Matt Turpin's China Articles - July 23, 2023
Friends,
So far, I’ve avoided speculation on the whereabouts of Qin Gang, the PRC’s relatively new Foreign Minister. But this weekend marks of month for his disappearance and, as usual within the PRC system, Chinese officials are unwilling to clear up the mystery, even as rumors swirl.
One rumor is that Qin had an extramarital affair in the United States and that his mistress was a British spy. Another version of that rumor alleges that he had a son with her meaning that Qin has an American child… a tricky situation when one considers the enormous paranoia the Party has for espionage and American influence.
Perhaps Qin is just ill, and the Party wishes to protect the privacy of one of its top officials.
Eventually, this mystery will be at least partially solved.
Qin may just resume his duties and explain he was recovering from a health problem without going into further details.
Or in a few months, a grey-haired Qin in a drab jacket and flanked by two policemen, will be paraded out in front of a judicial hearing and the cameras, to confess his corruption or some other crime.
Is this Qin Gang’s fate?
[See Josh Rogin’s piece, “China’s missing foreign minister exposes Beijing’s secrecy under Xi,” Washington Post, July 21, 2023]
Other interesting topics this week:
It appears that the PRC lost the title of top exporter to the United States for the first time in 15 years as the U.S. increasingly relies on Canada and Mexico and the Chinese economy stalls (see article #42).
The evidence for Canadian election interference by the Chinese Communist Party continues to mount (see articles #33 and #34, in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times).
MIT and Stanford publish pieces detailing how the PRC Government has developed and sharpened technology transfer policies and tools since 2006 to extract technology from foreign companies with 85% of it occurring in industries with great economic and military utility (see articles #48 and #49).
Read the chapter I co-authored with my friend and colleague, Robert Daly (Director of the Kissinger Institute on China and the United States at the Wilson Center), in the new report '“Silicon Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security” (see article #2).
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. The Treacherous Silicon Triangle
Larry Diamond, Jim Ellis, and Orville Schell, Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2023
According to U.S. intelligence and other analysts, Xi has set 2027 as the year by which China must be militarily ready to attack Taiwan. Although Xi may have been given second thoughts by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine, there is still little time to lose in projecting U.S. readiness and resolve and in strengthening Taiwan’s ability to protect its democracy and the world’s microchip supply chain.
Economic, technological, and strategic competition between China and the United States will remain the dominant feature of geopolitics for years, if not decades, to come. To enhance its chances of prevailing in this competition, the United States will need reliable international partners with whom it can reconfigure and strengthen its semiconductor supply chain. No partner is more important in this effort than Taiwan.
2. Silicon Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, China, and Global Semiconductor Security
Hoover Institution and Asia Society, July 18, 2023
A multidisciplinary working group examines the national security and economic risks from a dynamic, global semiconductor ecosystem centered on Taiwan.
COMMENT – My colleague and friend, Robert Daly and I wrote Chapter 9 of this report. We examined the likely counterstrategies that the PRC would employ as the United States, Taiwan, and other countries took action to protect Taiwan and the broader semiconductor industry from the PRC’s harmful trade practices, coercion, and potential military aggression.
This week, we rolled the report out in Washington just as the CEOs of Intel, Nvidia, and Qualcomm were in town lobbying for weaker enforcement of semiconductor restrictions on the PRC.
3. PODCAST – Bordering on difficult
David Rennie and Jeremy Page, Drum Tower, June 18, 2023
COMMENT – The Chinese Communist Party lives in a complicated neighborhood. Rather than seeking to resolve differences peacefully and equitably with its neighbors, the Party employs force, coercion, and threats… demanding that its neighbors submit to Beijing’s domination.
As David Rennie and Jeremy Page describe in this episode, that behavior only worsens the Party’s dilemmas.
4. Suspicion deepens as absence of China's foreign minister persists
Laurie Chen, Martin Quin Pollard and Kate Lamb, Reuters, July 20, 2023
"Qin's disappearance does cast much uncertainty and confusion over the consistency, stability and credibility of Beijing's decision-making," said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center in Washington.
"If a vice-national level leader can just disappear without much of an explanation, people find it difficult to trust and count on any Chinese leader or official and their positions."
Asked at his ministry's daily press conference on Thursday, about his status and when he would be returning to duties, spokesperson Mao Ning said: "I don’t have any information for your question."
China said on Wednesday that Wang Yi - Qin's slighter and shorter predecessor who wore the quickly adjusted shirt in Jakarta - will also fill in for China at a BRICS meeting in Johannesburg on July 24-25.
As well as the absence in Jakarta, details of which were relayed to Reuters on condition of anonymity by sources familiar with the planning, Qin's vanishing from the diplomatic scene is raising scheduling questions for other engagements.
Britain has not been able to fix a date for its foreign minister to visit China, a trip slated to happen as soon as this month and seen as critical to patching up turbulent ties, sources familiar with the planning told Reuters.
Meanwhile, a visit by the European Union's top diplomat, Josep Borrell, shelved at the last minute this month, is now not due to happen until the autumn, a senior EU official said.
…
Qin has been considered a rising star in China's political firmament. The former aide to President Xi Jinping was appointed foreign minister in December after serving less than two years as ambassador to the United States.
Since taking up the foreign minister post, he has played a prominent role in steering rocky U.S.-China ties, meeting Secretary of State Antony Blinken in Beijing in June on the first visit to China by the top U.S. diplomat in five years.
But his last public engagement was a meeting with visiting Russian, Sri Lankan and Vietnamese officials on June 25.
Then he disappeared.
Aside from the brief comment about his health on July 11, his ministry has declined to offer any further information, rebuffing reporters' questions at daily briefings and leaving out the exchanges, including the initial health comment, from its official transcript.
Comments on articles mentioning Qin shared on the WeChat messaging app have been disabled and a search by Reuters found no recent mentions of Qin in state media.
But there has been no shortage of interest.
Searches for "Qin Gang" on the Baidu search engine have increased 28-fold in the past week to more than 380,000 a day, according to platform data.
Qin's absence has also been widely discussed in the diplomatic community, with some saying it is another example of China's lack of transparency.
Amid a broad national security push in China in recent months, access to information including academic journals, corporate registries and economic indicators has been restricted, unnerving foreign governments and investors.
COMMENT – Needless to say, this mystery has consumed the China-watcher community.
5. Chinese Embassy Responds to Taiwan’s Lai
Liu Pengyu, Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2023
“He has betrayed the totality of the Chinese nation.”
COMMENT – I don’t usually publish Party propaganda, but it is worth reading this piece published by the Wall Street Journal from the PRC Embassy spokesperson in Washington.
Clearly, Vice President Lai is under Beijing’s skin and the Party is desperate to see him defeated in January. A third term for the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party) would serve as a serious rebuke to Xi’s strategy of turning the screws on Taiwan. It may continue to force Party elites to question the wisdom of Xi’s entire approach to governance (though I wouldn’t bet on that).
We should view this article, along with other statements from the Party’s mouthpieces, as an effort to frame the Taiwanese Presidential election as a stark choice: a vote for the DPP is a vote for war.
It’s an odd formulation that only makes sense in the bizzarro worldview of the Party and amplified by “China’s friends” around the world.
In this alternative reality, the Taiwanese are the aggressors and warmongers. Their crime is not wanting to be annexed by their authoritarian neighbor, not wanting their hard-fought civil and political liberties erased, and not wanting to be subsumed by a race-based vision of ultra-nationalism championed by the Chinese Communist Party.
The Party simply cannot admit to itself that the Taiwanese people overwhelmingly reject what the Party has on offer. To do so, would be to question the entire legitimacy of the Party and its justification for its monopolistic hold on power. For if free Chinese citizens reject the Chinese Communist Party, isn’t it conceivable that other Chinese citizens, given a choice, would reject the Party as well?
Leninist parties cannot survive referendums on their rule, so therefore, Leninist parties reject the entire concept of legitimate elections.
Instead of resolving this cognitive dissonance by examining its own actions and seeking to undergo the kinds of political reforms that might reassure Chinese citizens, the Party must find traitors and enemies to blame for their own failures.
6. PODCAST – Should We Ban TikTok?
Justin Bassi and Malcolm Turnbull, Defending Democracy, July 18, 2023
Australia’s former Prime Minister and his National Security Advisor discuss the threats posed by digital platforms controlled by the People’s Republic of China.
COMMENT – My good friend Justin does a great job on this episode.
7. I was disinvited from a congressional hearing about China’s threats to free speech
Sophie Richardson, The Hill, July 14, 2023
Sophie Richardson, the Human Rights Watch China director was invited to testify about Chinese government threats to academic freedom in the US but was asked to remove a phrase criticizing the Trump administration. When Richardson refused, the invitation was withdrawn.
COMMENT – I’ve known Sophie for years and have seen her bravely challenge PRC officials and their proxies around the world when others, who see themselves as progressive, remain silent over fears of retribution or sympathize with their Party friends.
She is completely dedicated to shining a light on the horrendous abuses of the Chinese Communist Party and advocating for the dignity of the Chinese people, there is no better person to testify before Congress on these issues.
Sophie and I don’t agree on every detail (that’s what it means to live in a vibrant democracy), but the Committee was wrong to withdraw her invitation and they owe her an apology.
I encourage everyone to read the testimony that she submitted: “Testimony for U.S. House Committee on Education and the Workforce Development Hearing on Academic Freedom in China.” You will find it well reasoned and it contains valuable policy recommendations that we should implement.
Her work in 2018 to formulate a “Code of Conduct for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide” (Appendix of the Testimony) should serve as the basis for how academic institutions interact with the PRC Government and its malign influence.
Authoritarianism
8. Hong Kong security law Article 23 would target ‘modern-day espionage’ and ‘internet loopholes,’ security chief says
Hong Kong Free Press, July 17, 2023
The authorities are considering cases of “soft resistance” and “internet loopholes” when drafting Article 23 – the city’s own security law, Secretary for Security Chris Tang told state-backed newspaper Wen Wei Po on Monday.
Article 23 of the Basic Law stipulates that the government shall enact laws on its own to prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition and subversion against Beijing. Its legislation failed in 2003 following mass protests and it was not tabled again until after the onset of the separate, Beijing-imposed security law in 2020. Pro-democracy advocates fear it could have a negative effect on civil liberties.
“We are examining which behaviours have not been covered by the Hong Kong national security law and other laws, and [are] paying attention to ‘soft resistance’ and internet loopholes,” said Tang in a written response to the newspaper. He added that the move was “ to deal with offenses under the Hong Kong national security law more effectively.”
The local government has said that it will finish legislation of Article 23 no later than the end of next year, but the draft has not been disclosed and tabled yet. Tang, the city’s leader John Lee, and justice chief Paul Lam have each spoken about enacting the legislation in recent months.
COMMENT – The Party, and its proxies in Hong Kong’s government, will not be satisfied until all remnants of civil and political liberties have been eradicated.
John Lee and the APEC Summit:
The Biden Administration should not invite the city’s CCP appointed leader, John Lee, to attend the November APEC Summit in San Francisco. John Lee remains sanctioned under the Hong Kong Autonomy Act, a law that passed unanimously in both the House and Senate during the summer of 2020 following Beijing’s imposition of the National Security Law.
John Lee was one of the first officials sanctioned under the law as he was Hong Kong’s Secretary of Security and worked closely with the Chinese Communist Party to destroy his city’s autonomy. For his efforts, the Party made him the city’s Chief Executive in July 2022.
The Biden Administration faces a dilemma: if they refuse to invite John Lee, Xi Jinping may boycott the Summit out of protest. [More on the dilemma: “State Department amends comment on APEC invitation for Hong Kong's leader,” Reuters, June 13, 2023]
But, but, but… Beijing faces a dilemma as well: if Xi boycotts APEC, he stands to further harm the PRC’s economy as international businesses and investors internalize the geopolitical risks of doing business with the PRC. If the Chinese economy were in a stronger position, we would have much less leverage… but it isn’t and therefore we should not discount the pressure Xi would be under to accept this hit against Hong Kong’s leaders.
Two pieces of unsolicited advice for the Administration:
Stick to a principled position on John Lee - Refuse to give him an invitation even if that results in Xi’s boycott (I’m glad State walked back Wendy Sherman’s earlier statement). Caving to the Party’s threats is not conductive to peace and security [I suspect there is heated debate going on right now across the interagency over this issue… it bears watching].
Play hardball with the Party - If Xi boycotts the San Francisco APEC Summit, then invite President Tsai of Taiwan to attend. Taiwan has been a member of APEC since November 1991 (the same time Hong Kong and the PRC joined), but Taiwan’s head of state is the only leader not invited to attend APEC Summits due to intransigence by Beijing. We should use Xi’s boycott as an opportunity to correct a 32-year mistake. Beijing will howl at this move and claim that Tsai is NOT a head of state and Taiwan is NOT an independent country… but of course, neither is John Lee nor Hong Kong, so being a head of state or an independent country is NOT a requirement for attending the APEC Leaders Summit. We shouldn’t let Beijing have its cake and eat it too.
9. China foreign minister vanishes from public eye for 3 weeks
Yukio Tajima, Nikkei Asia, July 19, 2023
10. Where Is China’s Foreign Minister? Beijing Won’t Clear Up the Mystery.
Chris Buckley and David Pierson, New York Times, July 17, 2023
11. Fearful foreign firms cut off data over China’s anti-spying law
Ryan McMorrow, Joseph Leahy, and Eleanor Olcott, Financial Review, July 16, 2023
12. Multinationals in China accelerate push to decouple data
Ryan McMorrow, Joe Leahy, Sun Yu, and Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, July 19, 2023
13. Morgan Stanley moves 200 technologists out of China on data law
Reuters, July 19, 2023
Morgan Stanley is shifting more than 200 technology developers out of China after the country tightened access to cache of data stored onshore, Bloomberg News reported on Tuesday, citing people familiar with the matter.
Most of the employees are being moved mainly to Hong Kong and Singapore, according to the report, adding that the U.S.-based bank is building a standalone China system to comply with local regulations.
COMMENT – Whether you call it decoupling or derisking, it seems to be happening.
14. All eyes on China after Russia leaves Black Sea grain deal
Meredith Lee Hill, Politico, July 17, 2023
China has been a top beneficiary of the Black Sea grain deal that Russia publicly blew up Monday, sending shockwaves through the global food system.
15. China launches another internet crackdown targeting online rumors
Kawala Xie, South China Morning Post, July 16, 2023
16. Why Chinese entities are turning to People’s Daily censorship AI to avoid political mines
Vanessa Cai and Sylvie Zhuang, South China Morning Post, July 17, 2023
17. Xi Jinping calls for 'solid' security barrier around China's internet
Reuters, July 15, 2023
18. Innovators and Emulators: China and Russia’s Compounding Influence on Digital Censorship
Catherine Andrzejewski, Ana Horigoshi, Abigail I. Maher, and Jonathan A. Solis, AIDDATA, May 11, 2023
19. Official Data Hinted at China’s Hidden Covid Toll. Then it Vanished
Muyi Xiao, Mara Hvistendahl and James Glanz, New York Times, July 19, 2023
Official data from China offered a rare, but brief, glimpse of the true toll of Covid, indicating that nearly as many people may have died from the virus in a single province earlier this year as Beijing has said died in the mainland during the entire pandemic.
The data was deleted from a provincial government website just days after it was published on Thursday. But epidemiologists who reviewed a cached version of the information said it was the latest indication that the country’s official tally is a vast undercount.
The number of cremations in the eastern province of Zhejiang rose to 171,000 in the first quarter of this year, the website said. That was 72,000 more cremations, a roughly 70 percent increase, than had been reported in the same period last year.
In February, China said the official death toll in the mainland since the start of the pandemic was 83,150 — a remarkably low number that independent researchers have said is not credible. Since then, the government has released only weekly or monthly death tolls that, when added up, raise the overall total to about 83,700.
COMMENT – Here’s a fascinating chart from a piece by some of these reporters by in February 2023 in the New York Times:
20. China deletes Covid-19 death data
Ryan McMorrow and Nian Liu, Financial Times, July 18, 2023
Environmental Harms
21. Charting new paths for Antarctic protection despite China’s resistance
Claire Yang, Lowy Institute, July 11, 2023
Calls to renegotiate the agreements that govern the Antarctic, out of frustration at China’s and Russia’s opposition to establishing new areas for protection, would only put at risk the many benefits of the present Antarctic Treaty system. Instead, appealing to Beijing’s mercantilist interests, and greater scrutiny of China’s fishing industry, might eventually do the trick.
A special meeting under the ATS on the establishment of what are known as Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) in the Southern Ocean ended last month without agreement. Russia and China resisted the wishes of the other 25 members of the Commission for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources. CCAMLR, the body that oversees conservation and “rational” use of the Southern Ocean for fishing, operates under the ATS.
Much strategic writing about Antarctica concerns threats to the ATS posed by dual-use civil/military equipment and possible future competition for mineral resources. But differences over krill and fish – the resources accessible right now – are a more immediate challenge.
It is not China that wants to overturn the ATS. China is successfully bending the ATS to its interests through its de facto veto of consensus-based decision-making.
Rather, it is NGOs, academics and countries that back MPAs that are frustrated by the consensus-based system. But tweaking would inevitably become talks on a whole new agreement, which would mean countries agreeing to give up commercial and strategic interests for the sake of the environment and a peaceful Antarctica. Now is not the best geopolitical moment to ask for that. Many of the strongest provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, such as the right to inspect others’ stations and the prohibition on military uses, would likely be lost.
COMMENT – I admire the author’s optimism, but I’m deeply skeptical that we can “appeal to Beijing’s mercantilist interests” to incentivize compliance.
22. Chinese scientists claim lead in race for viable biodegradable plastics
Zhang Tong, South China Morning Post, July 17, 2023
23. As China Bakes in Record Heat, John Kerry Presses Beijing on Climate Change
Vivian Wang and Lisa Friedman, New York Times, July 18, 2023
Foreign Interference and Coercion
24. Chinese State-Linked Information Operation Revealed Social Media Account Takeover Potential
Sandra Quincoses, NISOS, July 10, 2023
Nisos investigators identified a network of pro-Beijing Twitter accounts likely engaged in state-backed information operation targeting audiences in various countries in Latin America, including Paraguay, Costa Rica, Chile, and Brazil. Some of the accounts promote strategic Chinese state media-linked news content in both Spanish and Portuguese.
The network is linked to China News Service and shows signs of coordinated inauthentic behavior, with accounts posting similar or identical content related to China at close time intervals. This indicates they are likely organized through a common operator echoing content mainly from Chinese state-linked media outlets, in an attempt to improve China’s image and enhance its policy and diplomatic efforts.
China News Service is reportedly part of China’s “United Front,” a strategy aimed at spreading Beijing’s influence that simultaneously works as an espionage method for Chinese government agencies. The accounts represent a likely covert effort to promote state media content that bypassed Twitter’s previous state media labeling policy.
Apps communicating with the IP address of the network’s affiliated websites showed permissions to not only gather personally identifiable information from subscribers, but also demonstrated the potential to control subscribers’ social media accounts. This could enable China’s government to potentially micromanage narratives and obtain information from dissidents residing abroad, which has been reported as common activity by Chinese government-linked actors through other methods. Nisos did not find the same level of invasive permissions among other news agencies, including other foreign state-affiliated media websites.
COMMENT – If this firm can detect this activity, why hasn’t Twitter done anything about it?
25. Kissinger Meets China Defense Chief in Pursuing Closer Ties
Rebecca Choong Wilkins and Evelyn Yu, Bloomberg, July 18, 2023
COMMENT - I can’t imagine John Kerry was too pleased to be upstaged by Henry Kissinger. While there hasn’t been a public announcement that Kissinger met with Xi, I’d be very surprised if the two did NOT meet.
The Party must understand how this makes the Biden Administration look, which means that these snubs are intentional and should be seen within a broader strategy. Clearly, the Party is trying to make the Administration look weak to the rest of the world and to sow domestic political divisions within the United States.
I suspect that the Party believes that business leaders and moderate foreign policy voices in the United States can compel the Administration to change course and back down. In April, Thomas Friedman urged his readers that America’s tough policy towards China was foolish (see “America, China, and a Crisis of Trust,” New York Times, April 14, 2023) and a week later, following Yellen’s China policy speech, Fareed Zakaria congratulated the Administration for changing course (see “Biden’s course correction on China is smart and important,” Washington Post, April 21, 2023) — I’ve heard that the opinions of Friedman and Zakaria hold considerable sway over President Biden.
We can see Beijing’s strategy play out in the effective efforts to prevent (so far) the introduction of an outbound investment screening regime, in the efforts by the U.S. semiconductor industry to ease export restrictions, in the chorus of condemnation on the Section 301 tariffs, and in the campaign to prioritize mutual economic interests over national security concerns (as the PRC moves in the opposite direction).
From the outside, it looks like the Chinese Communist Party is being fairly effective at exploiting divisions within the Biden Administration. Disadvantaging and denigrating the those who represent a more realist policy towards the PRC (Jake Sullivan and Kurt Campbell), while giving greater weight to those who advocate a return to business as usual with Beijing.
26. How Do the Chinese People View the “West”? Divergence and Asymmetry in China’s Public Opinion of the U.S. and Europe
Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, June 1, 2023
Surveys of over 2,000 people in China show clear differences in public opinion toward the U.S. and Europe. Negative views in China of the U.S. were twice as high (75%) as negative views of most European countries, while positive views in China of European countries ranged from 47% to almost 70%, compared to only 23% for the U.S.
A comparison with U.S. and European public opinion survey data shows that the U.S. largely reciprocated negative views of China (76%), while European views of China were much more negative than the other way around, ranging from 57% negative (Spain) to 80% negative (Sweden).
Analysis of the China survey data finds that young respondents were 7% more likely, and CCP members were 11% more likely, to hold negative views of the U.S., but these groups did not view Europe more negatively than average.
COMMENT – The team at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute continue to put out great research.
So what happens when the public in the PRC comes to realize that Europeans hold an increasingly negative view of China?
27. Solomon Islands PM returns from Beijing, calls Australia 'unneighbourly'
Reuters, July 17, 2023
Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manesseh Sogavare returned to Honiara on Monday after a week-long official visit to China, telling reporters Beijing would provide more budget support, and that criticism by Australia was "unneighbourly".
The United States, Australia, New Zealand and Solomon Islands' opposition party have called for Sogavare to publish details of a policing deal signed in Beijing last week, amid concern it will invite further regional contest.
28. Marcos hopes Xi's talks with ex-Philippine president included South China Sea
Reuters, July 18, 2023
Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr said on Tuesday he hoped his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed Beijing's actions in the South China Sea, including shadowing of Manila's vessels by Chinese coastguard ships.
Marcos said he was aware of Duterte's visit to China, adding that he welcomed any form of communication between the two countries.
"I hoped they discussed the issues we are seeing, shadowing, all these things now so we can achieve progress," Marcos told reporters.
COMMENT – This week, Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines’ former President, joined the ignominious ranks of former leaders like Germany’s Gerhard Schröder and Australia’s Paul Keating who sacrifice their country’s interests for their own.
29. Chemicals for Mexican fentanyl not from China, embassy in Mexico says
Kylie Madry, Reuters, July 19, 2023
Precursor chemicals used by Mexican cartels to make the deadly opioid fentanyl do not come from China, its embassy in Mexico said on Tuesday, rejecting U.S. officials' accusations.
The embassy said in a statement that China had measures in place to prevent the trafficking of substances used to make illegal drugs, and added the U.S. was "blindly shirking its responsibilities" by not taking domestic action.
"The root of the fentanyl crisis in the United States is within itself," the embassy said.
U.S. President Joe Biden's administration has been seeking cooperation with both Mexico and China in stemming the flow of fentanyl, which has fueled a health crisis and a sharp rise in overdose deaths, as well as its precursor chemicals.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration says the addictive painkiller and its precursors are transported from China to Mexico, the U.S. and Canada, often by international mail.
30. US hopes China won't take 'provocative' action over transit stops by Taiwan VP
Reuters, July 19, 2023
31. Germany will adopt China strategy to reduce reliance on Beijing
Hans von der Burchard, Politico, July 12, 2023
32. Countering China’s Information Manipulation in the Indo-Pacific and Kazakhstan
International Republican Institute, June 27, 2023
33. Canada Confronts Allegations of China-Led Electoral Interference
Paul Vieira, Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2023
A series of public revelations about alleged Chinese government meddling in Canadian politics has roiled the government of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, prompting calls from opposition politicians and China analysts for tighter monitoring of foreign-interference threats within Canada’s borders and a full probe of the alleged activities.
The latest concerns flared when Erin O’Toole, the former Conservative Party leader, said he was told recently by Canadian security officials that Beijing had tried to thwart his path to replace Trudeau as prime minister in the 2021 elections.
In a speech to Parliament in late May and in a subsequent interview with The Wall Street Journal, he said he was told that China’s Communist Party gave money to agents in Canada to campaign against him and the Conservative Party. He said he also was told that proxies used the Beijing-run instant-messaging service WeChat to spread disinformation about what the Conservatives were promising if elected, and, O’Toole added, officials indicated China attempted to dissuade people from voting at all in at least one electoral district.
“It was clear from my briefing that there was coordination by China to operate in Canada,” O’Toole said in the interview with the Journal. “I think we’re seeing the tip of the iceberg with some of these operations.”
He added that during the campaign, his team “saw glimpses of interference operations in anywhere between 10 and 15” electoral districts, mostly around Toronto and Vancouver, British Columbia.
A spokesman for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service confirmed that O’Toole was briefed on potential foreign-interference threats, but declined to provide details.
Unlike the U.S., Australia and the U.K., say O’Toole and former Canadian officials, Canada has failed to implement measures—such as a foreign-agent registry—to deter proxies acting on behalf of China’s ruling Communist Party. Canada promised late last year to get tougher with Beijing, calling China a “global, disruptive force” as part of a shift in Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
O’Toole’s comments followed Canada’s expulsion of a Toronto-based Chinese diplomat in May. The diplomat was ordered to leave after cabinet members learned he allegedly ordered authorities in Hong Kong to monitor and possibly intimidate the Hong Kong-based relatives of a Canadian lawmaker critical of Beijing’s treatment of the Uyghur Muslim minority, Canada’s Foreign Minister Mélanie Joly said.
In response, China ordered a Canadian diplomat in Shanghai to leave. At the time, Trudeau said Canada wouldn’t be intimidated, and the country would “do everything necessary to keep Canadians protected from foreign interference.”
A spokesman for China’s Embassy in Ottawa denied allegations of domestic interference, saying they “are unfounded. We never interfere in Canada’s internal affairs, including its election process, and have no interests whatsoever in doing so.”
Trudeau initially resisted calls for a formal probe into interference allegations, after reports earlier this year in Canadian media outlet the Globe and Mail detailed concerns from national-security officials in intelligence reports about what they concluded was China-led meddling in the 2021 election campaign.
In March, Trudeau appointed a special adviser to conduct a preliminary investigation. The adviser recommended against a formal inquiry, citing concerns about top-secret intelligence becoming public. The adviser added there was “no indication” of China trying to ensure a Liberal victory in the 2021 vote, and Trudeau said the election results represented the will of Canadians.
But after coming under pressure from other lawmakers, the Liberal government said it is now in negotiations with opposition parties about establishing a commission, led possibly by a judge, that could summon witnesses to testify on how Beijing might have exerted influence on Canada’s ethnic Chinese voters.
“I hope to announce the next stages soon,” Trudeau told reporters July 5 regarding a commission. He and other cabinet members also have promised a foreign-agent registry later this year.
“We need to know exactly what happened and have appropriate responses in place from the government,” said Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, a former senior Canadian official and now a senior fellow at the University of Ottawa’s graduate school of international affairs. “There seems to be evidence that, in specific electoral districts, the cause of democracy was subverted by Chinese interests.”
COMMENT – This issue isn’t going away in Canadian politics, Trudeau’s government would have been better off facing this issue head-on.
34. Canadian Politicians Who Criticize China Become Its Targets
Norimitsu Onishi, New York Times, July 15, 2023
As China increases its reach in diaspora communities, Chinese Canadian politicians in Vancouver are the focus of Chinese state interference in Canadian politics.
The polls predicted a re-election victory, maybe even a landslide.
But a couple of weeks before the vote, Kenny Chiu, a member of Canada’s Parliament and a critic of China’s human rights record, was panicking. Something had flipped among the ethnic Chinese voters in his British Columbia district.
“Initially, they were supportive,” he said. “And all of a sudden, they just vanished, vaporized, disappeared.”
Longtime supporters originally from mainland China were not returning his calls. Volunteers reported icy greetings at formerly friendly homes. Chinese-language news outlets stopped covering him. And he was facing an onslaught of attacks — from untraceable sources — on the local community’s most popular social networking app, the Chinese-owned WeChat.
The sudden collapse of Mr. Chiu’s campaign — in the last federal election, in 2021 — is now drawing renewed scrutiny amid mounting evidence of China’s interference in Canadian politics.
Mr. Chiu and several other elected officials critical of Beijing were targets of a Chinese state that has increasingly exerted its influence over Chinese diaspora communities worldwide as part of an aggressive campaign to expand its global reach, according to current and former elected officials, Canadian intelligence officials and experts on Chinese state disinformation campaigns.
Canada recently expelled a Chinese diplomat accused of conspiring to intimidate a lawmaker from the Toronto area, Michael Chong, after he successfully led efforts in Parliament to label China’s treatment of its Uyghur Muslim community a genocide. Canada’s intelligence agency has warned at least a half-dozen current and former elected officials that they have been targeted by Beijing, including Jenny Kwan, a lawmaker from Vancouver and a critic of Beijing’s policies in Hong Kong.
The Chinese government, employing a global playbook, disproportionately focused on Chinese Canadian elected officials representing districts in and around Vancouver and Toronto, experts say. It has leveraged large diaspora populations with family and business ties to China and ensuring that the levers of power in those communities are on its side, according to elected officials, Canadian intelligence officials and experts on Chinese disinformation.
“Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has doubled down on this assertive nationalist policy toward the diaspora,” said Feng Chongyi, a historian and an associate professor at the University of Technology Sydney. China’s role in Canada mirrored what has happened in Australia, he added.
Chinese state interference and its threat to Canada’s democracy have become national issues after an extraordinary series of leaks in recent months of intelligence reports to The Globe and Mail newspaper by a national security official who said that government officials were not taking the threat seriously enough.
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who has been criticized for not doing enough to combat reported interference by China, is under increasing pressure to call for a public inquiry.
Current and former elected officials interviewed by national security agents said some of the intelligence appeared to stem from wiretaps of Chinese diplomats based in Canada. The Globe has said that it has based its reporting on secret and top-secret intelligence reports it has viewed.
In Vancouver and two surrounding cities — Richmond and Burnaby — that are home to Canada’s largest concentration of ethnic Chinese, the reach of the Chinese Consulate and its allies has grown along with waves of immigrants from China, said longtime Chinese Canadian activists and politicians.
The Chinese Benevolent Association, or C.B.A. — one of Vancouver’s oldest and most influential civic organizations — was a longtime supporter of Taiwan until it turned pro-Beijing in the 1980s. But it has recently become a cheerleader of some of Beijing’s most controversial policies, placing ads in Chinese-language newspapers to support the 2020 imposition of a sweeping national security law that cracked down on basic freedoms in Hong Kong.
The association and the Chinese Consulate publicize close ties on their websites.
A former president of the C.B.A., Hilbert Yiu, denied that the organization had any official ties to Chinese authorities, but acknowledged that the association tended to support China’s policies, arguing that Beijing’s human rights record was “a lot better” than in the past.
Mr. Yiu, who remains on the C.B.A.’s board, said stories of Chinese state interference in Canadian politics were spread by losing candidates.
“I think it doesn’t exist,” Mr. Yiu said, adding instead that Western nations were afraid of “China being strong.”
Mr. Yiu, who as a host on a local Chinese-language radio station also pushes pro-Beijing views, was an overseas delegate in 2017 to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, an advisory body to the Chinese government that Beijing uses to win over and reward supporters who are not members of the Communist Party.
The leaders of the C.B.A. — whose opinions hold sway, especially among immigrants not fully comfortable in English — say their organization is politically neutral.
But in recent years, it and other ethnic Chinese organizations have excluded politicians critical of Beijing from events, including Ms. Kwan, the Vancouver lawmaker. A member of the left-leaning New Democratic Party, Ms. Kwan has represented, first as a provincial legislator and then at the federal level, a Vancouver district that includes Chinatown since 1996.
But after Ms. Kwan began speaking out in 2019 against Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong and its treatment of the Uyghurs, invitations dried up — including to events in her district, like a Lunar New Year celebration.
“Inviting the local member of Parliament is standard protocol,” Ms. Kwan said. “But in instances where I’ve not been invited to attend — whether or not that’s related to foreign interference are questions that I have.”
Fred Kwok, another former C.B.A. president, said Ms. Kwan was not invited to the Lunar New Year celebration because the coronavirus pandemic forced organizers to hold the event virtually and there was “limited time.”
Later that year, a couple of months before the federal election, Mr. Kwok held a luncheon for 100 people at a well-known seafood restaurant in Chinatown to support Ms. Kwan’s rival. Mr. Kwok said he was acting on his own behalf and not as the C.B.A.’s leader.
Richard Lee, a councilor in Burnaby and a former provincial legislator, faced far worse.
Mr. Lee, who was born in China and immigrated to Canada from Hong Kong in 1971, and was elected in 2001 to the provincial legislature, became known for supporting local businesses and never missing ribbon-cutting events. He also faithfully attended an annual commemoration of the massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
It was once a low-key event, but with Mr. Xi in power, many participants started wearing masks to hide their identities, fearing reprisals from Beijing.
Mr. Lee’s attendance became an issue at a barbecue party in the summer of 2015 when he said that the consul general at the time, Liu Fei, asked him, “Why do you keep attending those events?”
Later, in November, Mr. Lee and his wife, Anne, flew to Shanghai. At the airport, he said he was separated from his wife and detained for seven hours while the authorities searched his personal cellphone and a government-issued Blackberry.
He asked why and said he was told: “‘You know what you have done. We believe you could endanger our national security.’”
He and his wife were put on a plane back to Canada.
In Burnaby, the political climate shifted. He was no longer invited to some events because organizers told him that the consul general did not want to attend if Mr. Lee was also present. Longtime supporters started keeping their distance. Mr. Lee said he believed the icy treatment contributed to the loss of his seat in 2017, after 16 years in office.
A spokesman for the Chinese Embassy in Ottawa did not reply to questions about the consulate’s alleged actions in Vancouver, saying only that “China never interferes in other countries’ internal affairs” and that accusations of interference were an “out-and-out smear of China.”
But China’s former consul general in Vancouver, Tong Xiaoling, boasted in 2021, according to The Globe, about helping defeat two Conservative lawmakers, including one she described as a “vocal distractor” of the Chinese government: Kenny Chiu.
After arriving from Hong Kong in 1992, Mr. Chiu settled in Richmond, where more than half of the population of 208,000 is made up of ethnic Chinese. He was elected to Parliament in 2019 as a Conservative.
Mr. Chiu, 58, quickly touched on two issues that appeared to put him in the cross hairs of Beijing and its local supporters: criticizing Beijing’s crackdown in Hong Kong and proposing a bill to create a registry of foreign agents, inspired by one established by Australia in 2018.
The anonymous attacks against him on Chinese social media amplified criticism of the bill among some Canadians that it would unfairly single out Chinese Canadians.
A month before the federal election in September 2021, the polls instilled confidence in Mr. Chiu’s campaign staff.
But in the final 10 days, Mr. Chiu relayed growing concerns to his campaign manager, Jordon Wood: cooling response from ethnic Chinese voters and increasingly hostile and personal anonymous attacks. The attacks, which were going viral on WeChat, painted his bill as a racist assault on Chinese Canadians and Mr. Chiu as a traitor to his community.
Mr. Wood recalled a frantic late-night call from Mr. Chiu after a searing meeting with Chinese Canadian voters.
“‘Our community is more polite than this,’” Mr. Wood recalled Mr. Chiu telling him. “Even if you don’t like someone, you don’t go after them in this way. This was a level of rudeness and attack beyond what we would expect.”
The attacks on WeChat drew the attention of experts on disinformation campaigns by China and its proxies.
The attacks were driven by countless, untraceable human and artificial intelligence bots, said Benjamin Fung, a cybersecurity expert and a professor at McGill University in Montreal.
Their proliferation made them especially effective because ethnic Chinese voters depend on WeChat to communicate, said Mr. Fung, who assessed Mr. Chiu’s case shortly after the vote.
Less than a week before the vote, a Canadian internet watchdog, DisinfoWatch, noted the attacks against Mr. Chiu on WeChat.
“My assumption was that this was a coordinated campaign,” said Charles Burton, a former Canadian diplomat in Beijing and senior fellow at an Ottawa-based research group behind DisinfoWatch.
Mr. Chiu made last-ditch efforts to save his campaign, including meeting a group of older people who echoed the attacks against him and his bill on WeChat.
“Why would I subjugate my grandchildren to generations of persecution and discrimination?” Mr. Chiu recalled being asked.
The next day, he saw social media photographs of the same people publicly backing his main rival from the Liberal Party, Parm Bains, the eventual winner. Mr. Bains declined to comment.
Mr. Chiu asked allies to reach out to local leaders who had suddenly dropped him, including prominent members of a Richmond-based umbrella group, the Canadian Alliance of Chinese Associations. Its leader, Kady Xue, did not respond to messages seeking comment.
Chak Au, a veteran city councilor nicknamed the “Chinese Mayor of Richmond” and a longtime ally of Mr. Chiu, pressed ethnic Chinese leaders about the sudden erosion of support.
“There was a kind of silence,” Mr. Au said. “Nobody wanted to talk about it.”
He added, “They didn’t want to create trouble.”
35. U.S. Looks to Head Off Trouble Over Visit by Taiwan Vice President
Joyu Wang and Charles Hutzler, Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2023
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
36. Jewish Conspiracy Theories Find an Audience in China
Jordyn Haime and Tuvia Gering, China Media Project, July 18, 2023
Anti-Jewish content and conspiracies take up significant real estate among the top results on Chinese media platforms including Douyin, WeChat and Bilibili. Though borrowed from the West, they have taken on a localized identity.
Recent news of China’s renewed access to the Russian port of Vladivostok this May sparked celebration among some Chinese netizens. But among others, it was a painful reminder of its “century of humiliation,” beginning in the mid-nineteenth century. At the time, the Qing dynasty’s ruling Manchu royals had reluctantly handed over their homeland, which included the port, to their northern neighbors. More territory was ceded to the Japanese invaders in 1931, resulting in the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo.
The Vladivostok decision sparked a debate in corners of Chinese social media about whether a debilitated and increasingly reliant Russia would be made to return the stolen land. Surprisingly, a third perpetrator has emerged alongside the Russian and Japanese empires: the Jews.
In the early 20th century, “before moving into Palestine, Jewish capital chose to settle in the Northeast [of China]”, explained a May 19 article by popular WeChat account “Blood Drink” (血饮). It added that the Jews “were even willing to make a Devil’s bargain with the Japanese fascists and give almost all of their money away for this purpose.”
Over one-hundred thousand people have now read the post, many of whom learned for the first time how “during the ensuing eight-year war, Japan’s military industry, which was financed by Jewish capital, massacred tens of millions of Chinese civilians.”
As with most conspiracies, the Jewish-Japanese blood libel contains a kernel of truth. It is based on a little-known episode in World War II known as the “the Fugu Plan” (河豚计划).
In 1939, Japanese “Jewish experts” had proposed to invite 50,000 German-Jewish refugees to Manchukuo with the hope that Jewish capital would help revitalize the territory. Drawing on their expertise of the fabricated antisemitic text The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, they hoped that a “deal” with the Jews would inspire them to help improve Japan’s position in the war due to their supposed power over the West. It was named after the “fugu,” the Japanese blowfish that — like the Jews — was a delicacy when handled correctly, but deadly if not. Although Jews indeed found refuge in Japanese-controlled areas during World War II, they were never seriously involved in the Fugu Plan, and the plan never came to fruition, writes Meron Medzini, a professor of modern Japanese history at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
The Fugu Plan, though, takes on a different meaning inside China: It demonstrates a foreign assault on the homeland, with “Jewish capitalists” portrayed as the puppeteers behind Western governments seeking to “contain” China’s rise.
At the time of writing, the Fugu Plan is featured in the top search result for the word “Jew” (犹太人) on Douyin, ByteDance’s Chinese equivalent of TikTok. The video is the first in a three-part series about the historical “mistakes” of the Jews.
In less than eight minutes, the video’s narrator blames the Holocaust on Jewish greed, accuses Jews of starting China’s “century of humiliation” by financing the Opium Wars, and describes their cunning Fugu Plan with the Japanese.
Other videos about the Fugu Plan have received as many as 200,000 likes and 30,000 shares. Millions of others have followed the story on social media, where it can also be found with a simple search on Bilibili, WeChat and Weibo, among other platforms.
The narrative has become so popular that an acclaimed Chinese author Yang Shu (杨树) received state funding to pen a spy novel based on the story, which has been short-listed for television or film adaptation by the state-led Chinese Writers Association.
The conspiratorial spin on the Fugu Plan only scratches the surface. A distinct brand of localized antisemitic conspiracies is thriving on Chinese media platforms. A quick search for “Jews” on WeChat, Douyin, BiliBili, Weibo, or Zhihu, reveals that negative, anti-Jewish content and conspiracies take up significant real estate among the top results.
The economics of antisemitism
Antisemitism is not just a social media phenomenon. Despite Beijing’s tight control of the information space, it can also be found among leading academics, party-state journalists, and military strategists. Whereas benign pro-LGBTQ posts and dissenting political voices are often censored, Jewish hatred is openly propagated.
…
Chinese antisemitism should first be viewed as one manifestation of a broader problem of racist nationalism in Chinese discourse. Earlier this month, many observers were shocked and appalled to see how China’s top diplomat Wang Yi hinted at an East Asian race-based bonhomie against “sharp-nosed” and “yellow-haired” Europeans and Americans, advocating for an East Asian alliance that “can eliminate external interference and achieve sustainable development.”
The irony is that despite exhibiting some of the most well-documented instances of systemic violence, dehumanization, and discrimination against ethnic minorities, China is rarely called out for racism.
In his seminal book on the subject, historian Frank Dikötter shows how racialized discourse has been a part-and-parcel of Chinese nationalism since its inception in the late nineteenth century. Sun Yat-sen, dubbed “the Father of the Nation,” shared many Chinese revolutionaries’ fear and hatred of the ruling Qing’s “Manchu race.” This led him to incorporate racist nationalism into the bedrock of his political thought. “Sun claimed that only nationalism could forestall racial destruction,” writes Dikötter. Conspiracy theories about the Manchus persist in China to this day.
Sun and his contemporaries among China’s intellectual elites have attempted to construct a sense of national identity by appropriating Western antisemitic representations of Jews. By defining the “Jewish race” as a homogeneous group, argues Zhou Xun (周逊) with the University of Essex, they hoped to create a similar sense of unity among the Han-Chinese race. This process of othering the Jews has allowed the Chinese to project their own anxieties and desires onto a group that is both foreign and familiar.
Chinese nationalism under Mao Zedong viewed racial issues through the prism of class struggle, though there were times when the differences were merely semantic. When socialist Israel aligned itself with the “capitalist” Western Bloc, China gravitated towards the anti-Zionist Muslim world, viewing the Jewish state as “the enemy.” With little to no personal contact with Jews, many Chinese scholars and statesmen came to rely on the deeply antisemitic Soviet and Pan-Arabist anti-Zionism that masqueraded as legitimate criticism of Israel.
The enduring legacy of ultra-leftist “enemy studies” abounds in the works of Beihang University military strategist Zhang Wenmu (张文木). In a series of articles for a peer-reviewed socialist journal under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Zhang describes Covid-19 as a usurious American-Jewish bioweapon aimed at China and humanity as a whole. In keeping with the teachings of Mao and Karl Marx, Zhang says that “what Jews require most is an environment conducive to borrowing, which includes things like financial crises, pandemics, disasters, and, preferably, war.”
COMMENT – Every day, the Chinese Communist Party’s brand of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” seems to resemble more closely another form of ultra-nationalistic socialism: “National Socialism.”
The need for “enemies,” the obsession with racial stereotypes, the belief that the world is controlled by a shadowy cabal, and the fixation on increasingly militarized nationalism are dangerous ingredients.
There is a deep misunderstanding among some that Washington’s shift from engagement to cold war ‘forced’ PRC leaders to adopt a race-based, ultra-nationalism. The truth is the reverse happened.
37. ‘I wanted vengeance’: Tibet’s last resistance fighter
Violet Law, Aljazeera, July 10, 2023
38. Pope Francis Accepts Bishop Unilaterally Installed by China
Francis X. Rocca, Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2023
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
39. China’s Economy Might Look Good on Paper, but It Feels Like a Recession
Stella Yifan Xie, Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2023
40. China’s Economy Barely Grows as Recovery Fades
Jason Douglas, Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2023
41. China no longer top exporter to U.S. as trade rift widens
Rintaro Tobita, Iori Kawate, and Takafumi Hotta, Nikkei Asia, July 14, 2023
China likely lost the title of the top exporter of goods to the U.S. in the first half for the first time in 15 years, outpaced by Mexico and Canada amid decoupling between the world's two biggest economies.
American imports from China between January and May fell about 25% on the year to $169 billion, U.S. Commerce Department data shows. They accounted for 13.4% of the U.S. total -- a 19-year low and down 3.3 percentage points from a year earlier. Imports fell across a range of product categories, particularly semiconductors, which plunged by half.
42. China controls the supply of crucial war minerals
The Economist, July 13, 2023
43. Can Norwegian Phosphate Help Save the World from China’s Blackmail?
Elisabeth Braw, Foreign Policy, July 17, 2023
44. Wall Street Cuts China Growth Forecasts as Economy Disappoints
Bloomberg, July 17, 2023
45. Is China’s Greater Bay Area ‘the future of Asia’? Top Saudi diplomat says investors can bet on it
Kandy Wong and He Huifeng, South China Morning Post, July 18, 2023
46. China's existing-home prices back in free fall as sellers rush in
Iori Kawate, Nikkei Asia, July 18, 2023
47. China's exports fall most in three years as global economy falters
Joe Cash and Ellen Zhang, Reuters, July 13, 2023
48. Assessing the Strengths and Limitations of China’s Technology Transfer Policies
Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, July 1, 2023
China’s imposition of policies that condition foreign access to China’s market on technology transfer to domestic firms rose six-fold between 2002 and 2012, with 85% of the increase occurring in strategic industries.
Tech transfer policies were far more likely to be imposed in industries heavily reliant on China’s market to sell finished goods (like automobiles) versus industries reliant on processing foreign inputs for re-export abroad (like semiconductors).
The author suggests that tech transfer policies result from the bargaining power dynamics between China's government and multinational enterprises (MNEs). Strong enforcement capacity and market access control in China increase the government's bargaining power, while employing a large workforce in China and controlling access to overseas markets strengthen MNEs' bargaining power.
COMMENT – The SCCEI team does a great job explaining the PRC’s “Tech extractor” policies and their enormous influence on “strategic industries” after the implementation in 2006 of the ‘Medium- and Long-Term Program for National Science and Technology Development’ or MLP. This closely matches the “technology transfer” policies that the United States identified in its Section 301 investigation in 2017-2018 which brought about the imposition of tariffs focused on these “strategic industries.”
As a foreign company, if you find yourself in what the PRC considers a “strategic industry” and you are producing in China for the China market, expect the PRC Government to employ “tech extractors” and their significant enforcement capacity to undermine your position.
49. Scaling the Commanding Heights: The Logic of Technology Transfer Policy in Rising China
John Minnich, MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, July 6, 2023
This paper examines China’s efforts to accelerate its economic rise using technology extractors, defined as policies that condition foreign market access on technology transfers to domestic firms. I argue weak enforcement capacity and China’s position in global value chains (GVCs) constrain its bargaining power over foreign investors, limiting the use of technology extractors even in highly strategic sectors such as semiconductors.
Case studies and analysis of a new industry-level dataset from 1995-2015 suggest strategic industries account for most of the sixfold increase in tech extractors’ use after 2002. However, in strategic industries in which China is intermediate to GVCs, its reliance on foreign firms to drive exports and associated employment prevent it from imposing these policies. My findings illuminate how GVCs reshape the politics of bargaining over technology transfer between states and foreign investors, and how position in production networks influences the strategic choices behind China’s economic rise.
50. Looming U.S. Investment Restrictions on China Threaten Diplomatic Outreach
Alan Rappeport and Ana Swanson, New York Times, July 13, 2023
51. As Chinese cars speed into global markets, tensions will only escalate
Chris Miller, Financial Times, July 13, 2023
52. EU asks metals producers to explore making chip inputs after China export curbs
Harry Dempsey in London and Alice Hancock, Financial Times, July 14, 2023
53. Can EVs and Solar Panels Save China’s Economy?
Nathaniel Taplin, Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2023
54. One Reason China Is Willing to Engage Again: Its Troubled Economy
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, July 17, 2023
55. Chinese developer Evergrande reveals $81bn loss from property crisis
Thomas Hale, Financial Times, July 18, 2023
Cyber & Information Technology
56. Alibaba-Backed Trendyol Hit by Turkey E-Commerce Ruling
Taylan Bilgic, Bloomberg, July 14, 2023
57. ASML Faces Tighter Dutch Restrictions on Servicing Chip Equipment in China
Cagan Koc, Jillian Deutsch, and Alberto Nardelli, Bloomberg, July 14, 2023
58. China built more 5G base stations in 3 months than US did in 2 years
Stephen Chen, South China Morning Post, July 20, 2023
59. PC maker HP stresses commitment to China as it seeks to diversify manufacturing to Thailand, Mexico
Lilian Zhang, South China Morning Post, July 19, 2023
60. China AI Chip Firm Targeting Nvidia Seeks Hong Kong IPO in 2023
Dong Cao, Bloomberg, July 18, 2023
61. China SMIC chairman resigns, replaced by chemical industry veteran
Reuters, July 18, 2023
62. ASML’s Orders Rise as China Demand Bucks Semiconductor Slump
Cagan Koc, Bloomberg, July 19, 2023
63. Top Chinese chipmaker SMIC installs new chairman
Shunsuke Tabeta, Nikkei Asia, July 19, 2023
64. China’s Top Chipmaker Loses Chairman in Latest Executive Exit
Bloomberg, July 17, 2023
65. Musk Believes China Is on ‘Team Humanity’ When It Comes to AI
Anna Edgerton, Bloomberg, July 12, 2023
66. Chip companies, top US officials discuss China policy
David Shepardson and Stephen Nellis, Reuters, July 17, 2023
67. US chip CEOs plan Washington trip to talk China policy
Stephen Nellis, Andrea Shalal, and Karen Freifeld, Reuters, July 15, 2023
68. Tech war: Intel and Nvidia continue to push purpose-built chips for training AI systems in China amid US export restrictions
South China Morning Post, Yahoo! Finance, July 12, 2023
69. Microsoft takes pains to obscure role in 0-days that caused email breach
Dan Goodin, Ars Technica, July 15, 2023
Military and Security Threats
70. Japanese, Chinese defense officers revive exchanges after 4 years
Yukio Tajima, Nikkei Asia, July 18, 2023
71. China’s Border Talks with Bhutan Are Aimed at India
Marcus Andreopoulos, Foreign Policy, July 18, 2023
As tensions between China and India have grown in the last few years, the countries wedged between them are becoming more strategically significant. The two competing powers have sought a buffer between them ever since their founding—1949 in the case of the People’s Republic of China, and 1947 for India. Many scholars argue that it is this desire for a safety cushion that led to China’s 1950 invasion of Tibet. Today, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) efforts to manipulate democracy in Nepal have succeeded in shaping a government in Kathmandu that is more receptive to Beijing than to New Delhi. The CCP has also extended its reach to monitor and suppress the Tibetan community there.
In recent months, China has also turned its attention eastward to its long-standing border dispute with the Kingdom of Bhutan. After years of so-called salami slicing along their shared border, as documented in Foreign Policy, China is attempting to engage in negotiations with Bhutan to formalize its ill-gotten gains—a strategy reminiscent of China’s playbook along its border with India and in the South China Sea. What is different is the strategic importance of Bhutan’s disputed regions to the China-India relationship.
Chinese control of the disputed Doklam plateau would allow Beijing unhindered mobilization and more access routes in the event of military conflict with New Delhi. As a result, any China-Bhutan talks are not just a bilateral issue, but rather part of a Chinese strategy to gain a crucial advantage over India. A resolution between the CCP and the government of Bhutan would reverberate throughout India, threatening peace in the region and escalating the crisis along the Sino-Indian border. The issue requires close attention from New Delhi as well as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—the Indo-Pacific partnership that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.
72. US expected to get around China’s export controls on gallium, an essential component for American military radar tech
Seong Hyeon Choi, South China Morning Post, July 17, 2023
73. Taiwan says looking to buy NASAMS air defence system from US
Reuters, July 18, 2023
74. China prepares for naval drills with Russia in sign of continuing support amid Ukraine conflict
Associated Press, July 19, 2023
75. Russia to take part in China's military drills in Sea of Japan
NHK, July 16, 2023
76. China and Russia step up military co-operation on Japan’s doorstep
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, July 18, 2023
77. Air Force general who predicted war with China leads 'unprecedented' training exercise
Courtney Kube, NBC, July 13, 2023
78. The emergence of “collective strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan
Rupert Schulenburg, Lowy Institute, July 17, 2023
79. White House Fights to Strip Tough-On-China Provisions from Annual Defense Spending Bill
Adam Kredo, Washington Free Beacon, July 11, 2023
80. China Poses ‘Alarming’ Threat to US Power Grid, Lawmakers Told
Ari Natter, Bloomberg, July 18, 2023
81. Alarming Navy Intel Slide Warns of China’s 200 Times Greater Shipbuilding Capacity
Joseph Trevithick, The Drive, July 11, 2023
82. Mineral Monopoly: China’s Control over Gallium Is a National Security Threat
Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, CSIS, July 18, 2023
83. Technology remains core battle with Beijing
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, July 19, 2023
84. Why Wagner revolt is such a nightmare to Xi Jinping
Hiroyuki Akita, Nikkei Asia, July 16, 2023
One Belt, One Road Strategy
85. A $6 Billion China-Built Railway Is on the Move with a Vast New Network Down the Track
Feliz Solomon, Wall Street Journal, July 19, 2023
86. Why China tripled its heavy truck shipments to Central Asia: Unravelling the influence of Russia’s war in Ukraine
Joseph Webster, Lowy Institute, July 19, 2023
87. Italy’s decision on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and beyond
Jianli Yang and André Gattolin, Politico, July 18, 2023
David Bandurski, China Media Project, July 11, 2023
As China pursues water diplomacy with countries along the Lower Mekong, seeking to strike a benevolent tone and downplay environmental and livelihood impacts that have devastated local communities, it has another big tool in its toolbox — media diplomacy.
Opinion Pieces
89. Is China really leading the clean energy revolution? Not exactly
Li Shuo, The Guardian, July 6, 2023
90. John Kerry Tilts at Chinese Coal Plants
The Editorial Board, Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2023
91. The U.S. Can Help Ukraine and Deter China
Michael Allen and Connor Pfeiffer, Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2023
92. Chinese Embassy Responds to Taiwan’s Lai
Liu Pengyu, Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2023
93. Ties to China Weren’t a Problem for Cirrus Aircraft. Now They Are.
Brooke Sutherland, Bloomberg, July 19, 2023
94. How America Can Escape China’s Rare Earth Pincer
J. Peter Pham, The National Interest, July 16, 2023
95. China’s Economy Hits the Skids
Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, July 17,2023
96. A Look Back at Our Future War with China
Carlos Lozada, New York Times, July 18, 2023
97. One-way easing of U.S.-China tensions does not help much
Brian P. Klein, Nikkei Asia, July 17, 2023
98. China can't just keep building the world's biggest dam in secret
Brahma Chellaney, Nikkei Asia, July 14, 2023