S.A.R. government’s efforts are less likely to be noticed by China watchers and human rights defenders.
The S.A.R. network relentlessly pushes pro-C.C.P. propaganda, promoting C.C.P. foreign policy priorities like the Belt & Road Initiative, maligning Hong Kong’s democratic movement, and whitewashing the S.A.R. government’s human rights abuses.
Policy Recommendations
For Congress: Revoke the privileges of the H.K.E.T.O.s by passing the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office Certification Act.
For the Administration: The Department of Justice should designate the Hong Kong Associations and similar organizations as foreign agents under FARA. Strengthen capacity in combating foreign influence.
For politicians, think tanks, media, and other U.S. organizations: Conduct background research before endorsing, partnering up, or engaging with relevant organizations.
22. The Covert War for American Minds
David R. Shedd and Ivana Stradner, Foreign Affairs, October 29, 2024
23. Can BRICS Finally Take on the West?
Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, October 21, 2024
24. The Changing Dynamics of China’s Threat Perception toward India
Soumyodeep Deb and Li Jiayue, National Bureau of Asian Research, October 29, 2024
25. China’s emergence in the global order
Lt Gen S L Narasimhan, Gateway House, October 23, 2024
26. The Next U.S. Administration and China Policy
International Crisis Group, October 17, 2024
Strategic competition between the U.S. and China is poised to intensify whether former President Donald Trump or Vice President Kamala Harris assumes the U.S. presidency in January 2025. Distrust between the two countries is strong, growing and multifaceted. Foreign policy observers across the political spectrum in Washington assess that China is striving to overtake the U.S. as the world’s leading power, while Chinese President Xi Jinping charges that the U.S. aims to constrain China’s development. While U.S. analysts agree that Beijing is Washington’s foremost challenger, a second Trump administration and a Harris administration would likely take very different approaches to China. Regardless of who wins November’s election, the next U.S. administration should pursue a tenable cohabitation that enables Washington and Beijing to compete responsibly, reduce the risk of armed conflict and protect space for bilateral cooperation. Ways to buttress that effort include preserving key elements of the political status quo around Taiwan, expanding communication channels to Beijing and making clear that the U.S. does not seek a Cold War-style victory over China.
The world’s two most powerful countries are increasingly at odds, with several issues straining their highly consequential relationship. Taiwan remains the most contentious: China is becoming more assertive in pressing its claim to the island, testing the decades-old U.S. policy of “dual deterrence” that seeks to deter China from attacking and Taiwan from making moves toward formal independence. The near-term risk of war over Taiwan may be low, but it is growing. Maritime disputes in the South China Sea, especially between China and the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, are also escalating. The dynamics that fuel these disputes will make armed conflict increasingly likely absent reciprocal, reinforcing steps by leaders in Washington and Beijing to dial down tensions in Asia. The two countries are competing in numerous other ways as well: to drive leading-edge technological innovation, to cultivate economic and diplomatic influence in the developing world and to promulgate a compelling conception of international order.
With the U.S. presidential election taking place in early November, stewardship of this important relationship will soon pass to either former President Trump or Vice President Harris – the two of whom have distinct policy inclinations that will be important for U.S. allies, partners and competitors – including, importantly, Beijing – to understand. Three points typify Trump’s likely approach. First, he mainly views U.S.-China relations through the lens of trade, and he seems committed to accelerating economic decoupling between Washington and Beijing. Secondly, his first administration and his campaign statements underscore a fundamentally transactional mindset, whereby he subordinates most other objectives – strengthening U.S. alliances and partnerships in Asia and improving human rights conditions inside China, for example – to that of creating what he sees as a more balanced economic relationship with Beijing.
Thirdly, there is a level of unpredictability at work, not only because the former president has staked out contradictory positions over time – whether on his relationship with Xi or his feelings about the social media platform TikTok – but also because the advisers who would likely help him develop and shape China policy have divergent views on how to characterise and manage the competitive challenge that Beijing poses. With such a team of rivals giving him counsel, Trump’s own, sometimes idiosyncratic, decision-making would play a key role in setting the administration’s course on China policy.
As for Harris’s likely approach, it would likely draw from her background as the child of civil rights advocates and as a practicing lawyer. This background suggests an interest in issues of human rights and international law, which provide ample fodder for bilateral frictions – though she also has a pragmatic streak, suggesting that she would look for ways to keep the relationship on an even keel. Another theme that emerges is continuity with the Biden administration. Having helped drive the administration’s effort to rebalance U.S. foreign policy despite turbulence in Europe and the Middle East, the Harris team would likely aim to build on that legacy, which includes a three-pronged approach to China: invest in U.S. capacity at home, align with allies and partners and compete with Beijing where warranted.
Still, a Harris administration would likely contemplate some “dial shifting” of the policy that it would inherit. On export controls, for example, it might seek to work with multilateral groupings of like-minded countries to shore up aspects of the current restrictions that are not having their intended effect. It might also aim to recalibrate the U.S. approach to countries in the so-called Global South. Some of these countries contend that the U.S. views them narrowly through the lens of strategic competition with China, focusing on leveraging bilateral relations to get a leg up on Beijing. Conscious that this impression can damage U.S. interests, Harris might invest more effort in developing relationships that revolve less around big-power competition.
Much as the candidates may differ in style and approach, whoever wins should start with a realistic assessment of Washington’s competitor. Beijing is neither gliding toward hegemony nor staring down decline, contrary to assessments that have gained widespread traction in the U.S.; instead, it is likely to prove an enduring competitor on several fronts, one with which the U.S. will remain highly interdependent. However reluctant the two countries may be to countenance cohabitation, that outcome for their relationship is the most probable.
The winning candidate can take several steps that would help U.S. policy reflect this likelihood, while still preserving space that both Trump and Harris would likely see as necessary to compete with China and advance U.S. interests. They include working to enhance “dual deterrence” of both Beijing and Taipei, an approach that has governed U.S. policy toward Taiwan for 45 years; deepening communications between the U.S. and Chinese militaries; making greater use of the back channel that high-level U.S. and Chinese officials have used for decades to hold essential discussions in confidence; and avoiding intimations that the U.S. seeks to achieve a Cold War-style defeat of China.
The complex and often difficult relationship between the U.S. and China will likely test leaders in both Washington and Beijing for decades to come. As the next steward of the U.S. side of that relationship comes to power in early 2025, he or she should take these and other steps in the interest of stability that would serve both countries – and the wider world.
COMMENT - Its always fun to read policy advice from a group that is detached from reality.
27. Bots Linked to China Target Republican House and Senate Candidates, Microsoft Says
Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, October 23, 2024
28. How Russia, China and Iran Are Interfering in the Presidential Election
Sheera Frenkel, Tiffany Hsu, and Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, October 29, 2024
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
29. Uyghur activist accuses Labour of failing to stand up to China
Geneva Abdul, The Guardian, October 22, 2024
30. Holy See: Agreement with China Should Promote Rights
Human Rights Watch, October 28, 2024
31. Chinese authorities are once again unreasonably suppressing and persecuting human rights lawyers
Human Rights in China, Twitter/X, October 29, 2024
32. Today, Yu Wensheng and Xu Yan were sentenced to 3 years and 1 year, 9 months, respectively, for "inciting subversion of state power."
Human Rights in China, Twitter/X, October 29, 2024
33. Activists fasting to support jailed dissident Xu Zhiyong’s hunger strike
Sun Cheng, Radio Free Asia, October 28, 2024
34. Condemned Uyghur official dies in prison in China’s Xinjiang region
Radio Free Asia, October 22, 2024
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
35. German car industry and politicians slam EU tariffs on Chinese EVs
Jens Kastner, Nikkei Asia, October 30, 2024
36. Priced-out European airlines cut Chinese routes over winter
Jens Kastner, Nikkei Asia, October 29, 2024
37. US Efforts to Contain Xi’s Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering
Bloomberg, October 30, 2024
38. China’s economic stimulus isn’t enough to overcome that sinking feeling
Jeremy Mark, Atlantic Council, October 21, 2024
39. Staying Ahead in the Global Technology Race
CSIS Economic Security and Technology Department, October 29, 2024
40. From Brussels with leverage: How the EU is recalibrating its China strategy
Janka Oertel, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 24, 2024
41. READOUT: Sixth Meeting of the Economic Working Group Between the United States and the People’s Republic of China
U.S. Department of the Treasury, October 25, 2024
The United States and the People’s Republic of China held the sixth meeting of the Economic Working Group (EWG) in Washington on the sidelines of the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings on October 25th, co-led by Jay Shambaugh, Under Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Treasury, and Liao Min, Vice Minister of Finance at China’s Ministry of Finance.
The two sides discussed recent macroeconomic policy developments in the United States and China, including China’s recently announced stimulus measures. The two sides also discussed areas of cooperation including how to support low-income countries facing liquidity challenges. The U.S. side continued to raise concerns related to China’s industrial overcapacity and its impact on U.S. workers and firms.
U.S Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen also received a brief update from the EWG on its discussions. She emphasized the importance of the EWG as a resilient channel of communication between the U.S. and China.
The EWG is one of two working groups formed by Secretary Yellen and Vice Premier He Lifeng of the People’s Republic of China last September. The EWG reports directly to Secretary Yellen and Vice Premier He.
COMMENT - I think its remarkable that Secretary Yellen’s Treasury Department is continuing to conduct meetings with their PRC counterparts like its business as usual.
The PRC government is revealed to be purposefully interfering in the election and they carry out senior level Economic Working Group meetings like everything is hunky-dory.
This is a serious question: Under what circumstances would the U.S. Treasury consider calling off these meetings?
Would the PRC have to sink an American ship or shoot down an aircraft for folks like Janet Yellen and Jay Shambaugh to say to themselves… gee maybe we shouldn’t meet with them about furthering a mutually beneficial economic relationship when they are openly attacking us?
This is the problem when an Administration has two, contradictory policies: a policy championed by the National Security Advisor to compete with the PRC and a second policy championed by the Treasury Secretary to build a mutually beneficial economic relationship with the PRC.
Hopefully, the next Administration can resolve this contradiction… it appears beyond Biden’s grasp.
42. China Issues New Export Control Regulations: What Businesses Need to Know?
Giulia Interesse, China Briefing, October 23, 2024
43. HSBC Hong Kong joins China’s alternative to Swift global payments system
Kaye Wiggins, Financial Times, October 24, 2024
44. China’s Top Oil Companies Turn in Mixed Results Amid Weak Demand
Kimberley Kao, Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2024
45. China loses third of its billionaires as economy falters
Joe Leahy, Financial Times, October 28, 2024
46. Why Europe’s car crisis is mostly made in China
Kana Inagaki, Edward White, and Sarah White, Financial Times, October 28, 2024
47. China’s largest coffee chain plans to take on Starbucks in US
Eleanor Olcott and Gregory Meyer, Financial Times, October 28, 2024
48. China sharpens edge in global trade with zero-tariff deal for developing world
Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, October 30, 2024
49. Exclusive: China considers over $1.4 trillion in extra debt over next few years
Reuters, October 29, 2024
50. TSMC Chips Ended Up in Devices Made by China’s Huawei Despite U.S. Controls
Meaghan Tobin, Ana Swanson, John Liu, and Amy Chang Chien, New York Times, October 29, 2024
51. Spain Opens Its Doors to China as a European Trade War Looms
Patricia Cohen, New York Times, October 30, 2024
52. Europe Imposes Higher Tariffs on Electric Vehicles Made in China
Melissa Eddy and Jenny Gross, New York Times, October 30, 2024
53. EU still has key role as US-China bridge as it ‘does not challenge either on tech’
Cyril Ip, South China Morning Post, October 31, 2024
54. China's looming fiscal package set to stabilise rather than boost growth
Kevin Yao and Ziyi Tang, Reuters, October 30, 2024
55. China’s industrial profits plunge as economic momentum falters
Thomas Hale, Financial Times, October 27, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
56. Apple Ships $6 Billion of iPhones From India in Big China Shift
Sankalp Phartiyal, Bloomberg, October 28, 2024
57. With Dreams of a Lunar Outpost, China Takes New Risks in Space Race with U.S.
Brian Spegele and Clarence Leong, Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2024
58. US finalizes rules to curb AI investments in China, impose other restrictions
David Shepardson, Michael Martina, and Trevor Hunnicutt, Reuters, October 28, 2024
59. Intel invests US$300 million in China chip packaging and testing plant
Coco Feng, South China Morning Post, October 28, 2024
60. Chinese plane designed to travel twice as fast as Concorde completes test flight
Zhang Tong, South China Morning Post, October 30, 2024
Military and Security Threats
61. Taiwan says China deployed jets and drones after latest US arms sales
AFP, Hong Kong Free Press, October 27, 2024
62. The Risk of Another Korean War Is Higher Than Ever
Robert A. Manning, Foreign Policy, October 7, 2024
63. CCP Political Warfare: Federal Agencies Urgently Need a Government-Wide Strategy
House Committee on Oversight and Accountability, October 24, 2024
64. DoD Releases National Defense Industrial Strategy Implementation Plan
U.S. Department of Defense, October 29, 2024
65. Chinese hackers breach parts of US telecom system, target Trump, Harris campaigns
Jeff Seldin, Voice of America, October 25, 2024
Hackers linked to the Chinese government have broken into parts of the U.S. telecommunications system in a breach that might be connected to an attempt to access data from the presidential campaigns of Republican nominee Donald Trump and Democratic nominee Kamala Harris.
The FBI and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency late Friday said they were investigating "unauthorized access" to commercial telecommunications infrastructure, attributing the attack to Chinese-affiliated actors.
The agencies said they immediately notified affected companies once the breach was detected and had offered assistance, though there might be additional victims.
"The investigation is ongoing, and we encourage any organization that believes it might be a victim to engage its local FBI field office or CISA," the statement said.
"Agencies across the U.S. government are collaborating to aggressively mitigate this threat and are coordinating with our industry partners to strengthen cyber defenses across the commercial communications sector," it added.
The Chinese Embassy in Washington dismissed the U.S. hacking allegations as disinformation, calling the U.S. "the origin and the biggest perpetrator of cyberattacks."
"For some time, the U.S. has compiled and spread all kinds of disinformation about the so-called Chinese hacking threats," said embassy spokesperson Liu Pengyu in an email to VOA.
"China's position is consistent and clear," he said. "China firmly opposes and combats cyberattacks and cyber theft in all forms."
Word of the breach linked to China followed a report by The New York Times on Friday that Chinese hackers are thought to have broken into telecommunications networks to target the Trump campaign.
People familiar with the investigation told the Times that the Chinese hackers specifically looked to access data from phones used by Trump and his running mate, Republican Senator JD Vance.
Separately, a person familiar with the investigation told VOA that people affiliated with the campaign of Vice President Harris were also targeted.
COMMENT - I wonder what our response will be… to date we have seemed to shrug our shoulders at these deliberate efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States.
My advice to business leaders and investors with exposure in the PRC is to reduce their exposure… at some point these activities will illicit a response from the United States and you will only have yourselves to blame when you are caught in the crossfire.
66. Election shock in key US ally Japan could embolden China, other rivals
Tim Kelly, Reuters, October 28, 2024
67. China arrests South Korean chip engineer on espionage charges
Christian Davies, Song Jung-a, and Ryan McMorrow, Financial Times, October 29, 2024
68. Elon Musk’s SpaceX, Already a Leader in Satellites, Gets Into the Spy Game
Eric Lipton, New York Times, October 30, 2024
69. Trump Family Members and Biden Aides Among China Hack Targets
Devlin Barrett, Ben Protess, and Maggie Haberman, New York Times, October 29, 2024
70. U.S. Panel to Probe Cyber Failures in Massive Chinese Hack of Telecoms
Dustin Volz, Wall Street Journal, October 27, 2024
71. Pentagon Runs Low on Air-Defense Missiles as Demand Surges
Nancy A. Youssef and Gordon Lubold, Wall Street Journal, October 29, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
72. Brazil won’t join China’s BRI, 2nd BRICS nation after India to do so
PTI, Tribune, October 30, 2024
In a major setback to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Brazil has decided against joining Beijing’s multi-billion-dollar initiative, becoming the second country after India in the BRICS bloc not to endorse the mega project.
Brazil, headed by President Lula da Silva, will not join the BRI and instead seek alternative ways to collaborate with Chinese investors, Celso Amorim, special presidential adviser for international affairs, said on Monday.
Brazil wanted to “take the relationship with China to a new level, without having to sign an accession contract”, he told a Brazilian newspaper. “We are not entering into a treaty,” Amorim said, explaining that Brazil did not want to take Chinese infrastructure and trade projects as “an insurance policy”.
COMMENT – Quite the setback as Xi prepares for his visit to Brazil.
73. China’s language diplomacy in Papua New Guinea
Bernard Yegiora, Lowy Institute, October 28, 2024
Opinion Pieces
74. ‘This is treason’: Chinese agents are running Canada
Daniel Dorman, The Telegraph, October 31, 2024
Election meddling and politicians handled by foreign intelligence agencies.
Canadian democracy is in serious trouble. Based on a report released earlier this year, it appears that not only has China extensively interfered in Canadian institutions (particularly during the last federal election), but that Members of Parliament have willingly colluded with various foreign powers against Canada’s interests for personal benefit. The story grows stranger by the day as Canada’s ongoing public inquiry into foreign interference reveals the troubling extent of the problem and as politicians use the inquiry for political theatre. Canadians risk losing track of just how serious the threat is and just how devastating the revelations of the report released earlier this year should be.
On June 3, Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), an advisory committee to the Prime Minister, released a heavily redacted report outlining frightening instances of China’s interference in Canada’s democratic process. These include the creation of community organisations to interfere in specific electoral districts, the defrauding of a nomination election to install a pro-China candidate, and the practice of Chinese proxies skirting election finance laws by encouraging individuals to donate to a specific candidate with a promise they will be paid back.
It’s disheartening to hear of significant foreign interference in Canadian elections, but it’s absolutely devastating to watch the Prime Minister (whose party benefited from Chinese interference in the last election) shrug, attempt multiple cover-ups, and fail to defend Canadian sovereignty. Canadian democracy can’t survive if those tasked with defending it are disloyal, dishonest, and naive.
Perhaps the most disturbing part of the report is a redacted case study in which an unknown Member of Parliament is said to have “maintained a relationship with a foreign intelligence officer” and to have “proactively provided the intelligence officer with information provided in confidence.”
As Canadian national security expert Wesley Wark wrote: “There is no other word for it. This is treason.”
Opposition MPs have demanded that the redacted names of Parliamentarians who “wittingly assisted foreign state actors” be named, but the Government has staunchly refused to release any further information, citing national security concerns and the desire not to undermine due process of any ongoing criminal investigations.
However, the report itself says that instances where MPs knowingly participated in the efforts of foreign states to interfere in Canada are unlikely to lead to criminal charges despite the fact that some of the MPs’ behaviour “may be illegal”. NSICOP sanctimoniously reminds MPs that all such behaviours are “deeply unethical and… contrary to the oaths and affirmations Parliamentarians take to conduct themselves in the best interest of Canada,” but a finger-wagging in a committee report is hardly a fitting punishment for treason.
The government only seriously responded to the threat of foreign interference after an intelligence officer leaked documents indicating the depth of Chinese interference to the Globe and Mail in February of 2023. Since then, Prime Minister Trudeau has dragged his feet every step of the way.
He attempted to avoid an independent public inquiry into foreign interference by appointing former Governor General David Johnston, a friend of the Trudeau family and a man with clear ties to China, to the invented role of “Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference.” To his credit, Johnston eventually resigned from the role recognising the controversy surrounding his appointment prevented him from doing the job.
When Johnston resigned and Trudeau was forced to call a public inquiry, two discouraging things happened: First, the Government significantly expanded the mandate for the inquiry, indicating yet another instance of obfuscation from the core issue of Chinese interference in our recent elections. Second, the commissioner of the inquiry, Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, allowed three Canadian politicians with ties to the Chinese government to stand in the inquiry (granting them access to confidential documents and the capacity to cross examine witnesses). The presence of these individuals led two Chinese diaspora groups to refuse to participate, citing security concerns. With a truly tragic irony, even the inquiry meant to address foreign interference became a venue for repression and interference.
Following the interim report from the public inquiry, the government did table Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, but even here the efforts are minimal. As national security expert and Macdonald-Laurier Institute senior fellow Christian Leuprecht testified before the House of Commons Committee on National Security and Public safety, the bill “represents the absolute minimum the government would have to do anyway… only once its hand was forced.”
The Prime Minister’s abdication of responsibility also came through loud and clear in the NSICOP report itself. In a section titled “briefing parliamentarians,” it becomes clear that between 2018 and 2022 the Prime Minister received, and failed to respond to, at least four detailed reports from three different government bodies or advisors recommending that new MPs be briefed on risks of foreign interference. When asked why he didn’t act on these recommendations, Trudeau reportedly responded that he thought that the Parliamentary Protective Service already briefs new parliamentarians about foreign interference. That is shocking negligence.
Canadian democracy is flatlining and those tasked with defending it are at best asleep at the wheel and at worst complicit in its downfall.
COMMENT – What’s happened in Canada over the past decade is mindboggling. I simply cannot understand how Justin Trudeau is still holding public office.
75. Kevin Rudd on Xi Jinping
Catherine Putz, The Diplomat, October 23, 2024
76. Voices Series: Perspectives from the Indo-Pacific on the Next U.S. Administration
Kei Koga, Jasmine Lee, Ji-Young Lee, Lavina Lee, Rohan Mukherjee, Hanh Nguyen, and Yohanes Sulaiman, National Bureau of Asian Research, October 28, 2024
77. Has India made friends with China after the Modi-Xi agreement?
Tanvi Madan, Brookings Institution, October 29, 2024
78. A Biden-Starmer Giveaway Helps China
John Bolton, Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2024