MAGA+MIGA = MEGA Partnership

Modi Comes to Washington to Talk Trade (and China)

Friends,

I’m skiing with my family this weekend so I’m finishing this issue on Thursday evening just as I’m watching the Modi-Trump press conference. That means that if something happened on Friday or Saturday, I’ll catch it next week.

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Building off their relationship during President Trump’s first term, the meeting on Thursday between Prime Minister Modi and President Trump is likely the most consequential foreign leader meeting the President has had thus far.

It appears that President Trump sees Prime Minister Modi as his new principal partner… the role that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe played during the first term.

Reporter: “Mr. President, who is the tougher negotiator you or Prime Minister Modi?”

President Trump: “He is a much tougher negotiator, and a much better negotiator, than me. There is not even a contest.”

That is some high praise from Trump for Modi!

Prime Minister Modi comments that MAGA plus MIGA (Make India Great Again) equals a “MEGA-Partnership.”

India’s relationship with Moscow could create openings for negotiations on the Ukraine War and the potential for an Indian-American trade deal could upset Beijing’s calculus if Trump and Modi forge agreements that isolate Xi Jinping.

Modi’s visit builds off his Foreign Minister’s visit during the inauguration when S. Jaishankar, joined his Australian and Japanese counterparts to meet with Secretary of State Rubio for a Quad Foreign Minister Meeting, Rubio’s first high level meeting after being sworn in.

The Modi-Trump Press Conference provided a roadmap for what could take shape:

• Impose reciprocal tariffs on all U.S. trading partners.

• Negotiate first with India by increasing energy and defense exports.

• Trump and Modi team up to push for a Ukraine peace negotiation.

• Once that negotiation concludes and Trump restarts a U.S.-Russia relationship with the intention of isolating the PRC, then Washington turns its attention towards Beijing.

Going back to last week’s axioms, I think they stand up pretty well.

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Over the next few weeks and months, it might be helpful to start recalling the 2018 Section 301 investigation into the PRC’s ‘forced technology transfer’ activities, as well as the 2020 Phase One Trade Deal which appeared to pause the tensions between the U.S. and the PRC in January 2020, to only see them deteriorate during COVID.

The Congressional Research Office just provided a helpful memorandum summarizing the issues that you might want to brush up on: Section 301 and China: The U.S.-China Phase One Trade Deal (Karen Sutter, Congressional Research Service, February 12, 2025)

I hear that Wang Yi, the PRC Foreign Minister might be making a trip to New York this weekend or next week (he was in the UK last week for the first talks with a UK Foreign Secretary in a decade and then to Dublin). Rubio and Wang Yi spoke on the phone three weeks ago, the conversation that the PRC side let slip that Wang had scolded Rubio to behave himself.

Will the two meet if Wang Yi stops in New York after Europe… or will Wang Yi try to rekindle the National Security Advisor channel that he had with Jake Sullivan by reaching out to Mike Waltz.

We will just have to wait and see.

***

For those who want to support the work of this newsletter, please contribute by signing up for a paid subscription.

Thanks for reading!

Matt

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MUST READ

1. How I Accidentally Became Part of China’s PR Campaign
   Jacqueline Cole, The Assembly, February 5, 2025

Dozens of Duke University students signed up for a free trip to China. Even the university was surprised by what happened when we got there.

Duke University junior Kyle Abrahm was about to shotgun a can of Pabst Blue Ribbon on the last day of classes in 2024—an end-of-semester ritual on the engineering quad—when his buddy, Matthew Rodriguez, asked if he had “signed up for China.”

Abrahm had not signed up, nor did he know what Rodriguez was talking about. But he found the email from the school’s campus in China—Duke Kunshan University or DKU for short—took 30 seconds to fill out the attached application form, and proceeded to chug his PBR.

The email encouraged students to apply for a week-long trip to Jiangsu province, with all costs covered by the Jiangsu Foreign Affairs Office. Dozens of other Duke students received the invitation from professors or friends. I was one of them. So was Sophia Lehrman, a close friend whose “how can we turn down a free trip?” energy pushed me to click the button. Chinese is my minor and I have spent more than a decade learning the language. A chance to visit for free in the summer before my senior year at Duke was too good to pass up.

By August, the four of us were among 70 students en route to China for the eight-day tour. Most of us had no idea what to expect.

My first clue that this wasn’t just a sightseeing opportunity was in an email full of disclaimers that arrived at 5:36 a.m. as I was sitting at my gate in LaGuardia Airport, knees propped on my carry-on bag.

“Notice: Media Coverage During Collegiate Immersion Bootcamp,” read the subject line.

The notice, sent from DKU’s Office of International Relations, alerted us that professional photographers and videographers from DKU and local Jiangsu media would join us on portions of the trip.

Some of the footage, it said, “may be utilized as part of our promotional efforts, showcased across our social media platforms, and shared through various communication outlets.”

I would quickly discover why Duke’s China campus sent this last-minute alert. Upon landing, we were met by our tour guide, Frank—and a camera crew. Like others on the trip, I would soon be hounded by Chinese TV crews.

“From the second we stepped into the airport, we were asked to hold a banner and there was a media crew of at least five people holding cameras and interviewing us,” Lehrman recalled.

I came to feel that the trip had two purposes: Yes, we were there to explore a mammoth country with a culture and government unlike the United States. But it also felt like we were helping promote the Chinese government. Many other students felt the same way.

Duke and DKU have since acknowledged mistakes in how they ran the program. They say they didn’t know the Chinese media would be bombarding us and will not let that occur on future trips.

“We were surprised at the media’s intrusive behavior, and we sincerely hope that it did not detract from the overall value of the trip,” said Lydia Jin, senior director at DKU’s Office of Communications & Public Affairs. “We intend to run the program again this year, but based on multiple inputs, we will set some boundaries on Chinese media access to student participants.”

The Chinese Embassy in Washington told me that although there was local coverage of our visit, the goal was “encouraging more people to learn, cherish and support the long-standing friendship between China and the U.S. and to better understand each other.”

The 50,000 Initiative

Looking back, obtaining visas, often a lengthy ordeal, had been surprisingly easy. The whole trip was that way.

“They’re planning everything for me,” Abrahm, now a senior, remembers thinking. “Like, I’ll bring 100 U.S. dollars and just see where this takes me.”

Hours after arriving in Shanghai, we traveled south to Kunshan and moved into the suite-style dorms at DKU’s campus, our home base for the first few days of the trip. The campus, a partnership between Duke in Durham and Wuhan University in China, features sleek glass buildings and tranquil water gardens covered in lily pads.

Duke is one of a handful of universities that have campuses in China. New York University has a Shanghai campus, and Kean University in New Jersey has one, too. When then-Duke President Richard Brodhead announced the plans for DKU in 2012, he said that “through DKU, Duke will play a leadership role in creating new models of world-class higher education in China, introducing students and faculty to Duke’s signature strengths of liberal arts education and the interdisciplinary study of contemporary problems.”

China has had strained relationships with several U.S. administrations, but student exchange programs have sometimes been a symbolic effort to open up the country. Recently, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “50,000 initiative” seeks to bring that number of young Americans to his country by 2028. An article in Yibiao Magazine, a U.S. publication that focuses on human rights in China, said that at least five American student groups visited the country in January 2024, including students from Columbia University, table-tennis players from Virginia, and high school students from Iowa. The article said the motive for the group visits was to give students a positive view of the country.

Evan Osborne, an economics professor at Wright State University who co-wrote the article, told me, “People who are there are there to serve the interest of the Communist party—not willingly, or even knowingly, necessarily, but that’s why they are there.”

“There’s no genuine cultural exchange,” said Jeanette Tong, the other co-writer, who works at Citizen Power Initiatives for China, a pro-democracy group. “Everything has an agenda behind it.”

She said university students are seen as a good fit for such promotional tours: young, influenceable subjects, with deep pockets to fund these kinds of trips. Governments that host such exchanges are aiming for what she referred to as the “pebble effect.” One student comes back from their trip with a positive impression of the country and tells 10 friends. Each one tells 10 more. The impact is exponential.

Among the 70 students on our trip, 62 attend Duke in Durham. The remaining seven were from other American schools, including Columbia University and the University of Michigan.

Nowhere in Duke’s brief description of the program, nor the emails leading up to it, nor the pre-departure Zoom session, was the 50,000 Initiative mentioned. Duke’s website said we would “not only witness and experience the unique charm of Chinese culture firsthand but also gain insights into the groundbreaking advancements China has made in the field of technological innovation.”

In addition to giving us a rosy view of China, the Chinese media also sought to show their viewers a group of Americans who were impressed with their culture. It’s not clear how much Duke or DKU initially knew about this effort. But as DKU representatives became aware that the trip could become a week-long photo shoot, they alerted us with that 5:36 a.m. email.

“While DKU and Duke supported student recruitment and support, we weren’t involved in the media aspects and didn’t receive advance information on promotion or media presence,” Duke spokesman Frank Tramble told The Assembly. “We were surprised of their presence as well.”

In theory, our trip could have been a sincere attempt at mending decades of tension between China and the United States. But the lack of details from the start should have made us wary that it was more than an innocent tour of museums and canals.

“China is a totalitarian country where everything of consequence is controlled by the communist party,” said Osborne.

COMMENT – Let this be a lesson to university administrators who encourage these programs.

2. China 2035: The Chances of Success
   François Godement and Pierre Pinhas, Institut Montaigne, January 1, 2025

In a sense, predictability has been the hallmark of Xi Jinping's era, thanks to a highly centralized power structure and relentless surveillance -but even so, China continues to keep the world on edge. In pursuit of the goal of achieving "socialist modernization" by 2035, China is prioritizing new technologies, striving to reach self-sufficiency, and making national security an unyielding focus. Nevertheless, the contradictions are evident-for all that China appears to demonstrate unstoppable power. It is also grappling with a demographic decline, excessive savings, and the stifling effects of Xi’s recentralization.

Meanwhile, Taiwan’s "reunification" remains central to China’s grand vision, underscoring Beijing’s ambition to reshape global power dynamics. In terms of trade, China’s zero-sum approach-which takes more from global growth than it contributes to it-is leading to heightened tensions with international partners who are wary of its rise.

Four possible scenarios for China’s future loom on the horizon. In each of these scenarios, the actions of China’s partners and competitors matter as much to its future as China’s own actions will affect the world. Unless other countries can show genuine unity in creating alternatives and deterrents, China’s trajectory may well have redefined the global landscape by 2035.

Scenario n°1: A triumphant and largely prevailing China with a minimal foreign presence, able to coerce its partners and overshadow democratic systems,

Scenario n°2: Pushbacks without much coordination from partners, creating more irritants than genuinely effective barriers to Beijing’s ascent, yet with a somewhat preserved global geopolitical balance,

Scenario n°3: A coordinated global response, with alliances ranging from the transatlantic sphere to the middle and emerging powers, challenging China’s economic and strategic choices,

Scenario n°4: A major conflict, most likely over Taiwan, spiraling into a worldwide crisis that no one can fully contain. While all participants in the global economy would be impacted, a defeat for the People’s Republic of China would create major regime uncertainty.

COMMENT - Great work by the team at the Paris-based Institut Montaigne. I always take their analysis seriously.

3. Data-Centric Authoritarianism: How China’s Development of Frontier Technologies Could Globalize Repression
   Maya Nguyen, National Endowment for Democracy, February 11, 2025

Artificial intelligence (AI) and other technologies that collect and analyze digital data are transforming how autocrats work to stifle dissent. Today, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stands out for its quest to collect and leverage unprecedented types and volumes of data, from public and private sources and from within and beyond its borders, for social control.

Thus, it is especially critical for civil society and democratic governments to identify effective, forward-looking strategies for confronting the spread of data-centric authoritarianism and mitigating its adverse impacts on human rights and democracy.

COMMENT – As the National Endowment for Democracy faces funding freezes by DOGE, it is important to consider the research they have sponsored and the insights it provides. Considering the next article, if the U.S. Government won’t support this kind of research to shine a light on Beijing’s malign activities, it probably won’t get done, as independent organizations and researchers face legal threats from PRC entities that want their behavior to remain hidden.

4. Chinese Companies’ New Tactic to Stop Damaging Research: Legal Threats
   David McCabe and Tripp Mickle, New York Times, February 11, 2025

Think tanks and universities have helped expose problematic Chinese business practices. Now, those businesses are accusing them of defamation.

A little over a year ago, a group of researchers at Sheffield Hallam University in England published a report documenting a Chinese clothing company’s potential ties to forced labor. Members of the British Parliament cited the report ahead of a November debate that criticized China for “slavery and forced labor from another era.”

But Smart Shirts, which is a subsidiary of the manufacturer and makes clothing for major labels, filed a defamation lawsuit. And in December, a British judge delivered a ruling: The case would move forward, which could result in the university’s paying damages.

The preliminary finding in the case against the university is the latest in a series of legal challenges roiling the think tanks and universities that research human rights abuses and security violations by Chinese companies. To stop the unfavorable reports, which have led to political debate and in some cases export restrictions, the companies are firing back with defamation accusations.

Chinese companies have sued or sent threatening legal letters to researchers in the United States, Europe and Australia close to a dozen times in recent years in an attempt to quash negative information, with half of those coming in the past two years. The unusual tactic borrows from a playbook used by corporations and celebrities to discourage damaging news coverage in the media.

The budding legal tactic by Chinese firms could silence critics who shed light on problematic business practices inside one of the most powerful countries in the world, researchers warn. The legal action is having a chilling effect on their work, they say, and in many cases straining the finances of their organizations.

The problem has become so pronounced, the U.S. House of Representatives’ Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party held a hearing on the issue in September.

The researchers in these cases “are faced with a choice: Be silent and back down against the C.C.P.’s pressure campaign or continue to tell the truth and face the tremendous reputational and financial costs of these lawsuits alone,” the committee’s chair, Representative John Moolenaar, a Michigan Republican, said at the hearing.

He added, “The Chinese Communist Party uses the American legal system to silence those who might expose them in America.”

The battle between Chinese companies and critical researchers has escalated as tensions have mounted between the United States and China over trade, technology and territory.

Washington has taken steps to limit China’s access to resources like chips needed for artificial intelligence, and in recent days the Trump administration imposed a 10 percent tariff on all Chinese imports. Beijing countered with measures including limits on the export of rare earth minerals and an antimonopoly investigation into Google.

Over the past decade, researchers — relying primarily on publicly available records and photographs and videos — have documented problematic business practices in China. Those reports have helped show how products made for American and European companies benefited from an epidemic of forced labor by minority ethnic Uyghurs in China. Researchers have also shed light on potential security flaws, raising national security concerns, as well as problematic connections between companies and the government.

Now, Chinese corporations are increasingly hiring Western lawyers to combat those types of reports over allegations of defamation.

One of the first examples occurred in 2019 when Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications giant, threatened to sue the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, an Australian think tank. ASPI had released a report containing allegations that servers provided by Huawei to a coalition of African nations were sending data to Shanghai.

COMMENT – Resolving this will likely require broad statutory changes that deny PRC entities from being able to utilize U.S. and other Western legal systems.

5. U.S. chip curbs hit China harder than expected as TSMC treads carefully
   Cheng Ting-Fang, Nikkei Asia, February 8, 2025

Chinese developers beyond AI face supply disruption from strict compliance efforts.

The latest U.S. export controls on China's chip sector are causing more disruption than the industry expected, as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. takes an extremely cautious approach to ensure compliance, sources briefed on the matter said.

TSMC, the world's top contract chipmaker, has been informing Chinese customers that use the company's 16-nanometer or better production technologies that it cannot ship orders to them unless they use chip packaging services from a supplier on a U.S. "white list" of approved businesses, two people told Nikkei Asia.

6. China hawk picked for key US Commerce Dept job

Karen Freifeld, Reuters, February 12, 2025

President Donald Trump nominated Landon Heid, who served on the staff of the House of Representatives' Select Committee on China, for a key post in the U.S.-China tech battle.

Heid, a China hawk who helped set technology policy for the congressional committee, is being tapped to be assistant secretary of Commerce for export administration, according to a U.S. Senate filing. As such, he would help design export controls to keep AI chips, the equipment to make them and other technology from China and other countries.

COMMENT – Serious question: How does a media outlet decide that someone is a “China hawk”? Does Reuters have an internal set of guidelines that assign certain individuals this label? What is the alternative label?

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Authoritarianism

7. How not to get seduced by foreign spies: China’s spy agency
   Qian Lang, Radio Free Asia, February 7, 2025

Over WeChat, state security ministry warns people not to gossip or fall for ‘tall, beautiful people.’

Since China’s secretive spy agency -- the Ministry of State Security -- got itself a WeChat account, it has been churning out cautionary tales about spies as warnings to an unsuspecting public.

The account, set up in July 2023, was quiet at first, only publishing four warnings in all of last year. But it has stepped up activity in recent weeks, cranking out five warnings in January alone under the slogan “National Security is Everyone’s Responsibility.”

Recently, it warned people:

- not to get seduced by “tall, beautiful people”

- not to gossip carelessly when they travel home for Lunar New Year

- be aware that “foreign spies” could be reading their online comments and lurking on social media

“Foreign espionage agencies may actively connect with key target groups by disguising themselves as rich and beautiful, or tall, rich and handsome individuals,” the agency warned in a Jan. 16 post to its official WeChat account.

“Once a relationship is established, they may use the emotional connection to trick their targets into providing confidential information,” it said in a post titled, “Keep your eyes open, and build a Great Wall of Steel against espionage.”

Spooking foreign investors

The insistence that foreign spies are everywhere has spooked foreign investors in the wake of raids of foreign-owned firms and recent changes to national security legislation.

Commentators say the warnings likely have more to do with political turf wars in Beijing and encouraging people to spy on each other than with any concerted public action against a possible threat from overseas.

Officials, scientists and college teachers and students are likely targets for seduction, brainwashing, bribery and coercion, especially anyone with access to confidential information, it said.

Foreign spies may “disguise themselves as considerate, caring and open-minded confidants,” or “lurk in chat rooms, online forums and other online platforms” to recruit people.

8. Generic drug scandal undermines faith in regulator

Trivium China, February 13, 2025

9. Bail denied for Hong Kong woman arrested by nat. security police for allegedly helping fugitive protesters
   James Lee, Hong Kong Free Press, February 8, 2025

10. Hong Kong police arrest man in connection with helping 4 2019 protesters hide from authorities
    Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, February 10, 2025

11. Wanted Hong Kong activist Carmen Lau’s relatives taken in by nat. security police to assist investigation
    Hillary Leung, Hong Kong Free Press, February 11, 2025

12. Hong Kong media regulator loses bid to appeal to top court over RTHK satire that ‘insulted’ police
    Kelly Ho, Hong Kong Free Press, February 7, 2025

13. China appoints ‘wolf warrior’ ambassador to manage affairs with Europe
    Joe Leahy and Henry Foy, Financial Times, February 6, 2025

14. The Screws Tighten on Military Content
    David Bandurski, China Media Project, February 11, 2025

15. Bipartisan bill comes amid concerns that the application allows China to see user data
    Natalie Andrews, Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2025

16. China Weighs Probe into Apple’s App Store Fees, Practices
    Pei Li, Bloomberg, February 5, 2025

17. Republican attorneys-general say Wall Street firms underplay China risk
    Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, February 6, 2025

18. Xi Jinping swings his “assassin’s mace” of economic warfare
    The Economist, February 8, 2025

19. EU Set to Play for Time in Economic Coercion Case Against China
    Alberto Nardelli and Jenny Leonard, Bloomberg, January 23, 2025

20. Why China’s super-rich are spending billions to set up universities
    Bien Perez, South China Morning Post, February 9, 2025

21. Her parents were injured in a Tesla crash. She ended up having to pay Tesla damages
    Elsie Chen, Erika Kinetz, and Dake Kanz, Associated Press, February 11, 2025

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Environmental Harms

22. Study points finger at China’s air pollution as lung cancer cases in never-smokers rise

Holly Chik, South China Morning Post, February 10, 2025

Despite drops in tobacco use worldwide, the incidence of lung cancer among people who have never smoked is increasing, with higher risks for younger generations and women – particularly in China – a global analysis led by the World Health Organization has found.

The main culprit is air pollution known as PM, or particulate matter, in the form of tiny solid particles and liquid droplets.

“Our findings suggest that the largest incident burden of lung adenocarcinoma attributable to ambient PM pollution is in East Asia, especially in China,” the scientists involved in the study wrote.

COMMENT – Tobacco sales in the PRC are still controlled by a state-owned enterprise, China Tobacco. Almost 15 years ago, China Tabacco was reorganized under the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). China Tabacco is a huge revenue generator (encouraging Chinese citizens to smoke) and that revenue was funneled into MIIT to provide capital for the Ministry’s semiconductor initiatives.

23. Curbing the trade in pangolin scales in China by revealing the characteristics of the illegal trade network

Fei Xi, Xiaoran Chao, Shibao Wu, and Fuhua Zhang, Scientific Reports, January 21, 2025

Globally, pangolins are the most heavily trafficked mammals and China is one of the main destinations for their scales and meat. Conducting separate studies on the characteristics of the illegal trade in pangolin meat and in scales in China will provide a basis for devising more targeted protection strategies and actions.

This study focused on the illegal pangolin-scale trading network in China by collating relevant cases of smuggling published in China Judgements Online, revealing that most scales came from Africa. The six main cities involved in the illegal trade in China were Bozhou, Chongzuo, Dehong, Beijing, Hong Kong, and Kunming. Seizures of illegally traded scales have decreased significantly due to strengthened law enforcement and increased public awareness of their protected status.

We recommend that, in addition to advocating for stronger pangolin protection legislation and law enforcement in Africa, the inspection in China of cargo and baggage on ships and aircraft from Africa and of trucks entering and leaving Bozhou City should also by strengthened, as should the raising of awareness of pangolin protection among express delivery personnel, and in particular, practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine should be discouraged from using pangolin scales in treatments. These measures will further effectively curb the illegal trade in pangolins in China.

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Foreign Interference and Coercion

24. Canadian foreign interference agency says it detected a ‘malicious activity’ targeting candidate
    Associated Press, February 10, 2025

25. Canada task force says ex-Finance Minister Freeland target of China-linked campaign
    Ismail Shakil, Reuters, February 7, 2025

26. Kash Patel had a roster of foreign clients. Their interests could clash with FBI he hopes to lead
    Brian Slodysko, Eric Tucker, and Alan Suderman, Associated Press, February 7, 2025

27. Donald Trump’s FBI nominee Kash Patel under fire over Shein stake
    Demetri Sevastopulo, Stefania Palma and Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, February 9, 2025

28. Top Republican condemns Elon Musk for ‘supplication’ to China in new book
    The Guardian, February 11, 2025

29. Trump, the Panama Canal and the Hong Kong Firm at the Heart of a Showdown
    Alexandra Stevenson and Keith Bradsher, New York Times, February 6, 2025

30. China is infiltrating Taiwan’s armed forces
    The Economist, February 6, 2025

31. The U.S. Cannot Ignore China's Desire for a Naval Base in South Africa
    Frans Cronje and Robert Higgs, Real Clear World, February 9, 2025

32. China’s stunning new campaign to turn the world against Taiwan
    The Economist, February 9, 2025

33. Cook Islands’ ‘strategic’ deal with China angers New Zealand
    Nic Fildes, Financial Times, February 9, 2025

34. Rep. Luistro warns: ‘Will you trust our power grid to our enemy in West PH Sea?’
    Daily Guardian, January 30, 2025

35. China builds space alliances in Africa as Trump cuts foreign aid
    Joey Roulette, Eduardo Baptista, Sarah El Safty and Joe Brock, Reuters, February 11, 2025

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Human Rights and Religious Persecution

36. China tops list of countries trying to silence exiled dissidents over past decade, study shows

Katie McQue, The Guardian, February 12, 2025

Russia, Turkey and Egypt also among worst perpetrators of transnational repression around the globe.

A quarter of the world’s countries have engaged in transnational repression – targeting political exiles abroad to silence dissent – in the past decade, new research reveals.

The Washington DC-based non-profit organisation Freedom House has documented 1,219 incidents carried out by 48 governments across 103 countries, from 2014 to 2024.

However, a smaller number of countries account for the vast majority of all documented physical attacks on dissidents, with China the most frequent offender, responsible for 272 incidents, or 22% of recorded cases. Russia, Turkey and Egypt also rank among the worst perpetrators.

37. Chinese lawyer launches legal battle against Tencent's role in CCP repression
    Human Rights in China, February 11, 2025

38. Thousands rally against China’s ‘mega-embassy’ in London
    Jasmine Man, Matthew Leung and Tenzin Pema, Radio Free Asia, February 8, 2025

39. Ethnic Mongolian dissident Hada rushed to hospital from house arrest
    Qian Lang, Radio Free Asia, February 4, 2025

40. Police stop family members visiting ethnic Mongolian dissident Hada
    Qian Lang, Radio Free Asia, February 10, 2025

41. The Fight for Uyghur Rights
    Abduweli Ayup, New York Times, February 8, 2025

42. Uyghurs mark 28 years since Ghulja violence, condemn ongoing repression
    Kasim Kashgar, Voice of America, February 8, 2025

43. Campaign for Uyghurs, ‘Teacher Li’ nominated for Nobel Peace Prize
    Roseanne Gerin, Radio Free Asia, February 7, 2025

44. Chinese ‘should use their right to vote,’ despite the risks: activist
    Kitty Wang, Radio Free Asia, February 5, 2025

45. Investigation Reveals Uyghur Forced Labor in Decathlon’s Supply Chain
    Arthur Kaufman, China Digital Times, February 7, 2025

46. Australia expresses ‘serious concerns’ for dissident writer jailed in China
    Hong Kong Free Press, February 5, 2025

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Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage

47. The Drug Industry Is Having Its Own DeepSeek Moment
    David Wainer, Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2025

48. Strange Competition
    Drew Andy, Hoover Institution, February 6, 2025

49. China’s Firms Are Bleeding Cash—and Vulnerable to Trump’s Trade War
    Hannah Miao, Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2025

50. China’s Carmakers Face Crossroad as Slowdown Persists
    An Limin and Ding Yi, Caixin Global, February 7, 2025

51. ‘Made in China 2025’ puts US at risk of ‘losing next industrial revolution’, panel told
    Mia Nulimaimaiti, South China Morning Post, February 7, 2025

52. China+10: how multinationals are revamping their supply chains for Trump 2.0
    Kandy Wong and Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, February 7, 2025

53. Hong Kong follows China in complaining to WTO over Trump tariffs
    Kenji Kawase, Nikkei Asia, February 7, 2025

54. Hong Kong Gets Swept Up in Trump’s Trade War with China
    Alan Wong and Rebecca Choong Wilkins, Bloomberg, February 6, 2025

55. Apple’s China Focus Thrusts It into Center of Geopolitical Fight
    Mark Gurman, Bloomberg, February 6, 2025

56. Big companies see no China recovery soon, adding to trade tensions gloom
    Dominique Patton and Emma Rumney, Reuters, February 6, 2025

57. The US and China Trade Opening Barbs
    David J. Ross, Lester Ross, Neena Shenai, Lauren Mandell and Jake A. Laband, Wilmer Hale, February 7, 2025

58. Keep on truckin'
    Goldman Sachs, February 1, 2025

59. Why Trump Wants to Close a Trade Exemption for China
    Shen Lu, Liz Young and Preetika Rana, Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2025

60. Trump Delays Crackdown on China Imports Loophole
    Liz Young and Paul Berger, Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2025

61. A Sore Spot in L.A.’s Housing Crisis: Foreign-Owned Homes Sitting Empty
    Rebecca Picciotto, Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2025

62. Trump Says He Will Announce Reciprocal Tariffs Next Week
    Ana Swanson, New York Times, February 7, 2025

63. China Is at the Heart of Trump Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum
    Keith Bradsher, New York Times, February 10, 2025

64. What History Tells Us About Geopolitical Shift and Its Economic Consequences
    Zhou Qiren, Caixin Global, February 8, 2025

65. China’s Xi Is Building Economic Fortress Against U.S. Pressure
    Brian Spegele, Jason Douglas and Yoko Kubota, Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2025

66. China dreams of building a world-class jumbo jet. Can it do it without the West?
    Frank Chenin and Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, February 11, 2025

67. Chinese automakers Changan and Dongfeng seen weighing merger
    Nikkei Asia, February 11, 2025

68. Japan overtakes Thailand as China's most popular destination
    Nancy Zheng and Chihiro Ishikawa, Nikkei Asia, February 11, 2025

69. China Is at the Heart of Trump Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum
    Keith Bradsher, New York Times, February 10, 2025

70. Marriages in China Crash, Portending Deeper Demographic Woes
    Carl Minzner, Council on Foreign Relations, February 10, 2025

71. Tesla opens Megapack battery factory in China amid nascent trade war
    Katrina Northrop and Vic Chiang, Washington Post, February 11, 2025

72. Chinese Temu sellers use fake U.S. postage labels to boost their profits
    Viola Zhou, Rest of World, February 11, 2025

73. VIDEO – Why Chinese President Xi’s $93 Billion Dream City Remains Empty
    Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2025

74. Baidu in Talks to Operate Robotaxis in U.A.E.
    Wall Street Journal, February 12, 2025

75. China’s richest cities say medical costs are bleeding dry health insurance funds
    Luna Sun, South China Morning Post, February 12, 2025

76. BYD takes lead in China auto market once driven by state-backed players
    Tomoko Wakasugi and Shunsuke Tabeta, Nikkei Asia, February 12, 2025

77. China’s Property Crisis Enters a Dangerous New Phase
    Bloomberg, February 11, 2025

78. Is China ending its stint as major global grain importer?
    Karen Braun, Reuters, February 12, 2025

79. Is China's state-funded stock revival plan pie in the sky?
    Samuel Shen and Vidya Ranganathan, Reuters, February 11, 2025

80. China’s Cabinet Pledges to Boost Spending, Attract Foreign Investment
    Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2025

81. SMIC Quarterly Profit Falls, Expects Continued Revenue Growth
    Sherry Qin, Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2025

82. Trump Hits Foreign Steel and Aluminum with Tariffs, Restarting an Old Fight
    Ana Swanson, New York Times, February 10, 2025

83. China goes all-out to keep foreign investors onshore amid Trump threats
    Mia Nulimaimaiti, South China Morning Post, February 11, 2025

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Cyber and Information Technology

84. Which countries have banned DeepSeek and why?
    Aljazeera, February 6, 2025

85. South Korea spy agency says DeepSeek 'excessively' collects personal data
    Nikkei Asia, February 10, 2025

86. Coaxing Dangerous Information from DeepSeek Is Easier Than with Other AIs
    Sam Schechner, Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2025

87. DeepSeek Offers Bioweapon, Self-Harm Information
    Sam Schechner, Wall Street Journal, February 8, 2025

88. DeepSeek Founders Are Worth $1 Billion or $150 Billion Depending Who You Ask
    Bloomberg, February 11, 2025

89. China’s Strategy in Trade War: Threaten U.S. Tech Companies
    Liza Lin and Raffaele Huang, Wall Street Journal, February 9, 2025

90. Apple’s China Focus Thrusts It into Center of Geopolitical Fight
    Mark Gurman, Bloomberg, February 6, 2025

91. Chinese chip champion’s ‘snowballing’ growth threatens Korean dominance
    Christian Davies, Song Jung-a and Zijing Wu, Financial Times, February 9, 2025

92. Taiwan's legacy chip industry contemplates future as China eats into share​
    Wen-Yee Lee, Reuters, February 10, 2025

93. Cheaper China e-bikes 'kick in teeth' for UK firms
    Olivier Smith, BBC, February 8, 2025

94. State says app raises serious security and censorship concerns
    James Rundle, Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2025

95. China's ex-UK ambassador clashes with 'AI godfather' on panel
    Zoe Kleinman, BBC, February 10, 2025

96. Tesla Is Losing Ground Against Its Biggest Rival in China
    Raffaele Huang and Yoko Kubota, Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2025

97. China Launches New Rocket Crucial to Challenging Musk’s Starlink
    Bruce Einhorn, Bloomberg, February 11, 2025

98. What do we know about China’s new AI safety institute?
    Caroline Meinhardt and Graham Webster, DigiChina, February 6, 2025

99. Evaluating Security Risk in DeepSeek and Other Frontier Reasoning Models
    Paul Kassianik and Amin Karbasi, Cisco, February 5, 2025

100. Top China chipmaker SMIC says tariff war sparking 'rush orders'
     Cheng Ting-Fang and Lauly Li, Nikkei Asia, February 12, 2025

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Military and Security Threats

101. Can India and China Turn the Corner?
     Fahad Shah, Foreign Policy, February 6, 2025

102. The Silent Withdrawal: China’s Declining Female Workforce Poses a National Challenge
     Dian Zhong, Hoover Institution, February 11, 2025

103. Owner Of US Defense Contractor Making Fighter Jet, Missile Parts Listed as Chinese Intel Agency Official
     Philip Lenczycki, Daily Caller, February 10, 2025

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One Belt, One Road Strategy

104. Why is China so interested in the Cook Islands?

David Cohen, The Spectator, February 11, 2025

Tiny islands in the South Pacific are sitting on huge natural wealth, which can only be accessed with deep sea mining.

Diplomatic storm clouds are gathering around the Cook Islands, a picturesque tourist destination in the South Pacific known for its creaking palms, pink beaches and deliciously warm nights.

The microscopic island-nation has a long-standing “free association” with New Zealand, which sees Wellington give the islands defense and financial support. Now though the islands are in the middle of striking an agreement with China, and New Zealand says it has been kept in the dark about the nature of the pact.

COMMENT – Of course, the Cook Islands also sit astride the Sea Lines of Communication between the United States and Australia and New Zealand… just look at the map.

105. China Coast Guard Patrols in 2024: An Exercise in Futility?
     Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, February 6, 2025

106. China's tight grip on Hong Kong led to Trump's Panama gambit
     Katsuji Nakazawa, Nikkei Asia, February 6, 2025

107. China says ‘regrets’ Panama withdrawal from Belt and Road infrastructure project
     Hong Kong Free Press, February 7, 2025

108. China’s rust-belt regions at risk of being left behind as coastal economies surge
     Carol Yang, South China Morning Post, February 12, 2025

109. Amid tariff crossfire, China set to widen trade with Colombia
     Niki Mizuguchi, Nikkei Asia, February 10, 2025

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Opinion

110. A Terrible Idea: Buying From Our Adversaries, No. 617

Michael Hochberg, National Institute for Public Policy, February 12, 2025

Buying complex electronics and consumer goods from adversaries is a source of profound risk. Electronics designed or manufactured in China can be an attack vector aimed at the United States. Changing tariff structures to ‘price-in’ the risk of such attacks, and to drive manufacturing away from our adversaries, is essential.

International Precedent

The recent Israeli pager attack against Hezbollah sounded a clarion call. It was a master-stroke of precision targeting, intelligence, and psychological warfare. Israel managed, in a single blow, to kill 39 people and injure nearly 3,000, representing the bulk of the middle management of Hezbollah. Today, when one of Israel’s enemies hears a phone ring, or turns on the car ignition, or presses the lever on his toaster, he surely experiences intense fear.

In developing their attack, the Israelis had a double challenge: First, they needed to turn the pagers into weapons. Second, they had to convince their adversaries to buy these weaponized pagers. The technical problem was likely the easier of the two.

Creating a fake supply chain to insert these pagers into the enemy command hierarchy surely required operational genius. This operational problem was significant because Hezbollah doesn’t knowingly buy electronics from Israel: If it did, its members would have to assume that anything they were buying was an attack vector. This attack also pointed to the danger stemming from common U.S. consumer goods being manufactured in China.

Israeli Success Will Breed Imitation

Americans are too slow to recognize the danger of sourcing complex consumer and industrial goods from China. If China were to deploy a society-wide attack on the United States, it would face far fewer obstacles than the Israelis did when they corrupted Hezbollah’s communication devices, because Chinese manufacturers are already deeply embedded in U.S. supply chains: A recent Federal Reserve report estimated that in 2022, 16.5% of U.S. imports came from Chinese sources.

A steady increase in the volume of international trade – including specifically an increase in de minimis shipments valued at $800 or less – has made it progressively more difficult to detect malicious content in imported goods. There are as many as 4 million de minimis shipments to the United States every day; inspection of these daily shipments is infeasible. According to Andrew Renna, Assistant Port Director for Cargo Operations at John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK) Airport, “We have limited resources…there is no physical way…I could look at a significant percentage of that. So due to the volume, it’s a very exploitable mode of entry into the U.S.”

Thus, incoming goods are often not being inspected at the borders for even very obvious hacks, like the insertion of explosives, because of the sheer volume of imports. Instead, only the most high-risk shipments are thoroughly searched; a recent audit of international mail processing at JFK airport found that even with this approach, enormous backlogs caused risky packages to slip through the cracks.

While the mechanisms are new, targeted supply chain attacks are not. The United States has reportedly carried out its own supply chain infiltrations; in At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War, former National Security Council member Thomas Reed details a covert Cold War operation in which the United States inserted subtly hacked chips and equipment into Soviet supply chains by deliberately allowing corrupted parts to leak into Soviet hands, generating immense damage. Attacks against the United States have already been observed as well. At this point, any toaster or microwave being imported from China can contain an explosive, a hacked computer chip, or software or firmware containing back-doors.

These strategies are already spreading: Russia has been testing the use of incendiary devices shipped through commercial channels. On the one hand, it is promising that this attack was detected before it was replicated at large scale, and that the origin of the attack was identified. On the other, this test attack was not detected until several packages had caught fire in Western countries.

111. Welcome to the post-America world
     Raquel Garger, National Post, February 9, 2025

At this critical moment in history, Canada needs to take bold steps to ensure it doesn't get left behind.

We are living in the most historically significant moment since the fall of the Soviet Union. The shift in global power away from the United States has reached the point where the payoff that comes from “running the world” is no longer worth the cost. In upending how it engages in the world, the United States has declared: “We’re out.”

In the post-America world, to borrow Fareed Zakaria’s expression, the United States will be much less burdened by the constraints and costs that come from global leadership. Yet given its commitment to remaining the world’s most powerful state, it will not retreat into isolationism. It will engage in international affairs in ways that privilege its core national interests over those of its allies and partners, for whom there will be no more “special deals.”

With the United States no longer pushing back against hostile states to the same extent as in the past, the world will be a meaner and more dangerous place. Some countries will adapt and seize new opportunities. Others will fail to adapt, finding themselves weaker and poorer.

This tectonic shift has been long in the making, due in large measure to the 2008 financial crisis, decades of military overreach and China’s rise as a hostile (near) peer military and economic power — made possible in large measure by its economic warfare against the United States and its allies.

Struggling under those pressures, successive American administrations — Democrat and Republican alike — have spent the past decade warning allies in increasingly stark terms that the United States is no longer willing or able to underwrite the growing costs of the preferential defence and trade arrangements that underpin its global alliance structure.

Some allies understood early the inevitability of the moment we are now in and set to work preparing themselves for this new reality. Others remained committed to a foreign policy mindset anchored in visions of how they think the world should be, leaving themselves vulnerable to pressure from allies and adversaries alike as the contest over the next global order intensifies.

Navigating this new world requires an understanding of how the United States will rebuild its national power as it readies itself for the possibility that today’s economic war with China could slide into a full-scale conventional war.

As the Trump administration has made clear, it will tackle America’s internal rot (drugs, illegal migration); rebuild its economic base (resetting trade deals); and focus its military power (reorganizing NATO), while building its defence industrial base and deploying its military sparingly.

Rich in natural resources, geographically connected with the United States and deeply integrated into its critical sectors, Canada is on the front lines of America’s contest with China. This is not something we can change.

To secure ourselves in the world as it is — not as we might wish it to be — we need a national strategy for Canada. The must-do list is long: make the economy much more competitive; unleash the resource sector to capitalize on trends such as re-shoring manufacturing and energy-hungry artificial intelligence; rebuild the industrial base to serve as a secure source of supply for our allies; secure the border with much-needed immigration and criminal-justice reforms; and rebuild the Canadian Armed Forces, at speed.

At the same time, we must get serious about contesting China’s growing aggression, including its economic warfare aimed at Canada. When we let China abuse our investment and trade regimes to steal our valuable intellectual property and data, curry favour with decision-makers and fund malign information operations against those who would criticize Beijing, we open ourselves to coercion by the Chinese state. Worse still, we make ourselves unreliable and unwanted partners in a more dangerous world.

Natural resource wealth, geographic distance from the “hot” theatres of conflict and a high-tech ecosystem have provided Canada everything it needs to change course. We can make ourselves a strategic powerhouse in the post-America world. Or we can let ourselves grow weaker and poorer. Canadians deserve a say in that choice. Canadians need a prime minister with a new mandate, to lead us into this next, critical phase.

112. History’s Revenge: America Faces the New Eurasian Threat
     Hal Brands, American Enterprise Institute, February 10, 2025

113. South Korea Has More Leverage Over China Than You Think
     Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Foreign Policy, February 10, 2025

114. Pope attacks Trump administration over deportations — yet stays quiet on China

The Spectator, February 11, 2025

115. Can Trump Halt the BRICS De-Dollarization Effort?
     Timothy Hopper, Geopolitical Monitor, February 10, 2025