Matt Turpin's China Articles - June 18, 2023
Friends,
Secretary of State Blinken is in Beijing and it remains to be seen what, if any, benefit will result from the Administration’s efforts to reschedule this visit.
In other news, the PRC economy seems to be moving from bad to worse as foreign investors, companies, and its own citizens look for the exits. The only thing that seems to be preventing a stampede out of the PRC are the capital controls that Beijing invoked back in late 2015 which haven’t loosened (this is what likely explains the limited investment we are seeing by foreign firms… since they cannot repatriate revenue in the PRC, they have no choice but to “reinvest”).
I’m sure all of this only adds to Xi’s sense of being besieged, which then leads him to prioritize security over economic prosperity, and results in even more pull-back from the rest of the world and Chinese citizens. My friend Jude Blanchette and his colleagues at CSIS discussed this dynamic in light of the recent convening of the PRC’s National Security Commission in Jude’s podcast, Pekingology… you should listen.
I agree Jude and his colleagues, Xi could turn this ship around by pursuing just three measures:
Shed the Hukou system, a form of serfdom that the Party uses to control labor and which locks the PRC’s rural poor into gross inequality;
Institute a property tax, so that municipalities can tie government services to the well-being of their citizens, rather than through the confiscation and sale of real estate;
Make nice with the United States, Xi’s turn to hyper-nationalism is a choice that only he can undo.
My prediction: Xi and his cadres aren’t going to do any of these things because they fear instability and the relative loss of their own power more than they desire to solve the problems of their citizens.
Given these conditions, the United States, Europe, Japan, and India should be pressuring Xi even more, rather than looking for a way to bail him out.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. America’s Goal Should Be a Democratic China
Liza Tobin and Michael Auslin, Foreign Policy, June 5, 2023
The lack of a long-term vision keeps Washington’s China policies confused.
Ever since then-U.S. President Richard Nixon went to China in 1972, U.S. policymakers have sought above all to talk with their counterparts in Beijing, believing dialogue would lead to substantive cooperation on issues ranging from nuclear weapons to trade to climate policy. Yet today, as Chinese leaders stonewall their U.S. counterparts and the two countries’ militaries dance around each other in Asia, it might seem quixotic to ask: What future relationship does the United States even want with China?
This question will become even more important as the United States heads into its 2024 presidential election. As the Biden administration’s National Security Strategy has made clear, the 2020s are the decisive decade for setting the terms of U.S.-Chinese geopolitical competition.
A China strategy that combines a long-term vision with candor about the current rivalry can put the United States and its allies on a firmer footing. Ultimately, Washington’s desired end state is a constructive relationship with a democratic China, however long that may take. Until then, U.S. strategy should be two-pronged: It should protect U.S. interests from the harmful activities of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while maintaining ties to the Chinese people wherever possible. These efforts to maintain ties to the Chinese people are an investment in the possibility that political conditions in China could someday shift, opening a window to the desired U.S. end state of a post-CCP China. Balancing these two objectives will not be easy, requiring careful calibration and a tolerance for risk.
More than five years into Washington’s shift from engagement to strategic competition with China, it is now widely acknowledged that engagement failed to create an enduring, stable, cooperative bilateral relationship. Pursued with the best intentions during and after the Cold War, engagement was the United States’ bet that bringing China into the global community—by giving Beijing a seat at the United Nations in 1971, normalizing relations in 1979, and ultimately agreeing to admit China into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001—would turn it into a more responsible supporter of the international order. What’s more, engagement would “induce change” within China, as president-to-be Nixon wrote in a seminal 1967 essay.
We are now confronted with the flaws in this strategy. Most notably, it failed to account for the Leninist nature of the CCP, which seeks not to conform to the existing liberal international system but to transform that system and make it compatible with the CCP’s interests. In other words, Washington mirror-imaged its own desires for maintaining post-World War II political, economic, and security arrangements onto the CCP, which had a different vision for the global order all along. More frustrating for Washington, perhaps, is how little influence it ever had over Beijing. China’s entry into the WTO was seen as an especially critical milestone on the road to a more open and responsible China. Yet if U.S. policymakers overestimated their ability to induce fundamental economic and political change in 2001, when the U.S. economy was about eight times the size of China’s, how can they have any such hopes now, when China is almost an economic peer in terms of nominal GDP?
COMMENT – Great piece by my friends Liza Tobin and Misha Auslin… completely agree that our long-term goal must be to build a constructive relationship with a democratic China, no matter how long that may take. And in the meantime, the U.S. must wage focus on building an international system that can withstand the threat posed by a Communist China.
2. Spilling the Tea on the SLD
Josh Cartin, The Wire China, June 11, 2023
A tongue and cheek piece by Josh Cartin on the way that commentators obsess over the drama of US-PRC meetings, while missing the broader geopolitical shifts taking place.
3. Chinese police kidnaps writer in Mongolia
Safeguard Defenders, June 12, 2023
A new report from the human rights group, Safeguard Defenders, about how the PRC police entered Mongolia and kidnapped an 80-year-old activist and historian who published works detailing PRC abuse of Mongols. This is likely the fifth known transnational kidnapping by Beijing from Mongolia in the last several years.
4. Why Are More and More Chinese Migrants Risking Their Lives to Cross the US Southern Border?
Ting Zhang, The Diplomat, June 09, 2023
Tens of thousands of Chinese citizens are fleeing the PRC and making the dangerous journey to cross the U.S. southern border. Economic uncertainties and limited personal freedoms in the PRC, combined with declining social and religious freedoms, contribute to this exodus.
COMMENT - When combined with article #6 below, this is a pretty damning indictment of the Chinese Communist Party. Despite years of deeply Anti-American propaganda vilifying “Western ideology,” the Chinese people seem to be voting with their feet.
5. Zombie Engagement with Beijing
Representative Mike Gallagher, Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2023
The Biden administration seems determined to revive an approach to China that has failed for 30 years.
President Biden foresees a “thaw” in relations with Beijing. The State Department wants to “move beyond” what Mr. Biden now calls the “silly balloon” and get “back to Bali,” where in late 2022 the president apparently enjoyed a brief honeymoon with General Secretary Xi Jinping. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen suggests that we needn’t fret about our economic dependence on China, as the costs of decoupling would prove “disastrous.”
If this script sounds familiar, it’s because we’ve seen this movie before. For more than 30 years, Washington has pursued economic engagement with communist China on the theory that economic growth would lead to political liberalization. We now know that prosperity has served only to embolden Mr. Xi’s worst authoritarian instincts.
The scene isn’t confined to economics. Nearly a decade ago, President Obama engaged with Mr. Xi in the hope that he wouldn’t militarize newly constructed islands in the South China Sea. The president in 2015 also announced a cyber agreement with Beijing, believing that it might slow the party’s cyberwar against American companies. Each gambit failed.
By the time the party’s Covid coverup came to light in 2020, it appeared as if the era of wishful thinking had ended. Yet like a zombie in a horror movie, the strategy of unfettered engagement has come back from the dead.
Authoritarianism
6. China millionaire exodus to continue this year: report
Pak Yiu, Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2023
An exodus of Chinese millionaires is expected to continue this year, according to a new report by investment migration consultancy Henley & Partners, as the economy slows and the government tightens political controls.
China is expected to see a net outflow of 13,500 high net worth individuals this year, extending the loss of millionaires in the past decade, according to the Henley Private Wealth Migration Report.
COMMENT – I wonder if any other country, aside from Russia, experiences this level of flight by its own successful citizens… it certainly suggests that there is little confidence in the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to maintain the kind of living standards and freedoms that these citizens had come to expect.
7. Germany accuses China of ‘aggressively’ claiming supremacy in Asia
Hans von der Burchard, Politico, June 14, 2023
Germany on Wednesday blasted China for acting against Europe's interests, "aggressively claiming regional supremacy" in Asia and putting international security at risk.
The criticism, which is part of a 76-page national security strategy Chancellor Olaf Scholz's government has adopted, comes ahead of German-Chinese government consultations in Berlin next Tuesday, set to be led by Scholz and Chinese Premier Li Qiang.
POLITICO reported Tuesday that the German government is keen to downsize the number of ministers participating in the summit to avoid giving allies the impression it's too welcoming to China.
8. China records fewest marriages in more than three decades as population crisis looms
Simone McCarthy, CNN, June 12, 2023
News18, June 13, 2023
Lionel Messi faced a small issue at Beijing Airport when he was stopped at border control for trying to use his Spanish passport instead of his Argentine one.
The 35-year-old Argentine international arrived in China via a private jet over the weekend, accompanied by his “bodyguard" and a group of friends, to join his international teammates in preparation for a friendly match against Australia on Thursday.
However, upon his arrival in Beijing, a video circulating on social media showed Messi surrounded by several police officers. He was seen clutching his passport while discussing the matter with them.
Local Chinese media reported that the problem arose from Messi’s use of the incorrect passport. According to UK-based Mirror, Messi believed his Spanish passport would allow him to travel to Taiwan, assuming it would also be valid for China.
He was quoted as saying, “Is Taiwan not China?"
COMMENT – That’s kind of embarrassing for the Party.
10. His Authorship, Xi Jinping
David Bandurski, China Media Project, June 13, 2023
11. Xi Prepares China for ‘Extreme’ Scenarios, Including Conflict with the West
Lingling Wei, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023
12. Chinese Parts Help Iran Supply Drones to Russia Quickly, Investigators Say
Dion Nissenbaum, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023
13. Saudi Arabia and China Flaunt Growing Ties at Investment Forum
Vivian Nereim, New York Times, June 12, 2023
14. Saudi Arabia, China ignore Western ire to pledge closer ties
Kinling Lo, South China Morning Post, June 12, 2023
15. EU cuts Chinese firms from sanctions list over flow of military goods to Russia
Finbarr Bermingham, South China Morning Post, June 15, 2023
16. Germany mulls downsizing China summit, aims to publish strategy in July
Hans von der Burchard, Politico, June 13, 2023
17. Deputy Assistant to the President and Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel J. Kritenbrink On the Secretary’s Upcoming Travel to the People’s Republic of China and the United Kingdom
Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Department of State, June 14, 2023
18. Blinken to visit China this week
Matt Berg, Politico, June 14, 2023
19. What really went on inside the Wuhan lab weeks before Covid erupted
Jonathan Calvert and George Arbuthnott, Sunday Times, March 01, 2023
20. China-led AIIB's communications chief quits, criticises bank's management
Laurie Chen, Reuters, June 14, 2023
21. Ottawa halts participation in China-led development bank
Steven Chase and James Griffiths, The Globe and the Mail, June 14, 2023
22. WAY BACK MACHINE – Canada to Join China-Led Bank, Signaling Readiness to Bolster Ties
Jane Perlez, New York Times, August 31, 2016
23. WAY BACK MACHINE – Despite promises, Canadian companies yet to benefit from $256M Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank membership
Marie-Danielle Smith, National Post, November 22, 2018
Environmental Harms
24. Could Beijing hold Washington responsible for South China Sea’s radioactivity?
Stephen Chen, South China Morning Post, June 13, 2023
25. US-led minerals partnership shortlists projects for green energy shift
Attracta Mooney, Financial Times, May 14, 2023
Foreign Interference and Coercion
26. China’s influence in South-East Asia has grown. America’s has waned
The Economist, June 12, 2023
27. China’s pressure on ‘weakest link’ South Korea falls flat amid tensions with US
Christian Davies and Joe Leahy, Financial Times, June 13, 2023
28. Trudeau Mishandled Alleged Chinese Election Meddling, Poll Finds
Brian Platt, Bloomberg, June 13, 2023
29. China and the Judicial Reform in Israel
Adi Ben Eli and Ori Sela, Institute for National Security Studies, June 12, 2023
30. U.S. Plans to Rejoin Unesco to Counter China’s Growing Sway
Noemie Bisserbe and Stacy Meichtry, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023
31. Chinese Businesses Look to New Frontiers in Middle East
Stephen Kalin, Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2023
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
32. 5 Hong Kong human rights activists call for Gay Games to be canceled
OutSports, June 7, 2023
Human-rights concerns are too great to host the Gay Games in Hong Kong, they say. Guadalajara should be the sole host.
We are five LGBTQ Hong Kong human rights activists who have been following the developments of the Gay Games Hong Kong (GGHK), set to be held in November, with growing concern and dismay.
We believe that the GGHK leadership team has betrayed the values and principles of the Gay Games, which purport to celebrate inclusion and promote human rights. Instead, they have aligned themselves with pro-authoritarian figures responsible for widespread persecution against the people of Hong Kong. As a result, they are providing dangerously misleading information to potential participants about their safety if they attend the Games.
In 2017, when the Federation of Gay Games chose Hong Kong to host the Gay Games, we were thrilled at the prospect of the first Asia games and what it could do to advance LGBTQ equality in the region. For 40 years, the Gay Games have fostered an inclusive sporting community for many who felt excluded from other sports leagues and promoted acceptance for LGBTQ people across the world.
For those of us who love Hong Kong and have been frustrated at its slow progress on LGBTQ rights, the Games presented an opportunity to jump start the conversation on LGBTQ rights in the city while also showing off our beloved home to the global LGBTQ community.
But in 2019, pro-democracy protests enveloped the city, and the government response was brutal. Since then, the Hong Kong government has arrested and imprisoned thousands for political crimes, virtually eliminated free speech and expression, and compelled hundreds of thousands of Hongkongers to flee into exile.
The GGHK leadership team—most of whom came on board after the crackdown began—has not only ignored these developments, but openly embraced the illegitimate regime tasked with crushing Hong Kong.
Last November, the GGHK team hosted a gala honoring Regina Ip, a senior Hong Kong official who is currently the convenor of the regime’s Executive Council. In 2003, when Ip was Hong Kong’s Security Secretary, she introduced the first iteration of what would become Hong Kong’s repressive national security law. Amidst the recent crackdown, a version of this law finally passed in 2020 and has been used to silence nearly all dissent and imprison pro-democracy leaders.
In recent years, Ip has expressed support for Uyghur concentration camps, the imprisonment of hundreds of democratic lawmakers and activists, and the crushing of the 2019 Hong Kong protest movement.
GGHK’s disturbing turn towards authoritarianism isn’t limited to its outside affiliations, however. GGHK’s Director of Marketing and Public Relations, David Ko, is an outspoken anti-democracy advocate, concentration camp denialist, and an avid supporter of the government’s crackdown on Hongkongers. He has said that he prefers dictatorships like the PRC because he believes they appoint officials based on “merit,” while democracies do not. As for the Uyghur concentration camps, Ko goes even further than Ip, calling them a “debunked myth.”
The Games’ co-chairs, Lisa Lam and Alan Lang, shown little concern with these developments, and appear to have embraced these pro-authoritarian figures. Lang has appeared in smiling pictures with Ip and another pro-authoritarian politician, Allan Zeman.
Lam, for her part, has given media interviews minimizing the danger to athletes and spectators of visiting a city where clapping in court or publishing a children’s book about wolves and sheep can get you jailed for sedition. In one such interview with a local radio station, Lam rejected concerns that the city’s crackdown on dissent could endanger Gay Games participants, saying that participants will be fine so long as they “abide by local laws and respect local culture.”
This is, of course, false. The National Security Law is incredibly vague, with the red lines shifting from day to day. No one, including officials themselves, know what is or is not illegal. This is by design, as it allows Beijing to order the arrest and indefinite detention of virtually anyone if it is politically advantageous to do so.
With respect to the Games, which undoubtedly will be seen as a political event by authorities, the National Security Law’s vagueness means that Beijing could decide to either ignore the event entirely, or order arrests of participants for sedition or subversion—and there is simply no way to know which direction it will choose until the event itself.
Current enrollment in GGHK is historically low, with only 433 paid registrants as of May 11. This could indicate that many athletes recognize the dangers of attending the Games in Hong Kong and associating with an organization that seems comfortable legitimizing authoritarianism. However, even a relatively small Gay Games in Hong Kong would legitimize the city’s authoritarian government, undermine the values of human rights and inclusiveness that the Games purport to stand for, and put hundreds of athletes at unnecessary risk of arrest.
What’s more, the National Security Law’s coverage isn’t limited to things participants do while physically in Hong Kong. It applies extraterritorially, meaning that anyone, anywhere in the world, who has expressed a critical view about the Beijing or Hong Kong government at any point since 2020 risks arrest if they set foot in Hong Kong. This means that many LGBTQ athletes, including an untold number of LGBTQ Chinese, Taiwanese, and Hong Kong dissidents, could not even consider attending the Games.
Indeed, with this danger in mind, the Taiwan Gay Games affiliate has pulled out of the Games entirely due to fears for athletes’ safety.
The Federation of Gay Games has a duty to ensure the Games hold fast to its principles and values, and to ensure the safety of athletes. At this point, it appears to have wholly failed on both fronts.
It is not too late to change course, however. With the Games already hosting an alternative event in Guadalajara this year and enrollment in the Hong Kong Games still relatively low, it would cause minimal disruption to simply cancel the Hong Kong games and host all events in Mexico. Unless the Games’ new motto is “rights for me, but not for thee,” we strongly urge them to do so.
If the Federation of Gay Games fails to do the right thing, Western governments and gay sports organizations should follow Taiwan’s lead and formally caution their citizens against attending for safety reasons. In the U.S., where the Federation is based and where the government has sanctioned senior members of the Hong Kong government, officials should closely examine the Federation’s actions—or, more accurately, inaction—in allowing the Games to proceed.
33. China’s “Query System for Islamic, Catholic, and Christian Clergy,” Another Tool for Repression
He Yuyan, Bitter Winter, June 08, 2023
34. Temu Sells Products in US Linked to Forced Labor in China’s Uyghur Region, Analysis Shows
Sheridan Prasso, Bloomberg, June 13, 2023
35. Beijing Lampstand Church: Pastor Qin Sifeng Sentenced to Five Years in Jail
Tao Niu, Bitter Winter, June 12, 2023
36. Countries can follow ‘various paths’ on human rights, says Chinese President Xi Jinping
Yuanyue Dang, South China Morning Post, June 14, 2023
Xi Jinping asserted that there are multiple models for human rights, essentially arguing that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the bedrock of the United Nations, should be rejected and that any regime can define “human rights” in a way that suits the regime’s interests, rather than the interests of a country’s citizens.
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
37. Top US Chip Gearmaker Accuses China Rival of 14-Month Spy Spree
Debby Wu, Bloomberg, June 15, 2023
Applied Materials Inc. is suing a Chinese-owned rival over what it says was a 14-month effort to steal some of its most valuable secrets, allegedly including an orchestrated employee-poaching spree and surreptitious transfers of semiconductor equipment designs.
The biggest US supplier of chipmaking equipment accused Mattson, a Fremont, California-based company acquired by Beijing-backed Beijing E-Town Dragon Semiconductor Industry Investment Center in 2016, of hiring away 17 of its most senior engineers over just more than a year.
COMMENT - Where is the Department of Justice?
38. Former Samsung exec accused of stealing data to build copycat chip plant in China
Kate Park, TechCrunch, June 12, 2023
39. Ex-Samsung executive alleged to have stolen tech to recreate chip plant in China
Christian Davies and Song Jung-a, Financial Times, June 12, 2023
40. Dutch government to screen foreign PhD tech students, denies targeting China
Reuters, June 12, 2023
41. China lures increasing numbers of research scholars from Japan
Noriaki Koshikawa and Ryosuke Matsuzoe, Nikkei Asia, June 12, 2023
42. China’s economy is way more screwed than anyone thought
Linette Lopez, Business Insider, June 14, 2023
43. With eye on China, US and five allies condemn trade-related 'economic coercion'
Jeff Mason, Reuters, June 9, 2023
44. Distributor Bunzl shifts more sourcing out of China
Leke Oso Alabi, Financial Times, June 13, 2023
Bunzl, the UK distributor of products that range from plastic spoons to PPE, is “de-risking” its supply chain by shifting some of its sourcing from China amid geopolitical concerns in the Asia-Pacific.
Frank van Zanten, chief executive, said that the company, which buys 10-15 per cent of the products it supplies to customers from China, was diversifying this sourcing into countries including Mexico, India, Vietnam and Malaysia.
Bunzl’s customers range from hotels to supermarkets, including Walmart, its largest customer by revenue. “We import about $1bn [in products] from China,” said Van Zanten. “But . . . we are reducing our exposure in China by moving to other countries.”
His comments come as tension rises between China and Taiwan — one of a number of issues dampening the investment appetite of European corporations.
A slew of businesses are reducing their reliance on China as a manufacturing hub, moving to different parts of south-east Asia and other developing countries, while some are “onshoring” their supply chains closer to their home markets.
“China is an important part of the world economy, so . . . I don’t think you can simply switch off China . . . but we are certainly de-risking,” added Van Zanten.
45. Demand grows for Asian investment products that exclude China
Hudson Lockett and Leo Lewis, Financial Times, June 13, 2023
46. Air-Bag Parts Maker Refusing U.S. Recall Request Had Workplace-Safety Woes
Ryan Felton and Selina Cheng, Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2023
47. Chinese tech groups suffer as foreign investors take flight
Ryan McMorrow, Nian Liu, Hudson Lockett, and Qianer Liu, Financial Times, June 12, 2023
48. U.S. companies face China relations hurdles and growing political risk
David J. Lynch, Washington Post, June 10, 2023
49. American Investment Banks Give Up Some China IPO Mandates
Dave Sebastian, Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2023
50. China rate cut signals possible stimulus for faltering economy
Joe Leahy and Hudson Lockett, Financial Times, June 13, 2023
51. Yellen Says Bid to Decouple from China Would Be ‘Disastrous’
Alan Rappeport, New York Times, June 13, 2023
52. China to become oil refining juggernaut, raising global risks
Clyde Russell, Reuters, June 14, 2023
Cyber & Information Technology
53. How a Shady Chinese Firm’s Encryption Chips Got Inside the US Navy, NATO, and NASA
Andy Greenberg, Wired, June 15, 2023
The US government warns encryption chipmaker Hualan has suspicious ties to China’s military. Yet US agencies still use one of its subsidiary’s chips, raising fears of a backdoor.
COMMENT – Come-on guys, be better!
Austin Larsen et al, Mandiant, June 15, 2023
On May 23, 2023, Barracuda announced that a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2023-2868) in the Barracuda Email Security Gateway (ESG) had been exploited in-the-wild as early as October 2022 and that they engaged Mandiant to assist in the investigation. Through the investigation, Mandiant identified a suspected China-nexus actor, currently tracked as UNC4841, targeting a subset of Barracuda ESG appliances to utilize as a vector for espionage, spanning a multitude of regions and sectors.
Mandiant assesses with high confidence that UNC4841 is an espionage actor behind this wide-ranging campaign in support of the People’s Republic of China.
…
Targeting – Targeted organizations have spanned public and private sectors worldwide. A majority of exploitation activity appears to impact the Americas; however, that may partially reflect the product’s customer base.
Almost a third of identified affected organizations were government agencies (Figure 5), supporting the assessment that the campaign had an espionage motivation. Further, in the set of entities selected for focused data exfiltration, shell scripts were uncovered that targeted email domains and users from ASEAN Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAs), as well as foreign trade offices and academic research organizations in Taiwan and Hong Kong. In addition, the actors searched for email accounts belonging to individuals working for a government with political or strategic interest to the PRC at the same time that this victim government was participating in high-level, diplomatic meetings with other countries.
Based on the evidence available at the time of analysis, earliest compromises appear to have occurred on a small subset of appliances geo-located to mainland China. The C2 communications utilized during this early set of compromises also leveraged port 8080 while later compromises that occurred globally almost entirely leveraged port- 443 or port 25.
Attribution – Mandiant assesses with high confidence that UNC4841 conducted espionage activity in support of the People’s Republic of China. While Mandiant has not attributed this activity to a previously known threat group at this time, we have identified several infrastructure and malware code overlaps that provide us with a high degree of confidence that this is a China-nexus espionage operation. Additionally, the targeting, both at the organizational and individual account levels, focused on issues that are high policy priorities for the PRC, particularly in the Asia Pacific region including Taiwan.
COMMENT - More cyber-espionage by the PRC.
55. Apple’s supply chain evolves as China faces competition from Southeast Asia
Iris Deng, South China Morning Post, June 12, 2023
56. China's quantum leap — Made in Germany
Sandra Petersmann and Esther Felden, DW, June 13, 2023
57. Huawei wins lion’s share of China Mobile’s 5G base station contracts
Che Pan, South China Morning Post, June 13, 2023
58. Microsoft to move top AI experts from China to new lab in Canada
Eleanor Olcott in Hong Kong, Qianer Liu in London and Ryan McMorrow, Financial Times, June 10, 2023
59. U.S. to Allow South Korean, Taiwan Chip Makers to Keep Operations in China
Yuka Hayashi, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023
60. American Tech Giants Are Slowly Cutting Off Hong Kong Internet Users
Newley Purnell, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023
61. OpenAI CEO Calls for Collaboration with China to Counter AI Risks
Karen Hao, Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2023
62. EU funding Huawei in critical tech projects despite bans on Chinese group
Cheng Ting-Fang and Javier Espinoza, Financial Times, June 14, 2023
Military and Security Threats
63. "Every Time China Has Been United, It Has Dominated"
Bernhard Zand and George Yeo, Der Spiegel, June 2, 2023
China is upgrading its nuclear arsenal even as its relationship to the U.S. is deteriorating. George Yeo, the former foreign minister of Singapore, discusses the ongoing power struggle in the Pacific region.
64. Strategic Upgrades in the Pacific
Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, June 15, 2023
Since AMTI’s last 2019 feature on Chinese strategic inroads in the Pacific Islands, the region has seen marked political shifts as well as continued strategic attention from China and the resident powers of Australia, France, New Zealand, and the United States. While Beijing has yet to realize a basing agreement in the Pacific Islands, it has continued to elevate its engagement with the region and secured a landmark security pact with the Solomon Islands in 2022. Amid continued anxiety about China’s growing influence, major political, economic, and security initiatives are underway by the United States and Australia to shore up their own strategic interests.
65. ASEAN to hold first joint military exercise in the South China Sea
Reuters, June 8, 2023
The Southeast Asian bloc ASEAN will hold its first-ever joint military exercise in the South China Sea, its chair Indonesia said on Thursday, the latest multilateral security drills at a time of rising tension and uncertainty in the region.
The decision was taken at a meeting of military commanders of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Indonesia, which will host the exercise in the North Natuna Sea, the southernmost waters of the South China Sea.
Indonesia’s military chief, Admiral Yudo Margono, told state-run news agency Antara the exercise would be in September and would not include any combat operations training. The purpose, Margono said, was strengthening “ASEAN centrality.”
66. Cambodia Pumps Brakes on Plan for ASEAN Joint Military Exercises in South China Sea
Sim Chansamnang, VOA, June 13, 2023
Cambodia has thrown a diplomatic wrench in ASEAN plans for joint military drills in the contested South China Sea, in the latest test of Prime Minister Hun Sen's balancing act between the regional bloc and Beijing.
Indonesia's military commander, Admiral Yudo Margono, announced on Thursday that his regional counterparts had agreed on first-ever joint military drills in September.
Margono said the drills would focus on strengthening "ASEAN centrality," while an Indonesian military spokesman cited the "high risk of disaster in Asia, especially Southeast Asia," according to Reuters.
The proposed military exercises would not include combat operations, according to Indonesia.
But General Vong Pisen, commander-in-chief of the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, released a statement soon after saying that Cambodia had yet to agree to the drills.
COMMENT – All the money and protection that Beijing has showered on Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen pays off again.
Hun Sen became the de facto leader of Cambodia in 1985 and has held on to his position since then as a client of the Chinese Communist Party. Since 1998, he has won five national “elections” in row, the last one in 2018 with assistance by the Chinese Ministry of State Security’s cyber hackers undermining opposition candidates, human rights advocates, and Cambodia’s elections commission (See Mandiant’s “Chinese Espionage Group TEMP.Periscope Targets Cambodia Ahead of July 2018 Elections and Reveals Broad Operations Globally” July 10, 2018).
As Beijing’s vassal within ASEAN, Cambodia assists its benefactor by neutering ASEAN even as the PRC seizes or threatens to seize territory from other ASEAN members (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia). Cambodia does all this and allows the PLA to build a naval base on the Gulf of Thailand, further threatening ASEAN.
67. China Is Rewriting the Law of the Sea
Peter A. Dutton, Foreign Policy, June 10, 2023
68. Sunk Costs: The Difficulty of Using Sanctions to Deter China in a Taiwan Crisis
Gerard DiPippo and Jude Blanchette, CSIS, June 12, 2023
69. Chinese-Built Armored Trucks Make Appearance in Chechnya
James T. Areddy, Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2023
70. China ‘anxious and regretful’ over Ukraine war, PLA strategist says
Minnie Chan, South China Morning Post, June 14, 2023
71. US cracks down on flight training for Chinese pilots with export restrictions
Reuters, South China Morning Post, June 13, 2023
72. China using secret base in Cuba to spy on U.S., Biden admin official confirms
Alexander Ward, Politico, June 10, 2023
73. Ukraine Declares Hikvision and Dahua "Sponsors of War"
Charles Rollet, IPVM, June 12, 2023
74. China rejects nuclear talks with the U.S. as it looks to strengthen its own arsenal
Jay Solomon, Semafor, June 9, 2023
75. American Sea Power in the Asia-Pacific
Francis Sempa, Real Clear Defense, June 10, 2023
76. Tripolar Instability
Robert S. Litwak, Wilson Center, May 2023
77. China Drives Spike in Global Nuclear Stockpile
Joshua Keating, The Messenger, June 12, 2023
78. China holds live-fire drills in East China Sea north of Taiwan
Reuters, June 13, 2023
79. China Creates a Coast Guard Like No Other, Seeking Supremacy in Asian Seas
Damien Cave, New York Times, June 12, 2023
One Belt, One Road Strategy
80. Court Papers Open Rare Window Into Role of Graft in China’s Overseas Lending
Chun Han Wong and Keith Zai, Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2023
81. Honduras requests entry to BRICS-led development bank on China trip
Reuters, June 9, 2023
82. VIDEO – The Belt and Road's Impact on Partner States Pt.1
Woodrow Wilson Center, May 24, 2023
83. The Advance of China and Authoritarian Populism in Honduras
R. Evan Ellis, Global Americans, June 9, 2023
Opinion Pieces
84. China’s new culture war on America
Richard McGregor, Australian Financial Review, June 7, 2023
China is returning to the ‘Asian values’ debate of the 1980s and 1990s in its efforts to exclude the West from the Indo-Pacific region.
85. How to leverage America’s software advantage in the decisive decade
Wendy R. Anderson and Michelle A. Flournoy, Breaking Defense, June 13, 2023
President Joe Biden’s National Security Strategy calls the 2020s a “decisive decade” [PDF], which has been underscored by Russian aggression in Ukraine and increasing Chinese threats to Taiwan. Yet many major defense acquisition programs, necessary for US national security, are not slated to be delivered in the next ten years and each military service will continue to rely on legacy platforms well into the 2030s.
One way to bridge this gap is by adopting and leveraging innovative software across the Department of Defense. Software can help the US military unlock new capabilities from existing platforms while increasing the speed of trusted, secure decision making and the efficiency of resource allocation.
However, current acquisition systems designed for large and exquisite weapons systems are poorly optimized for software development or leveraging a “software as a service” model. And traditional DoD software acquisition is often painfully slow, disconnected from end-users, and outdated on arrival.
It’s time to move beyond the legacy systems for how the Pentagon approaches software. Moving forward, DoD should put in place processes that allow the military to field software rapidly and continuously improve it with testing and user feedback. Software intensive systems should be updated rapidly to respond to operational needs and threats as they arise.
86. Losing the Pax Americana
James E. Fanell and Bradley A. Thayer, American Greatness, June 13, 2023
87. Washington is Recalibrating its Asia Strategy
Ved Shinde, Geopolitical Monitor, June 9, 2023
88. What Does China Really Spend on Defense?
Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2023
89. Russia, China and Iran in America’s Backyard
Walter Russell Mead, Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023
90. What Does the West Really Know About Xi’s China?
Odd Arne Westad, Foreign Affairs, June 13, 2023
91. Investors face a stark choice: are they on the side of the US or of China?
Diana Choyleva, Financial Times, June 14, 2023
92. US, Europe, Japan Are Saving Ukraine but Not Preparing for China War
Hal Brands, Bloomberg, June 14, 2023
93. Xi Jinping revered his father. So why isn’t he more like him?
Jerome A. Cohen, Washington Post, June 13, 2023
94. How does Biden handle China? He blames Trump
Jim Geraghty, Washington Post, June 14, 2023
95. ‘Crypto Communism’ Has a New Meaning
Tommy Tuberville, Wall Street Journal, June 7, 2023