Matt Turpin's China Articles - January 8, 2023
Friends,
Happy New Year!
I hope everyone is getting to spend some time with family and friends during this holiday period.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Watching China in Europe - January 2023
Noah Barkin, German Marshall Fund, January 4, 2023
Known Unknowns – I have been following the ins and outs of Europe’s relationship with China for the past five years. Still, as 2023 begins, I am cautious about predicting where this relationship is headed. The known unknowns are increasing and the horizon has become disconcertingly blurred. In the final weeks of 2022, we saw China suddenly abandon the draconian COVID-19 restrictions that had come to define the country over the past three years—a policy reversal that has unleashed a deadly wave of infections across the country.
We enter the new year with no end in sight to Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine and with fears of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait on the rise. There are worrying divisions in Germany’s government over China policy, which are poisoning the European debate, and cracks in the transatlantic relationship that risk deepening as the Biden administration presses ahead with new measures to restrict trade and technology ties with China.
I am struggling to discern a clear path forward in 2023, but I have spent the past weeks speaking with a wide range of policymakers, diplomats, and executives in Europe, China, and the United States to assess the mood and to attempt to cut through the fog.
2. The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution Is No Solution
Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass, Foreign Affairs, December 28, 2022
COMMENT – I consider both Jude Blanchette and Ryan Hass to be friends and have sincere respect for their opinions and expertise. However, the longer we hide our heads in the sand and kick this can down the road, the more difficult this problem will be to manage.
Until we stop legitimizing the Party’s ‘One China’ fantasy and call on Beijing to act like a responsible great power (responsible powers don’t threaten their neighbors with annexation), we are unlikely to find a way to manage the long-term stability in the Indo-Pacific. The compromises and half-measures we adopted five decades ago to “reassure” the CCP, under very different circumstances, are no longer fit for purpose, pretending that they are is dangerous.
3. Lawyers exit Hong Kong as they face campaign of intimidation
James Pomfret, Greg Torode, Anne Marie Roantree, and David Lague, Reuters, December 29, 2022
A special investigative report by Reuters.
Hong Kong’s human rights lawyers are fleeing abroad amid an effort to cleanse the city of dissent. The pressure is part of a wider crackdown by the ruling Communist Party on lawyers across China, say activists, legal scholars and diplomats.
Anonymous threats sent by text message and email. GPS tracking devices placed under a car, and Chinese “funeral money” sent to an office. Ambushes by reporters working for state-controlled media. Accusations of disloyalty in the press.
These are some of the methods deployed in a campaign of intimidation being waged against lawyers in Hong Kong who take on human rights cases, have criticized a China-imposed national security law or raised alarms about threats to the rule of law. While some of Hong Kong’s leading rights lawyers have been detained in the past two-and-a-half years, many others have become the target of a more insidious effort to cleanse the city of dissent – part of a wider crackdown by the ruling Communist Party on lawyers across China, say activists, legal scholars and diplomats.
Michael Vidler, one of the city’s top human rights lawyers, is among them. Vidler left Hong Kong in April, a couple of months after a judge named his law firm six times in a ruling that convicted four pro-democracy protesters on charges of illegal assembly and possession of unauthorized weapons. Vidler interpreted the judgment as “a call to action” on the city’s national security police “to investigate me,” he told Reuters in an interview last month in Europe. He asked that his location not be disclosed.
The event that precipitated his hasty departure, Vidler said, was the appearance of articles in the state-backed media in Hong Kong about him. One said he was the representative of an “anti-China” group. Within days, the British national left his home of three decades.
Vidler tried to make an inconspicuous exit. He sent a suitcase to a friend before flying out. On the day of departure, he met the friend with the suitcase and went to the airport. But on arriving, reporters from state-backed media outlets were waiting.
They “descended on me as a mob at the check-in counter, taking photos of my travel documents,” Vidler said. His last-minute flight plans were known only to his wife, the airline and immigration authorities, he said, which “clearly shows that this information was provided by official sources” to the media.
“This was in my view state-sponsored intimidation and harassment,” said Vidler, whose wife and children later left Hong Kong. A government spokesman called Vidler’s characterization of events “baseless and erroneous.”
Other high-profile departures include former Bar Association chairman Paul Harris. He left his home of decades for England hours after being called in for questioning by national security police. Harris, too, was hounded by reporters from state-backed outlets at the airport as he departed.
4. China’s online nationalist army
Kenji Asada, Aiko Munakata, Marrian Zhou, Cissy Zhou, and Grace Li, Nikkei Asia, December 29, 2022
How social media users weaponized patriotism.
5. Carmakers quietly cut ties with China in supply chain shake-up
Peter Campbell, Eri Sugiura, and Edward White, Financial Times, December 26, 2022
Over the past 20 years, China has risen from obscurity to become a global leader in the car parts industry.
Its growth was fuelled by European and American carmakers that farmed out the production of an increasing number of their components to China to save costs and establish links with the world’s largest car market.
But international groups have now launched a quiet yet concerted effort to cut their reliance on China’s sprawling network of components makers, according to industry executives and supply chain experts.
“There is a large-scale rethinking of logistics operations [across the industry],” said Ted Cannis, a senior executive at Ford. “The supply chain is going to be the focus of this decade.”
The move has been prompted by two developments. The first is uncertainty caused by China’s zero Covid-19 policy that forces plants to close at short notice.
“The longer the pandemic stretches, the more uncertainty there is,” Volvo Car boss Jim Rowan said earlier this year, when announcing the Geely-backed carmaker was increasing its use of non-Chinese components.
But the second is a longer-term concern about a larger political decoupling in the event of a breakdown in China’s relations with the international community, similar to Russia, that could threaten trade.
Although most international groups are unlikely to abandon the Chinese market entirely because of its size, they expect the flow of components from the country to plants across the world to fall over time.
6. China ESG reckoning looms for investors
Edward White and Leo Lewis, Financial Times, January 3, 2023
Sustainability rules and standards common in western jurisdictions are at odds with realities in China.
Foreign investors in Chinese equities have a problem. China’s growth offers the hope of big returns over the coming decade, but on environmental, social and governance ratings, its companies rank lower not only than western nations, but also below most emerging markets.
The combination of the world’s biggest consumer market with fast-growing technology and services sectors has attracted global investors willing to look the other way on censorship, surveillance, environmental, labour and other human rights abuses.
However, there are signs an ESG reckoning is looming for Chinese companies and those investing in them. ESG ratings are increasingly important for international investors, but the sustainability rules and standards common in western jurisdictions are at odds with realities on the ground in China.
In a move signalling the challenge ahead, Sustainalytics, a sustainable rating agency owned by research house Morningstar, in October downgraded three Chinese tech darlings on its watchlist — Tencent, Weibo and Baidu — to the category of “non-compliant with UN principles”.
“It seemed to our team that internet censorship in China was increasing — Tencent, Baidu and Weibo are playing a significant part in that,” Simon MacMahon, global head of ESG research at Sustainalytics, told the Financial Times.
“There was evidence of censorship and surveillance related to religion, related to LGBT rights, to the war in Ukraine, to Covid-19,” MacMahon said. “The scope and scale of the censorship and surveillance appeared to be increasing.”
7. Hacked Russian Files Reveal Propaganda Agreement with China
Mara Hvistendahl and Alexey Kovalev, The Intercept, December 30, 2022
Soon after Russia invaded Ukraine, a Russian defense ministry spokesperson resuscitated debunked claims about a U.S.-funded bioweapons program in the region, accusing Ukrainian labs of experimenting with bat coronaviruses in an attempt to spark “the covert spread of deadliest pathogens.”
Disinformation is an old Russian government tactic. But this time Russia had help. Within days, Chinese officials and media outlets had picked up the lies and were amplifying and expanding on the biolabs yarn. The Chinese Communist Party tabloid Global Times created two splashy spreads, one sourced in part to Sputnik News, the other featuring a quote from Russian President Vladimir Putin. “What is the U.S. hiding in the biolabs discovered in Ukraine?” it screamed.
“China jumped on the biolabs conspiracy theory,” said Katja Drinhausen, an analyst with the Mercator Institute of China Studies in Berlin. Chinese officials and media outlets had spent the preceding months pushing the notion that the pandemic might have originated in a lab accident outside China. “It was like, here’s the perfect conspiracy theory coming out of Russia to support our ‘everywhere but China’ main talking point of the last year,” she said.
Since the war broke out in February, experts have been struck by a convergence in Russian and Chinese media narratives. While some of the convergence was likely happenstance, occurring when storylines aided both governments’ goals, documents found in a trove of hacked emails from Russia state broadcaster VGTRK show that China and Russia have pledged to join forces in media content by inking cooperation agreements at the ministerial level.
AUTHORITARIANISM
8. My Mother Just Died of COVID in Wuhan
Jiwei Xiao, The Atlantic, December 30, 2022
She was one of millions left virtually defenseless by China’s sudden abandonment of its failing zero-COVID policy.
9. China’s Censors End Crackdown on Covid-Policy Criticism—of a Certain Kind
Austin Ramzy, Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2022
Protesters, public-health experts targeted for country’s sudden about-face as infections explode, but leader Xi Jinping remains unscathed.
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The rapid changes have left some citizens bewildered. As overflowing crematoria point to a surge in deaths, some have expressed anger at the swift reversal of the longstanding zero-tolerance approach. Those who called for changes are facing much of the blame, even as those at the top who ordered the changes have remained relatively shielded from criticism.
…
“All of these criticisms are allowed to flow on the internet, but not to the degree of allowing criticism of who decided this, meaning Xi Jinping and the central government,” said Xiao Qiang, a researcher on internet freedom at the University of California, Berkeley. “They give certain room for opinions on both sides, a certain degree of debate and letting the information flow a bit, but there is a clear limit.”
Mr. Zhang, the writer, became one of the most vocal critics of the reopening after his mother, who had late-stage cancer, contracted Covid in a hospital and died on Dec.14. In several posts on Weibo, Mr. Zhang said he believed the coronavirus accelerated his mother’s death and her infection was the result of the hurried change in pandemic restrictions.
“In the eyes of many people, these elderly people should go,” he wrote. “But without the reopening, even in a case as serious as my mother’s, her vital signs would have been stable and she would have had a chance to continue treatment, slow down her illness and prolong her life.”
Mr. Zhang, widely seen as a staunch nationalist, says other countries offer even worse models of pandemic control. He declined an interview request, saying: “I think the death of more than a million people in the U.S. due to Covid-19 is more worthy of U.S. media coverage.”
His writing has found support from readers who also backed the previous policies. They have criticized those protesters who supported ending zero Covid of “lying flat,” or tangping in Mandarin, a slang term for a slacker lifestyle that state media has also used to indicate surrendering to the coronavirus. The phrase has now morphed into tangfei, or “reclining bandits,” to disparage those who wanted the country to open up again.
10. Leading WHO advisers call for 'realistic' COVID data from China at key meeting
Jennifer Rigby, Reuters, January 3, 2023
11. WHO says China data underrepresents COVID surge and deaths
Jennifer Rigby and Gabrielle Tetrault-Farber, Reuters, January 4, 2023
China's COVID-19 data is not giving an accurate picture of the situation there and underrepresents the number of hospitalisations and deaths from the disease, a senior official at the World Health Organization said on Wednesday.
The U.N. agency was preparing to meet Chinese scientists again on Thursday as part of a wider briefing among member states on the global COVID-19 situation as concerns grow about the rapid spread of the virus in the world's No. 2 economy.
COMMENT – More than three years of opacity.
12. EU, Beijing heading for collision over China’s COVID crisis
Raf Casert, Associated Press, January 3, 2023
The European Union and China on Tuesday moved closer to a political standoff over the COVID-19 crisis, with Beijing vehemently rejecting travel restrictions some EU nations have started to impose that could be expanded in coming days.
An EU offer of help, including vaccine donations, was also as good as slapped down, with Beijing insisting the situation was “under control” and medical provisions “in adequate supply,” government spokesperson Mao Ning said.
And as the 27-nation bloc moved closer to imposing some sort of restrictions on travelers from China, Beijing threatened countermeasures.
“We are firmly opposed to attempts to manipulate the COVID measures for political purposes and will take countermeasures based on the principle of reciprocity,” Mao said.
Still, the EU seemed bent on taking some sort of joint action to ensure incoming passengers from China would not transmit any potential new variants to the continent.
13. EU officials 'strongly' urge testing for travel
Kathryn Armstrong, BBC, January 5, 2023
European Union officials are "strongly" recommending that all member states insist on negative Covid tests from Chinese arrivals before they travel.
14. China Denounces Covid Testing Rules Imposed on Its Travelers
Alexandra Stevenson, New York Times, January 3, 2023
The Chinese government on Tuesday denounced Covid testing requirements imposed by other countries on travelers arriving from China as unscientific or “excessive,” and threatened to take countermeasures.
As China prepares to open its borders later this week, allowing its citizens to travel abroad for the first time since the pandemic began, countries like Canada, the United States, France, Spain, Japan and the United Kingdom have moved to restrict travelers arriving from the country.
15. China Rails Against Covid Restrictions on Its Citizens
Joyu Wang, Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2023
China criticized what it called unacceptable and politically motivated Covid-related travel restrictions on its citizens and warned of countermeasures, an escalation in rhetoric that comes days ahead of a planned border reopening on Sunday.
COMMENT – Pot, meet kettle…
16. China’s Covid generation: the surging inequality behind Xi’s U-turn
Edward White and Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, January 3, 2023
Lockdowns have often been more relentless in rural areas, upending the education of millions and blocking social mobility.
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Beyond the immediate health crisis, which could persist for months, the true extent of the damage wrought upon Chinese society by Xi’s hallmark policy is only just emerging.
For large swaths of the country’s 1.4bn people, the pandemic shattered the fragile balance that once supported the back-and-forth movement of people such as Tashi’s parents from rural areas to large cities. Zero-Covid’s vast web of intersecting restrictions hammered low-income families and in many cases left people cut off from their loved ones.
China-focused economists, market analysts and media have mostly paid attention to the hit to consumer spending and disruptions to factories and supply chains. China’s more developed eastern and southern megacities, such as Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen and Guangzhou have dominated headlines. But many of the areas that have been locked down for the longest have been largely out of sight.
By the time Beijing unveiled its policy pivot, heightened restrictions were still being enforced across more than a dozen regions, including Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Heilongjiang and Liaoning in China’s northern rustbelt, as well as Xinjiang in the west and central Hubei.
But as the restrictions have been unwound, it is becoming clear that the pandemic’s scars are deepest among children in many of these areas, experts say. Rising inequality, which is heavily influenced by access to education, will in the coming years carry long-term repercussions for Xi and the ruling Chinese Communist party. Adding to the bleak outlook, China’s youth unemployment rate has been near-record levels and the brunt of the impact is shouldered by those born into poorer households.
17. With ‘Zero Covid,’ China Proved It’s Good at Control. Governance Is Harder.
Li Yuan, New York Times, December 26, 2022
In its single-minded pursuit of the “zero Covid” strategy, the Chinese government was omnipresent and omnipotent, using its unlimited resources and unchecked power to control the nation. Having nearly exhausted its resources and the good will of the public, the government has now simply disappeared, just as many Chinese are getting very ill with the virus or dying from it.
For much of this year, Yang, an engineer in Shenzhen, took Covid tests nearly every day, from one of the more than 40 government-built booths in his neighborhood. Whenever he missed one, he would get text reminders from his district. After buying pain relief medication, he got calls from three community workers because the state had strict rules about the sale of such over-the-counter drugs.
Since the Chinese leadership abruptly abandoned its stringent “zero Covid” policy several weeks ago, Mr. Yang has rarely heard from the government.
“No one is in charge now,” said Mr. Yang, who asked to be identified only by his surname because of safety concerns. His daughter’s school was still open last week even though most students were staying home, because they were either ill or worried about getting sick. There’s no national mask mandate. People with mild symptoms are showing up at work because no one bothers to check in on them anymore. Medicines are in short supply, so Mr. Yang is sharing what he has with friends. His family has four rapid test kits, which are being saved until they’re really needed.
18. Why China’s Economy Faces a Perilous Road to Recovery
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, January 2, 2023
Years of lockdowns took a brutal toll on businesses. Now, the rapid spread of Covid after a chaotic reopening has deprived them of workers and customers.
19. Police in China can track protests by enabling ‘alarms’ on Hikvision software
Johana Bhuiyan, The Guardian, December 29, 2022
Chinese surveillance manufacturer Hikvision has put in place tools to help police track protest activities
Chinese police can set up “alarms” for various protest activities using a software platform provided by Hikvision, a major Chinese camera and surveillance manufacturer, the Guardian has learned. Descriptions of protest activity listed among the “alarms” include “gathering crowds to disrupt order in public places”, “unlawful assembly, procession, demonstration” and threats to “petition”.
These activities are listed alongside offenses such as “gambling” or disruptive events such as “fire hazard” in technical documents available on Hikvision’s website and flagged to the Guardian by surveillance research firm IPVM, or Internet Protocol Video Market. The company’s website also included alarms for “religion” and “Falun Gong” – a spiritual movement banned in China and categorized as a cult by the government – until IPVM contacted the company.
20. Saudi Aramco and Sinopec sign initial agreement to set up refinery in China
John Benny, National News, December 18, 2022
21. Chinese government crackdown on the peaceful protests across the People's Republic of China
European Parliament Resolution, December 15, 2022
European Parliament…
…Strongly condemns the Chinese Government-led reaction to the peaceful protests and the persecution of the peaceful protesters across the People’s Republic of China; expresses its condolences to and stands in solidarity with the victims of the Urumqi fire and their family members; calls upon the Chinese Government to be transparent about the number of victims and the circumstances under which they died; calls for a prompt, effective and thorough investigation of the Urumqi fire;
…Expresses its solidarity with the people of China in their fight for fundamental freedoms; condemns the persecution of the peaceful protesters; urges all police forces to respond in line with international standards, including the United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials;
22. The CCP Dictionary: Three Imperatives
China Media Project, November 8, 2022
Introduced in Xi Jinping’s political report to the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party on October 16, 2022, the “three imperatives” define the desired character and attitude of the CCP member and officials in the so-called New Era — essentially the need to be ideologically on task, hard-working and service-minded, and able to forge ahead despite challenges.
23. Ripped away from home, we are haunted by the Hong Kong taken from us
Rhoda Kwan, The Guardian, January 4, 2023
To lose Hong Kong and choose to rebuild in Taiwan is a recentering, a way of moving forward in a reality we have no choice but to inhabit. There’s no running away from the continuing pain of turning our backs to a disappearing Hong Kong. But at least we can continue our lives in a place that kind of understands.
And after Hong Kong, choosing to rebuild here means choosing uncertainty: the place where we’ve chosen to rebuild could very well be the next place to disappear. Life in Taiwan after Hong Kong is not easy. But it can be meaningful.
24. China’s Young Elite Clamber for Government Jobs. Some Come to Regret It.
Claire Fu, New York Times, January 2, 2023
With youth unemployment high, millions will take this month’s Civil Service exam. But for those who get jobs, the reality can be monotonous work that blurs the line with personal lives.
COMMENT – Xi’s campaign against the private sector and the demonization of entrepreneurial and individualistic work is bound to have a terrible impact on the Chinese economy and the future of innovation in the PRC. The Party’s own form of national socialism (aka ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’), which vilifies liberal ideals and demands its subjects to sacrifice for the Party’s definition of the ‘common good,’ will only undermine the Party’s stated goal of the ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS
25. Ghana fishing: Abuse, corruption and death on Chinese vessels
George Wright and Thomas Naadi, BBC, January 4, 2023
26. Gulf of Guinea countries band together to stop illegal Chinese fishing
North Africa Post, December 13, 2023
Gulf of Guinea nations have banded together earlier this year to crack down on illegal fishing, which environmental groups blame on Chinese boats that are decimating West Africa’s fish stocks and fishing communities along the coastline.
Chinese boats are decimating West Africa’s fish stocks and fishing communities in the Gulf of Guinea, say environmental groups. The Institute for Security Studies, a South African think tank, said the communities could be losing more than $2 billion each year to illegal fishing, mainly from Chinese-owned boats.
The Print, January 7, 2023
China’s authoritarian rule in Tibet and the country’s portrayal of Tibet as a part of themselves, have caused the world to ignore the environmental degradation in Tibet, according to Tibet Press.
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND COERCION
28. TikTok Spied on Forbes Journalists
Emily Baker-White, Forbes, December 22, 2022
ByteDance confirmed it used TikTok to monitor journalists’ physical location using their IP addresses, as first reported by Forbes in October.
29. US, Taiwan to Hold Trade Talks in Taipei in Defiance of China
Bloomberg, January 4, 2023
Officials from the US and Taiwan plan to hold trade talks in Taipei this month, highlighting the expansion of ties between the two sides in the face of increasingly fraught relations with China.
The US will send a delegation led by Assistant US Trade Representative Terry McCartin and officials from other government agencies for four days of meetings starting Jan. 14, according to a statement late Wednesday from the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US embassy in Taiwan.
30. Australian coal industry says China market matters less than before, even if import ban ends
Peter Hannam, The Guardian, January 5, 2023
Queensland Resources Council says industry would welcome restrictions easing but new long-term customers since found elsewhere in Asia.
31. Sour U.S.-China Relations Feed the Fentanyl Crisis
Brian Spegele and Julie Wernau, Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2022
Beijing has stopped cooperating in restricting the flow of Chinese-made chemicals that Mexican cartels use to make the deadly drug.
Chinese chemical companies are making more ingredients for illegal fentanyl than ever. Strained relations between Beijing and Washington are undermining efforts to stop the flow.
Among the available products are compounds with obscure names such as N-Phenyl-4-piperidinamine, which Mexican cartels purchase to make into fentanyl. The opioid has become the most deadly illegal drug the U.S. has ever seen.
A few years ago, a joint effort to limit the flow of illicit fentanyl was a successful point of collaboration in a tense U.S.-China relationship. In 2018, China restricted the production and sale of two of the most common ingredients for the drug, a move that won it praise from the U.S.
Since then, the U.S. has adopted a tougher posture toward China, while China has also grown more assertive about defending its interests. As a consequence, the cooperation on combating the drug trade has broken down.
COMMENT - I have the disagree with the tone of this piece… for all of Beijing’s rhetoric about wanting to have a “positive” relationship with the United States, this would be the easiest area for the Party to take action. The fact that it has lifted its briefly imposed restrictions on these drug-traffickers provides all the evidence we need of the Party’s bad faith.
It is time for Congress to reconvene another, more objective, commission about combatting opioid trafficking. This time, not to shy away from the role that the Chinese Communist Party actively plays in dumping these drugs in the United States. See the final report, Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking from February 2022.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
32. Peng Shuai: WTA demands private meeting before tournaments can resume
Nicholas Yong, BBC, January 5, 2023
The governing body for women's tennis says it wants to meet Peng Shuai in person before it can resume tournaments in China.
Last year the former tennis star accused a top Chinese official of sexual assault in a social media post.
Ms Peng then briefly disappeared from the public eye. She later denied making the allegations.
The Women's Tennis Association (WTA) also called for a "formal investigation" into her accusations.
In a statement, the WTA said it would not "compromise its founding principles" to operate events in China.
"We have received confirmation that Peng is safe and comfortable, but we have not yet met with her personally," the WTA said in a statement on Thursday.
"There has not been any change in the WTA position on a return to China and we have only confirmed our 2023 calendar through US Open."
33. Turkey won’t extradite Uyghurs to China, foreign minister says
Erkin Tarim, Radio Free Asia, January 3, 2023
34. Former Uyghur Muslim preacher confirmed dead in prison in China’s Xinjiang
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, December 28, 2022
A Uyghur Muslim preacher serving a five-year sentence in China’s far-western Xinjiang region for making a religious pilgrimage abroad died of liver cancer in prison in February, according to a police officer who works in the district where the preacher resided.
Omar Huseyin, 55, was the former hatip, or preacher, at the Qarayulghun Mosque in Korla, known as Ku’erle in Chinese and the second-largest city in Xinjiang. Authorities apprehended him in September 2017 amid a widespread crackdown on Islamic clergy and other prominent Uyghurs, for traveling to the holy city Mecca in 2015.
Authorities also detained Huseyin’s three brothers in 2017, one of whom was serving a 12-year sentence for participating in religious activities and died in prison.
Huseyin was healthy before authorities took him away for “re-education” in one of hundreds of facilities across Xinjiang where authorities detained an estimated 1.8 million Uyghurs and other Muslims purportedly to prevent religious extremism and terrorism.
35. Renowned Uyghur poet dies following prison release in Xinjiang
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, December 29, 2022
A renowned Uyghur writer and poet in poor health when released from prison died on Dec. 18 because he could not obtain food or medical treatment amid a strict coronavirus lockdown, according to social media posts and information from relevant government organizations.
Abdulla Sawut, 72, was an important figure in contemporary Uyghur literature. His most famous novels and novellas are The Bloody Shore, The Thunder, and The Unrusty Sword, The Chain of Life, Shiraq, and The Saint Fire.
In his writings, he highlighted the revolutionary history of East Turkistan, Uyghurs’ name for Xinjiang, and elevated the status of Uyghur historical heroes.
Sawut, who was convicted of advocating ethnic separatism and attempting to divide the country, was detained in 2017, according to the nonprofit human rights advocacy group Uyghur Hjelp, based in Norway.
36. Uyghur nutritionist confirmed detained in China’s Xinjiang
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, December 21, 2022
Authorities in China’s far-western Xinjiang region have detained a well-known Uyghur nutritionist for messages he posted on social media, according to Sweden-based siblings and police in the region’s capital Urumqi.
Behtiyar Sadir, 46, a national-level health coach and member of Xinjiang’s Association of Health and Nutrition, went missing in mid-October when authorities placed Urumqi and other regional population centers under a strict lockdown to contain an outbreak of the coronavirus, his younger brother, Seydijan Sadir, and elder sister, Munewer Sadir, told RFA Uyghur.
Sadir, the father of three children, had suddenly stopped using the WeChat social messaging service and updating information on his company website, which alerted them to his disappearance.
37. U.S. Bars Imports from Three Companies, Citing Possible Use of Forced Labor
Richard Vanderford, Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2022
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
38. Former GE Power Engineer Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Economic Espionage
U.S. Department of Justice, January 3, 2023
A New York man was sentenced today to 24 months in prison for conspiring to steal General Electric (GE) trade secrets, knowing or intending to benefit the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Xiaoqing Zheng, 59, of Niskayuna, New York, was convicted of conspiracy to commit economic espionage, following a four-week jury trial that ended on March 31, 2022. According to court documents, Zheng was employed at GE Power in Schenectady, New York, as an engineer specializing in turbine sealing technology. He worked at GE from 2008 until the summer of 2018. The trial evidence demonstrated that Zheng and others in China conspired to steal GE’s trade secrets surrounding GE’s ground-based and aviation-based turbine technologies, knowing or intending to benefit the PRC and one or more foreign instrumentalities, including China-based companies and universities that research, develop, and manufacture parts for turbines.
“This is a case of textbook economic espionage. Zheng exploited his position of trust, betrayed his employer and conspired with the government of China to steal innovative American technology,” said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Department’s National Security Division. “The Justice Department will hold accountable those who threaten our national security by conniving to steal valuable trade secrets on behalf of a foreign power.”
“Zheng sought to enrich himself, and benefit the People’s Republic of China, by stealing trade secrets developed and owned by his longtime employer, General Electric," said U.S. Attorney Carla B. Freedman for the Northern District of New York. "We will continue to work with the FBI to hold criminals accountable when they seek to illegally exploit American ingenuity.”
39. China Trying to Fight Back US Ban on Its Chip Industry
Saibal Dasgupta, Voice of America, December 16, 2022
China is spending $143 billion to combat U.S. moves to cut off its supply of semiconductor technology.
The funds will be used to provide financial subsidies and incentives to help China's chipmakers develop and acquire semiconductor technology to withstand the U.S. move.
This is one of three measures, analysts say, taken by Beijing to protect semiconductor companies supporting its vast electronics, automotive and military hardware industries.
“China views semiconductors as a strategic resource. Therefore, it wants to become self-sufficient in all aspects of advanced chip design and manufacturing,” said Lourdes S. Casanova, director of the Emerging Markets Institute at Cornell University. “These funds are meant to build China’s capabilities towards this goal."
40. Nexperia calls in the lawyers to save Welsh chip fab deal
Tobias Mann, The Register, December 30, 2022
Blocked by the British government from acquiring Newport Wafer Fab — Britain's largest chip factory — Nexperia has solicited the help of US law firm Akin Gump in the hopes of overturning the ban.
The hire comes just weeks after the UK secretary of state for business, energy and industrial strategy Grant Shapps unwound the deal on national security grounds. Nexperia is a Netherlands-based company that was acquired in 2018 by China-based Wingtech Technology. It's that Chinese connection and potential future use of the site that has His Majesty's government up in arms.
41. China’s Imports of Chip-Making Gear Drop to Lowest Since Mid-2020
James Mayger, Bloomberg, December 22, 2022
42. Apple’s Best Bet Against China Might Be India
Megha Mandavia, Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2022
The South Asian country is shaping up as the right place for big electronics manufacturers.
India could well become the manufacturing darling of Apple this decade. Beijing’s own missteps have much to do with that. But New Delhi also deserves credit for a concerted push to make India an easier—and financially more attractive—place to build gadgets.
Many Western manufacturers are increasingly uncomfortable with their heavy reliance on China—especially after its uncompromising and unpredictable approach to public health over the past year. Violent protests at Apple supplier Foxconn‘s Zhengzhou factory in November further highlighted the risks of an overly concentrated supply chain.
CYBER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
43. Dell looks to phase out China-made chips by 2024
Kanjyik Ghosh, Reuters, January 5, 2022
Dell Technologies Inc plans to stop using China-made chips by 2024 and has told suppliers to reduce the amount of other made-in-China components in its products amid concerns over U.S.-Beijing tensions, the Nikkei reported on Thursday.
The news comes after the United States added Chinese memory chipmaker YMTC and 21 "major" companies in the country's artificial intelligence chip sector to a trade blacklist in December.
MILITARY AND SECURITY THREATS
44. Former NATO chief: Europe must help deter China from attacking Taiwan
Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Axios, January 5, 2023
The most important way to deter China from attacking Taiwan is to ensure a Ukrainian victory in the war against Russia, former NATO secretary-general Anders Fogh Rasmussen said on Thursday.
Why it matters: It's the first time a former NATO chief has made an official visit to Taiwan, highlighting the growing concern in Europe over China's aggression in the Asia-Pacific.
What he's saying: "The parallels with Russia and Ukraine are hard to ignore. We must not make the same mistakes with Xi Jinping that we did with Vladimir Putin," said Rasmussen, who served as NATO chief from 2009 to 2014 and was formerly prime minister of Denmark, during a visit to Taipei.
"The free world has shown impressive unity in response to the war in Ukraine," Rasmussen said. "We can be sure Xi Jinping is watching closely. Any attempt by China to change the status quo in Taiwan by force should spark an equally unified response, and we must make this clear to China now."
Cyril Ip, South China Morning Post, January 3, 2023
The country’s newest carrier is viewed as central to Xi Jinping’s goal of returning the country to the forefront of global powers by 2049. The vessel is expected to have a major presence in the Taiwan Strait
46. The 20th Central Military Commission: Personnel and Priorities
Amrita Jash, Jamestown Foundation, December 8, 2022
Now that Xi has a new CMC in place and has instructed the PLA with strict guidelines, he will accelerate efforts in his third term to build a strong military. For Xi, this entails a force that is both loyal to himself and the party, as well as prepared for warfighting. Therefore, it is worth watching if the new CMC, on matters where China’s “core interests,” such as Taiwan or the border dispute with India, are concerned, will continue with an approach premised primarily on coercion or whether it will instead show an increased proclivity for the direct use of military force.
COMMENT – Useful reference for the members of the Central Military Commission. It is important to remember that the PRC’s military is a “Party army” and NOT a “national army.” The difference is significant. Control of the military exists outside of typical government control and is the exclusive domain of the Chinese Communist Party. The People’s Liberation Army’s primary task is to protect the CCP, which makes it inherently “political” in nature and its leadership are Party members.
For those of us who are used to thinking of militaries as “professional,” “apolitical,” and loyal to the nation writ large, irrespective of the political party in power… the PLA represents the opposite of those attributes.
47. An Anatomy of the Chinese Private Security Contracting Industry
Sergey Sukhankin, Jamestown Foundation, January 3, 2023
48. PLA posture on LAC is at odds with Wang Yi’s conciliatory remarks
Hindustan Times, January 2, 2023
49. Chinese jet flies within 10 feet of U.S. military aircraft
Nikkei Asia, December 30, 2022
A Chinese military plane came within 10 feet (3 meters) of a U.S. Air Force aircraft in the contested South China Sea last week and forced it to take evasive maneuvers to avoid a collision in international airspace, the U.S. military said on Thursday.
The close encounter followed what the United States has called a recent trend of increasingly dangerous behavior by Chinese military aircraft.
The incident, which involved a Chinese Navy J-11 fighter jet and a U.S. Air Force RC-135 aircraft, took place on Dec. 21, the U.S. military said in a statement.
"We expect all countries in the Indo-Pacific region to use international airspace safely and in accordance with international law," it added.
A U.S. military spokesperson said the Chinese jet came within 10 feet of the plane's wing, but 20 feet from its nose, which caused the U.S. aircraft to take evasive maneuvers.
Eric Cheung, Jessie Yeung, and Emiko Jozuka, CNN, December 23, 2022
China sent 47 aircraft across the median line of the Taiwan Strait on Sunday, its largest incursion into Taiwan’s air defense zone in recent months, as Beijing steps-up efforts to normalize aggressive military operations around the self-ruled island.
The incursions were made by 42 J-10, J-11, J-16 and Su-30 fighter jets, two Y-8 maritime patrol aircrafts, a KJ-500 early warning aircraft, as well as a CH-4 and a WZ-7 military drone, according to the Taiwanese defense ministry.
It added that a total of 71 Chinese aircraft were spotted around the island, and that Taiwan’s military have responded by tasking combat air patrol aircrafts, navy vessels, and land-based missile systems.
The flights, part of a so-called “strike drill” according to China’s military, follow naval exercises by a Chinese aircraft carrier group in the Western Pacific close to Japan on Friday.
ONE BELT, ONE ROAD STRATEGY
51. China Makes a Move in the Middle East: How Far Will Sino-Arab Strategic Rapprochement Go?
Sine Ozkarasahin, Jamestown Foundation, December 30, 2022
With a well-planned strategy and a careful exploitation of the gaps opened by U.S. foreign policy shifts, China has successfully increased its role as a strategic actor in the Middle East, including by gaining a foothold in the regional arms market. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s early December visit to Saudi Arabia, upon King Salman’s invitation, exemplifies the recent improvement in Sino-Arab ties (Xinhua, December 8). While in Saudi Arabia, Xi initiated two new multilateral forums intended to strengthen engagement between China and the Arab world: the China-Arab States Summit and the China-Gulf Cooperation Council summit (Xinhua, December 11).
In addition to deepening political rapprochement between Beijing and several regional countries, China is simultaneously establishing crucial military-strategic ties with key Middle Eastern states. Chinese-made drones are already present in the arsenals of multiple Arab countries and technological cooperation between Beijing and its regional counterparts is rapidly increasing. The most striking example in this regard was the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) revocation of the F-35 deal that constrained its cooperation with the Chinese tech and telecommunications giant Huawei over 5G technology (Al Arabiya News, December 14, 2021). As many Arab countries’ doubts about Washington’s commitment to regional security grow, more and more countries are increasingly open to entreaties from China.
52. Finland and the Demise of China’s Polar Silk Road
Matti Puranen and Sanna Kopra, Jamestown Foundation, December 30, 2022
Only a short time ago, considerable enthusiasm existed in Finland regarding Beijing’s efforts to forge an “Arctic corridor” of railroads and undersea tunnels, satellite ground stations, an airport for scientific expeditions, and massive biorefineries.
In this, Finland was not alone but represented only a small branch of China’s comprehensive thrust to permanently establish a presence above the Arctic Circle. Yet, with the recently emerging geopolitical turbulence, China’s Arctic expansion is facing a standstill, even in Finland, which long seemed like its most viable partner in the region. By applying for NATO membership along with Sweden, Finland is turning westward, practically closing the gates on China’s Arctic expansion beyond Russia. Its story serves as an interesting microcosm on the rise and demise of China’s Arctic policy.
53. The Caribbean and U.S.-China Strategic Competition: Next Phase of the New Cold War?
Scott B. MacDonald, Jamestown Foundation, December 30, 2022
Although the U.S. remains the dominant geopolitical force in the Caribbean, China has established itself as the “other” great power in the region, exerting influence from the Bahamas in the northern part of the archipelago of island-states, south through the Greater and Lesser Antilles and into the Guianas on the northeastern shoulder of South America. China is adept at economic statecraft, but unlike the Soviet Union in the last Cold War, Beijing has not sought to establish military alliances and bases in the Caribbean—at least not yet.
Chinese efforts in the region are likely to increase considering the continuation by President Xi Jinping of an ambitious foreign policy agenda during his third term. Like it or not, Caribbean countries have become a geopolitical cockpit for the United States and China.
54. The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway and the Future of the Belt and Road Initiative
William Yuen Yee, Jamestown Foundation, December 22, 2022
On the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Bali, Indonesia, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo watched over a video livestream as the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway (HSR) sped through its first trial run between Tegalluar Station and Casting Yard No. 4 (Antara, November 21). Yet the smiles plastered across the faces of the two world leaders belied the fraught, winding journey of the railway until this point, as well as the uncertainties surrounding its future.
Upon completion, the 142-kilometer (88 mile) railway will connect Indonesia’s current capital city, Jakarta, with its fourth largest city, Bandung. Chinese state media has called it one of the “flagship” projects of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, a global infrastructure development strategy widely viewed as the signature foreign policy project of Xi Jinping’s administration (Xinhua, November 16). After all, it was in a speech in Jakarta in 2013 that Xi first unveiled one of the BRI’s cornerstone development programs to bolster infrastructure connectivity—the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (ASEAN-China Centre, October 2, 2013).
OPINION PIECES
55. 5 Ways the U.S.-China Cold War Will Be Different from the Last One
Jo Inge Bekkevold, Foreign Policy, December 29, 2022
Guardrails and statesmanship will be even more important this time around.
2022 was arguably the most turbulent and transformative year in international politics since the revolutions of 1989. It was turbulent because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the crisis over Taiwan, but it was transformative in the way the United States acknowledged China as a superpower rival. In the U.S. National Security Strategy issued in October, the Biden administration not only identified China as its most important security challenge, but also declared unequivocally that the post-Cold War era is over. If the United States’ unipolar power position was the defining feature of the post-Cold War era, the shift to a U.S.-Chinese bipolar power structure will shape a new world order.
Ultimately, decisions on war and peace will be made by individual leaders. But to better understand how the new bipolar era might unfold, we must look at its structure: the balance of power, the new system’s origin, and the geographic setting. The U.S.-Chinese rivalry is unique in many ways, and its nature provides us with salient information on the new world order, its stability, and the role that might be played by statesmanship.
In terms of balance of power, the U.S.-China rivalry resembles the Cold War, another antagonism between two superpowers. This is why former Obama administration Asia-Pacific advisor Evan Medeiros called the November meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia, “the first superpower summit of the Cold War Version 2.0.” This has raised concerns, particularly in Europe, about the reemergence of competing blocs, and among developing countries about being stuck in the proverbial middle.
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Second, in contrast to the Cold War, the main theater of the U.S.-Chinese military rivalry is naval, which is inherently less stable and at greater risk of a limited war. The Cold War’s main focus on the European land theater allowed the strategy of massive retaliation to emerge, strongly deterring any attempts to cross the fixed line dividing Europe. The use of military force by the two superpowers in Asian waters is less likely to pose an existential threat to either state or risk a nuclear war. China might use nuclear weapons if invaded, but it is much less likely that Chinese leaders will risk all-out war with the United States if some of their ships are destroyed. This increases the risk of a limited war in Asian waters, as the chances of massive escalation are lower than they were in Europe. But even a limited war at sea between two superpowers could have devastating consequences for regional stability and the global economy.
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Fifth, contrary to the theory that interdependence reduces the risk of war, the high level of economic and technological interdependence between the United States and China is potentially more conflict prone than the relative autarky of the two blocs during the Cold War. Indeed, the historian Gaddis pointed to the lack of interdependence between the two superpowers as an important factor enhancing the stability of the Cold War rivalry, mainly because not depending on a potentially hostile rival increased a superpower’s sense of security.
China’s high level of interdependence with the world economy is the very reason why some observers prefer to use labels other than “cold war” when describing the U.S.-China bipolar system—suggesting terms such as competitive coexistence, cold coexistence, or conflictual coexistence. But the level of interdependence in the U.S.-China rivalry leaves more room for economic warfare than was the case during the Cold War; in a bipolar power structure, the two superpowers view mutual interdependence as vulnerability and thus seek to reduce it.
56. Turn Taiwan into a Bristling Porcupine
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Foreign Policy, January 5, 2023
It is impossible not to draw parallels between Russia’s attack on Ukraine and China’s ambitions for Taiwan: a nuclear-armed autocracy threatening a smaller democracy, revanchist rhetoric about reuniting the motherland, a leader turning increasingly repressive at home and aggressive abroad. However, for every similarity there is a significant difference. China is now one of the world’s two predominant powers, and the global consequences of a war in the Taiwan Strait would be manifestly greater. A China-Taiwan war would quickly draw in other countries.
Both Ukraine and Taiwan sit outside of formal treaty alliances, and neither benefits from a security guarantee like NATO’s Article 5. This makes it even more important that the free world learns the right lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine if it wants to deter any attempt by China to take Taiwan by force.
First, when you do not have a treaty to rely on, words matter. In the buildup to the war, Russian President Vladimir Putin made his ambitions explicit: “True sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia,” he wrote in July 2021. Days before the invasion, he called Ukraine an “inalienable part of [Russia’s] history, culture, and spiritual space.” Putin repeatedly denied Ukraine’s right to exist, yet Western leaders ignored the risk of a full-scale invasion.
The world cannot make the same mistake with China. When Chinese President Xi Jinping says Beijing has the right to use all measures necessary to “reunite” Taiwan with China, we should take him seriously. As we should when a Chinese ambassador says Taiwanese citizens will need to be reeducated after reunification. China’s actions in Hong Kong show what the “One China” principle means in practice. There should be no doubt of China’s ambitions or what they will mean for the people of Taiwan.
Second, any strategy for Taiwan to deter and, if need be, defeat an attack must be based on technological superiority. It was the Ukrainians’ bravery that repelled the initial advance, but turning the tide of the war was achieved with superior Western-made weapons. Meanwhile, Russia has increasingly turned to crude Soviet-era equipment, not least due to the Western sanctions now hobbling the Russian arms industry.
China, despite making significant progress in recent years, is still crucially dependent on the United States and its allies for the most advanced microchips and the machinery to develop them. The United States’ economic and technological advantages over China give the democratic world a significant military edge. Maintaining this edge will be vital to deterring any efforts to take Taiwan by force.
Third, allies and partners must act together. The free world has shown impressive unity in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine—a unity Putin surely did not expect. Significant sanctions were agreed in record time, not only by NATO allies but also by South Korea, Japan, Australia, and other countries. China, which is far more reliant than Russia on global supply chains, must understand that any attack on Taiwan would spark an equally unified response.
The lesson from Russia’s invasion is that deterrence will fail unless the messaging is strong and united before war starts. That’s why the economic consequences of a move against Taiwan must be made clear to Beijing now. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing last November with a group of CEOs in tow sent the opposite message. Xi is actively working to address China’s supply chain vulnerabilities—can Taiwan and its partners say they are doing the same?
Fourth, weapons are what counts. Although sanctions are important, it is the vast military aid provided predominately by the United States that has changed the reality on the ground in Ukraine. Superior weapons allowed the Ukrainians to repel the initial Russian advance and take back large swaths of territory. If Ukraine had had these capabilities before the war, Putin may have thought twice before launching a full-scale invasion. The same lesson applies to Taiwan. With the help of its partners, the island must become a porcupine bristling with armaments to deter any possible attempt to take it by force. China must calculate that the cost of an invasion is simply too high to bear.
Finally, the most important way to deter a Chinese move on Taiwan now is to ensure a Ukrainian victory. If Russia can gain territory and establish a new status quo by force, China and other autocratic powers will learn that the democratic world’s resolve is weak. That in the face of nuclear blackmail and military aggression, it chose appeasement over confrontation.
This outcome would make the entire world a more dangerous place. That is why all those who believe in a democratic Taiwan and a rules-based international order must work to ensure Ukraine prevails.
57. ‘A sea change’: Biden reverses decades of Chinese trade policy
Gavin Bade, Politico, December 26, 2022
Forget tariffs. Biden’s actions to crack down on Beijing’s tech development will do more to hinder the Chinese economy — and divide the two nations — than Trump ever did.
After decades of U.S. efforts to engage China with the prospect of greater development through trade, the era of cooperation is coming to a screeching halt.
The White House and Congress are quietly reshaping the American economic relationship with the world’s second-largest economic power, enacting a strategy to limit China’s technological development that breaks with decades of federal policy and represents the most aggressive American action yet to curtail Beijing’s economic and military rise.
The Economist, January 4, 2023
Until a few years ago, the term “Indo-Pacific” was hardly uttered in international affairs. Now many countries have adopted so-called Indo-Pacific strategies, including America, Australia, Britain, France, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines and even Mongolia. South Korea joined the pack in December. The main Asian holdout is China, which scorns the phrase. That is key to understanding what the Indo-Pacific is all about.
Outside geopolitics, the term, implying a conjoined perspective on the Indian Ocean and the even vaster Pacific, is not new. Its first recorded use was by a British colonial lawyer and ethnographer in the mid-19th century. Patterns of human trade and exchange had already spanned the two oceans for millennia, with Islam spreading eastward from the Middle East and Hinduism and Buddhism fanning outwards from India. In more recent decades scientists have grasped how the circulation and biogeography of the two oceans are closely connected. The great story of Asia can be usefully framed by the two-ocean notion of an Indo-Pacific.
59. China’s Future Isn’t What It Used to Be
Paul Krugman, New York Times, December 22, 2022
The world’s two most powerful leaders have just had very different years.
At the beginning of 2022, Joe Biden was widely portrayed as a failed president. His legislative agenda appeared stalled, while economic troubles seemed to guarantee devastating losses in the midterms. What happened instead was that the Inflation Reduction Act — which is mainly a game-changing climate bill — was enacted, the much-hyped “red wave” was a ripple, and while many economists are still predicting a recession, unemployment is still low and inflation has been subsiding.
By contrast, early this year Xi Jinping, China’s paramount leader, was still boasting about his triumph over Covid. Indeed, for a while, people commonly heard assertions that China’s apparent success in pandemic management heralded its emergence as the world’s leading power. Now, however, Xi has abruptly ended his signature “zero Covid” policy, with all indications pointing to a huge surge in hospitalizations and deaths that will stress health care to the breaking point; the Chinese economy seems set to face major problems over the next two or three years; and long-term projections of Chinese economic growth are being marked down.
China’s future, it seems, is not what it used to be. Why?
China’s ability to limit the spread of the coronavirus with draconian lockdowns was supposed to demonstrate the superiority of a regime that doesn’t need to consult the public, that can simply do what needs to be done. At this point, however, Xi’s refusal to make preparations to move on, his failure to adopt the most effective vaccines and get shots in the arms of his most vulnerable citizens, have highlighted the weakness of authoritarian governments in which nobody can tell the leader when he’s getting it wrong.
Beyond the imminent prospect of carnage, China’s long-running macroeconomic problems seem to be reaching a tipping point.
60. Xi Jinping’s reputation in China and his standing in the world may not survive this Covid disaster
Isabel Hilton, The Guardian, January 1, 2023
Having forced draconian lockdowns on his people, China’s supreme leader is now expecting them to believe that the virus is no worse than a cold.
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Within a breathtakingly brief interlude, China’s people have been asked to forget that the Covid threat justified draconian lockdowns, loss of livelihood and liberty. Now they must believe that it is no worse than a common cold, that traditional Chinese medicine is effective and that the death rate is negligible. Despite the double shifts in crematoriums and the lived experience of millions of people, Chinese officials continue to insist that all is well.
Even in a population accustomed to being told that black is white if the party says so, this has generated a mix of indignation and incredulity: indignation at three years of government failure to fully vaccinate a vulnerable population; at its failure to learn from the experience of other countries and territories such as Hong Kong; and incredulity at the manifest gap between propaganda and the evidence of their own eyes. In the black box of Chinese politics, the pressures that led to the decision are unlikely to be revealed, but the chaos of its execution is unmistakable.
61. 'White-paper' protests carry many echoes of China's past
John Delury and Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Nikkei Asia, December 23, 2022
Too early to conclude today's youth are done demonstrating.
62. Just How Badly Does Apple Need China?
Chris Miller, The Atlantic, December 28, 2022
Long before it reached your home, even before its tiny components were pieced together in an assembly plant, your phone was already one of the most complex gadgets in the world. It is the product of a delicate supply chain whose every link is forged by competing business and political interests.
That chain is starting to rattle and even break, as the global tech industry works to become less dependent on China. Earlier this month, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) held an event celebrating the expansion of its first major facility in the United States, a semiconductor plant in Phoenix, Arizona. When the facility starts operating in early 2024, it will use the world’s most precise manufacturing tools to etch billions of microscopic circuits onto the silicon chips that provide all of the world’s computing power.
President Joe Biden attended the event and declared that TSMC’s investment proved that “American manufacturing is back, folks.” Morris Chang, TSMC’s founder, said in a speech that “globalization is almost dead and free trade is almost dead.”
The moment certainly was a turning point—both for technology manufacturing and for the fraught relationships among the United States, China, and Taiwan—but neither Biden nor Chang had things exactly right. The idea that the arrival of TSMC’s factory in Arizona represents a new era of self-sufficiency or the end of globalization is a fantasy. Chang, a Taiwanese American tech tycoon, sits atop a chip industry that can function only by sourcing ultra-precise tools and materials from half a dozen advanced economies. His company’s new Arizona facility is reportedly the largest foreign investment project in the state’s history. Deglobalization this is not.
In fact, the CEOs in attendance at the ribbon cutting, including Apple’s Tim Cook and AMD’s Lisa Su, each of whom buys chips from TSMC, have no plans to make their far-flung supply chains any less complex. Instead, they’re taking costly steps to reduce the share of their component production and assembly that takes place in China or Taiwan, to insure themselves against the growing risk that tensions between the U.S. and China finally snap. Any military escalation in the Taiwan Strait would not only be a grave geopolitical crisis—it would also tear apart the world’s semiconductor and electronics supply chains and pose a critical threat to America’s biggest tech firms.
63. Beijing Makes a List and Checks It Twice
Miles Yu, Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2022
The Chinese Communist Party gave me a strange Christmas present. On Dec. 23 Foreign Minister Wang Yi signed an order imposing sanctions on me and Todd Stein, a Tibet expert who serves on the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China.
The sanctions amount to nothing. The regime froze my assets in China but I don’t have any. It banned any Chinese entities, institutions or individuals from making “transactions” with me (I have no intention of entering into any such transactions). And it prohibited my immediate family and me from obtaining visas to travel to China. I was born in China, but I regard it as unsafe to visit and haven’t since 2015.
So what was the point? Publicity. After Mr. Wang’s order, state propaganda outlets celebrated the news. The English-language Global Times did so in threatening terms: “Since ancient times, all those who have betrayed the country and the nation have met a tragic end. Yu’s can’t be any better.”
64. To Deter China, Taiwan Must Prepare for War
Ethan Kessler, Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2022
China’s threat to take Taiwan by force looks more credible by the day as Beijing’s military power grows. The U.S. is taking the lead in response. But that needs to change if Taiwan wants to secure itself from invasion.