Matt Turpin's China Articles - October 23, 2022
Friends,
We are inching closer to recognizing that the United States and the People’s Republic are engaged in an on-going cold war, even as a hot war rages in Europe.
Notice that I did not say we are inching towards a cold war, for we are already in one, we have just been slow to recognize that reality.
Future historians will spill a lot of ink over the date that this new cold war started, but be assured, it is already in our past.
After that unhappy note, let’s take a look at the material from this week.
Cate Cadell and Ellen Nakashima from the Washington Post provide yet another excellent piece of investigative journalism, unfortunately it highlights more failure by portions of the U.S. Government tasked with safeguarding dual-use technology (technology that has both military and civilian uses). These revelations are becoming increasingly common, and it begs the question: when will there be consequences for these failures?
As readers of this newsletter may recall, multiple news outlets, think tanks and research firms have uncovered how the PRC side-steps these controls (some examples here, here, here, and here).
The Washington Post article suggests that lessons are not being learned… the official responsible for developing the regulations continues to insist that private, for-profit companies who make this technology must police themselves better. You can read my comments below…
Some of the ‘deep cuts’ this week are worth your time too…
Just before the opening of the 20th Party Congress last weekend, a lone protester suspended two giants banners from a bridge in Beijing and for the briefest of time Chinese citizens caught a public glimpse of what is likely bubbling beneath the surface (#s 11-15).
Last weekend during a protest outside the PRC Consulate in Manchester, consulate staff (to include the Consul General!!!) started tearing down posters and drug a man inside the consulate compound and beat him until police intervened and pulled the man out (#s 28-32). The PRC immediately blamed the incident on the victim and the UK Government.
The implications of this incident are still unfolding, and the resignation of Prime Minister Truss on Thursday adds even more uncertainty.
But one thing seems clear to me: UK citizens in the PRC should be making plans to leave as soon as possible… I would not be surprised if the Party decided to dust-off the ‘hostage-diplomacy’ playbook that they have used against Canada and others over the years.
For those who appreciate schadenfreude, I recommend reading #39… for me, this is one of the most satisfying stories I’ve read in a long time.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. American technology boosts China’s hypersonic missile program
Cate Cadell and Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post, October 17, 2022
Military research groups at the leading edge of China’s hypersonics and missile programs — many on a U.S. export blacklist — are purchasing a range of specialized American technology, including products developed by firms that have received millions of dollars in grants and contracts from the Pentagon, a Washington Post investigation has found.
The advanced software products are acquired by these military organizations through private Chinese firms that sell them on despite U.S. export controls designed to prevent sales or resales to foreign entities deemed a threat to U.S. national security, the investigation shows.
Scientists who work in the sprawling network of Chinese military research academies and the companies that aid them said in interviews that American technology — such as highly specialized aeronautical engineering software — fills critical gaps in domestic technology and is key to advances in Chinese weaponry.
COMMENT – It seems almost weekly that another investigative journalism piece reveals that dual-use export controls, which are supposed to prevent sensitive, military technology from falling into the hands of our adversaries, are being mismanaged by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), along with the Defense Department’s Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) and the State Department’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN).
In this case, reporters from the Washington Post used publicly available data to trace “more than 300 sales since 2019 of U.S.-origin technology to dozens of entities involved in China’s hypersonics or missile programs by analyzing contract solicitation and award documents issued by the groups, as well as speaking to six Chinese scientists working in military labs and universities who described almost unfettered access to American technology with applications in the design and testing of missiles.”
It begs a few questions:
If a couple of reporters at the Washington Post can discover this as they work on multiple other stories simultaneously, why aren’t the responsible officials in these three Departments conducting their own investigations to prevent the PRC from developing more advanced missiles using U.S. technology? [BIS even has a law enforcement division with criminal investigation authorities]
How has this transfer of technology, under the noses of regulators responsible for preventing it, impacted U.S. national security and the security of allies and partners like Taiwan, Japan, Australia, and India who likely stand to be targeted by these missiles?
Will there be a top-to-bottom review of how dual-use export controls are administered and enforced? [It appears that the approach of “the first responsibility is on the company,” is entirely inadequate…]
What, if any, consequences exist for the failure to prevent this transfer of missile technology? [It’s not hard to imagine that American, Japanese, Australian, Indian and Taiwanese citizens could end up paying enormous costs, in blood and treasure, from advanced PRC missiles that would not have been in existence had the officials responsible for dual-use export controls done their jobs properly.]
2. China’s Economic Data Gets Harder to Find as Growth Slows
Stella Yifan Xie, Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2022
The world is eager for clues about the health of China’s economy as the country endures its worst prolonged slowdown in years. But getting a clear picture has only grown more difficult, as data becomes harder to obtain and unflattering analysis vanishes.
On Monday, China’s National Bureau of Statistics abruptly canceled the release of quarterly gross domestic product data just hours before it was set to be published, without providing a reason or setting a new date. Days earlier, the country’s customs agency simply didn’t release monthly official trade data, offering no explanation.
The moves, which economists said had no obvious precedent in China, came as China holds a Communist Party congress where leader Xi Jinping is expected to secure a third term. They were only the most glaring examples of what many investors and scholars say reflects increasing sensitivities around economic data and commentary that have made analysis of the world’s second-largest economy more difficult.
In the past year, China’s official statistics bureau and private research firms have retracted or removed more data from public access, while reports by economists and market analysts—particularly those with a more bearish outlook—have been retracted or expunged. Some prominent analysts who have questioned economic policy have had their social-media accounts suspended.
And, in recent weeks, China’s securities regulator has urged brokerage firms, including the domestic Chinese businesses of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., to refrain from commenting ahead of the Communist Party conclave on politically sensitive topics, which could include a range of subjects, including many aspects of the economy.
…
In August, Beijing-based Beike Research Institute, which regularly publishes reports on China’s real-estate market, pegged the average residential vacancy rate in 28 Chinese cities at 12.1%. Though the level was far lower than in earlier scholarly estimates, Beike described the vacancy rate in its report as being “relatively high,” exceeding that of the U.S. and U.K.
Within days, Beike retracted the report and apologized for what it called an “incomprehensive” survey that had employed “nonstandardized” sampling methods. A representative of Beike, a subsidiary of New York-listed KE Holdings Inc., declined to comment.
…
Some worry that economists and investment banks in China are holding off on offering more downbeat assessments of the economy, for fear of running afoul of authorities—even after a string of GDP forecast cuts in recent months.
That means more aggressive downgrades may still be in the offing, especially for next year, creating more uncertainty for investors, said Logan Wright, director of China markets research at New York-based Rhodium Group.
At the height of the initial outbreak in April 2020, Li Xunlei, chief economist at Chinese brokerage firm Zhongtai Securities, wrote on his social-media account that the country’s overall jobless rate, taking migrant workers and other factors into account, could be as high as 20.5%. In contrast, China’s official headline measure of joblessness—the surveyed urban unemployment rate—was at about 5.9%.
The post was deleted that day. Four days later, Mr. Li published a statement playing down his analysis and said that he had deleted the report in part to “avoid misinterpretation by certain media.”
“Please refer to the official figures,” he wrote at the time. Mr. Li didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
COMMENT – For the cheerleaders of the PRC economy (or anyone who has decided to invest there) this must be quite disturbing.
3. Why Another Xi Jinping Term Might Be in U.S.’s Interest
Greg Ip, Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2022
Xi has made China’s challenge to the West clearer but its economic prospects darker.
Times have changed. In the last 10 years, the U.S. has come to see China as a competitor rather than a partner, bent on displacing the U.S. as leader of the global economic and geostrategic order.
This has two somewhat unsettling implications. First, while the U.S. doesn’t want China to be poor, it is no longer as supportive of it becoming rich—since this would make it a more potent competitor.
So while the Biden administration says it isn’t trying to contain China, its sweeping new restrictions on Chinese access to semiconductors, equipment and talent have that intent. The restrictions go beyond simply maintaining a U.S. technology lead to “strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill,” wrote Gregory Allen of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Second, the consensus of Western experts is that China’s long-term prospects have, on net, suffered under Chinese leader Xi Jinping, so a third term, which he is expected to receive at the end of the current party congress, could serve U.S. interests—at least in an economic sense.
This turn of events can be traced to the transformation in American attitudes toward China. Until around 2012, successive U.S. presidents thought engagement would make China more politically open, more market driven and more invested in the rules-based international system the U.S. had nurtured since the end of World War II.
Since Mr. Xi took office in 2013, those hopes have withered away and a darker view has arisen: U.S. engagement was doomed to fail.
This view is advanced by Michael Pillsbury in his book “The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower,” which was influential during the Trump administration, and by Rush Doshi in “The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to Displace American Order.” Mr. Doshi, a political scientist at Yale University, is now serving on President Biden’s National Security Council.
The thesis of both books is that the Chinese Communist Party has always seen itself in a long-term struggle with the U.S. for ideological and geostrategic hegemony. Mr. Doshi quotes Jiang Zemin, president from 1993 to 2003, telling Chinese diplomats in 1993: “From now on and for a relatively long period of time, the United States will be our main diplomatic adversary.”
The parts of Mr. Xi’s foreign policy that most unsettle the U.S. all predate him: the insistence on bringing Taiwan under communist rule, by force if necessary; the development of a military able to seize Taiwan and force the U.S. out of the western Pacific; even the attempted imposition of a national-security law on Hong Kong.
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Still, even if Mr. Xi is bad for China’s economic prospects, that doesn’t make him an unalloyed positive for U.S. geostrategic interests. When the second-largest economy in the world, nuclear-armed and driven by a sense of victimization, is led by someone who doesn’t listen to other voices, it “could very well lead to higher likelihood of conflict,” said Matthew Turpin, a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution who served on former President Donald Trump’s National Security Council.
As Russian President Vladimir Putin shows, economically weakened leaders can still be unpredictable and dangerous. Mr. Xi’s economic policies matter much less to the U.S. than whether he starts a war, said Andrew Batson, research director at Gavekal Dragonomics. “It seems Xi doesn’t have great judgment. Is it in U.S. interests for the person in charge of China’s military and nuclear arsenal to not have great judgment?”
4. Containing China is Biden’s explicit goal
Edward Luce, Financial Times, October 19, 2022
US efforts to isolate Beijing’s high-tech sector may accelerate Xi Jinping’s bid to take control of Taiwan
Imagine that a superpower declared war on a great power and nobody noticed. Joe Biden this month launched a full-blown economic war on China — all but committing the US to stopping its rise — and for the most part, Americans did not react.
To be sure, there is Russia’s war on Ukraine and inflation at home to preoccupy attention. But history is likely to record Biden’s move as the moment when US-China rivalry came out of the closet. America is now pledged to do everything short of fighting an actual war to stop China’s rise.
It is not clear that corporate America, or its foreign counterparts, have fully digested what is about to hit them. For decades, serious businesses have based their growth models on having a China strategy — whether it be by exporting to China, or producing there, or both. Unless a company’s product is, say, luxury goods or agricultural commodities, Biden’s technological decoupling will hit their bottom line. His escalation also marks a final break with decades of US foreign policy that assumed China’s global integration would tame its rise as a great power.
America’s conversion to China containment is bipartisan. It was one thing for Donald Trump to target Huawei and ZTE, the Chinese telecoms conglomerates, and aim for managed trade. It is another for Trump’s Democratic successor to isolate China’s entire high-tech sector. It is notable there are no prominent voices raised in either political party against US-China decoupling. Washington’s China politics is now about which party can get more to the right of the other.
5. No, China isn’t throwing the doors open again
Dexter Tiff Roberts, The China Project, October 13, 2022
“You’d think people would have learned their lesson after watching Xi Jinping emerge as one of the most conservative, ideological leaders of China in decades,” writes Myth of Chinese Capitalism author Dexter Tiff Roberts: “I certainly learned mine.”
COMMENT – Dexter Roberts publishes a great Substack column called ‘Trade War’ and provides incredible insight into the dynamics of geopolitics and economics.
6. China gives Tesla tax break 3 days after Musk's Taiwan advice
Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, October 13, 2022
Model S and Model X receive Chinese tax breaks after foreign ministry praises his Taiwan plan.
Two Tesla models were handed tax exemptions by Beijing on Monday (Oct. 10), after a report cited the company's CEO Elon Musk as recommending Taiwan should be run along the lines of Hong Kong's "one country two systems" model — and one day after China expressed approval of his plan.
On Friday (Oct. 7), the Financial Times published an interview with Musk when he recommended Taiwan become absorbed into China as a special administrative zone that is "reasonably palatable." The tech tycoon then speculated that while it "won't make everyone happy," the terms of Beijing's rule over Taiwan could be "more lenient than Hong Kong."
Musk's unsolicited advice was roundly rejected across the Taiwanese political spectrum, including Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Spokesperson Huang Tsai-lin (黃彩玲), who on Saturday (Oct. 8) said Musk “caters to the threat of the aggressor by sacrificing Taiwan’s independence, completely ignoring the limitless ambitions of authoritarian rulers."
On Tuesday (Oct. 11), Premier Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌) said that Musk, "truly does not understand Taiwan nor cross-strait relations." He called for more emphasis to be placed on the words of the leaders of democratic countries.
By Wednesday (Oct. 12), Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正) said the military would not buy more Tesla vehicles after his comments on converting Taiwan into a special administrative zone. Although the vehicles had been purchased to meet the government's environmental policies, Chiu stressed that if a procurement leads to concern or discomfort, it would be halted or banned.
Initially, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spokesperson Mao Ning (毛寧) was cited by China’s state-run Central Television News on Saturday (Oct. 8) as describing Musk's proposal as an "inappropriate statement." However, on Sunday (Oct. 9), Mao backtracked on his previous comment and was quoted by CGTN as appearing to support Musk's claims:
"Provided that China's sovereignty, security and development interests are guaranteed, after reunification Taiwan will enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region," Mao said.
The next day, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) announced that Tesla's Model S and Model X variants would be exempt from the vehicle purchase tax. The announcement indicates the two models will soon enter the China market again after a long hiatus.
The consensus of statements issued by politicians from the major political parties in Taiwan, including the DPP, Kuomintang, New Power Party, and Taiwan People's Party was that Taiwan is a sovereign county not beholden to the whims of a businessman. Taiwanese politicians and citizens alike said they believed Musk's pro-China comments reflected his business interests, with 30-50% of Tesla’s production coming from his Shanghai factory.
AUTHORITARIANISM
7. AUDIO – The Clash of Orders with Rana Mitter on China
Mark Leonard and Rana Mitter, ECFR’s The World in 30 Minutes Podcast, October 7, 2022
Leonard is joined by Rana Mitter, vice-president of the British Academy and professor of the history and politics of modern China at the University of Oxford, to talk about the Chinese understanding of order. How are economic inequalities and covid-19 challenging Chinese stability? What is the role of multilateralism in the international system? And finally, how do narratives of the past shape understandings of ‘order’ today?
8. ‘Walled-in’ China under Xi Jinping poses long-term global challenges
Steven Jiang, CNN, October 17, 2022
During China’s National Day holiday in early October, several expatriate friends and I took our young children – who are of mixed races and tend to stand out in a Chinese crowd – to the Great Wall on the outskirts of Beijing.
As we climbed a restored but almost deserted section of the ancient landmark, a few local families on their way down walked past us. Noticing our kids, one of their children exclaimed: “Wow foreigners! With Covid? Let’s get away from them…” The adults remained quiet as the group quickened their paces.
That moment has lingered on my mind. It feels like a snapshot that illustrates how China has changed since its strongman leader Xi Jinping took power a decade ago – it’s become an increasingly walled-in nation physically and psychologically – and such transformation will have long-term global implications.
9. Xi Jinping’s Ideological Ambition Challenges China’s Economic Prospects
Lingling Wei, Wall Street Journal, October 17, 2022
Xi Jinping laid out ambitious plans two years ago to expand China’s wealth and double the size of the nation’s economy by 2035.
The target would require China’s economy to grow an average of nearly 5% annually over 15 years, according to estimates by officials involved in policy-making. Many economists inside and outside of China now believe 5% won’t be achievable, not just for this year, but also for the longer term.
A major challenge is Mr. Xi’s political agenda. Since he rose to power in 2012, Mr. Xi has put ideological rectitude, national security and Communist Party control at the center of policy. And he has insisted on greater state control over the economy—an approach that many economists say has come at the expense of the dynamic private sector that propelled China’s extraordinary growth.
Private-sector economists, the World Bank and other institutions expect China’s growth to rebound to around 4.5% next year after an estimated 3% or so in 2022, assuming Beijing eventually relaxes its zero-Covid policy. Many economists predict growth will remain weaker than before the pandemic, in part due to a shrinking workforce and rising debt levels.
10. Xi Jinping’s Endgame: A China Prepared for Conflict with the U.S.
Jonathan Cheng, Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2022
He has unleashed an array of military, economic and political campaigns to brace the country for the possibility of confrontation.
Since rising to power a decade ago, Xi Jinping has unleashed an array of campaigns to help ensure that China would prevail in, or at least withstand, a confrontation with the West. He has bolstered China’s military, reorganized the economy and remade society around a more ideologically committed Communist Party.
Mr. Xi has made clear that his overarching goal is to restore China to what he believes is its rightful place as a global player and a peer of the U.S. As a consequence, he has come to see the possibility of a showdown with the West as increasingly likely, according to people familiar with his thinking. Now he stands on the edge of a third five-year term in power at a Communist Party conclave starting Sunday, in a break with a recent precedent of stepping aside after two terms. That will likely ensure that his vision, which is simultaneously assertive and defensive, will guide China for years to come.
His approach could be summed up in a favorite aphorism of Mao Zedong that Mr. Xi has invoked, warning against a lack of vigilance, according to people familiar with the matter: “Don’t fight unsure wars, and don’t fight unprepared battles.”
11. ‘We all saw it’: anti-Xi Jinping protest electrifies Chinese internet
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, October 14, 2022
Scramble to censor posts about Sitong bridge incident in Beijing where defiant banners were hung and a fire lit in lead-up to Communist party congress.
Chinese authorities have strictly censored discussion of a rare protest in Beijing on Thursday that saw large banners unfurled on a flyover calling for boycotts and the removal of Xi Jinping, just days before China’s most important event of its five-year political cycle.
Photos and videos of the protest on the Sitong bridge emerged on social media on Thursday afternoon, also showing plumes of smoke billowing from the bridge over a major thoroughfare in the Haidian district of the capital.
“We want food, not PCR tests. We want freedom, not lockdowns. We want respect, not lies. We want reform, not a Cultural Revolution. We want a vote, not a leader. We want to be citizens, not slaves,” said one banner, while a second called for a boycott of schools, strikes and the removal of Xi.
COMMENT – Of course, this is what the billions and billions of RMB spent on internal security, surveillance and social control is supposed to prevent… and no picture of this was ever supposed to get out. As should be expected, it appears that plenty of Chinese citizens wanted to capture evidence of this on their own phones.
12. Beijing bridge protest: One-off or ‘canary in the coal mine’?
Sidney Tarrow, The Hill, October 19, 2022
Last week, as the world’s media covered the impending Chinese Communist Party Congress, an unknown protester dared to string two banners across a Bridge in Beijing.
The first one read: “No Covid test, we want to eat. No restrictions, we want freedom. No lies, we want dignity. No Cultural Revolution, we want reform. No leaders, we want votes. By not being slaves, we can be citizens.”
The other banner called on residents to “go on strike at school and work, remove dictator and national traitor Xi Jinping.”
13. Protest against China's Xi Jinping spreads after 'no to great leader' poster in Beijing
India Today, October 20, 2022
According to a report by Bloomberg, VoiceofCN -- a group of anonymous Chinese nationals who run a pro-democracy Instagram account -- said the slogans calling for Xi's removal have cropped up in at least eight cities in China. These eight cities include Shenzhen, Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou, as well as Hong Kong.
An administrator for VoiceofCN also said the group received several submissions showing the slogans from mainland China. Interestingly, these slogans were mostly seen inside bathrooms or posted on noticeboards in schools.
14. Anti-Xi Slogans in Rare Beijing Protest Spread Within China
Bloomberg, October 18, 2022
15. Beijing protest against Covid-19 rules and leadership finds support among overseas Chinese
Aw Cheng Wei, The Straits Times, October 18, 2022
16. EU is leaving "naivety" behind with China, Dutch foreign minister says
Charlotte Van Campenhout, Reuters, October 17, 2022
17. China’s ‘Absurd’ Covid Propaganda Stirs Rebellion
Zixu Wang, New York Times, September 29, 2022
The use of propaganda in the country has been on overdrive in the pandemic, with some Chinese citizens arguing the language has bordered on “nonsense.”
18. A quarter of Britons consider China to be an enemy of the UK
Fintan Smith, YouGov, October 14, 2022
Attitudes towards China have deteriorated since YouGov started tracking in November 2016. At that time a third of Britons (33%) had a favourable opinion of China, with around half having an unfavourable view (49%). Now the latest data shows that just one in eight Britons (13%) have a favourable view of China, with three quarters (75%) having a negative view.
Just 1% Britons see China as an ally of the UK, with only a further 9% viewing China as a friend. By contrast, a third (34%) believe China to be a rival of the UK, with another quarter (26%) believing China to actively be an enemy.
19. China’s Surveillance State Pushes Deeper into Citizens’ Lives
Brian Spegele, Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2022
In many parts of Xi Jinping’s China, state surveillance and Covid-19 controls begin the moment you step out the door in the morning.
The day might start with a government-mandated Covid test from workers in white hazmat suits. Without proof of a negative result, public spaces are off limits, including office buildings, grocery stores and parks.
Surveillance cameras keep watch over the city streets. In a cab on the way to work, the driver requires you to scan a QR code for a government database tracking people’s movements. Scan again when stopping by Starbucks for coffee and then again at the office.
If the database shows you’ve crossed paths with someone infected by the virus, you’ll likely be forced into quarantine. It may be in a hotel room, at a converted convention center, or if lucky, at home with an alarm installed on the front door.
The Chinese state has stretched far deeper into citizens’ lives since Mr. Xi took power in 2012. Covid has pushed the controls to entirely new levels. Such measures are increasingly testing the faith of Chinese citizens in a government that is no longer delivering the supercharged economic growth that underpinned popular support for decades.
When Mr. Xi took office, he set in motion a campaign to put the Communist Party back at the center of public life. Beijing increased censorship of social media, expanded surveillance and cracked down on private enterprise. He is expected to secure a third term as the country’s leader following the party’s twice-a-decade congress this week, after a steady drive to consolidate power.
20. VIDEO – Hear the grim warning that got Xi Jinping a roaring applause during speech
Selina Wang, CNN, October 16, 2022
SPOILER – the biggest applause was for never renouncing the use of force against Taiwan.
21. ‘Moving Backward’: In Xi’s China, Some See an Era of Total Control
Li Yuan, New York Times, October 17, 2022
A decade ago, many prominent Chinese hoped that Xi Jinping would usher in openness and reform. Today, some of them believe he has created a totalitarian state.
22. Xi Jinping steers towards confrontation with west in ‘great rejuvenation’ push
Edward White, Financial Times, October 16, 2022
China’s president Xi Jinping has signalled his intention to steer the foreign policy of the world’s most populous country and rising military superpower away from reconciliation with the west as he warned of “grave international developments” not seen in the past 100 years.
In a nearly two-hour speech opening the Chinese Communist party’s 20th national congress in Beijing on Sunday, Xi touted his administration’s success in countering foreign interference and safeguarding China’s “dignity” and “core interests”.
Xi also issued thinly veiled criticism of the US and its allies, boasting that China under his leadership had taken a “clear-cut stance” against hegemonism and stood unwavering in the face of “bullying”. China’s most powerful leader since Mao Zedong reiterated his commitment to taking control of Taiwan, potentially by military force.
But he also warned the party’s leadership gathered in the Great Hall of the People to “be ready to withstand high winds, choppy waters and even dangerous storms”.
His remarks came as ties between China and the west have sunk to historic lows. Experts on both sides see scant possibility of an improvement under Xi, who will cement his leadership beyond the two five-year terms of his predecessors at the party congress this week.
“The Chinese leadership has convinced itself that the west won’t voluntarily accept China’s rise unless China demonstrates formidable power,” said Zhao Tong of Tsinghua University in Beijing.
On Sunday, Xi emphasised that China’s military had been significantly strengthened under his watch and promised that the nation’s rejuvenation was on an “irreversible” course.
“There was a defensiveness to Xi’s message, insisting that ‘security’ comes first and that only the party can keep the nation and people safe . . . with himself at the helm,” said John Delury, an expert on Chinese politics at Yonsei University in Seoul.
Analysts said Xi, who took power in 2012, has decisively abandoned decades of caution in Beijing’s foreign relations as he seeks to fulfil his vision for China’s “great rejuvenation” as a superpower.
Ryan Hass, a former White House National Security Council director for China and Taiwan, said Beijing seemed to have resolved on compelling other countries to accept China’s conduct and ambitions, rather than “placate external anxieties” about its amassing strength.
“Whereas former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping preached patience, Xi is a study in impatience,” Hass, now with the Brookings Institution, wrote in a recent essay. “China’s leaders seem to want to put the world on notice that they are prepared to confront any country that dares stand in their path of ‘national rejuvenation’.”
In response to fears of China’s increasing military and economic sway, the US and its allies are formalising multilateral economic and security groups and restricting China’s access to leading technologies. Western capitals have also become increasingly outspoken about Beijing’s crackdowns in Xinjiang and Hong Kong and the People’s Liberation Army’s assertiveness in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.
Wang Jisi, a top Beijing foreign policy expert, characterised US-China ties over the past 10 years as a “tortuous road” from engagement to competition. As frictions deepened, China’s leaders “developed a clearer realisation” that the difficulties were deep-rooted not only in areas of direct competition but were also embedded in the countries’ respective political structures.
“Consequently, as long as China insists on ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ — or what some Americans call ‘state capitalism’ — and refuses to make fundamental political changes, it must be prepared to engage in a long-term strategic competition with the United States,” Wang said in a recent lecture.
Rather than try to address frayed relations with the west, analysts said Xi’s diplomats and Chinese companies were likely to be directed to expand influence over governments seen as less closely aligned with the US and Europe. Yet Xi’s refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or employ his significant leverage to lobby President Vladimir Putin to end the war threatens to undermine Beijing’s standing with non-western countries.
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, Beijing has echoed the Kremlin’s insistence that US-led Nato “encroachment” in Europe was the real trigger for the conflict.
Over recent weeks, Xi has come under renewed pressure to step back from his decade-long partnership with Putin amid rising global fears that Russia might be preparing to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
One international relations expert based in Shanghai who asked not to be named said China felt “more secure” as it expanded its influence over other countries. However, the expert said there were areas in which China’s position could be improved, including “Russia and the handling of the Ukraine war”.
Others believed Xi will not abandon his close friendship and “no limits partnership” with Putin — the pair have met in person 39 times in the past decade — despite the Russian leader’s nuclear threats clashing with China’s own self-interest.
“If Russia is not stopped, China will blame it on the west and Ukraine pushing Russia into a corner, with an alluded message that no one should push China on Taiwan, ever,” said Yun Sun, director of the China programme at the Stimson Center think-tank in Washington.
As Xi embarks on an unprecedented third term as China’s leader, his consolidation of power also means he is increasingly surrounded by people afraid to give him bad news, stifling any calls for course-correction as Beijing’s relations with the west worsen, analysts warned.
Wang, the Beijing academic, said China’s “official line has encouraged nationalistic sentiments and triumphalism . . . and discouraged people from voicing modest views. Those Chinese who are openly critical of such a diplomatic style run the risk of being attacked as ‘traitors’.”
ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS
23. China’s International Development Finance and Risks to Global Biodiversity
Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, August 15, 2022
INSIGHTS
China is now a leading lender of global development finance, issuing international financing comparable in sum to that extended by the World Bank.
Using high-precision, geospatial data, researchers find that 63% of development finance loans issued by China’s two leading policy banks have projects that overlap with critical habitats, protected areas, or Indigenous lands.
China’s development projects pose greater risks to critical habitats, Indigenous lands, and distribution ranges of threatened species than those of the World Bank.
24. Risks to global biodiversity and Indigenous lands from China’s overseas development finance
Hongbo Yang, B. Alexander Simmons, and others, Nature Ecology and Evolution, September 20, 2021
Overall, China’s development projects pose greater risks than those of the World Bank, particularly within the energy sector. These results provide an important global outlook of socio-ecological risks that can guide strategies for greening China’s development finance around the world.
25. China Won’t Rush Its Clean Energy Transformation, Xi Says
Bloomberg, October 16, 2022
FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND COERCION
26. China Blocks Polish Delegation's Flight to Korea
Roh Suk-jo, Chosunilbo, October 19, 2022
A Polish government delegation's visit to Korea has been cancelled because China refused to let it fly through Chinese airspace.
The delegation was to attend a ceremonial handover of a consignment of Korean weapons to Poland.
Warsaw recently bought dozens of Chunmoo multiple rocket launchers in addition to Korean tanks, howitzers and fighter jets.
Instead the event takes place via Zoom on Wednesday.
The delegation led by Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak had planned to leave Warsaw for Seoul on Monday but cancelled at the last minute because their request to fly through Chinese airspace was turned down by Beijing right before their departure.
A roundabout route would have taken too long.
There was no explanation from Beijing for the tantrum, but Poland is among the most vociferous Eastern European countries and NATO members seeking to increase armaments due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and China seems to be siding with Putin.
27. How a Tycoon Linked to Chinese Intelligence Became a Darling of Trump Republicans
Evan Osnos, The New Yorker, October 17, 2022
Guo Wengui has been trailed by scandals involving corruption and espionage. What is he really after?
28. VIDEO – Protester attacked outside Chinese embassy in Manchester by alleged consular staff
The Guardian, October 17, 2022
29. British police probe beating of protester on China consulate grounds
Martin Quin Pollard, Reuters, October 17, 2022
British police are investigating an assault on a protester who was beaten by several men after being dragged inside the grounds of the Chinese consulate in Manchester during a demonstration against President Xi Jinping.
Sunday's protest took place on the first day of the twice-a-decade congress of China's ruling Communist Party in Beijing at which Xi is widely expected to win a third leadership term.
30. Hong Kong protester dragged into Chinese Consulate in Manchester and beaten
Lily Kuo and Vic Chiang, Washington Post, October 17, 2022
31. Consulate attack in UK reflects China’s aggressive foreign policy, analysts say
Verna Yu, The Guardian, October 17, 2022
32. Chinese consul-general defends actions after being seen pulling protester's hair in Manchester
Inzamam Rashid, SkyNews, October 20, 2022
The Chinese consul-general accused of attacking a protester has denied the claims and said his alleged victim was "abusing my country, my leader".
Senior diplomat Zheng Xiyuan was pictured pulling Bob Chan's hair before yanking him into the Chinese consulate in Manchester.
33. BMW to move production of electric Minis from UK to China
Robert Lea, Times of London, October 15, 2022
34. Foreign Influence Registration Scheme to make clandestine political activity illegal
Tom Tugendhat, UK Home Office, October 18, 2022
New legislation to compel those acting for a foreign power or entity to declare political influencing activity – and criminalise those who do not.
HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
35. Reports of teenager dying in Covid quarantine cause outcry in China
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, October 19, 2022
Reports that a 16-year-old girl has died in a Covid quarantine centre after pleas from her family for medical help were ignored have caused anger in China, where ongoing tight pandemic controls have started to take their toll on a weary population.
36. The U.N. Abandons the Uyghurs
Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2022
If pathological optimists still think the U.N. Human Rights Council cares about human rights, they might want to note events last week. A motion was made in Geneva to debate China’s abuses against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang province, and the council voted 19-17 not even to discuss it.
Siding with China against the motion were regular lackeys such as Cuba and Venezuela, as well as countries such as Nepal, Indonesia and Pakistan, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates that don’t want to offend China or are on the hook as part of its Belt and Road Initiative.
The last four in that list are majority Muslim nations voting to ignore the documented persecution of a Chinese Muslim minority group. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, and Pakistan’s state religion is Islam.
In addition to China, the other nations on the dishonor role were: Bolivia, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Gabon, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, Namibia, Senegal, Sudan and Uzbekistan. There were also 11 abstentions, including India, Mexico and Ukraine. Perhaps Kyiv hopes to keep China from giving military aid to Russia’s invaders, but this wasn’t Ukraine’s finest hour. Mexico under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has never met a left-wing dictatorship it didn’t support.
In August the U.N. High Commissioner on Human Rights published a report that drew on interviews with former detainees in Xinjiang. “A consistent theme was description of constant hunger and, consequently, significant to severe weight loss during their periods in the facilities,” it said. “Almost all interviewees described either injections, pills or both being administered regularly.”
Read on, if you have the stomach. “Some also spoke of various forms of sexual violence, including some instances of rape,” the report said. “Several women recounted being subject to invasive gynaecological examinations, including one woman who described this taking place in a group setting.”
Routine abuses included being deprived of sleep and prayer, in addition to being forced to sing patriotic songs. The report asked China to look into “allegations of torture, sexual violence, ill-treatment, forced medical treatment, as well as forced labor and reports of deaths in custody.” It said the pattern of repeated maltreatment in Xinjiang “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.”
Pragmatists might be pleased that the motion Thursday failed by only two votes, after a fierce lobbying campaign by Beijing to defeat it. But what a disgrace. Everyone knows the U.N. Human Rights Council is a sinkhole of moral equivalence. But if it can’t pass a motion merely to open discussion on China’s abuses in Xinjiang, there is no reason for it to exist, or for the United States to continue to be a member.
37. Xinjiang vote failure betrays core mission of UN Human Rights Council
Amnesty International, October 6, 2022
38. Xi Jinping’s continued tenure as leader a disaster for human rights
Amnesty International, October 15, 2022
Ahead of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP), where President Xi Jinping is expected to be confirmed as CCP General Secretary for a third term, Amnesty International’s Deputy Regional Director Hana Young said:
“Confirmation of Xi Jinping’s third term will be an ominous moment not only for the millions of Chinese citizens who have suffered grave human rights violations under his rule, but also for people around the world who feel the impact of the Chinese government’s repression.
“President Xi’s decade in power has been characterized by sweeping arbitrary detentions, a ruthless nationwide crackdown on freedom of expression and association, crimes against humanity against Muslims in the Xinjiang region, and a dramatic escalation of repression in Hong Kong.
“The government’s policies and practices under Xi’s leadership pose a threat to rights not just at home, but globally. From the government’s campaign to silence and forcibly repatriate Uyghurs overseas to its attempts to redefine the very meaning of human rights at the United Nations, the arm of Chinese state repression increasingly extends beyond China’s borders.
“And as Chinese activists, human rights lawyers, independent journalists and other human rights defenders brace themselves for more of the same – or worse – the international community must redouble efforts to ensure the next five years are different. There can be no excuse for failing to hold the Chinese authorities to account over atrocities committed in President Xi’s name.”
INDUSTRIAL POLICIES AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
39. China dumps dud chips on Russia, Moscow media moans
Simon Sharwood, The Register, October 18, 2022
What? Sanctions-busting sellers aren't interested in your complaints? That's a shame
The failure rate of semiconductors shipped from China to Russia has increased by 1,900 percent in recent months, according to Russian national business daily Коммерсантъ (Kommersant).
Quoting an anonymous source, Kommersant states that before Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine the defect rate in imported silicon was two percent. Since that war commenced, Russian manufacturers have apparently faced 40 percent failure rates.
Even a two percent defect rate is sub-optimal, because products made of many components can therefore experience considerable quality problems. Forty percent failure rates mean supplies are perilously close to being unfit for purpose.
According to Kommersant, Russian electronics manufacturers are not enjoying life at all because, on top of high failure rates, gray market gear doesn't flow with the same speed as legit kit and supply chains are currently very kinked indeed inside Russia.
COMMENT – I find this story incredibly satisfying… with a ‘no-limits friend’ like Beijing, who needs enemies.
From Moscow’s perspective, this is worse than NOT providing any chips. These kinds of defects serve as the most insidious sabotage to the entire Russian defense industrial base, infrastructure, and economy. Chip failure causes damage to other components and the defects don’t necessarily manifest immediately, which causes incalculable costs across complex systems.
Had the United States tried to design an operation to sabotage Russia’s military, infrastructure, and economy, we could never have been as effective as this will likely be.
I don’t believe for one minute that Beijing is doing this intentionally, it is just how the Chinese system works under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.
40. China’s Economic Picture Grows Murkier in Xi’s ‘New Era’
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, October 18, 2022
The delay in announcing routine growth data this week was only the latest example of how hard it has become to peer into China’s economy, the world’s second largest.
41. China competition eclipses all other EU relations with Beijing, top diplomat Josep Borrell says
Finbarr Bermingham, South China Morning Post, October 18, 2022
EU foreign affairs chief makes comments after European Union ministers discuss a paper by the bloc’s foreign service
Paper advises EU to stand up to Beijing’s efforts to ‘systematically promote an alternative world order’ in which human rights are secondary to national sovereignty
42. Apple freezes plan to use China's YMTC chips amid political pressure
Cheng Ting-Fang, Lauly Li, and Yifan Yu, Nikkei Asia, October 17, 2022
Apple has put on hold plans to use memory chips from China's Yangtze Memory Technologies Co. (YMTC) in its products, multiple sources told Nikkei Asia.
The move comes amid the latest round of U.S. export controls imposed against the Chinese tech sector and is a sign that Washington's crackdown is creating a chilling effect down the supply chain.
43. China's state banks seen acquiring dollars in swaps market to stabilise yuan
Reuters, October 17, 2022
China's state banks stepped up their intervention to defend a weakening yuan on Monday, with banking sources telling Reuters these banks sold a high volume of U.S. dollars and used a combination of swaps and spot trades.
Six banking sources told Reuters the country's major state-owned banks were spotted swapping yuan for U.S. dollars in the forwards market and selling those dollars in the spot market, a playbook move used by China in 2018 and 2019 as well.
CYBER AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
44. Anti-Xi Jinping Posters Are Spreading in China via AirDrop
Rachel Cheung, Vice, October 19, 2022
"This is the first time I saw or received a medium of any kind that is critical of the current regime."
A Shanghai resident was riding the metro on Tuesday when an AirDrop notification popped up on his iPhone: “‘Xi Jinping’s iPhone’ would like to share a photo.”
Curious, the man accepted the request and received an image denouncing Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s authoritarian rule. “Oppose dictatorship, oppose totalitarianism, oppose autocracy,” some of the characters on the poster read.
The slogans echoed what a man had written on two banners and hung on a highway overpass in Beijing last week in a daring act of defiance of Xi’s tight grip on the country. The unusual display of dissent came at a sensitive time, as the Chinese president is expected to secure an unprecedented third term as the chief of the ruling Chinese Communist Party at a key political meeting held in the Chinese capital this week.
“This is the first time I saw or received a medium of any kind that is critical of the current regime,” he told VICE World News, speaking anonymously to avoid retaliation from Chinese authorities. “Word of mouth, even from the locals, is common, but never something of this nature.”
45. TikTok Security Deal Is Likely to Leave US Data Leaking to China
Daniel Flatley, Bloomberg, October 19, 2022
TikTok users would still risk having personal data exposed to hacking and espionage by China even if the Biden administration forges a security agreement designed to spare the video platform from a total US ban.
That’s the conclusion of former national security officials and other experts as the Justice Department reviews an accord that would keep the popular video-streaming app, which is owned by China’s ByteDance Ltd., accessible to its millions of US users.
COMMENT – I suspect that there will be no decision on TikTok before the mid-term elections.
46. EU fordert unverzügliche Beschränkungen für „Hochrisiko-Lieferanten“ im 5G-Netz [EU calls for immediate restrictions on "high-risk suppliers" in the 5G network] – ORIGINAL IN GERMAN
Moritz Koch, Handelsblatt, October 18, 2022
GOOGLE TRANSLATE – The EU Commission is very concerned about the security of the mobile communications infrastructure. This is shown by an explosive, previously unpublished document.
The EU Commission is calling on European governments to secure their 5G mobile networks. "Member States that have not yet imposed restrictions on high-risk suppliers should do so immediately, as the lost time can increase the vulnerability of networks in the Union," writes the EU Commission in a recommendation on the protection of critical infrastructure, which the authority published today wants to publish Tuesday. The document is available to the Handelsblatt.
"High-risk supplier" is a Brussels code word for Chinese manufacturers, most notably Huawei. The technology of the company from Shenzhen plays a central role in many European mobile networks. The company maintains intensive business relationships with mobile phone providers such as Deutsche Telekom.
MILITARY AND SECURITY THREATS
47. China Recruiting Former R.A.F. Pilots to Train Its Army Pilots, U.K. Says
Mark Landler, New York Times, October 17, 2022
China has recruited as many as 30 retired British military pilots, including some who flew sophisticated fighter jets, to train pilots in the People’s Liberation Army, according to Britain’s Defense Ministry. A senior official said the ministry worried that the practice could threaten British national security.
Britain said it was working with allies to try to stop the practice, which the official said dated to before the coronavirus pandemic but had gained momentum in recent months. The recruited British pilots, the senior official said, included former members of the Royal Air Force and other branches of the armed forces.
48. Australia probes reports ex-pilots approached to train China’s military
Nic Fildes, Kathrin Hille, and Mercedes Ruehl, Financial Times, October 19, 2022
Australia’s defence force has launched an investigation into allegations that a number of its former air force pilots were offered lucrative packages to teach Chinese pilots how to fly western attack aircraft.
Australian pilots were among those approached by a South African flight school to train Chinese pilots to operate warplanes that included Typhoons, Tornados and Harriers.
49. How China Views It: Sino-American Technology Competition
Dan Blumenthal, Gregory Graff, and Christian Curriden, AEI, October 20, 2022
Robert Clark, Civitas, October 2022
A year after publication of his book uncovering how Chinese defense conglomerates and PLA-linked institutions embed their researchers within UK universities, Robert Clark provides an update that a large number of them are still there and new ones have taken up residence.
He also identifies that in many cases, these UK universities continue to unintentionally generate research that is sponsored by and may be of use to these same defense conglomerates, including those with activities in the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) as well as hypersonic missiles.
51. Academics fail to break links with US-sanctioned Chinese firms
George Greenwood, Times of London, October 17, 2022
British academics have continued working with US-sanctioned Chinese companies despite their universities claiming that formal research collaborations with them had ceased.
An audit by The Times and Civitas found that academics at universities that had highlighted ending work with military-linked Chinese organisations after being criticised had continued to co-author academic papers with them.
Concerns have been raised that collaborations with civilian research that can have military applications risks British research supporting the authoritarian state in expanding its military reach. That, experts say, could have an impact on British security interests.
52. German spy chief: 'Russia is the storm, China is climate change'
Sarah Marsh, Reuters, October 17, 2022
53. China plans to seize Taiwan on ‘much faster timeline,’ Blinken says
Ellen Francis, Washington Post, October 18, 2022
Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused China of speeding up plans to seize Taiwan as Chinese President Xi Jinping looks set to secure a precedent-breaking third term at a Chinese Communist Party congress this week.
“There has been a change in the approach from Beijing toward Taiwan in recent years,” Blinken told an event at Stanford University on Monday.
This includes “a fundamental decision that the status quo was no longer acceptable and that Beijing was determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline,” he said. Blinken did not provide details about the claim of a shorter timeline and said China may be willing to use coercive means, a prospect that is “creating tremendous tensions.”
Responding Tuesday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry described Blinken’s comments as an example of the United States reneging on its commitment to the one-China policy, which acknowledges Beijing’s position that there is only one China.
54. Xi’s Fiery Taiwan Rhetoric Raises Risk of War in His Third Term
Sarah Zheng, Bloomberg, October 17, 2022
President Xi Jinping proclaimed on Sunday that Taiwan’s status should be “settled by Chinese people.” Yet he faces a tricky balancing act managing public opinion among China’s 1.4 billion people on an issue that looks set to dominate his third term.
Xi’s vow that China can realize unification with Taiwan “without a doubt” got some of the loudest applause from the 2,400 delegates who watched his speech at the Communist Party congress in Beijing. The response reflected growing nationalistic fervor toward taking over the self-ruled island that Beijing considers its own territory.
55. China tension over Ukraine flares at Arctic Circle Assembly in Iceland
South China Morning Post, October 16, 2022
Rob Bauer, chair of NATO’s Military Committee, confronted He Rulong, China’s ambassador to Iceland, over China’s failure to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
A senior NATO official confronted a Chinese diplomat over China’s failure to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, injecting tension over the war into an international conference about the Arctic.
The unusually frank exchange between Admiral Rob Bauer, chair of the alliance’s Military Committee, and He Rulong, China’s ambassador to Iceland, followed a speech by Bauer on NATO’s role in the region at the annual Arctic Circle Assembly.
Bauer, a Dutch Navy officer, said China “doesn’t share our values and undermines the rules-based international order.”
ONE BELT, ONE ROAD STRATEGY
56. Australia, South Pacific islands bolster ties as China's clout grows
Fumi Matsumoto, Nikkei Asia, October 19, 2022
OPINION PIECES
57. It’s time for the US to revoke China’s ‘normal trade’ status
Nathan Picarsic and Emily de La Bruyere, The Spectator, October 14, 2022
It’s an economic adversary and we should treat it as such.
In April 2022, six weeks after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, President Biden signed legislation to suspend Russia’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status. “Revoking PNTR from Russia,” he said, “is going to make it harder for Russia to do business with the United States… The free world is coming together to defeat Putin.”
PNTR status, also known as Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, is a designation granted among World Trade Organization members. Receiving nations are awarded all trade advantages that any other nation receives.
Revoking PNTR status from Russia was a strategic move. It opened the door to deliver comprehensive economic strikes against Moscow and sent a clear signal to markets. But five months later, Russia continues its offensive against Ukraine, with the Chinese Communist Party serving as Moscow’s primary international backer. This demands attention. The Russia PNTR move was reactive. It did not deter Putin’s ambition or impose costs on his chief ally, now eyeing further international aggression. Might a proactive move to rescind China’s permanent trading status have strategic value at this stage?
The real threat facing the international system is not simply Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is not Russia’s assault on international norms. It is a rising axis of authoritarian aggressors — led by China with Russia — intent on strangling the international system by weaponizing economic interdependence.
The answer, then, is not simply to push back on Russia’s aggression, just as it is not simply to throw a whack-a-mole jumble of sanctions and tariffs at China. The answer is strategic economic competition with Beijing that builds on the recent precedent of actions taken against Russia. Revoking China’s PNTR status is a step toward seriously defending the international order and the free-market ideals that non-market Beijing has distorted over the past 20 years.
The US granted China PNTR status in 2000 as part of Beijing’s World Trade Organization accession. Then-president Bill Clinton led the charge. He promised that the move would make the United States richer, China freer, and the world more peaceful.
The opposite proved true.
China’s PNTR designation facilitated outsourcing to China, and with it the hollowing out of American industry. Instead of espousing freedom, a richer Chinese Communist Party tightened control of its domestic economy and implemented a genocide against its people. As for the promised global peace, President Zelensky might have something to say about that.
Moreover, Beijing has violated the obligations that come with PNTR status. Receiving governments must not restrict emigration of their people. China not only controls — and prohibits — that of its minorities, but also, according to the United Nations, monitors their communications with people abroad and their movements within China.
China is a national security adversary and source of global economic distortions. It is also a human rights abuser.
These realities have been clear for decades. Senator Bernie Sanders in 2005 introduced a bill to repeal China’s PNTR status, saying, “Anyone who takes an objective look at our trade policy with China must conclude that it is an absolute failure and needs to be fundamentally overhauled.” More recently, in 2021, Republican Senators Tom Cotton, Jim Inhofe, and Rick Scott introduced a bill to end China’s PNTR status.
What has been less clear is the strategic opportunity that revoking China’s PNTR status presents. Existing US tools of economic competition are inadequate to address Beijing’s threat: constrained by unwieldy bureaucracies, political pathologies, and regulatory limitations, they permit, at best, a half-hearted “whack-a-mole” defense. Addressing China’s PNTR status could leapfrog these constraints. It could open the door to strategic action to reset the foundational structure of US-China economic relations.
It could send a clear signal to market actors about the end of the foolish assumption that economic integration would liberalize the communists in Beijing. It would also allow the United States to reclaim the moral high ground of refusing to permit permanent trade with non-market authoritarian regimes that abuse their own people.
And here’s the kicker: the American public supports this. The immediate, conventional response to any proposal to revoke China’s PNTR status is simple. It would be too expensive, the economies are too intertwined, and the American consumer wouldn’t stand for it. But a poll conducted in July 2022 — when gas sat north of $5 a gallon — found that was not the case. It found that the plurality of likely voters supported revoking China’s PNTR status, even if that risked exacerbating inflation supply chain pressures. Only 35 percent were opposed, and 26 percent among Republicans.
Here is an issue that has public and bipartisan support and both immediate and historical precedent. Here is a strategic opportunity and national obligation. Here is an opportunity for the US to come together not only to defeat Putin but to begin to seriously correct China’s non-market distortion of the global, free trading system.
58. The U.S. Isn’t Ready to Face China on the Battlefield
Seth Jones, Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2022
The invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated critical deficiencies in America’s defense industrial base.
The Biden administration is doubling down on its recognition of China as America’s main competitor. The recently released National Security Strategy and the soon-to-be-released National Defense Strategy—Congress has already received a version of the latter—conclude that China poses the most significant threat to the U.S. What administration officials haven’t said, however, is that the U.S. isn’t fully prepared to fight a major war against China.
59. The Thoughts of Chairman Xi: His China combines Marxism-Leninism with nationalist aggression.
Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2022
The most important election in the world this year is no election at all. It’s a coronation. When China’s Communist Party anoints President Xi Jinping for a third five-year term this week, it will confirm China’s combination of aggressive nationalism and Communist ideology that is the single biggest threat to world freedom. It all but guarantees an era of confrontation between China and the U.S.
60. The Manchester consulate attack shows how China is flexing its muscles abroad
Nathan Law, The Guardian, October 18, 2022
I can’t help but imagine what would happen if I was taken to a Chinese embassy. Would I be detained in a small blackout room? Extradited to mainland China and have a forced confession on state television? Or disappeared for ever, like some of the dissidents in other embassies of autocracies?
I have to come to the understanding this week that, for Hong Kong dissidents, Britain may not be as safe as we hope.
Last Sunday, 2,296 delegates met in Beijing to kick off the 20th Chinese Communist party (CCP) congress. It is the most important gathering of the country and the top leaders present the result of predetermined policy directions. Beijing saw it as a celebratory event, but that is not what the rest of the world perceived.
In Manchester, a group of Hong Kong protesters gathered outside the Chinese consulate. They displayed a cartoon of Xi Jinping, the leader of China who is expected to stay in power for another five years, in which he was portrayed as in the emperor’s new clothes, only wearing pants and a crown. The images of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Ukraine covered in blood are held with his hand. Banners read “End CCP”.
The protesters expected their freedom of demonstration to be protected on British soil, but the situation became tense when staff from the consulate came out with motorcycle helmets on and vandalised the signs.
In my years of activism, I have been imprisoned, experienced mob violence by pro-CCP thugs in Hong Kong, and was listed with a bounty for my whereabouts in the UK to threaten my safety. But being brought to the embassy, which essentially is People’s Republic of China (PRC) territory and they can do anything to you without the knowledge of the outer world, is way too much a risk for any of us.
After the incident, a protester known as Bob was hospitalised, having sustained injuries to his head, face, neck, back and waist. He was lucky that after being surrounded by several PRC consulate staff and beaten briefly, the police managed to pull him out of the brawl and out of the consulate area. Yet this attack has left a scar in the Hong Kong community.
Many in the UK have overlooked the influx of Hongkongers and their impact on the country. There have already been more than 140,000 applications in the first 18 months since the launch of the British national (overseas) visa in early 2021. It has been estimated that there will be 300-400,000 Hongkongers relocating to the UK in the first five years of the visa scheme, mainly due to the political deterioration in the city.
They fled Hong Kong for a supposedly safe haven where they are no longer threatened by the long arms of the CCP, but now it seems they might face the same nightmare here again.
The extraterritorial persecution conducted by Chinese authorities here is not only a diplomatic and foreign policy issue, but also a domestic issue that affects the sense of security of freedom-loving Hongkongers in this country.
This has to be addressed properly and urgently in order to ease tension within the community. The government apparatus has started rolling: Greater Manchester police said an investigation into the incident had begun; a spokesperson for the prime minister, Liz Truss, expressed “deep concerns” over the incident.
In response, the Chinese embassy says that a “small group of Hong Kong independent activists … hung an insulting portrait of the Chinese president at the main entrance”. I don’t consider posting a satirical cartoon of a dictator an “insult”. Even if it makes Chinese diplomats upset, it does not give them licence to destroy the private property of the protesters and physically abuse them.
If the participation of consulate staff is confirmed, they should be immediately expelled from the UK, if prosecution is not possible due to their diplomatic impunity. The Chinese ambassador to the UK, Zheng Zeguang, should be summoned and criticised for these barbaric behaviours.
Such actions must be taken to maintain Hongkongers’ confidence in the system that should protect them from the persecution of the Chinese autocracy. Otherwise, all forms of “welcoming” programmes and devices are empty as Hongkongers will still live in fear.
COMMENT – Nathan Law is a former Hong Kong politician and democracy activist who was forced to flee when the PRC destroyed the ‘one country, two systems’ arrangement that guaranteed political freedoms in Hong Kong.
61. Xi Jinping’s Strategy of Conflict
Dan Blumenthal and Cindy Chen, 1945, October 18, 2022
As the People’s Republic of China marks its 20th party congress this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping is poised to shepherd both the Chinese Communist Party and the nation into a new and dangerous era. The foundations of China’s “harmonious rise” – public quiescence predicated on sky-high growth – have crumbled.
Xi has responded by centralizing power, relying increasingly on the coercive tools of his internal security services to govern. But the Chinese leader’s effort to build a 21st-century police state promises growing internal risk, and this will likely translate into conflict-seeking abroad.
62. Three Things Americans Should Learn from Xi’s China
Farah Stockman, New York Times, October 16, 2022
About four decades ago, Chinese Communist Party officials scoured the world for best practices, which they cautiously piloted to create the economic miracle that their country showcases today. These days, though, the Communist Party champions Chinese solutions, and not just for China but also for the rest of the world. Xi Jinping, who is widely expected to receive an unusual third term at the helm of the world’s most populous country, embodies a far more confident China that has begun to portray itself as an alternative to the West.
63. Germany will pay the price for its bizarre love affair with dictatorships
Juliet Samuel, The Telegraph, October 15, 2022
The more factories and technology and marketing you throw at doing business in this dead-end dictatorship, the more you’ll lose in the end
64. China Could Decide Now Is the Time For War With America
James Holmes, 1945, September 25, 2022
65. This is the beginning of Xi’s great unravelling
Roger Boyes, Times of London, October 18, 2022