Matt Turpin's China Articles - August 13, 2023
Friends,
It’s that special time of year again: the Beidaihe Summer Retreat for CCP Elites.
This is when the entire country “knows” its leaders are hanging out at the beach on the Bohai and dressing more causally… but no one inside the PRC can admit out loud that the retreat is happening.
Security in Beidaihe has been turned up to 11, with checkpoints and boat patrols everywhere (Teslas aren’t allowed near for fear that the United States will use those rolling surveillance platforms against the Party).
What a difference one or two years makes.
Two years ago, Xi and his cadres must have felt pretty pleased with themselves at Beidaihe. Back in 2021, the Chinese economy was humming, zero-COVID seemed like a good policy choice, relations with Moscow had never been better, and the United States looked to be crumbling given the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan and what appeared to be a fracturing West. A fracturing West and an inwardly focused America would provide opportunities to resolve the “Taiwan question” as well as to consolidate hegemony over the Asia-Pacific and rewrite the rules of the international order in ways that were much more friendly to the Party.
In the language of the Party at the time, it really did seem that there were “great changes unseen in a century.”
A year later in 2022, things looked a little darker for the Party, but still they had reason to be optimistic. Putin’s illegal war on Ukraine had been an embarrassment for Xi, given his clear endorsement of it in early February, and it appeared that the war was uniting the West under Washington’s leadership. However, Xi was a few months out from the 20th Party Congress and all appeared in order as Xi and his allies prepared to consolidate power and put him on the same level as Mao Zedong.
The Party must have felt that it had a card up its sleeve from the perspective of the 2022 Beidaihe retreat: eventually, the Party would end zero-COVID and open-up to the world, supercharging its economy. Certainly, the real estate crisis and massive municipal debt weighed heavily on the Party’s leadership, but they must have assumed that the end of zero-COVID would mitigate those challenges and create incredible economic opportunities. It would confer on the public and the Party the wisdom of Xi’s leadership as his third term started with a huge economic bounce.
As it turned out, that bounce was a thud.
Looking at the world from the Party’s perspective today, one might observe that there are “great changes [inside China] unseen in a half century.” Exports are down, foreign direct investment is down, GDP is down, debt is at an all-time high, deflation is spreading, and the world is an incredibly inhospitable place for the PRC as populations nearly everywhere view Beijing with suspicion and the United States and its Allies take concerted action to undermine the Chinese Communist Party. Things haven’t looked so bleak for the Party since the Cultural Revolution (admittedly, it looked much bleaker in 1972).
Oh to be a fly-on-the-wall in the Beidaihe conference rooms today.
Some Party elite must still be supremely confident in their future and the wisdom of Xi Jinping. Some Party elite must understand that there are structural forces acting against the PRC that can’t be overcome with Party slogans. These individuals will put their heads down and work, but won’t stick their necks out or pursue innovative approaches. And there must be some Party elite that have lost faith in Xi’s leadership and understand that the continued accretion of power to one man will be disastrous to themselves and their country.
…
Outbound Investment Executive Order is finally here…
After nearly four years of examination by two Administrations, the United States took another tentative step towards restricting Americans from funding the military modernization and technological advancement of the People’s Republic of China. While I congratulate those folks in the Biden Administration who have been working tirelessly to get this Executive Order published, often battling their colleagues and influential special interest groups who wanted to kill it, I’m incredibly frustrated that it took so long and the order is essentially toothless (the Treasury Department will take another year to develop the rules before this Order even takes effect… which given the election cycle, won’t actually be put in place, if at all, until the spring of 2025).
Ensuring that Americans don’t unwittingly (or wittingly) fund the military modernization and technological advancement of an adversary seems like a no-brainer… especially when you consider that the United States and Europe have had a comprehensive arms embargo on this country since 1989. As an adversary becomes more technologically advanced, it becomes ever more costly to maintain deterrence, meaning that Americans are forced to spend more taxpayer dollars on defense or risk even greater costs (in blood and treasure) should a conflict erupt.
The underlying basis of American deterrence is to use a qualitative military advantage (more advanced technology, which we derive from our commercial and academic sectors) to offset the quantitative and geographic advantages of our adversaries and potential adversaries.
Under that context, it seems quite reasonable that a handful of influential and wealthy Americans (venture capital firms, private equity firms, and institutional investors) be restricted from making even more money for themselves by not allowing them to “help” the CCP gain parity in advanced technology. Their selfish pursuit of profit, by enabling of Beijing’s techno-nationalist objectives, undermines the safety and security of their own country.
Unfortunately, this logic has failed to sway enough people.
This is not a partisan critique, the failure to restrict Americans from funding our adversary is a bipartisan problem. I have met several individuals who claim that their continued investment in advanced technology sectors in the PRC should NOT be restricted because their efforts are beneficial for humanity… and in the same breath, they assure me that they are patriots. [LIFE LESSON: If you have to assure other people that you are a patriot, perhaps you aren’t]
So we find ourselves in a terrible position.
Just as the PRC is in its own a really difficult position, the United States seems unwilling or unable to follow through on taking the kinds of clear-eyed actions that would materially reduce the capabilities available to Xi and his cadres. If we can’t restrict Americans from aiding an adversary when its economy is on the ropes, how will we do so when it starts to improve?
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Executive Order on Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern
The White House, August 9, 2023
I, JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR., President of the United States of America, find that countries of concern [People’s Republic of China, Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, and Special Administrative Region of Macau] are engaged in comprehensive, long-term strategies that direct, facilitate, or otherwise support advancements in sensitive technologies and products that are critical to such countries’ military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities. Moreover, these countries eliminate barriers between civilian and commercial sectors and military and defense industrial sectors, not just through research and development, but also by acquiring and diverting the world’s cutting-edge technologies, for the purposes of achieving military dominance. Rapid advancement in semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and artificial intelligence capabilities by these countries significantly enhances their ability to conduct activities that threaten the national security of the United States. Advancements in sensitive technologies and products in these sectors will accelerate the development of advanced computational capabilities that will enable new applications that pose significant national security risks, such as the development of more sophisticated weapons systems, breaking of cryptographic codes, and other applications that could provide these countries with military advantages.
As part of this strategy of advancing the development of these sensitive technologies and products, countries of concern are exploiting or have the ability to exploit certain United States outbound investments, including certain intangible benefits that often accompany United States investments and that help companies succeed, such as enhanced standing and prominence, managerial assistance, investment and talent networks, market access, and enhanced access to additional financing. The commitment of the United States to open investment is a cornerstone of our economic policy and provides the United States with substantial benefits. Open global capital flows create valuable economic opportunities and promote competitiveness, innovation, and productivity, and the United States supports cross-border investment, where not inconsistent with the protection of United States national security interests. However, certain United States investments may accelerate and increase the success of the development of sensitive technologies and products in countries that develop them to counter United States and allied capabilities.
I therefore find that advancement by countries of concern in sensitive technologies and products critical for the military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities of such countries constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security of the United States, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, and that certain United States investments risk exacerbating this threat. I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with this threat.
Accordingly, I hereby order:
Section 1. Notifiable and Prohibited Transactions. (a) To assist in addressing the national emergency declared in this order, the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary), in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and, as appropriate, the heads of other relevant executive departments and agencies (agencies), shall issue, subject to public notice and comment, regulations that require United States persons to provide notification of information relative to certain transactions involving covered foreign persons (notifiable transactions) and that prohibit United States persons from engaging in certain other transactions involving covered foreign persons (prohibited transactions).
(b) The regulations issued under this section shall identify categories of notifiable transactions that involve covered national security technologies and products that the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and, as appropriate, the heads of other relevant agencies, determines may contribute to the threat to the national security of the United States identified in this order. The regulations shall require United States persons to notify the Department of the Treasury of each such transaction and include relevant information on the transaction in each such notification.
(c) The regulations issued under this section shall identify categories of prohibited transactions that involve covered national security technologies and products that the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and, as appropriate, the heads of other relevant agencies, determines pose a particularly acute national security threat because of their potential to significantly advance the military, intelligence, surveillance, or cyber-enabled capabilities of countries of concern. The regulations shall prohibit United States persons from engaging, directly or indirectly, in such transactions.
COMMENT – I completely agree with the first three paragraphs (though I would include more than just semiconductors, quantum, and artificial intelligence).
But the actions directed by the President are completely inadequate to the national emergency he declares.
In Section 3, the operative portion of the EO, the President directs the Treasury Secretary, and in consultation with the Commerce Secretary, to take a year “to assess whether to amend the regulations” governing outbound investment restrictions and then to simply “periodically review the effectiveness of the regulations thereafter.” Consulting with other Departments and Agencies, like the ones with actual responsibility for defense technology and national security like the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community, well that is left up to the discretion of the Treasury Secretary as the President’s order to conduct consultation with those “other relevant agencies” will be done “as appropriate.”
In bureaucracy speak, this gives the illusion of action while guaranteeing that nothing needs to change, if people who oppose this action don’t want it to.
One clear indicator that this Executive Order is designed to sweep Outbound Investment Restrictions under the rug is that it received glowing endorsement from the Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE) the day after it was published. (See Biden's new outbound investment restrictions with China are a sensible compromise, but further tightening is likely, Martin Chorzempa, PIIE, August 10, 2023)
Given that the Biden Administration has been mulling this EO over for two years, one might reasonably expect that in the declaration of a national emergency the President might have already determined whether regulations needed to be amended and what those changes are… rather than task the Treasury Department (a Department that has opposed these actions from the get-go… hence the two year delay) to spend yet another year “analyzing” whether any changes are needed at all.
Why issue an Executive Order declaring a national emergency if you haven’t even figured out if regulatory changes are necessary?
SPOILER ALERT – Don’t be surprised that if after a year the Treasury Department “discovers” that its current regulations are adequate.
2. Outbound Investment Executive Order: Waste of Time
Derek Scissors, AEI, August 10, 2023
The Biden administration’s executive order (EO) on outbound investment finally appeared, continuing a process that began July 2021. Thanks to the Department of the Treasury wanting to ignore the national interest, and a bit to Congressional inaction, the EO does little. It’s in large part an IOU for choices that should have been made months ago. The EO isn’t “small yard, high fence.” It’s small yard and still thinking about how many holes in the fence.
Consider a good motivation for the EO. The US has means to prevent China’s acquisition of technology here—the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. It has controls to prevent Chinese acquisition of technology through American exports, though effectiveness of the controls is often in doubt. But American investors can freely and on a large scale help China develop advanced technology, which is the worst outcome.
The EO probably doesn’t change this. There are different ways to count how much the US invests in China, but don’t use Treasury’s monthly data. Those indicate the Cayman Islands may have the biggest securities markets in the world (it has none). Treasury has annual data that correct for offshore financial centers and put US portfolio investment in mainland China at $946 billion in 2021 (latest).
The EO correctly treats Hong Kong and Macao as part of the PRC. Including those totals raises portfolio investment to $1.18 trillion in 2021. This more than doubled from 2016. In comparison, direct investment rose from $168 billion in 2016 to $209 billion in 2021 (and fell in 2022). Another $40 billion in direct investment, if it doesn’t bring technology that should already be blocked, doesn’t matter.
Another $650 billion in portfolio investment can matter. It made the US by far the biggest national partner for China on the capital side, and Beijing is currently soliciting more money. The EO isn’t being applied retrospectively, and shouldn’t. If it were, guess how much of the $1.38 trillion in total American investment in the PRC would be covered? Seriously, guess, because Treasury won’t tell you. Best estimate: well under 1 percent.
We don’t know definitively because Treasury (i) claims still not to have decided how to treat the largest investment channels and (ii) has never provided information on investment in specific technologies it now says is so important. Regarding the latter, amazingly, it just asked the public for this information. Secretary Yellen calls for transparency for investors, even for China. But her department has utterly failed to pursue it.
Regarding the former, “the Treasury Department expects to create a carveout or exception for specific types of transactions, such as certain investments into publicly-traded securities or into exchange traded funds”
How can this not have been decided? Treasury had two years to consult interested parties. Yet there are five pages of outstanding questions along these lines in Treasury’s notice. The financial sector has of course already demanded exceptions to let investment flow as it likes, which is basically what Secretary Yellen promised. We don’t know how much money each exception covers. This has been a painfully long charade.
It may not even be worth debating. After discussing the EO with half the planet, there will be an extended period for more comments. Any bets if this produces tighter or looser restrictions? A possible time for “full” implementation is five months before the 2024 election. After the election, a second Biden administration could simply drop the EO, with much less political accountability.
A new Republican administration absolutely might do the same. By far the biggest surge in American investment into China occurred when President Trump was in office. While he talked tough, hundreds of billions of dollars headed west across the Pacific. If the next administration drops the EO, it will have achieved only a minor pause. In something yet to be determined.
For its part, Congress condemns Chinese behavior, then asks for reports. The Senate’s record to date on outbound investment is a notification requirement that may have no effect at all. The House passed an outbound investment bill last year but the Senate wouldn’t take it up. This year, the House has done nothing.
Outbound investment is going the way of intellectual property—speeches but no steps. China wasn’t getting enough technology by stealing, we should fund their technology too. China isn’t too scary for the US, but it’s too scary for US decision-makers. When it’s time to act, they curl into a ball. That the EO is only the first move is laughable. It took the administration two years to do almost nothing, and Congress longer than that. If more is coming, it will be just as empty.
COMMENT – Derek and I share the same frustrations; he just communicates them better than me.
Our approach so far seems to be ‘small yard surrounded by a fence with many holes.’ This Executive Order is unlikely to change that.
3. Bankers Forced to Study Xi’s Thoughts as Party Tightens Grip
Bloomberg, August 8, 2023
Firms holding studying sessions, writing papers on Xi Thought. Concerns grow over Chinese economy as confidence takes a hit.
Xi Jinping Thought is becoming inescapable for bankers and businesspeople across China.
The Communist Party leader’s musings on everything from the economy to space missions have long been required reading within the party and China’s government. But with Xi Jinping now months into a precedent-breaking third term — and with no limits on how many more he can serve — study sessions on his ideology have also become mandatory for staff at many state-owned and private-sector companies.
COMMENT – Given the state of the Chinese economy, the last thing bankers should be studying is Xi Jinping Thought.
But I’m reminded of an old maxim from Napoleon: Never interrupt your enemy when he is making a mistake.
4. Inconvenient truths about the green transition
Rana Foroohar, Financial Times, August 7, 2023
Getting rid of carbon and forced labour in clean energy supply chains is costly but necessary.
When western policymakers talk about reasons for supply chain decoupling from China in areas like semiconductors and clean energy technology, they often cite two inconvenient truths.
First, cheap Chinese inputs like the polysilicon needed for solar panels and critical minerals for batteries are often made or extracted by forced labour in Xinjiang. Second, a lot of what’s advertised as “clean” energy technology coming out of China is made in factories that use coal-powered electricity. If you tally in the true carbon and labour cost of that production, it doesn’t seem so “clean” any more.
America’s Inflation Reduction Act is meant to start tallying up the real cost of labour and emissions, with carrots and sticks designed to cut forced labour and dirty power out of supply chains. In theory, that also cuts China out of the clean energy transition in the US, at least unless it changes its position on coal and Xinjiang.
Or does it? As the IRA subsidies start rolling out, it’s clear that it’s difficult, if not impossible at the moment, to decouple totally from China in areas like solar power. Indeed, recent conversations I’ve had with both policymakers and business leaders have convinced me that we are about to have some very tough global conversations about the trade-offs that will need to be made if we want a truly green energy transition that creates decent jobs in the US and abroad.
Consider, for example, the last year of new solar and green battery factory announcements in the US. New rules mean that solar modules deemed to have been made with forced labour in those dirty Chinese factories can be impounded at the US border. At first glance, this looks like a huge win for the Biden administration. And in some ways it is: America is finally starting to pass policies to encourage sustainable, inclusive growth.
But when you dig deeper, you realise that the IRA specifications for things like modules or solar battery cells don’t account for the fact that nearly all raw polysilicon, which is traded as a commodity on the global market and thus not identified by origin, is made in China, much of it in Xinjiang. That means that there’s hardly any solar panel in the US or pretty much anywhere else that’s “clean”, not to mention made completely with fair labour practices, given the dominance of China in the market.
“You have to ask the question, what clean energy technologies can we make at scale to achieve the green energy transition in the west that don’t currently depend on China?” says David Scaysbrook, a managing partner of Quinbrook Infrastructure Partners, an Australian firm that both builds and invests in renewable energy, including IRA-related projects. His answer? “Not much.”
Scaysbrook, like many executives in the sector, has been delving into the minutiae of supply chains. He is doing so in the expectation that continued US-Chinese trade tensions will make it increasingly risky for his firm to use Chinese-sourced inputs — from polysilicon to Chinese intellectual property or labour — as American politicians on both sides of the aisle push for further decoupling. In the latest sign of this pressure, the top Republican and Democrat on the US House of Representatives China committee accused BlackRock of profiting from investments that benefit the Chinese military. (BlackRock said that it complies with all applicable US laws.)
COMMENT – Rather than narrowly and belatedly issue an EO on Outbound Investment Screening, the Administration could have sought to address the concerns highlighted in this piece by Rana Foroohar.
5. Law firm Dentons hives off China business as Beijing tightens regulation
Joe Miller, Financial Times, August 8, 2023
Months before global law firm Dentons decided to decouple from its Chinese affiliate Dacheng, its staff in western nations were advised against travel to the country.
Some professionals who had visited China were “delayed by many weeks” when they attempted to leave, a person close to the firm said, prompting a policy change. Chinese authorities also made multiple “visits” to Dacheng sites, two people familiar with Dentons’ decision this week added.
Facing an increasingly hostile environment, the largest global law firm by personnel quietly retreated from the country on Monday. It told clients that due to “new mandates and requirements relating to data privacy, cyber security, capital control and governance”, it would sever its official relationship with Dacheng, according to an email seen by the Financial Times.
Dentons’ partners were quick to reassure clients that the firm would continue to refer work to Dacheng, in a “seamless” transition, and that its Hong Kong practice, which handles the biggest Asian deals, would remain untouched.
But the implicit message from Dentons — that China was no longer a place global law firms could easily do business — raised eyebrows across the industry. The firm had been the flag bearer for Chinese integration when it merged with Dacheng in 2015, proclaiming to be “uniting East and West” and even incorporating Chinese characters into its new combined logo.
“They are being forced to unwind one of the most historic law firm mergers,” said Kent Zimmermann of Zeughauser Group, a consultancy that advises some of the legal sector’s biggest players. “They didn’t really have a choice.”
COMMENT – Decoupling is happening whether we want it to or not… the sooner policy-makers, business leaders, and investors come to grips with it (rather than hiding their collective heads in the sand by saying it is simply impossible… see U.S. Treasury chief says 'impossible' to decouple Chinese and American economies and French finance minister says economic ‘decoupling’ from China is impossible and The Folly of Decoupling From China: It Isn’t Just Perilous—It’s Impossible) the better off we will be.
6. Demystifying ‘De-Risking’: Can the PRC Sell to Countries and Coerce Them at the Same Time?
Ben Sando and Liu I-Chen, The Jamestown Foundation, August 4, 2023
With the rapid growth of its economic and diplomatic power, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has cultivated diverse new connections with the societies of other states. These connections, most often deriving from economic activity, have given the PRC methods to influence the political directions of foreign countries. Network engagement through United Front Work and the Ministry of State Security, the influx of corrosive PRC capital, and predation of Chinese diasporic communities all find their origin through these channels of communication (Joske, 2022). This wide set of tactics is now loosely referred to as Chinese “foreign influence” or gray zone political warfare (IRSEM, 2021). Despite the notoriety of this issue, there remains little clarity about which connections with China actually lead to influence (Tiffert, 2020).
Meanwhile, the recent “de-risking” discourse of China policy centers on what kinds of economic linkages with the PRC create vulnerabilities. The de-risking debate in part refers to Beijing’s ability to leverage trade relations with other states to coerce them into favorable policy positions (Brookings Institution, 2023). To date, scholars have employed a variety of methods to test whether trade linkages actually predict the PRC’s influence in other states. A curious result of this research is that when scholars separate trade into imports and exports, the degree a country imports from China serves as a robust predictor of influence, equal to or exceeding the predictive power of exports to China. This result is rather counterintuitive, and generally outside the predictions of researchers. When theorizing the relationship between trade and influence, analysts usually focus on countries’ exports to China as a vector for Beijing’s leverage (Strüver, 2012).
Devising satisfying measures for the PRC’s influence in foreign countries is not easy. Identifying and assessing these methods represents a key stumbling block of the nascent PRC foreign influence field. When testing for Beijing’s influence, academics generally study the presence of decisions or outcomes in target countries favorable to the PRC. While some of these outcomes may be attributable to chance—or natural similarities between certain regimes and the PRC—researchers assume that a non-negligible proportion of these outcomes were stimulated by influence from PRC actors.
7. How a U.S. Tech Mogul Used Nonprofits to Sow Chinese Propaganda
Mara Hvistendahl, David A. Fahrenthold, Lynsey Chutel, and Ishaan Jhaveri, New York Times, August 5, 2023
The Times unraveled a financial network that stretches from Chicago to Shanghai and uses American nonprofits to push Chinese talking points worldwide.
The protest in London’s bustling Chinatown brought together a variety of activist groups to oppose a rise in anti-Asian hate crimes. So it was peculiar when a street brawl broke out among mostly ethnic Chinese demonstrators.
Witnesses said the fight, in November 2021, started when men aligned with the event’s organizers, including a group called No Cold War, attacked activists supporting the democracy movement in Hong Kong.
On the surface, No Cold War is a loose collective run mostly by American and British activists who say the West’s rhetoric against China has distracted from issues like climate change and racial injustice.
In fact, a New York Times investigation found, it is part of a lavishly funded influence campaign that defends China and pushes its propaganda. At the center is a charismatic American millionaire, Neville Roy Singham, who is known as a socialist benefactor of far-left causes.
What is less known, and is hidden amid a tangle of nonprofit groups and shell companies, is that Mr. Singham works closely with the Chinese government media machine and is financing its propaganda worldwide.
From a think tank in Massachusetts to an event space in Manhattan, from a political party in South Africa to news organizations in India and Brazil, The Times tracked hundreds of millions of dollars to groups linked to Mr. Singham that mix progressive advocacy with Chinese government talking points.
Some, like No Cold War, popped up in recent years. Others, like the American antiwar group Code Pink, have morphed over time. Code Pink once criticized China’s rights record but now defends its internment of the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs, which human rights experts have labeled a crime against humanity.
COMMENT – I’m a fan of the hard-hitting investigative journalism that the New York Times has been doing on the malign activities of the Chinese Communist Party… Times readers need to see that evidence in front of their eyes everyday.
However, the Times did not “break” this story… the magazine New Lines did it 18 months ago (as highlighted in this newsletter): The Big Business of Uyghur Genocide Denial, Alexander Reid Ross and Courtney Dobson, New Lines Magazine, January 18, 2022… here’s an excerpt of their reporting:
A New Lines investigation reveals a network of charities funneling millions into left-wing platforms that take Beijing’s side on the genocide allegations — and they’re all connected to an American tech magnate.
A months-long investigation by New Lines can reveal that over the past five years almost $65 million has filtered through various entities connected with people who have defended the Chinese government and downplayed or denied documented human rights violations committed by Beijing against the Uyghur and Turkic Muslim minorities.
This funding has moved through a complex series of mostly tax-deductible investment funds and charities, all linked by virtue of their governance structures to one man: the 67-year-old American tech magnate Neville Roy Singham.
Of mixed Sri Lankan and Jamaican heritage, Singham has long held an ideological affinity with the Chinese Communist Party, dating to his youthful membership in the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a Mao-influenced group based in Detroit, Michigan. In his capacity as a cadre of the organization, which advocated revolutionary unionism in opposition to racist policies within reformist unions, Singham took a job at the Detroit Chrysler plant in 1972 at the age of 18.
After attending Howard University, Singham spent the next several years cobbling together a consulting firm for equipment-leasing companies out of a basement in Chicago. In 1993, he named his company Thoughtworks, then expanded its focus to incorporate what Singham calls “Agile” software development, which involves adaptive management, decentralized systems, and close collaboration between developers and users.
In many ways Singham’s radical evolution from an evangelist of the Black industrial working class into a luminary of the information age embodies the high-flown dreams of the transformative ’90s.
According to a biographical note on the Chinese recruitment platform Boss Zhipin, Singham worked with Chinese tech monolith Huawei from 2001 to 2008 as a strategic technical consultant. During that period, he raved about China’s economic model, telling Fortune magazine’s senior editor David Kirkpatrick in 2008, “China is teaching the West that the world is better off with a dual system of both free-market adjustments and long-term planning.” Two years later, Thoughtworks’ Fifth Agile Software Development Conference was held in Beijing, with Singham proclaiming his own influence on Huawei in his opening speech.
I think it is extremely important to give credit where credit is due and I’m disappointed in the New York Times for failing to credit New Lines Magazine in this case. That being said, the story is important and deserves much more attention.
Times: You can do better!
Authoritarianism
8. Wanda Executive Taken Away by China’s Police, Local Media Says
Bloomberg, August 8, 2023
9. China to require all apps to share business details in new oversight push
Josh Ye, Reuters, August 10, 2023
10. China Seeks Tip-Offs from Public on Obstacles to Private Sector
Bloomberg, August 3, 2023
11. Chinese political slogans spark graffiti free-for-all on east London wall
Geneva Abdul, The Guardian, August 8, 2023
12. Tracking the Impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law
Lydia Wong, Eric Yan-ho Lai, Charlotte Yeung, and Thomas Kellogg, China File, August 8, 2023
13. Sebastien Lai on the erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong
The Economist, August 7, 2023
14. Hong Kongers are bracing for an even wider clampdown on dissent
The Economist, August 7, 2023
15. TED talks cross free speech ‘red line’ in Xi Jinping’s China
Edward White, Stephen Foley, and Gloria Li, Financial Times, August 9, 2023
16. A Family Is Divided by Hong Kong’s Pursuit of U.S.-Based Activist
Elaine Yu, Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2023
17. China Reassures Russia on Ukraine After Meeting on How to End the War
Chun Han Wong, Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2023
Environmental Harms
18. China Emphasizes Absent Xi Has Been ‘Strong’ in Flood Response
Bloomberg, August 7, 2023
19. How China cornered the market for clean tech
Edward White, Financial Times, August 9, 2023
20. Beijing’s tougher regulations thwart Big Tech’s electric vehicle dreams
Ryan McMorrow, Nian Liu, Gloria Li, and Qianer Liu, Financial Times, August 7, 2023
Foreign Interference and Coercion
21. Ford’s Shutdown After 100 Years in Brazil Cedes US Territory to China
Simone Preissler Iglesias and Leonardo Lara, Bloomberg, August 9, 2023
22. China not expected to push Russian return to Black Sea grain deal
Amy Chew, Nikkei Asia, August 7, 2023
23. HSBC executive apologises for calling UK weak over China
Anna Isaac, The Guardian, August 7, 2023
24. Election Interference Demands a Collective Defense
Richard Fontaine, Foreign Affairs, August 7, 2023
25. Philippines and US accuse China of illegally targeting supply ships
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, August 6, 2023
26. An Oil-Rich Ally Tests Its Relationship with the U.S.
Vivian Nereim, New York Times, August 8, 2023
27. Australian aid policy to focus on climate — and countering China
Rachel Pannett and Frances Vinall, Washington Post, August 8, 2023
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
28. Hong Kong police plan to arrest Danish artist, hold trial in mainland China: report
Jojo Man, Siyan Cheung, and Chingman, Radio Free Asia, August 4, 2023
29. ‘Barbie’ Is a Sleeper Hit in China
Vivian Wang and Siyi Zhao, New York Times, August 6, 2023
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
30. China retains crown in scientific papers, widens lead over U.S.
Ryosuke Matsuzoe and Satoshi Kawahara, Nikkei Asia, August 9, 2023
31. Don’t Be So Picky About a Job, China’s College Graduates Are Told
Claire Fu and Daisuke Wakabayashi, New York Times, August 8, 2023
32. China can no longer 'extend and pretend' on municipal debt
Kevin Yao and Samuel Shen, Reuters, August 7, 2023
33. Tesla relies on China for 40% of battery supply chain: analysis
Nikkei Asia, August 9, 2023
34. In previous downturns the world turned to China as an engine of growth – this time that driver may not be there
Peter Hannam, The Guardian, August 9, 2023
35. Trump will raise China tariffs if he wins White House: ex-USTR
Rintaro Tobita, Nikkei Asia, August 6, 2023
36. China, Saudi in talks for ETF cross-listings to bolster financial ties
Xie Yu and Selena Li, Reuters, August 4, 2023
37. Analysis: Yuan loses core support as firms leave China
Samuel Shen and Tom Westbrook, Reuters, August 7, 2023
38. China universities waste millions in research, fail to produce, audit finds
Meredith Chen, South China Morning Post, August 9, 2023
39. US discussed 'creative ways' to help landlocked Mongolia export rare earths, officials say
David Brunnstrom and Simon Lewis, Reuters, August 4, 2023
40. China eases entry visa and hukou rules in all-out push to save the economy
Orange Wang, The Star, August 5, 2023
41. Assessing U.S. and Chinese Influence in Southeast Asia
Gregory B. Poling and Andreyka Natalegawa, CSIS, August 7, 2023
42. How America is failing to break up with China
The Economist, August 8, 2023
COMMENT – As usual, The Economist is shooting behind the duck.
43. Russian companies move legal battles to Hong Kong courts
Pak Yiu and Echo Wong, Financial Times, August 9, 2023
44. EU trade chief to push China on barriers to exports
Andy Bounds and Sam Fleming, Financial Times, August 7, 2023
45. Saudi Aramco signals further investments in China
Tom Wilson, Financial Times, August 7, 2023
46. Why the party’s over for Chinese venture capitalists in Silicon Valley
Tracy Wen Liu, South China Morning Post, August 5, 2023
Michael made his fortune in electronics, starting an appliance company right out of university. He rode the astronomical growth of China’s economy in the early 21st century, selling his company to one of the country’s technology giants.
In late 2011, he moved to the United States – partly motivated, he says, by a huge sandstorm that had affected his children’s health. He settled in Irvine, California, and was soon invited into an exclusive club of investors, wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs who had made their own ways in real estate, mining and IT.
The next few years were a whirlwind. Friends in China kept calling him, asking if he could connect them to people in Silicon Valley. Almost every month, he would host a Chinese delegation, introducing them to American start-ups and venture capitalists.
“It felt like everyone had so much money to invest, they would fight for deals and compete to sign memorandums,” says Michael, who spoke on condition of anonymity, because he has since moved back to China.
A suburban neighbourhood in Irvine, California, where Michael settled after moving to the US. Photo: Getty Images
“It’s almost like they were afraid that they would lose the opportunity to make a great fortune if they acted slowly.”
And, of course, there were parties. Boat parties, penthouse parties, suites at the Four Seasons Hotel in Los Angeles and fancy Japanese meals in Michelin-star restaurants. Parties in mansions in Palo Alto with free-flowing premium wine and cigars, and gourmet food. Rounds of golf at exclusive country clubs.
Michael was invited to all sorts of pitch competitions, fundraising events, road shows and industrial conferences. He bought a Maserati because everyone else was driving Rolls-Royces, Bentleys and Maybachs.
“At that time, you often heard people talk about making tens of millions of dollars, raising multiple rounds of funding and going public,” he says. “You had this illusion that making money was so easy.”
The late 2010s were a boom time for Chinese investors in the US. Relations between Washington and Beijing were cordial, and the two countries’ tech sectors were constantly seeking opportunities to tap into the other’s market.
Chinese venture capitalists – many of them with close ties to the government – invested billions of dollars in US start-ups; American companies went on tours of Chinese provincial cities.
That’s all come to a near-total stop.
The flow of investment in tech between China and the US has fallen off a cliff in recent years, thanks to the deterioration of the countries’ relationship. Photo: AFP
The US government is deeply suspicious of any technology linked to China, tightening its controls and threatening to ban companies from its market, making American companies nervous about taking Chinese investment.
China, too, is throttling the flow of money and talent to the US. Chinese venture capitalists still want to put their money to work in America, they say. But the good times are well and truly over.
One sign of how comfortable the relationship between Chinese capital and the American tech sector had grown in the late 2010s was the sheer number of state-linked players operating in the US market.
One, the ZGC Innovation Center, was based in Santa Clara, California. The nearly 7,000 square metre (75,000 sq ft) building provided an open-space work area for start-ups to rent, as well as conference rooms and multimedia centres to host events.
It was opened in May 2016 as an incubator and accelerator, providing capital and mentoring to early-stage start-ups and working to bring American technology and talent to China.
The deterioration of the Sino-US relationship did not happen gradually – Frank Liu, director of Silicon Valley-China Innovation Development Center
According to its official website, the mission of the centre was to “help Zhongguancun (China’s equivalent of Silicon Valley) capital to go abroad, and bring in overseas advanced technology and talents”.
The innovation centre was backed by ZGC Group, which is funded by the local Beijing government-owned Operation and Management Company and other government-related entities.
It was hardly the only one. According to news agency Reuters, more than 20 venture-capital firms operating in Silicon Valley in 2018 had close ties to a Chinese government fund or other state-owned entity.
These ties to the government were part of the appeal.
Frank Liu, director of Silicon Valley-China Innovation Development Center, an incubator, says that from 2015, each year his organisation would arrange a start-up competition in North America, giving winners a small angel investment round.
Cyclists in Beijing’s CBD. It is believed that in 2018, over 20 venture capital firms operating in Silicon Valley had ties to the Chinese government. Photo: Getty Images
Then they’d send details of the companies to the government of Shandong province, in eastern China, which would invite a select few to attend a roadshow in China, where the founders could pitch to local officials.
American entrepreneurs were treated to complimentary hotel rooms, fancy dinners, and sightseeing tours, but most importantly, they got to meet people in government with the power to help them enter the Chinese market.
Aimee Chin, founder of Kuaizi Express, an international logistics company, says that US start-ups that could demonstrate they had potential in the Chinese market found it easy to raise funds.
“Deals in my industry usually closed within six months,” she recalls, “there were not so many regulations and restraints on Chinese people moving their capital abroad, and there were not so many investigations.”
For American entrepreneurs, this eagerness to move fast was one of the most compelling characteristics of Chinese investors.
Paul Orlando, a professor at the University of Southern California and the director of the school’s incubator programme, says that in 2017 and 2018 he was regularly approached by Chinese investors.
They were different from American investors.
“American investors usually approached me through some sort of connection to USC,” he says. “The investors from China would instead just email me or the department, or come directly to my office.”
For Chinese investors coming the other way, the main motivation was making money, Liu says. But there were other benefits.
Some hoped that investing would help them secure visas to stay in the US. Others saw it as a way to move money abroad – something that can be difficult under Beijing’s capital controls.
In total, the amount that Chinese-controlled venture funds invested in the US start-ups peaked in 2018, with a total value of US$4.59 billion, according to data from Rhodium Group, an economic research firm.
But the environment soured quite suddenly late that year. The speed of the shift in relations took many by surprise. “The deterioration of the Sino-US relationship did not happen gradually,” Liu says, adding that it caught “many investors and entrepreneurs off guard”.
Then-president Donald Trump’s administration imposed tariffs on Chinese imports and began to openly share concerns about China’s investments in advanced technologies.
The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 took effect in November of that year, putting new restrictions on foreign investments in US companies.
In May 2019, the US Department of Commerce added Chinese technology giant Huawei Technologies to its “Entity List”, preventing US companies from doing almost any business with it.
In February 2020, more regulations were added, requiring heavier scrutiny of investments in sensitive personal data, some real estate assets, “critical technologies” and “critical infrastructure”.
The pandemic put a stop to the roadshows. Rhodium Group data shows that Chinese venture-capitalist investment in US start-ups dropped to US$2.27 billion in 2019, just over half the previous year’s total.
Academic ties had been growing stronger, with top US colleges – including Harvard, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and Carnegie Mellon – hosting forums for Chinese investors. These were now under new scrutiny.
In January 2021, the FBI arrested MIT professor Gang Chen on allegations of federal grant fraud. The charges were later dropped.
It was around this time that Michael decided to leave the US, returning to China to join a start-up founded by friends. “At that time, China seemed to have more opportunities, while too many political issues were involved in doing business in the US,” he says.
Since then, President Joe Biden’s administration has continued to put pressure on China’s technology sector, imposing new export controls, investment restrictions, and tariffs.
In October 2022, the US Department of Commerce released new rules prohibiting US companies from exporting technology used to produce advanced chips or supercomputers.
The White House is close to reaching an agreement on limiting American investments in Chinese tech firms and prohibiting some deals in critical sectors, including microchips. Under pressure in China and the US, some Chinese tech companies, including the ride-hailing giant DiDi, have delisted from American markets.
Others, including the podcast platform Himalaya, have postponed their own plans to list in the US. American lawmakers are publicly discussing banning TikTok, the social media platform owned by Beijing-based ByteDance.
These crackdowns have attracted an angry response from some in China. Andy Mok, a research fellow at the Center for China and Globalization, a Beijing-based think tank, says Chinese investors still want to work with their American counterparts, but “this animosity from the US side creates barriers”.
“I find it deeply disappointing that many Americans are poisoned by Western media about China,” he adds.
Many Chinese investors have left the US; others are keeping a low profile.
Before the Sino-American relationship started to unravel, Chinese-American academics had been a bridge between the two countries, and regular participants in exchange programmes and incubators.
“But since many scholars like Chen Gang were investigated by the FBI, they are now too afraid to have ties with Chinese investors and the Chinese government,” says Liu, whose company is shifting its focus to Europe, Israel, Japan and South Korea.
USC’s Orlando says that he is now rarely approached by Chinese investors and that founders are wary of taking Chinese money.
[Chinese investors in Silicon Valley] are afraid that they might be cracked down on by the Chinese government sometime in the future – Aimee Chin, founder of Kuaizi Express, an international logistics company
“People are thinking ahead and considering the potential risks. Just like I have start-ups that think about the risk of building a following on TikTok, founders are aware of potential risks of being reliant on Chinese investment.”
But despite the barriers, a trickle of money is still flowing from China into the US. American markets are picking up, and there are opportunities in unsanctioned sectors of the economy. And many wealthy Chinese people are looking less at the risks in the US and more at the risks at home.
Chin, the logistics entrepreneur, says she’s noticed a shift in focus among the Chinese investors in Silicon Valley. Their motivation isn’t what it used to be – they’re not talking about going public or “bringing American technology to China”, she says.
They’re talking about “transferring money out of China. They are afraid that they might be cracked down on by the Chinese government sometime in the future.”
According to data from New World Wealth, a wealth intelligence firm, nearly 11,000 rich Chinese left China in 2022, the most since 2019.
Michael is thinking of emigrating back to the US. The start-up he joined did well initially but went downhill during the pandemic.
The zero-Covid-policy lockdowns were challenging for his personal life, while the government’s restrictions on tech, education, gaming and cryptocurrencies mean he’s worried about his ability to continue doing business, and, he says, “There are too many uncertainties here in China.”
COMMENT – The author leaves out one critical piece of this story… the imposition of massive capital controls by the PRC at the start of 2016, following the Chinese stock market crash of 2015.
By early 2016, Beijing severely limited who could send money out of the country and closely controlled where that money could go (before Trump was even the nominee). Investments into real estate and other assets that could enable “capital flight” dried up. Simultaneously, investments into what the PRC Government defined as critical and strategic technologies accelerated.
This is what “caused” the United States and Europe to become far more critical of Chinese FDI in 2016 onwards and resulted in a number of interventions to block PRC investments at the end of the Obama Administration and into the Trump Administration (the German semiconductor equipment maker, Aixtron; the U.S. FPGA manufacturer, Lattice Semiconductor; etc.).
47. Bertelsmann Investments to plough $700mn into Chinese start-ups
Laura Pitel, Financial Times, August 5, 2023
One of Germany’s biggest venture capital funds plans to invest $700mn in Chinese start-ups, bucking widespread gloom among western investors about the country’s tech scene.
Carsten Coesfeld, chief executive of Bertelsmann Investments, said he had been struck on a visit to China by its “very impressive” entrepreneurial talent.
Along with co-investors including large financial institutions and sovereign wealth funds, the company will back tech groups in China and start-ups founded by Chinese entrepreneurs abroad over the next three to five years.
Coesfeld said there was “sometimes a bit of a disconnect” between the western media portrayal of China’s struggle to return to growth since the pandemic and reality.
“Obviously, we’re not going back to 10 per cent [GDP growth],” he told the Financial Times. “[But] even if it’s at a lower scale, the quantum of economic growth is something we can’t neglect.”
COMMENT – Interesting move by one of Germany’s largest venture capital firms. We should pay attention to whether there is a delta between rhetoric and reality (announcing “plans to invest” versus actual investments).
My suspicion is that Carsten Coesfeld is under the exact same pressures that other business leaders and investors with existing businesses and portfolios in the PRC, are under: they must publicly extol the PRC economy because they fear retaliation by the Party.
The people who suffer from this lack of transparency are the shareholders and clients of these firms. Regulators in Europe and the United States should be pressuring these companies to speak transparently about the material risks they face in the PRC. That transparency is what differentiates our markets from what the Chinese Communist Party controls inside the PRC. Until that happens, we can’t expect our markets to work properly and for folks to fully account for the risks involved.
48. Chinese economists told not to be negative as rebound falters
Sun Yu, Financial Times, August 6, 2023
49. Biggest Chinese mutual funds near limits on offshore investment
Cheng Leng and Thomas Hale, Financial Times, August 6, 2023
50. U.S. companies are buying less from China as relations remain tense
David J. Lynch, Washington Post, August 6, 2023
51. Another Big Chinese Property Domino Is Wobbling
Jack Wong, Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2023
52. The Era of Ultracheap Stuff Is Under Threat
Jon Emont, Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2023
53. China Slips into Deflation in Warning Sign for World Economy
Stella Yifan Xie, Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2023
54. China’s Latest Problem: People Don’t Want to Go There
Wenxin Fan, Wall Street Journal, August 3, 2023
55. Chinese Exports Fall at Steepest Pace Since February 2020
Stella Yifan Xie, Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2023
56. Japanese Carmakers See Next Few Years as Fight for Survival in China
River Davis, Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2023
57. Biden Restricts U.S. Investment in China
Andrew Duehren, Wall Street Journal, August 9, 2023
Cyber & Information Technology
58. Japan blockchain startup seeks to build Asian digital payment network
Keita Sekiguchi, Nikkei Asia, August 8, 2023
59. TikTok owner ByteDance ramps up companywide test of AI chatbot ‘Grace’
Ben Jiang, South China Morning Post, August 9, 2023
60. Indian equipment for China’s Tiangong space station faces export delay
Ling Xin, South China Morning Post, August 7, 2023
61. Huawei to revive smartphone business on the back of AI-powered operating system
Iris Deng, South China Morning Post, August 7, 2023
62. How U.S. microchips are fueling Russia's military — despite sanctions
Karen Gilchrist, CNBC, August 7, 2023
63. China targeting German tech 'through back door' with licences - report
Reinhard Becker, Reuters, August 9, 2023
64. AI, superconductor experts joined Chinese summer leadership retreat in Beidaihe
Sylvie Zhuang, South China Morning Post, August 9, 2023
65. Beijing wants its own EUV light source, a key part of the chip supply chain
Eduardo Jaramillo, The China Project, August 3, 2023
66. Taiwan’s TSMC to Build First European Chip Plant in Germany
Yang Jie and Bertrand Benoit, Wall Street Journal, August 8, 2023
Military and Security Threats
67. Chinese military scientists claim to have achieved a ‘huge breakthrough’ on laser weapon technology
Stephen Chen, South China Morning Post, August 11, 2023
Chinese military scientists have announced a major breakthrough in laser weapon technology, claiming they have developed a new cooling system that allows high-energy lasers to operate “infinitely” without any build-up of waste heat.
According to scientists at the National University of Defence Technology, in Changsha, Hunan province, the new cooling system completely eliminates the harmful heat that is generated during the operation of high-energy lasers. The issue has been a major technical challenge for laser weapon development.
With the new technology, weapons can now generate laser beams for as long as they want, without any interruption or degradation in performance.
“This is a huge breakthrough in improving the performance of high-energy laser systems,” said the team led by laser weapon scientist Yuan Shengfu in a paper published on August 4 in Acta Optica Sinica, a Chinese-language peer-reviewed journal.
…
If necessary, China also plans to use laser weapons against satellites such as SpaceX’s Starlink, according to some military scientists.
These weapons can disrupt enemy communications, navigation, and surveillance capabilities, and could be used to gain a strategic advantage in space-based conflicts.
COMMENT – I hope U.S. universities didn’t train members of this scientific team.
68. 2 US Navy sailors charged with providing sensitive military information to China
Julie Watson and Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press, August 3, 2023
69. India bars makers of military drones from using Chinese parts
Krishn Kaushik, Reuters, August 8, 2023
70. Closer unofficial ties? Taiwanese coastguard ship docks in Japan
Lawrence Chung, South China Morning Post, August 9, 2023
71. China releases TV documentary showcasing army's ability to attack Taiwan
Simina Mistreanu, Associated Press, August 6, 2023
72. Mainland China airs documentary signalling preparation for Taiwan attack
Liu Zhen, South China Morning Post, August 4, 2023
73. China, Philippines' dispute over grounded warship heats up
Ella Cao, Liz Lee, and Karen Lema, Reuters, August 8, 2023
74. U.S. needs a team to counter China's political warfare: CSIS
Ken Moriyasu, Nikkei Asia, August 7, 2023
75. Japan ex-PM Taro Aso to go to Taiwan, speak on security at forum
Nikkei Asia, August 4, 2023
76. The CCP Deals Directly with U.S. States. How Should U.S. States Deal With the CCP?
National Security Institute, Medium, June 8, 2023
77. Xi Rebuilt the Military to His Liking. Now a Shake-Up Threatens Its Image.
Chris Buckley, New York Times, August 7, 2023
78. Biden to Restrict Investments in China, Citing National Security Threats
Ana Swanson, New York Times, August 8, 2023
79. China hacked Japan’s classified defense cyber networks, officials say
Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post, August 7, 2023
80. Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska
Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef, Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2023
One Belt, One Road Strategy
81. Security Concerns, Payment Disputes Hinder China's BRI Investment in Pakistan
Ayaz Gul, Voice of America, July 6, 2023
82. Economists Tally Results of Decade of Chinese Investment in Pakistan
Muhammad Jaleel, Voice of America, July 27, 2023
James Brooke, New York Sun, August 3, 2023
Opinion Pieces
84. Rising Taiwan risks cloud improved US-China ties
James Crabtree, The Straits Times, August 3, 2023
85. No decoupling, but West and China drift apart
Mark John, Reuters, August 8, 2023
COMMENT – The title of this piece is deceiving… the author describes how the U.S. and PRC ARE decoupling and that trends indicate the same is happening between Europe and the PRC.
The author tries to make a distinction between decoupling caused by political pressures and “drifting apart” caused by “wider economic headwinds”… asserting that the former isn’t happening, but the latter is. But of course, these two causes aren’t separate, they are interrelated and “decoupling” and “drifting apart” are synonymous.
Our separation of political and economic activities is an artificial distinction, mostly made by those economists who want to pretend that economics can function without those messy and irrational humans and their political processes.
As Walter Russell Mead points out in the next article, denialism has taken hold in many quarters. There is a deep reluctance to admit that our post-cold war era has ended because doing so would require us to accept that ‘business as usual’ won’t be sufficient.
86. Geopolitical Climate Denialism
Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2023
87. Why China is not as powerful as the West might think
Stuart Lau and Phelim Kine, Politico, August 3, 2023
88. Get Ready, Europe: Trump(ism)’s Coming
Edward Lucas, CEPA, August 6, 2023
89. Dissent In Post-Covid China
Aaron Sarin, Persuasion, August 3, 2023
90. New Zealand's new prime minister is making nice with China
Derek Grossman, Nikkei Asia, August 9, 2023
91. The West’s de-risking strategy towards China will fail, says Chris Miller
The Economist, August 4, 2023
92. Here’s How Scared of China the United States Should Be
Stephen M. Walt, Foreign Policy, August 7, 2023
93. Britain’s Chinese student diaspora should not live in fear
Lyndon Li Shixiang, Financial Times, August 8, 2023
94. Why Joe Biden is the heir to Trump
Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, August 7, 2023
95. China is enabling Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It needs to stop.
The Editorial Board, Washington Post, August 8, 2023
96. Column: Live and don't learn. The lesson of China's failed Australia trade bans
Clyde Russell, Reuters, August 7, 2023
97. Your Business in China May Be Uninsurable
Elisabeth Braw, Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2023