Matt Turpin's China Articles - February 5, 2023
Friends,
Just as I was finishing this week’s issue, Secretary Blinken canceled his trip to Beijing over the growing controversy of a Chinese surveillance balloon loitering over the United States (can’t make this stuff up).
The Secretary’s plane was scheduled to depart within hours and now one of the most anticipated meetings between the PRC and the US has been canceled due to Beijing’s violation of US sovereignty.
For those of you who haven’t seen it, here’s the footage of a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor shooting down the balloon and its surveillance payload just as it crossed over the Atlantic just off the South Carolina coast: High-definition footage of the shoot down.
My main take-away from this whole balloon debacle is that it should be obvious to anyone, who doesn’t have their head in the sand, that the United States and the People’s Republic are already in a cold war.
I recommend spending a little time reading about the history surrounding the Soviet shoot down of Francis Gary Powers’ U-2 spy plane on May 1, 1960 and how that led to the cancelation of a Khrushchev-Eisenhower summit and the shattering of the ‘Spirit of Camp David’ (a September 1959 meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David that seemed to signal a thawing of the first cold war). Of course history doesn’t repeat itself, but it certainly rhymes.
While we have some great material this week, I expect some fascinating commentaries next week.
Thanks for reading!
Mat
MUST READ
1. Watching China in Europe with Noah Barkin – February 2023
Noah Barkin, German Marshall Fund, February 2, 2023
Another outstanding commentary by Noah on the transatlantic dynamics of shifting policies towards the PRC. I recommend reading in full and subscribing yourself.
2. AUDIO – Drum Tower: Autocrats' pact
David Rennie and Alice Su, The Economist, February 1, 2023
It’s been a year since Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced the “no-limits” friendship between China and Russia. What drives the relationship and which side benefits from it more?
In the first episode of a two-part series, The Economist’s Beijing bureau chief, David Rennie, and senior China correspondent, Alice Su, assess how the relationship between Mr Xi and Mr Putin has evolved over the past year and ask whether the friendship has any boundaries.
They also speak to Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at Renmin University, about how China sees Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and whether that view has changed over the course of this year.
COMMENT – Alice Su and David Rennie examine what has happened over the past year since the signing of the Sino-Russian ‘no limits friendship’ agreement.
3. Europe’s Strategic Technology Autonomy from China
Tim Rühlig, DGAP (German Council on Foreign Relations), January 25, 2023
Open Strategic Autonomy in emerging and foundational technologies has rightly been identified as a crucial policy goal in order to preserve the European Union’s capability to act. China is at the centre of this discussion, not least because of increasing geopolitical tensions and China’s growing footprint in digital technologies.
What sounds good in abstract terms, however, can be difficult to operationalize. We identify four dimensions of Open Strategic Autonomy: supply chain resilience, national security, values and sustainability, and technological competitiveness. All four dimensions are equally legitimate policy goals but require different policy tools that can at times be conflicting.
COMMENT – I met Dr. Tim Rühlig a few months ago when he visited Washington and was impressed by the work his team has been doing to conceptualize the challenges facing Europe as the PRC works aggressively to establish dependencies in critical and emerging technologies.
4. Japan, Netherlands Agree to Limit Exports of Chip-Making Equipment to China
Yuka Hayashi and Vivian Salama, Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2023
Japan and the Netherlands have agreed with the U.S. to start restricting exports of advanced chip-manufacturing equipment to China, joining efforts by the Biden administration to slow China’s military development by cutting access to advanced technologies.
The agreement was reached Friday at a meeting in Washington between top national-security officials from the three countries, according to people familiar with the situation, a result of the Biden administration’s effort to convince allies to implement export controls on their companies with critical technologies.
The agreement comes in the wake of Washington’s decision in October to impose expansive export restrictions on advanced chips and equipment manufactured by U.S. companies, and was reported earlier by Bloomberg. The agreement hasn’t been formally announced by any of the three countries, which another person familiar with the situation said was out of concerns by Japan and Netherlands about potential retaliation by China.
Under the rule announced by the U.S. last year, U.S. chip makers are required to obtain a license from the Commerce Department to export certain chips used in advanced artificial-intelligence calculations and supercomputing that are required for modern weapons systems.
Under the agreement reached Friday, the Netherlands will bar ASML Holding NV, a Dutch maker of photolithography machines, from selling to China at least some immersion lithography machines, the most advanced kind of gear in the company’s deep ultraviolet lithography line. The equipment is essential to making cutting-edge chips. Japan will set similar limits on Nikon Corp., according to one of the people familiar with the discussions.
Representative David Trone (D-MD), January 24, 2023
As you know, from September 2021 through August 2022, the most recent twelve-month period available, fatal overdoses from synthetic opioids claimed the lives of 73,000 Americans, equal to 200 deaths each day. Tragically, overdose involving fentanyl is now the leading cause of death for Americans aged 18 to 45. Further, Stanford estimates more than 1.2 million Americans and Canadians will die of drug overdoses in this decade alone. Demand is a significant factor in driving the flow of illicit drugs into our country and, though there is still more work to be done, I’m proud of the steps Congress and the Administration have taken in the past two years to expand prevention, treatment, recovery, and harm reduction strategies. However, reducing the supply of these substances is also critically important, and the PRC plays an integral role.
The U.S. Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking, which I co-chaired along with Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR), found that the majority of chemical precursors, which are manufactured into synthetic opioids, are produced by companies in the PRC. At the United States’ urging, the PRC scheduled all fentanyl-related substances in 2019. While this drastically reduced the amount of synthetic opioids mailed directly from the PRC to the United States, companies shifted to exporting precursors to Mexico to circumvent these new restrictions. Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), primarily the Cártel de Sinaloa and Cártel Jalisco Nueva Generación, synthesize opioids using Chinese precursors and traffic them into the United States. This supply chain — precursors manufactured in the PRC, then shipped to Mexico where they are synthesized, and then trafficked into the United States — is the main route by which illicit fentanyl enters American communities. Profits are funneled through PRC-based money-laundering organizations and Mexican TCOs, making it difficult to investigate and disrupt criminal actors.
6. China’s Indo-Pacific Folly: Beijing’s Belligerence Is Revitalizing U.S. Alliances
Andrew D. Taffer and David Wallsh, Foreign Affairs, January 31, 2023
In December 2022, Japan released its first national security strategy in nearly ten years. The document committed Tokyo to strengthening the U.S.-Japanese alliance “in all areas.” And Japan is not alone. Over the last half decade, almost all U.S. allies across the Indo-Pacific have deepened their partnerships with Washington and formed new networks with one another.
At first blush, this might seem puzzling. Chinese President Xi Jinping has voiced his desire for the United States to withdraw from the Indo-Pacific, and his government has upheld China’s long tradition of expressing hostility toward Washington’s alliances, which form the foundation of the U.S. presence in the region. Many analysts, including Rush Doshi and Elizabeth Economy, have argued that Beijing has a disciplined and coherent strategy to drive a wedge between the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies. But far from a well-executed campaign, Beijing’s effort to erode U.S. alliances has been incoherent and undisciplined, strengthening, rather than weakening, U.S. alliances in the region and producing an energized U.S.-led coalition poised to constrain Beijing for years to come.
Beijing’s ambition to isolate Washington from its Asian allies has been derailed in large part by its desire to redress more immediate grievances—namely, to reclaim what it sees as lost territory and punish countries that offend its sensibilities. Instead of staying focused on its long-term strategic objectives, China has grown preoccupied with achieving near-term tactical gains in both its territorial disputes with its neighbors and its quest for deference from other countries. These impulses have resulted in major strategic errors and suggest that Beijing is not nearly as adept at planning and executing long-term strategy as many believe.
COMMENT – I think it is hard to overstate just how important the CCP’s malign behavior has been in convincing the PRC’s neighbors that they need to band together, and with the United States, to deter further hostility. Xi Jinping and his cadres have been incredibly effective spokesmen for the necessity of collective security.
This reminds me of a piece by Edward Luttwak, “The myth of Chinese supremacy: Strategic incompetence has always plagued Beijing,” Unherd, February 19, 2022… I recommend re-reading Luttwak’s piece.
7. Ontario Teachers’ $181 Billion Pension Fund Pauses Private China Deals
Layan Odeh and Ben Bartenstein, Bloomberg, January 31, 2023
Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, a Canadian fund that manages C$242.5 billion ($181 billion) of assets, has paused direct investing in private assets in China, according to people familiar with the matter.
Geopolitical risk is among the reasons behind the pension fund’s move, said one person, who asked not to be identified discussing a sensitive matter.
COMMENT – I think the important take-away from this is how time horizons for different types of investments are driving different behaviors.
Hedge Funds, with investing horizons of weeks or months, are loading up on PRC investments with the intention of only holding them in the short term (opening up from COVID only happens once and short-term investors want to reap rewards during the bounce). See Foreigners Scoop Up China Shares With January Inflow at Record, Bloomberg, January 30, 2023.
Direct investing in private assets (private equity) like the investments being halted by Ontario Teachers Pension Plan have investing horizons of 5-7 years. Clearly investors see some short-term returns, but they increasingly see systemic risk in the medium to long term.
AUTHORITARIANISM
8. Czech president-elect says west must accept China is ‘not friendly’
Raphael Minder, Financial Times, February 1, 2023
Petr Pavel challenges Beijing by becoming Europe’s first elected head of state to speak to Taiwanese President.
The Czech president-elect has called on EU states to drop any illusions about China, saying his country would no longer “behave like an ostrich” over divergent interests with Beijing.
COMMENT – I think the new Czech President, Petr Pavel, is my favorite European politician. Speaking truth to power is refreshing.
This is going to make the Chinese Communist Party very, very upset and it will make other European leaders very, very uncomfortable (side-eye at you French President Emmanuel Macron, who is headed to Beijing soon, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz).
9. Czech Parliament Speaker to Visit Taiwan Amid Row with China
Deana Kjuka, Bloomberg, February 1, 2023
Parliament speaker says she will visit Taiwan in March Czech president elect drew ire from China over Taiwan comments.
10. Macron Aims for China Trip to Discuss Energy, Defense with Xi
Ania Nussbaum, Bloomberg, January 19, 2023
Emmanuel Macron is planning a trip to China to discuss energy, trade and Russia’s war against Ukraine with President Xi Jinping, according to people familiar with his thinking.
While no date has been scheduled yet, the French president will try to make the trip by the end of April, said the people, who asked not to be identified because the arrangements are private.
The Chinese foreign affairs ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Macron’s planned visit would come as the European Union is seeking to recalibrate its trading position toward both China and the US. The EU is in the process of building a new industrial policy after Washington passed a climate law that the bloc’s leaders say unfairly subsidizes domestic companies.
Diplomatic ties between Paris and Beijing were strained during the Covid pandemic, when the Chinese embassy criticized France’s response to the pandemic.
But in a sign that France has been seeking an improvement in relations, Xi and Macron spoke in November on the sideline of the Group of 20 meeting in Bali, their first meeting in three years. In December, French Foreign Affairs Minister Catherine Colonna met with her counterpart Wang Yi.
COMMENT – I suspect we will continue to see President Macron pursue a policy of ‘triangulation’ vis-à-vis the United States and the People’s Republic (this ‘triangulation’ is on full display in Paris’ latest Indo-Pacific Strategy which portrays the U.S. as equally at fault for geopolitical tensions as the PRC and downplays the French-American alliance). This may prove more difficult as other EU members, like the new leadership in Prague, take a harder line on Beijing and denounce the Chinese Communist Party.
Paris will be forced to walk a fine line of maintaining European unity, while seeking to forge its own ‘third way’ between Washington and Beijing: an old French tactic that didn’t work particularly well for Charles de Gaulle and his politique de grandeur… and have not worked particularly well for Marcon.
I guess old habits die hard.
11. EU sidelined in US-Dutch deal to block chips exports to China
Pieter Haeck, Politico, January 31, 2023
Deal between The Hague and Washington exposes EU’s weaknesses in fighting global trade war over sensitive technologies.
The U.S. scored a major win in getting the Dutch government to block China’s access to critical chips technology — and to get there, it drove a wedge between The Hague and the rest of Europe.
The Netherlands late on Friday struck a deal in Washington to restrict its sales of advanced microchips manufacturing equipment to China. The country is home to ASML, a world-leading manufacturer of microchips printers. Pressured by the U.S. government, the Dutch hashed out a political deal that also included Japan and is aimed at putting the squeeze on China's ability to catch up on critical chips technologies.
The deal put the Western European country of 17.5 million at the heart of the tech war between the U.S. and China. But it also left its European counterparts reduced to a role of bystander, powerless to intervene.
12. Entrepreneurs Flee China’s Heavy Hand: ‘You Don’t Have to Stay There’
Li Yuan, New York Times, January 19, 2023
Weary of crackdowns and lockdowns, businesspeople are moving out of China and taking their wealth with them. Many have found a new home in Singapore.
They left after the government cracked down on the private sector. They ran away from a harsh “zero Covid” policy. They searched for safe havens for their wealth and their families.
They went to Singapore, Dubai, Malta, London, Tokyo, and New York — anywhere but their home country of China, where they felt that their assets, and their personal safety, were increasingly at the mercy of the authoritarian government.
In 2022, a year that proved extremely challenging for China, many Chinese businesspeople moved abroad, temporarily or for good. They were part of a wave of emigration that led to one of the year’s top online catchphrases, “runxue,” understood to mean running away from China.
A consequential, if privileged, piece of China’s economic puzzle, these people are pulling their wealth and businesses out when growth is at its lowest point in decades.
13. CCP Inc.: The Reshaping of China's State Capitalist System
Barry Naughton and Briana Boland, CSIS, January 31, 2023
What is “CCP Inc.”? At the conclusion of a multiyear project examining China’s state capitalist system, this CSIS report distills key observations about the changing nature of China’s domestic economic management and the international behavior of Chinese companies, state organizations, and financiers. Changing national mechanisms for extending Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authority over the economy and a proliferation of new financial institutions underpin a CCP Inc. ecosystem with a unique internal logic and new adaptability to respond to policy shifts. The strength of this ecosystem allows CCP Inc. to compete internationally as a well-resourced group of coordinated actors. However, recent changes to the operation of CCP Inc.—and the external environment in which it operates—foreshadow major challenges for the ecosystem.
COMMENT – Great final report by Barry Naughton and Briana Boland, well worth your time reading it.
I do have one quibble… “State Capitalism” doesn’t seem like the right term to use when describing the PRC’s political economy.
Capitalism is about separate and independent entities making their own decisions on the allocation of capital and exists when the State accepts that there are limits on State power, in essence relying on market forces to come to economic decisions. The Chinese Communist Party explicitly rejects this notion that State power can be limited.
As opposed to using the term “State Capitalism,” perhaps we should just use the term that the Chinese Communist Party uses: “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” which in other words is just nationalistic socialism or, if you will, national socialism.
Under ‘national socialism’ the State, ruled monopolistically by a single Party (rather than a pluralistic political system in which various political parties compete), controls corporate entities and makes economic decisions in ways that are explicitly ‘illiberal’. This term, that the CCP uses itself, seems like a much better description of the PRC’s political economy.
I think this report should be retitled as: “CCP Inc.: The Reshaping of China’s National Socialist System.”
Bottom line: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics is national socialism, not state capitalism.
14. Does Ideology Influence Hiring in China?
Jennifer Pan and Tongtong Zhang, Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, February 1, 2023
INSIGHTS
While firms in China do not reward job candidates who express support for the ideology of the CCP, job candidates who express “non-conformist” views that support Western democratic institutions are 9% less likely to receive callbacks from prospective employers compared to those who express no political orientation.
Hiring managers report that they avoid non-conformist candidates to minimize possible political risks, such as inviting penalties and investigations from the regime.
Penalties imposed on expressing politically non-conformist views vary by industry sector, as firms in innovative industries prioritized by the Chinese government as strategically important are most likely to discriminate against applicants supporting Western democracy.
15. Why Vladimir Putin is not a pariah in China
The Economist, February 2, 2023
For generations China’s people have been told that the outside world is—rather often—an unsafe and disappointing place. Communist Party ideologues teach that foreigners’ quarrels are best understood as contests of strength and self-interest. Relentlessly, official speeches and news reports cast doubt on the notion that other countries’ actions are explained by moral values, whatever outsiders claim. China is presented as an exception: a peace-loving giant that seeks only to do good.
Instilling cynicism about the world serves the party well. Without it, February 4th could be a ticklish anniversary for President Xi Jinping. It is a year since his declaration that China and Russia enjoy a “friendship without limits”, days before Vladimir Putin launched his blood-soaked, land-grabbing invasion of Ukraine.
16. As China’s Covid Tsunami Recedes, Relief, Grief and Anxiety Follow
Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien, New York Times, January 31, 2023
When China abruptly abandoned “zero Covid,” accelerating an onslaught of infections and deaths, many feared a prolonged tide rippling from cities into villages. Now, two months later, the worst seems to have passed, and the government is eager to shift attention to economic recovery.
Doctors who were mobilized across China to treat a rush of Covid patients say in phone interviews that the number of patients they are now seeing has fallen. Towns and villages that had hunkered down under the surge of infections and funerals are stirring to life. Health officials have declared that Covid cases “already peaked in late December 2022.”
17. Chinese cities are struggling to pay their bills as 'hidden debts' soar
Laura He, CNN, February 1, 2023
Three years of strict pandemic controls in China and a real estate crash have drained local government coffers, leaving authorities across the country struggling with mountains of debt. The problem has gotten so extreme that some cities are now unable to provide basic services, and the risk of default is rising.
Analysts estimate China’s outstanding government debts surpassed 123 trillion yuan ($18 trillion) last year, of which nearly $10 trillion is so-called “hidden debt” owed by risky local government financing platforms that are backed by cities or provinces.
18. Putin and Xi are as close as ever, and that’s a problem for the US
Simone McCarthy, CNN, February 3, 2023
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS
19. China's Rampant Illegal Fishing Is Endangering the Environment and the Global Economy
Mike Studeman, Newsweek, January 24, 2023
If the term "illegal fishing" conjures images of small numbers of scattered vessels independently pirating the sea's resources, think again. The problem of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing stems increasingly from state-supported deep water fishing fleets, including massive trawlers accompanied by sustainment vessels, freezer, and transport vessels. Operating continuously in large groups with global reach, these industrial-scale flotillas are able to drag massive nets, literally capturing everything in their wake, often without regard for fisheries laws or consent of the coastal nations.
20. 5 Latin American countries pledge to protect their fishing industry
Rohit Yadav, TFI Global, February 2, 2023
Marine resources in the eastern Pacific and southwest Atlantic, as well as the fishing industry in Latin American nations bordering either ocean, continue to be threatened by illegal and excessive fishing, which is primarily done by Chinese fleets. Year-round, Chinese fishing boats can be observed in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Peru. The majority of squid boats travel as far south as the Atlantic through the Antarctic Ocean, beyond Chile and up to Argentina’s coastal borders. The “squid route” is the name given to this passage.
China has actively pursued giant squid (Dosidicus gigas) in the Pacific. According to the satellite tracking app Global Fishing Watch, 615 vessels did so in 2021, 584 of which were Chinese. According to Alfonso Miranda, president of the CALAMASUR committee, which is made up of business people and fishermen from Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, said in 2022, 631 Chinese-flagged vessels have entered the Pacific waters of Ecuador and Peru.
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND COERCION
21. Fiala says Czechia sovereign state after China criticism of Pavel Taiwan call
Ian Willoughby, Radio Prague International, January 31, 2023
The Czech prime minister, Petr Fiala, has responded to Chinese criticism of a call between the Czech president-elect and the Taiwanese president, saying Czechia is a sovereign state and officials can phone and meet whomever they like.
22. Brazil’s Lula snubs Olaf Scholz with Ukraine war remarks
Hans Von der Burchard, Politico, January 31, 2023
German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Brazil's freshly inaugurated President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva traded barbs late Monday on who's responsible for Russia's invasion in Ukraine, as the latter suggested that Kyiv could also be at fault.
…
"If one doesn't want to, two can't fight," Lula told reporters, implying Ukraine as well had a role in Russia's invasion.
"I think the reason for the war between Russia and Ukraine also needs to be clearer. Is it because of NATO? Is it because of territorial claims? Is it because of entry into Europe? The world has little information about that," Lula added.
COMMENT – I suspect we are witnessing the direction that Brazil is going to lean under Lula for the next few years. Beijing and Moscow will have a reliable partner in Brasilia.
23. Lula and Latin America’s Great China Debate
Filipe Porto, The Diplomat, February 1, 2023
Great power competition is increasingly playing out in Latin America, even as Brazil’s new president seeks a return to regional unity.
24. China owns vast network of UK real estate, offshore records reveal
Rob Davies, The Guardian, January 27, 2023
The Chinese government owns a vast network of UK real estate via offshore secrecy jurisdictions such as Luxembourg and the Isle of Man, the Guardian can reveal, raising questions about Beijing’s grip on links in the UK supply chain.
Disclosures made as part of a new government register of property owned via offshore entities show that China’s investment division owns more than 250 properties across Britain via dozens of companies. They include distribution centres that are key to the flow of food and goods in multiple regions of the UK including the south-west and south-east of England and the Midlands.
25. Air Force Says Proposed Chinese-Owned Mill in North Dakota Is ‘Significant Threat’
Mitch Smith, New York Times, January 31, 2023
After more than a year of debate about whether a Chinese company’s plan to build a corn mill in North Dakota was an economic boon or a geopolitical risk, an assistant secretary of the Air Force has weighed in with a warning that the “project presents a significant threat to national security.”
The letter from Assistant Secretary Andrew P. Hunter, released publicly on Tuesday by North Dakota’s senators, noted the proximity of Grand Forks Air Force Base to the proposed mill and said the project raised “near- and long-term risks of significant impacts to our operations in the area.”
The debate over Fufeng USA’s plan to build a giant milling facility on the edge of Grand Forks, less than 15 miles from the Air Force base, divided the Republican power structure in North Dakota and showed just how swiftly the economic relationship between the United States and China had changed.
26. Pentagon tracking suspected Chinese spy balloon over the US
Oren Liebermann, Haley Britzky, and Michael Conte, CNN, February 2, 2023
The US is tracking a suspected Chinese high-altitude surveillance balloon over the continental United States, defense officials said on Thursday, a discovery that risks adding further strain to tense US-China relations.
Pentagon spokesman Brig. Gen. Patrick Ryder said the US government has been tracking the balloon for several days as it made its way over the northern United States, adding it was “traveling at an altitude well above commercial air traffic and does not present a military or physical threat to people on the ground.”
Speaking on background, a senior US defense official said senior military officials had advised President Joe Biden not to shoot it down due to fear the debris could pose a safety threat to people on the ground.
“We are confident that this high-altitude surveillance balloon belongs to the [People’s Republic of China],” the senior defense official said. “Instances of this activity have been observed over the past several years, including prior to this administration.”
While the balloon’s current flight path carries it over “a number of sensitive sites,” the official said it does not present a significant intelligence gathering risk. The balloon is assessed to have “limited additive value” from an intelligence collection perspective, the official added.
27. Why Chinese Intimidation Unites South Korea but Divides Taiwan
Christopher Carothers, US-China Perception Monitor, January 31, 2023
The majority of citizens in both South Korea and Taiwan believe that China poses a major security challenge to their country. Yet, while South Koreans are largely unified on China policy, Taiwan’s two main political camps remain at odds, even as Taiwan faces a far greater threat in the possibility of coercive unification with China. What explains this puzzling difference?
My recent article, ‘Does External Threat Unify? Chinese Pressure and Domestic Politics in Taiwan and South Korea’, in the peer-reviewed journal Foreign Policy Analysis addresses this question through an analysis of hundreds of official statements relating to China policy by the main conservative and progressive parties in South Korea and Taiwan. I argue that a country is less likely to unify against a foreign threat if a ‘formative rift’ in its history divides political groups over national identity issues and causes them to perceive the threat differently, as is the case for Taiwan but not South Korea. Understanding how national identity shapes foreign policy in East Asian democracies is critical for U.S. policymakers, who should calibrate expectations and manage alliances accordingly.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
28. Chinese province ends ban on unmarried people having children
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, January 30, 2023
A Chinese province of more than 80 million people will lift restrictions on unmarried people having children and remove caps on the number of babies as part of a national drive to increase the country’s birth rate.
Sichuan’s health commission announced on Monday it would allow all people to register births with the provincial government from 15 February. It will also remove limits on the number of birth registrations for any parent.
Until now, the commission had allowed only married couples who wanted to have up to two children to register with local authorities. In a government notice, Sichuan authorities said the measures “shift the focus of childbearing registration to childbearing desire and childbearing results”.
The measures will be in place for five years.
National reproduction policies do not explicitly ban unmarried women from having children but proof of marriage is often required for parents to access free services including prenatal healthcare, a mother’s salary during maternity leave, and job protection.
Those who seek to register a birth outside of marriage often face heavy fines in order to get the child a hukou – China’s crucial household registration that gives the child access to education and social services.
COMMENT – Let this sink in… in a Chinese province of 80 million people women who had children outside of marriage were denied social services and education for their children.
29. Cyprus denies extradition to China in a case illustrating transnational repression acts
Safeguard Defenders, December 23, 2022
The district court of Larnaca, Cyprus, issued a verdict today concerning the extradition process of Chinese national Ma Chau, who China wants for economic crimes. It denied the extradition. The judge ruled that the extradition of Ma, who stands accused of economic crimes, would be in violation of article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (on Torture and ill-treatment), and pointed out that 'diplomatic assurances' offered by the Chinese State were insufficient to overcome serious risks to the target's human rights.
More strikingly, the court also refused the extradition on the grounds of article 5, due to the significant risk of arbitrary detention and, in a rare instance by a European court, article 6, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, which China, the court held, could not offer.
30. Chinese woman says she is detained in secret location after Beijing protest
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, January 17, 2023
Video purportedly shows 26-year-old editor, who accuses police of forcing her and friends to sign blank arrest warrants.
A Chinese woman has accused police of forcing her and friends to sign blank arrest warrants and detaining them in secret locations over their attendance at a protest vigil in Beijing last year.
A video, purported to be of Cao Zhixin, a 26-year-old editor at Peking University Press, began spreading online on Monday. In it, Cao said she and five friends attended a riverside vigil in Beijing on 27 November, to mourn the victims of a building fire in Urumqi. The fire had been linked to the enforcement of China’s strict zero-Covid policy and became a catalyst for vigils and protests.
They were summoned by police a few days later, and released after 24 hours, the video said. However between 18 and 24 December, all were detained again, Cao being the last of them.
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
31. U.S. Outbound Investment into Chinese AI Companies
Emily Weinstein and Ngor Luong, CSET, February 1, 2023
U.S. policymakers are increasingly concerned about the national security implications of U.S. investments in China, and some are considering a new regime for reviewing outbound investment security. The authors identify the main U.S. investors active in the Chinese artificial intelligence market and the set of AI companies in China that have benefitted from U.S. capital. They also recommend next steps for U.S. policymakers to better address the concerns over capital flowing into the Chinese AI ecosystem.
32. Diversification isn’t enough to cure Europe’s economic dependence on China
Francesca Ghiretti and Hanns W. Maull, MERICS, January 30, 2023
In the most recent European Commission document on EU strategic dependencies, the term “diversification” appears no less than 28 times. It represents a key pillar of the proposed policy responses to dependence on Chinese supplies. The whole world depends on China for rare earths minerals, metals, and the magnets produced with them: China accounts for 63 percent of global rare earth oxides, 85 percent of the refined minerals, and 93 percent of the world’s magnet production. As for Europe, the newly discovered deposit of rare earths in Sweden, the continent’s largest known mineral reserve, may help to improve Europe’s resilience for the supply of rare earths.
Yet the crux of the issue is not dependence but vulnerability – the pain inflicted by disruptions in commercial exchanges, measured in economic costs, social suffering, and, possibly, political upheaval.
Vulnerability may exist even without dependence - Dependence is a rather crude yardstick for vulnerability. The European Union may depend almost completely on Madagascar for its supply of vanilla pods, yet even a complete loss of those supplies would hardly result in serious macroeconomic pain. On the other hand, vulnerability may exist even without dependence: Spain never relied on Russian natural gas supplies, but the shortfall to other European markets sharply increased the price of electricity throughout Europe, which affected Spain severely and thus revealed its vulnerability.
Vulnerability exists when three aspects combine. First, a major disruption of economic exchanges must be plausible. Second, the economic sectors affected must be constrained in their ability to adjust to disruptions by pivoting to alternative sources and/or endure reduced demand. Third, the consequences of the disruption must have a significant impact on the overall performance of the affected economy. The European Commission has conducted some of the necessary analysis of European vulnerabilities, but much remains to be done at the national level.
33. How Vietnam is learning from the ‘extravagance and consequences’ of China’s industrialization
Erica Na, South China Morning Post, January 19, 2023
Vietnam is taking note of China’s rapid industrialisation as it positions itself to benefit from multinationals looking to diversify from the mainland.
34. Canada can help cut reliance on China for critical metals: minister
Tomoyoshi Oshikiri and Tamayo Muto, Nikkei Asia, January 20, 2023
Canada can play a "big role" in reducing reliance on China for vital industrial metals, Canadian Minister of Natural Resources Jonathan Wilkinson said Thursday, as the U.S. and its allies seek to decouple their supply chains from Asia's largest economy.
Ottawa seeks to develop these resources and "also to look at processing those minerals in countries like Canada, in countries like Japan, countries like the United States, so that we're not quite so dependent on the processing that happens in China," Wilkinson told Nikkei in an interview here, explaining his country's new strategy on critical minerals.
35. China Tells Dutch It Wants Open Supply Chains Amid US Chip Curbs
Bloomberg, January 30, 2023
COMMENT – … says the country that imposed an embargo on Australia for requesting a transparent investigation into the origins of COVID, South Korea for hosting advanced air defense systems to counter North Korea, and Norway for awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo.
36. Democracies embrace economic security to counter China and Russia
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Axios, January 31, 2023
The vision of a truly open global economy is fading as countries adopt import and export bans, use tariffs as geopolitical leverage, and reroute investment and supply chains in the face of sanctions.
Why it matters: Democratic countries are increasingly using economic security as a crucial way to protect themselves from China and Russia.
Driving the news: The U.S. struck a deal with Japan and the Netherlands last week to restrict exports to China of equipment used to make chips, Bloomberg reports.
The big picture: The U.S., Europe, Japan, and other democratic countries are taking steps to improve supply chain resilience, diversify trade relations, and reduce dependence on China and Russia in key sectors such as energy and technology.
CYBER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
37. TikTok Dealt Another Hit as Democratic Senator Joins Calls for Banning the App
John McKinnon, Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2023
Another prominent Democrat has joined Republicans seeking to hobble TikTok, with Sen. Michael Bennet (D., Colo.) calling on Apple Inc. and Google to bar the Chinese-owned video platform from their app stores.
Republicans have been the most outspoken critics of TikTok, but in recent weeks, Democrat Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi of Illinois joined with Republicans to sponsor legislation to ban TikTok outright.
Sen. Bennet weighed in with a letter Thursday to Apple Chief Executive Tim Cook and Sundar Pichai, CEO of Google and its parent company Alphabet Inc., saying TikTok is a national security risk because Chinese law compels companies to comply with any demands from Beijing linked to state intelligence operations.
COMMENT – This does not bode well for ByteDance and its wholly-owned subsidiary TikTok. Of note, Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL) was just named the ranking member of the House China Committee.
38. China's self-driving car push hits legal and cost roadblocks
Takashi Kawakami And Naoshige Shimizu, Nikkei Asia, January 19, 2023
China's efforts to get more nearly autonomous vehicles on its roads have become bogged down by growing uncertainty over the technology's near-term profit potential in a challenging environment.
The country has made significant strides in recent years under a national strategy that prioritizes autonomous-driving technology. A road map released in November 2020 calls for 20% of all new vehicles sold to have Level 4 capabilities -- letting them operate without a driver under certain conditions -- by 2030.
39. TikTok Ban Faces Obscure Hurdle: The Berman Amendments
John D. McKinnon, Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023
As lawmakers push to ban or restrict Chinese-owned TikTok, one of the many hurdles they face is a pair of measures passed by Congress decades ago to let films, books and music flow freely between the U.S. and hostile foreign countries.
The measures, known as the Berman amendments, date to the last years of the Cold War. They took away the president’s authority to regulate or ban imports of “informational materials” from adversarial nations such as Cuba, and shielded those who produced such works—and their U.S. distributors—from penalties for violating economic sanctions.
TikTok and other social-media platforms weren’t around at the time, but the protections were later expanded to effectively extend First Amendment-type protections to foreign digital media and were invoked by TikTok attorneys in their successful 2020 lawsuit to block then-President Donald Trump’s attempt to ban downloads of the video app.
The dilemma for lawmakers now: how to write legislation to prevent China’s government from influencing content on TikTok or other Chinese social-media apps, and gathering data on users, without shutting down global exchanges of content—or inviting retaliation against U.S. platforms and media.
40. US and India launch ambitious tech and defence initiatives
Demetri Sevastopulo and John Reed, Financial Times, January 31, 2023
Effort designed to counter China in the Indo-Pacific and wean New Delhi off its reliance on Russia for weapons.
41. Washington halts licences for US companies to export to Huawei
Demetri Sevastopulo and Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, January 30, 2023
White House moves closer to imposing total ban on sale of American tech to Chinese group.
The Biden administration has stopped providing US companies with licences to export to Huawei as it moves towards imposing a total ban on the sale of American technology to the Chinese telecom equipment giant.
Several people familiar with discussions inside the administration said the commerce department had notified some companies that it would no longer grant licences to any group exporting American technology to Huawei.
42. China attacks ‘unscrupulous’ US after reports of further crackdown on Huawei
Verna Yu, The Guardian, January 31, 2023
Beijing reacts angrily to reports that Washington has moved to restrict American exports to hi-tech company.
China has reacted angrily to reports that the United States has stopped approving licences for American companies to export most items to China’s hi-tech company Huawei, accusing the US of deliberately targeting Chinese companies under the pretext of national security.
MILITARY AND SECURITY THREATS
43. China’s Top Nuclear-Weapons Lab Used American Computer Chips Decades After Ban
Liza Lin and Dan Strumpf, Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023
State-owned institute continued buying Intel- and Nvidia-made chips despite inclusion on a U.S. export blacklist in 1997.
China’s top nuclear-weapons research institute has bought sophisticated U.S. computer chips at least a dozen times in the past two and a half years, circumventing decades-old American export restrictions meant to curb such sales.
The chips, which are widely used in data centers and personal computers, were acquired from resellers in China. Some were procured as components for computing systems, with many bought by the institute’s laboratory studying computational fluid dynamics, a broad scientific field that includes the modeling of nuclear explosions.
Such purchases defy longstanding restrictions imposed by the U.S. that aim to prevent the use of any U.S. products for atomic-weapons research by foreign powers. The academy, known as CAEP, was one of the first Chinese institutions put on the U.S. blacklist, known as the entity list, because of its nuclear work.
A Journal review of research papers published by CAEP found that at least 34 over the past decade referenced using American semiconductors in the research. They were used in a range of ways, including analyzing data and generating algorithms. Nuclear experts said that in at least seven of them, the research can have applications to maintaining nuclear stockpiles. CAEP didn’t respond to requests for comment.
The findings underline the challenge facing the Biden administration as it seeks to more aggressively counter the use of American technology by China’s military. In October, the U.S. expanded the scope of export regulations to prevent China from obtaining the most advanced American chips and chip-manufacturing tools that power artificial intelligence and supercomputers, which are increasingly important to modern warfare.
COMMENT – Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics’ (CAEP) collaboration with German universities was the focus of Jeff Stoff’s recent report titled, Should Democracies Draw Redlines around Research Collaboration with China? A Case Study of Germany (see Issue 2 from three weeks ago).
44. NATO chief wants more ‘friends’ as Russia, China move closer
Mari Yamaguchi and Haruka Nuga, Associated Press, February 1, 2023
45. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at Keio University
Jens Stoltenberg, NATO, February 1, 2023
Thank you, Professor Itoh, Professor Tsuruoka. Good morning to everyone. It is great to be here at Keio University. And to engage with all of you here at Keio University. Japan is an important global actor. Actively promoting peace. And supporting the rules-based international order. This is what NATO stands for too. And for almost 75 years, NATO has ensured peace in the Euro-Atlantic area. Allowing democracy, freedom and prosperity to flourish. But today, the global order that has served us so well for many decades is under threat. Moscow and Beijing are at the forefront of an authoritarian pushback.
…
Ukraine needs our continued support. For as long as it takes. Because if Putin wins, the message to Moscow, and Beijing, will be that they can achieve what they want through brute force.
This would make the whole world more dangerous. And us more vulnerable.
At the same time as we support Ukraine, NATO’s main priority is to protect our one billion people, and every inch of Allied territory. To do this, we have been strengthening our military presence, especially in the eastern part of the Alliance. We have more troops on high alert. Ready to move, whenever and wherever needed. Stronger defences are not to provoke a conflict with Russia. But to prevent a conflict. And preserve peace.
Meanwhile, Beijing is watching closely. And learning lessons that may influence its future decisions.
What is happening in Europe today could happen in East Asia tomorrow. China is not NATO’s adversary. But its growing assertiveness and its coercive policies have consequences. For your security in the Indo-Pacific. And ours in the Euro-Atlantic.
We must work together to address them.
Beijing is substantially building up its military forces, including nuclear weapons, without any transparency. It is attempting to assert control over the South China Sea, and threatening Taiwan.
Trying to take control of critical infrastructure, including in NATO countries. Repressing its own citizens through advanced technology. And spreading Russian disinformation about NATO and the war in Ukraine.
Moscow and Beijing are deepening their strategic partnership. The two countries train and operate more together militarily. Conducting joint naval and air patrols also in the vicinity of Japan. Their economic cooperation is increasing.
And China has not condemned Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
A year ago, for the first time ever, China backed Russia's demand that NATO closes its door to new member states. But NATO’s door remains open. Soon two new countries – Finland and Sweden – will join the Alliance. This sends a powerful message. Violence and intimidation do not work. This is a more dangerous and competitive world. Our security is not regional, but global. So it is essential to have friends. Among NATO’s partners, none is closer or more capable than Japan.
COMMENT – In Tokyo, the NATO Secretary General explicitly links Moscow and Beijing as an entente of authoritarianism.
46. Taiwan activates defenses in response to China incursions
The Independent, February 1, 2023
Taiwan has scrambled fighter jets and and put navy ships and missile systems on alert in response to nearby operations of 34 Chinese military aircraft and nine warships.
47. Japan companies eye Taiwan's 100,000 shelters in strait crisis
Yu Nakamura and Hideaki Ryugen, Nikkei Asia, December 29, 2023
48. China’s put-upon maritime neighbours are pushing back
The Economist, February 1, 2023
China can no longer count on getting its way in the South China Sea.
The South China Sea is a third larger than the Mediterranean and has valuable fish stocks and untapped oil and gas reserves. Connecting East Asia’s economic miracle with much of the rest of the world, its waters play an outsize role in global maritime trade and security. Yet there is a problem. All seven nations that border the sea maintain overlapping rights to it. And one of them, China, claims nearly the entire maritime expanse—and struts about it like a municipal swimming-bath bully.
With massive terraforming, China has turned remote reefs into airstrips and bases. It uses its navy and coastguard, as well as “maritime militias” of armed fishing fleets, to intimidate its South-East Asian neighbours. It forcibly curtails their fishing and exploration for hydrocarbons. It is obstructing the Philippines’ efforts to resupply a remote island outpost. Yet for the first time in a decade, China is no longer making all the running in and around the sea. South-East Asians are at last refusing to yield to its provocations. This might—just—represent a turning-point in their struggle against the regional thug.
49. Ferdinand Marcos Jr says Taiwan tensions ‘very, very worrisome’ for Philippines
Gideon Rachman, Financial Times, January 18, 2023
President to tighten military ties with US but also hopes for better links with China.
50. U.S. reaches military base access agreement in the Philippines
Karen DeYoung and Rebecca Tan, Washington Post, February 2, 2023
The United States and the Philippines announced Thursday that U.S. military forces will be given access to four new bases in the Southeast Asian nation, solidifying a months-long U.S. effort to expand its strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific region to counter threats from China.
51. A planned spaceport in Djibouti may give China a boost
The Economist, January 19, 2023
52. Flooding the Zone: China Coast Guard Patrols in 2022
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, January 30, 2023
China’s coast guard presence in the South China Sea is more robust than ever. An analysis of automatic identification system (AIS) data from commercial provider MarineTraffic shows that the China Coast Guard (CCG) maintained near-daily patrols at key features across the South China Sea in 2022. Together with the ubiquitous presence of its maritime militia, China’s constant coast guard patrols show Beijing’s determination to assert control over the vast maritime zone within its claimed nine-dash line.
COMMENT – As the Taffer/Wallsh piece from Foreign Affairs argued (#6 above), Beijing’s aggressiveness in the South China Sea has convinced the PRC’s neighbors that they must band together, with the United States and Japan, to deter the PRC.
ONE BELT, ONE ROAD STRATEGY
53. China Belt and Road dreams fade in Germany’s industrial heartland
Jens Kastner, Financial Times, February 1, 2023
Geopolitical tensions including Beijing’s close ties with Moscow derail Duisburg’s hopes of trade bonanza.
54. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, 2 Years After the Coup
Timothy Millar, The Diplomat, February 1, 2023
After some initial hesitation, China is moving CMEC ahead in tandem with Myanmar’s military rulers – at least where the situation is stable enough to do so.
55. AUDIO – China’s Influence and Investments in Africa
Jude Blanchette and Margaret Pearson, Pekingology, January 19, 2023
In this episode of Pekingology, Freeman Chair Jude Blanchette is joined by Margaret Pearson, Distinguished Professor and Distinguished Scholar-Teacher in the Department of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, College Park to discuss her recent research on Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa. Her recent works include “Does Chinese FDI in Africa Inspire Support for a China Model of Development” and “Foreign Direct Investment, Unmet Expectations and the Prospects of Political Leaders: Evidence from Chinese Investment in Africa.”
OPINION PIECES
56. Telling the Truth About Possible War Over Taiwan
Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2023
Gen. Minihan shocks Washington by telling his troops to be ready to fight against China.
Honesty is not the default policy in Washington these days, so the political and media classes were jolted this weekend by the leak of a private warning by a U.S. general telling his troops to prepare for a possible war with China over Taiwan in two years. Imagine: A warrior telling his troops to be ready for war.
In an internal memo leaked to NBC News, Gen. Michael Minihan told his troops: “I hope I am wrong. My gut tells me we will fight in 2025.” The general runs the Air Mobility Command, the Air Force’s tank-refueling operation, and he says in his memo that he wants his force to be “ready to fight and win in the first island chain” off the eastern coast of continental Asia. He called for taking more calculated risks in training.
The general’s document won’t be remembered for subtlety. One of his suggestions is that airmen with weapons qualifications start doing target practice with “unrepentant lethality.” Another tells airmen to get their affairs in order. This candor seems to have alarmed higher-ups at the Pentagon, and NBC quoted an unidentified Defense official as saying the general’s “comments are not representative of the department’s view on China.”
But while Gen. Minihan’s words may be blunt, his concern is broadly shared, or ought to be. U.S. Navy Adm. Phil Davidson told Congress in 2021 that he worried China was “accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States,” and could strike Taiwan before 2027. Gen. Minihan came to his post after a tour as deputy of Indo-Pacific Command. He like many others suggested that 2025 may be a ripe moment for Chinese President Xi Jinping to move. Taiwan and the U.S. both have presidential elections in 2024 that China may see as moments of weakness.
No less than Secretary of State Antony Blinken said last year that Beijing was “determined to pursue reunification” with Taiwan “on a much faster timeline” than it had previously contemplated. Are war-fighters supposed to ignore that message as they prepare for their risky missions?
Gen. Minihan is doing his troops a favor by speaking directly about a war they might have to fight. A recent war game conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies warned that, in a conflict over Taiwan, “the scale of casualties” would “stagger a U.S. military that has dominated battlefields for a generation.” Gen. Minihan’s boom operators are accustomed to working in skies the U.S. controls. Tankers would be essential in a fight for Taiwan given the vast distance over the Pacific—and would be vulnerable to heavy losses.
Former naval officer Seth Cropsey explained on these pages last week that America isn’t investing in the ships and weapons stockpiles that would be required to support a long war in the Western Pacific. Such yawning gaps in U.S. preparedness make a decision by Beijing to invade or blockade the democratic island more likely. Preventing a war for Taiwan requires showing Beijing that the U.S. has the means and the will to fight and repel an invasion.
Whatever his rhetorical flourishes, Gen. Minihan seems to understand this, and what Americans should really worry about is that some of his political and military superiors don’t.
COMMENT – My reaction to the “controversy” over General Minihan’s internal memorandum to his own command was very similar to the WSJ’s OpEd… we have a military to be prepared to fight wars, and is so preparing, persuade our potential adversaries that the cost of starting a war is far too high (aka deterrence).
General Minihan’s devotion to his primary responsibility (make sure his command is prepared to fight) is laudable… the fact that some view this as provocative simply demonstrates their lack of seriousness about the situation or any real understanding of how deterrence works.
57. The Fate of Tibet After the Inevitable: A Tibetan Opinion
Ugyen Gyalpo, Bitter Winter, February 2, 2023
What will happen in Tibet and in the Tibetan diaspora when the Dalai Lama will die?
Careful of not sounding pessimistic, I am often worried about the fate of Tibet, which is fast diminishing under the unforgiving brutal wind of the ever changing geopolitical climate. A couple of decades ago, Tibet was often quoted by political analysts and media as a sore point when dealing with the emergence of China in the global paradigm shift. China was still at the cusp of the stratospheric rise that we are seeing today and not a global player yet.
Fast forward two decades later, after China’s stratospheric rise and becoming the factory of the world, even though the pandemic left a gaping dent and halted their astronomical growth for a while, the engagement with China on economic bilateral relations had tied down to how much China would open up its market for the respective countries, depending on how much they were willing to bend over knees and play by China’s strict rules.
This was perfectly summed up by Edward Lucas, who coined the term “Tibet test.” “If you think you live in a free country, ask if your politicians feel free to meet the Dalai Lama. If the answer is no, then you are part of the Chinese empire—you just haven’t realised it yet”
Now even after hundreds of self immolations inside of Tibet, ecological catastrophe, destruction of monasteries, and deteriorating human rights, Tibet is failing to make it to the global headlines and is often intentionally ignored and thrown in the back burner of hypocrisy and anonymity.
As of late, whenever we hear of the Chinese Communist Party and the condemnations thereof, Xinjiang has replaced Tibet as their Achilles heels that the west led by the U.S is keen on poking at. Not denying, though, that Xinjiang with all the atrocities it has suffered under the repressive Chinese regime deserves all the attention. But it is gravely coming at the cost of forgetting, Tibet, which happens to be the “lab test” of all the atrocities that are currently being committed in Xinjiang.
Tibet from 1959 has not seen a reprieve from the perennial repression under the Chinese Communist regime, and still continues to this day, largely ignored by the world powers, who are shamelessly kowtowing to the whims and fancies of the CCP due to its massive economic clout juxtaposing to the values they are proponents of.
Our self destructive political stance in reshaping the course of our history in the late seventies has also much to do with the waning of Tibet in the world’s political spectrum ever since we gave up our rightful claim to our independence. To make it worse, decades of endless appeasement policies of the Tibetan government in exile in the hope of a positive response, amounted to nothing but repeated shunned door for much desired diplomacy. It has also trained the eyes of the world to view with a false notion of how Tibetans were gradually accepting themselves as one of the many ethnic minorities of China and Tibet as an internal domestic issue of the PRC.
CCP’s massive half a billion dollars a year disinformation campaign as opposed to our self defeating complacency and a policy moulded around Buddhistic teachings has but helped legitimize the illegitimate Chinese narrative of Tibet being an inseparable part of China since time immemorial. In other words, China has been successful in burying Tibet alive and sometimes we played a somewhat suicidal role too.
China playing by their favorite Sun Tzu’s tactic of hyena’s “long wait game” has bought ample time for the icon and symbol of Tibet to gradually age, buying time by fooling us for decades into the hope of a compromise. It has now totally paralyzed our political movement and halted at a dead end.
58. Three ways to read the ‘deglobalisation’ debate
Adam Tooze, Financial Times, January 30, 2023
Proponents of business as usual and the new cold warriors are too confident of their ability to predict the future.
As 2023 unfolds, the world of economic analysis and commentary is marked by a disjuncture between discourse and data. On the one hand, you have feverish talk of deglobalisation and decoupling. While on the other, the statistics show an inertial continuity in trade and investment patterns.
There are at least three ways to reconcile this tension.
Option one: you can cleave to the old religion that economics always wins. In which case you dismiss the talk of deglobalisation as journalistic hype. This debunking posture has the air of empiricism and common sense about it. But to hold this view you have, in fact, to believe many things, chief among them being that the Biden administration does not mean what it says.
If you take Washington seriously it is hard to avoid the conclusion that whatever the statistics tell us about the current state of affairs, the US is bent on revising the world economic system. It intends to reprioritise domestic production and to face up to the historic challenge posed by China’s rise. If there is one thing that America’s divided polity can agree on, it is the necessity to confront China.
Adopting this view leads you to option two: rather than business as usual, we are on the cusp of a new historical epoch, a new cold war. And this is not the cold war of the detente era. In Washington these days even coexistence with CCP-led China is up for debate.
Taken at face value this is a scenario of high-stakes confrontation that overshadows every other priority. In recent weeks there have been efforts to de-escalate — first the G20 meeting between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, then China’s dovish appearance at Davos. But these moves do not presage a return to business as usual.
Rather than reconciliation and reconvergence, the Biden team holds out something far weirder. They do not want to stop China’s economic development, they insist, just to put a ceiling on every area of technology that might challenge American pre-eminence.
How that is supposed to work is anyone’s guess. But in its sheer otherworldliness it points to interpretive option number three. We are witnessing not a reversal of globalisation or full-scale decoupling, but a continuation of some aspects of familiar pattern, just on fundamentally different premises.
A future world economy might be made up of a patchwork of antagonistic coalitions divided by more or less visible data curtains. States that have the resources will launch national policies such as the US Inflation Reduction Act, which blends green industrialisation and “buy American”, with an anti-China stance and a push for friendly supply chains. That the IRA has caused a ruckus with Europe and South Korea is not a bug. It is a feature.
Perhaps a harbinger of the future is the crazy quilt of Covid vaccines: the US driving Operation Warp Speed; the Europeans trying to broker a complex bargain that includes exports to the rest of the world; India as a manufacturing hub; China pursuing an inadequate national solution; and a third of the world’s population excluded altogether.
You might shrug and ask whether this mélange of geopolitics, economic nationalism and the occasional pandemic is really new. Is it not just “history” as we have always known it — unpredictable and red in tooth and claw? But, in saying that you give the game away. The promise of globalisation, as it was understood from the 1990s onwards, was precisely that it would usher in a new era. So to admit not only that a slew of unexpected and diverse shocks is disrupting the world economy, but that they are multiplying and becoming more intense is, in fact, to admit a fundamental disappointment of expectations.
Whereas the advocates of business as usual declare that it is still “the economy, stupid” and the new cold warriors rally around the banner of “democracy versus autocracy”, the third position faces the reality of confusion, the kind of confusion registered by a term like “polycrisis”.
Polycrisis has its critics, and at Davos 2023 it risked becoming something of a cliché. But as a catchword it serves three purposes. It registers the unfamiliar diversity of the shocks that are assailing what had previously seemed a settled trajectory of global development. It insists that this coincidence of shocks is not accidental but cumulative and endogenous. And, by its currency, it marks the moment at which bullish self-confidence about our ability to decipher either the future or recent history has begun to seem at the same time facile and passé.
COMMENT – ‘Business as usual,’ ‘new cold war,’ and ‘polycrisis’, Adam Tooze does a solid job of defining the elements of the geopolitical debates roiling the transatlantic relationship.
59. The Mike Pompeo speech on China’s influence on US universities that MIT killed
Douglas Murray, New York Post, January 26, 2023
It’s always the way with political memoirs that everyone sifts them for the high-grade gossip. So it is with Mike Pompeo’s memoir, “Never Give an Inch” released this week. Media reports have understandably focused on the former CIA director and Secretary of State’s opinions on Donald Trump, John Bolton, Kim Jong-Un and a bunch of other folks.
But as is often the case, one of the biggest stories in the book has so far been overlooked.
When Pompeo was Secretary of State he took probably the most hawkish view any American official has yet taken towards the Communist Party of China. In a speech in October 2019, he told an audience of business-people (many of whom made money in China) that the Communist Party of China is “a Marxist-Leninist party focused on struggle and international domination.” He couldn’t be more correct. But something that happened afterwards proved his point.
As Pompeo relates it, he wanted to give a major speech on China and especially the way in which the CCP is distorting universities and other research institutes inside the United States. Not just by funding these institutions, and directing their research, but by trying to turn Chinese students into agents of the communist regime. It’s a crucial subject and was high time that an American official made such an intervention.
The speech was scheduled to take place at MIT, which had previously held an MIT-China Summit in Beijing sponsored by Chinese tech companies including ones that are now under sanctions for providing technology to crush human rights in China.
But shortly before the speech MIT said they couldn’t host the US Secretary of State after all. A strange move, no? Well according to Pompeo he picked up the phone and spoke with the president of MIT, Rafael Reif. And Reif claimed that there was no way that the speech could go ahead because of the risk of offending Chinese students. By MIT’s own data in 2021-22 a full 25% of international students at the university were from China.
In fact what was clear was that the no-platforming of an American Secretary of State on an American campus had nothing to do with a fear of upsetting Chinese students. What Reif and his fellow academic cowards were afraid of was that their money spigot from Beijing would be shut off.
If a speech were to take place on the MIT campus that upset the communists in China then the CCP would retaliate in a way that would cost MIT financially. Not just via Chinese students attending the university and paying full tuition fees, but in donations which have come to MIT from Chinese state-linked companies and even the Chinese government itself.
In the end Pompeo’s people tried a number of other American universities which passed for the same reasons. He was eventually able to give the speech at Georgia Tech where, as Pompeo says, many Chinese students came up to him afterwards to thank him for his remarks. So much for the great risk of offense.
It is a scandalous tale. But the real problem is that the CCP has control over so many universities and other research institutions in this country. The communists rely on America to train up many of their own people. And they use technology that comes from MIT and other institutions to make sure that their surveillance state keeps as strong a grip as possible on their own benighted people.
All the time they have an increasing number of this country’s institutions by the balls. And they choose their means of intimidation in this country very well. As Pompeo says, “An unhappy CCP will pull students and grants and programs not only to get even but to send a message: ‘We own you.’ ”
This is a scandal that has gone on for far too long. Why should institutes of learning in the world’s leading democracy be blackmailed and used by the communists in Beijing? Why should we prove to be the useful idiots and helpers to a regime which oppresses its own people and wants to replace this country as the world´s dominant power? Why, in short, are we actually being bought up by our main international competitor?
60. When facts about China change, elites should change their views too
Robert Atkinson, The Korean Times, January 16, 2023
Since the late 1970s, the United States has been in the grip of a deep, almost religious belief that free markets and unfettered globalization maximize U.S. and global welfare. Termed the "Washington Consensus," the view is based on a number of deeply held beliefs, including that small government is best, governments should not try to pick winners, no industry is more important than another, and more economic competition and global integration are always good.
For decades, economists and others who proffered such ideologically-based wisdom ran the show in D.C. Anyone who did not agree was excluded from polite policy-making circles. The sad part is that this was never based on actual empirical research or even careful logic. There were no studies that said government can't pick winners. It was all based on ideology.
Many of this dominant policymaking group remain firmly committed to this view, rejecting any and all contrary evidence that might require reinventing their guiding intellectual paradigm. They are not like Lord John Maynard Keynes, who once when criticized for changing his view on a matter said, "When the facts change I change my views. What do you do?" The answer for most holders of the Washington Consensus is: deny the new facts.
A case in point is a recent Project Syndicate article by Harvard scholar Joe Nye entitled "Peak China?" It's important to note that the major "facts change" in Washington in the last five years has been the rise of China and the recognition that President Xi is a Marxist-Leninist and that China's goal is to become the new global hegemon, economically, technologically, diplomatically and perhaps militarily. That recognition is changing the views of U.S. economic and foreign policy, and leading many, including in the U.S. Congress, to have second thoughts about the Washington Consensus. For true believers, like Nye, that is simply unacceptable. As such, the China threat must be destroyed intellectually.
And that is what Nye attempts in "Peak China?" Nye tells us that he simply wants to provide a "careful net assessment." But his article does not do that. In fact, he concludes, "All told, the U.S. holds a strong hand... For now, Americans have ample reason to feel optimistic about their place in the world. But if the U.S. were to abandon its external alliances and domestic openness, the balance could shift." That is code "no need to abandon the Washington Consensus."
He argues, "America has been at the forefront in the development of key technologies (bio, nano, and information) that are central to this century's economic growth." The key phrase here is "has been." A forthcoming ITIF report finds that when looking at a key range of innovation indicators, such as R&D spending, patents, STEM workers, and output in advanced industries, China had 39 percent more capabilities and output in 2020 than the United States. And as ITIF has shown, to match China's advanced industry output as a share of GDP, the U.S. output would have to grow by over $680 billion.
Nye then proudly notes that "the U.S. derives unrivaled financial power from its large transnational financial institutions and the international role of the dollar." But countries can't eat dollars or use them as weapons. That requires real production, and the dollar as the global reserve currency is a mill-stone around America's industrial neck, removing "market-based" currency devaluation from the tools of industrial competitiveness. Indeed, the strong dollar makes Chinese ―and Korean ― exports to the United States cheaper and U.S. exports to China more expensive.
He next claims that "The U.S. also has an energy advantage." It does, but energy is a commodity that any nation can get if they just pay for it. Does anyone want to say that Russia is a powerhouse because it has a lot of oil? That's about all it has.
Finally, he plays what is now the trump card among China denialists in Washington: demography. He rightly notes that China, like Korea, is facing a declining working-age population. But that's like saying someone who has 10 cars is in trouble if one breaks down. China has 986 million working-age people. What real difference does it make if that falls to 750 million in 2050, at a time when America's working-age population will be just one-third of that. Besides, over the last five years Chinese labor productivity growth, using a conservative estimate, was 3.5 times faster than U.S. productivity growth.
Even if Xi's Leninist policies slow Chinese growth by half, Chinese productivity would still be expected to grow faster than their labor decline, meaning that Chinese GDP will likely grow faster than U.S. GDP. This is not to say that China will catch up to the United States on per-capita GDP, something Korea is having a hard time doing now. But it is to say that as a nation with around 20 percent of the per-capita income of the United States, they have a long way to go before their productivity gains will be hard fought.
As Winston Churchill once stated "The truth is incontrovertible. Malice may attack it, ignorance may deride it, but in the end, there it is." And the truth about China sure looks like China will continue to challenge American leadership, especially if policymakers don't consign to the dustbin of history the Washington Consensus and instead embrace an alternative "national developmentalism" approach.
The Spectator, February 3, 2023
Doing nothing about China’s flagrancy would be a grave mistake.
Like many of you, Cockburn has been following the developing story involving the Chinese spy balloon currently hovering over Montana.
For those unaware, sometime over the last few days a spy balloon has floated over the Aleutian Islands in Alaska, across Canadian airspace and entered into Montana, where it's been for several days. It traveled at an altitude of around 50,000ft and is currently not far from the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base, which houses a portion of America's intercontinental ballistic missiles, among many other key military assets.
62. Only the truth will set China free
James J.Y. Hsu, Taipei Times, January 30, 2023
Criticisms of corruption, a poorly managed bureaucracy and uninformed, unprincipled or unaccomplished policy in China are often met with harsh punishments. Many protesters in the “blank paper movement,” for example, have been disappeared by the authorities.
Meanwhile, the WHO has asked China to provide data on its COVID-19 situation, with the Chinese government choosing to disseminate propaganda instead.