Friends,
I started writing this week’s commentary as I was flying over Fiji and the Solomon Islands on the way to Sydney, Australia. At nearly the same time on the other side of the world in the southern hemisphere, President Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping were meeting in the Peruvian capital on the sidelines of the APEC Summit.
With near certainty, this will be the last meeting between Biden and Xi and so it provides a glimpse into the dynamics at play in the Sino-American relationship.
Before we dive into some analysis, I was curious of what song might go along with this meeting in Lima, Peru. A short search brought me to this classic, the unofficial anthem of the Peruvian capital, La Flor de la Canela (The Cinnamon Flower) by the Peruvian singer-song writer Chabuca Granda.
The performance on the spoons is truly inspired.
Back to the main thing…
Unfortunately, it appears that President Biden’s team did not insist on a joint statement and instead we have dueling read-outs of what was discussed.
From Washington’s telling in the official read-out issued by the White House shortly after the meeting, the reader gets the sense that the last four years have witnessed the triumph of “managed competition” (referred to on multiple occasions in the read-out). While Washington and Beijing have some remaining “areas of difference,” the “areas of cooperation” are significant… in essence, things look pretty good as Biden leaves the White House. The read-out gives you the sense that the Administration’s approach to the PRC has been both responsible and vindicated.
You get a very different impression when you read what the PRC side put out.
Shortly after the end of the meeting, Xinhua (the Party’s official media mouthpiece) issued a glossy visual of Xi’s main points, and to put it mildly, it had a different vibe.
From Beijing’s telling, Xi Jinping issued an ultimatum to the United States consisting of four “red lines” that must never be crossed (never mind that for years the United States has crossed these so-called red lines and the world has not ended).
Here is a Google Translate version of what was published by CCTV:
“First, we must have a correct strategic understanding. The "Thucydides Trap" is not a historical destiny, the "new Cold War" cannot be fought and cannot be won, and containment of China is unwise, undesirable, and will not succeed.
Second, we must keep our word and act accordingly. A man cannot stand without trust. China always keeps its word, but if the US always says one thing and does another, it will be very detrimental to the US image and will also damage mutual trust between the two sides.
Third, we must treat each other as equals. In the exchanges between the two major countries of China and the United States, neither side can transform the other according to its own wishes, nor can it suppress the other side based on the so-called "power status", let alone deprive the other side of its legitimate right to development in order to maintain its leading position.
Fourth, red lines and bottom lines cannot be challenged. China and the United States are two major countries, and it is inevitable that there will be some contradictions and differences, but they cannot harm each other's core interests, let alone engage in conflict and confrontation. The one-China principle and the three Sino-US joint communiqués are the political foundation of bilateral relations and must be adhered to. The Taiwan issue, democracy and human rights, the road system, and the right to development are China's four red lines that cannot be challenged. These are the most important guardrails and safety nets in Sino-US relations.
Fifth, we should engage in more dialogue and cooperation. Under the current circumstances, the common interests between China and the United States have not decreased, but increased. Whether in the fields of economy and trade, agriculture, drug control, law enforcement, public health, or in the face of global challenges such as climate change and artificial intelligence, as well as on international hot issues, China and the United States need to cooperate. China and the United States should extend the cooperation list, expand the cooperation cake, and achieve win-win cooperation.
Sixth, we must respond to people's expectations. The development of China-US relations should always focus on the well-being of the two peoples and pool the strength of the two peoples. China and the United States should build bridges and pave the way for personnel exchanges and cultural exchanges between the two countries, but also eliminate interference and obstacles and avoid artificially creating a "chilling effect."
Seventh, we must demonstrate our responsibility as major countries. China and the United States should always consider the future and destiny of mankind, take responsibility for world peace, provide global public goods, and play a positive role in world unity, including conducting benign interactions, not engaging in mutual consumption, and not coercing other countries to take sides.”
Why are Chinese leaders using this language of “red lines” now?
This is a signal to the incoming Trump Administration that the Chinese side is very upset and that Washington must correct its thinking and undertake reforms on how it treats China to ensure disaster doesn’t happen.
[NOTE: Is there any recognition from the PRC side that their actions are undermining the core interests of the United States? Absolutely not… the only interests that matter are the Party’s interests]
What do these “red lines” mean?
Henry Gao, a law professor at Singapore Management University and senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation, provided an explainer thread on Twitter/X that I think does a pretty good job translating this ultimatum:
In the parlance of Barack Obama, this is a brushback pitch… rhetoric that is meant to get one’s rival to back-off.
It remains to be seen whether this will work.
President-elect Trump begins to announce his team.
Last week, the President-elect announced a number of cabinet nominations but we still haven’t seen announcements on the three most critical positions for U.S. policy on China: Treasury Secretary, Commerce Secretary, and U.S. Trade Representative. As I argued last week, a second Trump term will focus primarily on the trade balance and seek to employ levers in the commercial, financial, economic, and technological domains to reset the Sino-American economic relationship, along with much of the global economic order.
This will be an Administration focused on economic statecraft and employing to it further American prosperity. They will be less concerned about protecting the norms of globalization and the kind of international trade that has arisen since the founding of the WTO in 1995. Along with fixing illegal immigration, this is the topic that Trump feels he has the largest mandate to take action on.
While both the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor will have enormous influence, those three economic policy positions have statutory authority over the most important levers of economic statecraft.
The problem they will be trying to solve is summed up by this chart published by Semafor this week:
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Why Did Tens of Thousands of Chinese Students Go on Night Bike Rides?
Isabelle Qian and Yan Zhuang, New York Times, November 11, 2024
Making the impromptu five-hour ride between two Chinese cities became a craze among young people. But as their numbers swelled, the authorities shut it down.
The students would emerge on their bikes, in the tens of thousands, seemingly out of nowhere. Like a flash mob on wheels, they rode for hours in the night, by the light of streetlamps, sometimes bursting into verses of the Chinese national anthem. Some carried Chinese flags.
They were making the 40-mile journey from the Chinese city of Zhengzhou, the capital of Henan Province, to the neighboring city of Kaifeng, a cycling trip that can take up to five hours one-way. Why? For the sake of it.
It isn’t clear when the craze really took off, but by early this month, it was drawing hundreds of riders seemingly every night. At first it had been celebrated online and even by the People’s Daily, the Communist Party mouthpiece, which described the night rides as “a symbol of youthful energy and the joy of shared experiences.”
But over the weekend, after the number of riders swelled to the tens of thousands in a country where officials are increasingly wary of impromptu crowds, local authorities shut it down, citing traffic and safety concerns.
COMMENT – First the Party hates young people following the “lying flat” movement, now they hate it when young people ride bikes for 40 miles overnight… there is just no pleasing the Chinese Communist Party.
2. Trump national security appointees signal a new hawkish China policy
Cate Cadell and Ellen Nakashima, Washington Post, November 13, 2024
Powerful foreign policy roles for Marco Rubio, Mike Waltz and Elise Stefanik will put ardent China critics in key positions.
In a sweeping shift toward a hard-line approach, the new Trump administration is tipped to put some of Washington’s most ardent China critics in key foreign policy positions — signaling a potentially more confrontational stance with Beijing.
President-elect Donald Trump has announced Rep. Mike Waltz as his pick for national security adviser and is expected to nominate Sen. Marco Rubio as secretary of State, according to people familiar with the transition team’s thinking. Both men have been proponents of tough China policy, advocating for a diplomatic and security pivot to Asia to counter the growing influence of the Chinese Communist Party.
The transition from vocal legislators into high-stakes diplomatic roles could prove challenging, not least because of Trump’s transactional tendencies — in his first term, he lifted sanctions on a major Chinese telecom manufacturer in exchange for progress on a trade deal and blocked an effort by administration hawks to restrict exports of GE jet engines after an appeal by its chief executive that it would hurt business and worsen the trade deficit.
But analysts say these new appointments could signal a more concerted policy approach to contain China’s ambitions. “This is the biggest, clearest indicator we’ve had so far of the possible direction of Trump’s foreign policy,” said Rush Doshi, a former Biden administration national security official now at the Council on Foreign Relations.
“That may mean a tougher and more bipartisan approach than a transactional one focused on deals with President Xi Jinping,” said Doshi, who also teaches at Georgetown University.
COMMENT – I love the photo the Washington Post chose to headline this article… if you asked ChatGPT to create an image of a passive aggressive handshake between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, this is the picture you would get.
So of course, I asked ChatGPT to do that…
But ChatGPT refuses to make images of recognizable public figures. (Boo!)
So I could only make an image of generic political leaders at an international summit doing a passive aggressive handshake and here is what it generated:
Isn’t technology great?
3. On the Sentencing of Human Rights Defenders Yu Wensheng and Xu Yan
Matthew Miller, U.S. Department of State, October 31, 2024
The United States condemns the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) unjust imprisonment of human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng and his wife, Xu Yan. On October 29, PRC courts sentenced Yu Wensheng to three years in prison and Xu Yan to one year and nine months in prison for allegedly “inciting subversion of state power.” These sentences demonstrate the PRC’s continuing efforts to silence those who speak out for human rights and the rule of law. During Yu and Xu’s trials, authorities barred the attendance of diplomats from several foreign missions, including those from the United States, undermining transparency that is critical to ensuring respect for Yu and Xu’s right to a fair trial.
We call on the PRC to immediately and unconditionally release Yu Wensheng and Xu Yan. We also reiterate our request for the PRC to release all those unjustly detained or imprisoned. The United States continues to stand with those who bravely fight for human rights in the PRC and around the world.
4. 35 killed after car plows into crowds outside sports center in Chinese city, police say
Nectar Gan, CNN, November 13, 2024
Thirty-five people were killed in southern China after a man plowed his car into crowds exercising at an outdoor sports center on Monday evening, according to police, in the country’s deadliest known attack on the public in a decade.
Another 43 people were injured and hospitalized in the rampage in the southern city of Zhuhai, local police said in a statement Tuesday.
Police said the driver, identified as a 62-year-old man surnamed Fan, was apprehended while trying to flee the scene. An initial investigation suggested he was unhappy with the outcome of a divorce settlement, they added.
The death toll is the highest China has seen since 2014, when a string of terrorist attacks rocked the far western region of Xinjiang. But sudden episodes of violence in recent months targeting random members of the public – including school children – have surged across the country as economic growth stutters, unnerving a public long accustomed low violent crime rates and ubiquitous surveillance.
Chinese leader Xi Jinping described the mass hit-and-run in Zhuhai as “extremely vicious,” calling for the perpetrator to be severely punished in accordance with the law, state broadcaster CCTV reported.
Police said Fan’s small off-road vehicle forced its way into the grounds of the sports complex and hit people exercising around a track at around 7:48 p.m. Monday.
COMMENT – I know that this will shock readers of this newsletter, but immediately after this horrendous act of violence, the Party reacted like this:
· After Deadly Car Rampage, Chinese Officials Try to Erase Any Hint of It
Vivian wang, New York Times, November 13, 2024
“Flowers left at the site of the attack, which killed at least 35 people, were quickly removed. Censors deleted videos, articles and comments about it.”
5. China must face ‘higher cost’ for backing Russia in Ukraine, says next EU foreign policy chief
Jennifer Rankin, The Guardian, November 12, 2024
China should face “a higher cost” for supporting Russia in the war against Ukraine, the EU’s incoming foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, has said.
The former Estonian prime minister was speaking to MEPs during a three-hour hearing before she takes office, when she listed Ukraine’s victory as a priority – stronger words than vaguer formulas of support voiced by some EU politicians.
“Victory of Ukraine is a priority for us all; the situation on the battlefield is very difficult,” Kallas told MEPs in her opening remarks. “That is why we must keep on working every day, today, tomorrow and for as long as it takes, and with as much military, financial and humanitarian aid as needed.”
In a carefully worded overture to the incoming Donald Trump administration, she said support for Ukraine was in the US’s interest. “If the US is worried about China, or other actors, then they should also be worried about how we respond … [to] Russia’s war against Ukraine, because we see how Iran, North Korea, China – more covertly – and Russia are working together.”
COMMENT – For my readers who are NOT European, Kaja Kallas just finished her hearings before the European Parliament to be confirmed as the next High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs and security policy, as well as Vice-President of the European Commission (a position abbreviated as HR/VP).
If confirmed, she will replace Josep Borrell, a 77 year-old Spanish Socialist, who has filled the second most senior role at the European Commission since December 2019. The position of HR/VP is essentially Europe’s Foreign Minister and leads Europe’s foreign service, known as the European External Action Service (EEAS).
For the last three years, Kallas was Estonia’s Prime Minister and a loud proponent of defending Ukraine. She is a center-right politician from the Estonian Reform Party (also known as the “Squirrel Party” since its logo is a leaping squirrel… no I’m not joking). While being a harsh critic of Putin, she has also been a harsh critic of the PRC for its support of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine as well as the PRC’s behavior more generally.
6. Trump Could Win the Contest with China Once and for All
Craig Singleton, New York Times, November 14, 2024
Donald Trump’s first term signaled a historic shift in U.S. policy toward China. His strategic blend of economic pressure, unpredictability, sanctions and tariffs knocked Beijing off balance. It was a turning point: Washington moved from passive acceptance of China’s revisionist ambitions to assertive opposition. The Biden administration has wisely maintained and in some cases expanded on this framework.
Mr. Trump’s second term could help America to win this strategic contest altogether.
China faces an array of challenges, especially a stagnating economy, making it vulnerable to the president-elect’s assertive tactics. If Mr. Trump can couple the blustery style of his first term with a more focused strategy and tighter discipline, the next four years are a golden opportunity to keep Beijing on the defensive and permanently transform the rivalry in America’s favor.
For China, the ideal outcome in the U.S. election would have been another four years of the Biden-Harris administration’s cautious approach. Although President Biden maintained targeted pressure on Beijing, his emphasis on détente and aversion to escalation would have afforded China’s leader, Xi Jinping, the predictability he needs to address his domestic troubles and advance China’s ambitions in critical areas such as technology, trade and the future of Taiwan.
But Mr. Trump isn’t content with merely managing the competition with Beijing. He aims to win it. His zero-sum approach and unconventional tactics — as well as an emerging cabinet of China hawks — are likely to deny Mr. Xi the breathing room he desperately needs and push the Chinese leader into a high-stakes test of wills he cannot easily control or predict.
COMMENT – Great piece by Craig Singleton, I’m glad the New York Times had the courage to publish it.
7. TikTok deletes videos related to Uyghur human rights violations
Arslan Tash, Radio Free Asia, November 5, 2024
Uyghurs living abroad say they believe China is behind the deletions.
Nefise Oguz, a Uyghur student at Istanbul University, uploaded a video to TikTok of a brief debate she had with Doğu Perinçek, leader of Turkey’s nationalist Patriotic Party, about the Uyghur genocide and China’s oppressive policies in Xinjiang.
She posted it on the popular short-video platform on the evening of Oct. 24 after sharing it on Facebook and other social media sites — only to discover it had been deleted from TikTok the next morning.
Tik Tok said it removed the video because it violated its community guidelines. News of the incident spread on social media, generating strong opposition from Uyghurs.
Other Uyghurs living abroad say TikTok is deleting videos about human rights violations in Xinjiang, the far-western region of China where 12 million mostly Muslim Uyghurs live.
But TikTok and its Chinese parent company, ByteDance, have said they have no relationship with the Chinese government, which censors such posts within its borders.
RFA emailed TikTok for comment about this specific case, but did not receive a response.
“The ethnic genocide and oppression of the Uyghurs by the Chinese government is a fact,” Oguz told Radio Free Asia. “I uploaded a video to TikTok, but it was removed because it made them uncomfortable.”
COMMENT – Sources, including Kellyanne Conway, came out this week stating that the new Trump Administration would block the ban that is scheduled to take place on January 19, unless ByteDance agrees to sell the social media app.
But as Politico reported in March, Kellyanne Conway has been lobbying on behalf of TikTok for nearly a year.
8. T-Mobile hacked in massive Chinese breach of telecom networks, WSJ reports
Urvi Dugar, Kanjyik Ghosh and Surbhi Misra, Reuters, November 16, 2024
T-Mobile's network was among the systems hacked in a damaging Chinese cyber-espionage operation that gained entry into multiple U.S. and international telecommunications companies, The Wall Street Journal reported on Friday citing people familiar with the matter.
Hackers linked to a Chinese intelligence agency were able to breach T-Mobile as part of a monthslong campaign to spy on the cellphone communications of high-value intelligence targets, the Journal added, without saying when the attack took place.
"T-Mobile is closely monitoring this industry-wide attack," a company spokesperson told Reuters in an email.
"At this time, T-Mobile systems and data have not been impacted in any significant way, and we have no evidence of impacts to customer information."
It was unclear what information, if any, was taken about T-Mobile customers' calls and communications records, according to the WSJ report.
On Wednesday, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the U.S. cyber watchdog agency CISA said China-linked hackers have intercepted surveillance data intended for American law enforcement agencies after breaking into an unspecified number of telecom companies.
COMMENT – As a friend observed in one of the chat groups I’m in: “perhaps it would be easier now just listing the entities the PRC has NOT hacked into.”
8. Canadian indigenous groups seek deals with China despite security fears
Ilya Gridneff, Financial Times, November 14, 2024
Canada’s indigenous communities are seeking deals with China that could give Beijing access to the country’s natural resources, despite warnings from Canadian security services over doing business with Xi Jinping’s government.
This week the Canada China Business Council indigenous trade mission is in Beijing to discuss potential energy and other business deals in a trip that could put Canada’s national “reconciliation” with its First Nation communities at odds with its national security priorities.
Karen Ogen, the trade mission’s co-chair and chief executive of the First Nations Liquefied Natural Gas Alliance, said her goal on the trip, which starts on Wednesday, was to sell LNG for the benefit of the Wet’suwet’en communities in Canada’s western province of British Columbia.
“We’ve been oppressed and repressed by our own government,” she said. “I know the history with China is not good but we have an understanding of what we need and what they need.”
Prime Minister Justin Trudeau came to power in 2015 pledging to promote “economic reconciliation” with indigenous, or first nation, communities, which for decades saw their ancestral lands and resources exploited by European settlers and their culture belittled and attacked.
He committed to spend billions on business, economic and social programmes in an effort to reduce inequalities between indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians. The government also signed a number of land-sharing treaties with first nations communities giving them rights over the natural resources in their territories — subject to federal foreign investment rules.
Despite the pledges, many first nations communities remain socially and economically deprived. Earlier this year, a UN special rapporteur said Canada’s failure to provide First Nations reserves with clean drinking water and sanitation constituted a human rights violation.
China has spotted an opportunity in the sometimes fraught relations between Canada’s national and provincial governments and indigenous groups.
In 2021, shortly after Canada imposed sanctions on Beijing over the treatment of its Uyghur population, Chinese officials began to object to the “systemic violations of Indigenous people’s rights by the US, Canada and Australia” at the UN’s Human Rights Council.
“The PRC tries to undermine trust between Indigenous communities and Canada’s government by advancing a narrative that the PRC understands and empathises with the struggles of Indigenous communities stemming from colonialism and racism,” said a spokesperson for Canada’s security intelligence service.
A 2023 CSIS report accused China’s government of employing “grey zone, deceptive and clandestine means” to influence Canadian policymaking, including Indigenous communities.
“China knows how sensitive Indigenous reconciliation is to the Trudeau government,” said Phil Gurski, a former CSIS intelligence analyst.
Relations between Canada and China have deteriorated significantly in recent years. An official inquiry reported in May that China had directly meddled in Canada’s 2019 and 2021 elections and was “the most active foreign state actor engaged in interference” in the country. Ottawa’s 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy also described China as “increasingly disruptive”.
As a result, Canada’s policy towards Beijing is becoming more in line with that of the US, with Ottawa imposing tariffs on Chinese goods and forcing Chinese-owned social media company TikTok to close its Canadian office.
This realignment is expected to become even more important with the election of Donald Trump south of the border. “Canada would be expected to enforce harsher trade governance with China,” said Marc Ercolao, an economist with TD Bank.
But CSIS remains concerned over Beijing’s possible access to resource-rich areas or geopolitically important waterways and regions such as the Arctic through First Nations groups.
“It not only undermines the government but is a way to potentially embarrass them on Canada’s past,” said Gurski.
But Matt Vickers, from Sechelt Nations land in Canada’s western province of British Columbia, who first visited China in the 1990s and is part of the CCBC delegation heading to Beijing this week, rejected the concerns of the security services.
“China now understands that for any major project to receive approval in Canada, you need First Nation consent, and not only consent but the First Nations require a majority equity play in those projects,” he said.
The CCBC is a bipartisan organisation consisting of Canada’s biggest companies, including Power Corp, which is the main sponsor of the Indigenous event.
This week’s trip marks the third time a group of Indigenous officials has travelled with the council to China in an effort to identify export markets, sources of capital and potential tourism projects.
“These missions have been developed in the spirit of reconciliation and collaboration, to help delegates better understand how China’s economy and economic development influences its desire for imports and investment opportunities,” said Sarah Kutulakos, executive director of the CCBC.
The Chinese embassy in Ottawa declined to comment on CSIS’s security concerns over deals with First Nations communities but said: “We are pleased to see Canadians from all walks of life, including Indigenous Canadians, proactively engage in pragmatic co-operation with China.”
Deteriorating relations between Ottawa and Beijing meant this year’s CCBC meeting would likely be “sombre”, said former Canadian ambassador to China Guy Saint-Jacques.
First Nations leaders should have “very limited expectations” from the trip. “I don’t expect big business coming out of it,” he said.
But Ogen, of the First Nations LNG Alliance, said she would put the controversy surrounding the trip to Beijing aside. “I . . . look at the global energy sector, China’s need for our gas, and how I can make the best deal for my people,” she said.
COMMENT – More divide and conquer tactics by the CCP within democracies.
Authoritarianism
9. Hong Kong independent outlet InMedia fined HK$10,000 after being reported for not keeping registers at office
Irene Chan, Hong Kong Free Press, November 7, 2024
10. Hong Kong civil servants to be given confidential guidelines on how to safeguard national security
Irene Chan, Hong Kong Free Press, November 6, 2024
11. China journalism award for English story signals drive to shape narrative
Kenji Kawase, Nikkei Asia, November 11, 2024
12. City in Xinjiang Deletes Video Boasting That WeChat Records User Activity for Law Enforcement
Alexander Boyd, China Digital Times, November 7, 2024
13. “Provisions on the Fingerprint Information Work of Public Security Organs”
Daniel Asen, China Law Translate, November 8, 2024
14. China's local police seizing assets, demanding payments amid economic downturn
Bo Gu, Voice of America, November 8, 2024
15. China clamps down on quest for soup dumplings by 'Night Riding Army'
Reuters, Voice of America, November 11, 2024
16. Commending a Compliant Press
David Bandurski, China Media Project, November 12, 2024
17. Hong Kong ‘upgrades’ lamppost that matched Tiananmen massacre date
Alice Yam and Wei Sze, Radio Free Asia, November 11, 2024
18. Xi Jinping faces heat over failure to protect Chinese workers overseas
Kathrin Hille and Humza Jilani, Financial Times, November 12, 2024
19. Kyle Bass Hails Trump’s China Hawks as ‘Realists’ on Xi Threat
Vinicius Andrade, Bloomberg, November 12, 2024
Politico, November 11, 2024
“If the United States is worried about China, they should first be worried about Russia,” Kallas told MEPs — not for the first time. Maybe a hint at how she’ll approach Trump’s administration in the future?
As for China, the EU must treat the country “as more of a competitor and a systemic rival,” she said. “We need to [tackle] the areas where our vulnerabilities are the greatest, and we know what those are.
Environmental Harms
21. Mega-polluter China believes it is a climate saviour
The Economist, November 12, 2024
22. Trump Victory Leaves China Calling the Shots at COP29 Climate Negotiations
Matthew Dalton, Wall Street Journal, November 11, 2024
With Donald Trump’s election victory, the U.S. is headed again for the exits of the Paris accord, the international climate agreement signed nearly a decade ago, and toward an energy policy inspired by Trump’s campaign mantra “drill, baby, drill.”
China, on the other hand, appears more committed to the agreement than ever. It has vaulted to global leadership in renewable-energy deployment and is spending billions on green-energy projects across the developing world. Poorer nations increasingly look to Beijing for help shifting away from fossil fuels.
The sharp divergence between the two leading superpowers is expected to loom over the annual United Nations climate conference, known as COP29, kicking off in Baku, Azerbaijan, on Monday. Chinese leaders have thrown the country’s titanic economic power behind the shift to clean energy for economic, environmental and geostrategic reasons.
“China stands ready to work with other parties to uphold the goal, principles and system of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said on Friday.
Trump’s victory has underscored what many countries already believed: that America’s internal political divisions mean it can’t reliably lead global climate diplomacy. If Trump follows through on withdrawal, it would be the third time this century that a Republican president has pulled the U.S. out of a major international climate agreement.
“Everyone looks to China now,” said Jonathan Pershing, a senior U.S. climate negotiator under the Obama and Biden administrations. “I think with the U.S. out, China will step up, but in a very different way.”
COMMENT – The entire UN-led COP (Conference of the Parties) approach has failed, not because of Trump or Xi, but because the entire process has degenerated into a battle between “developed” and “developing” countries. Loud constituencies within “developed” (rich) countries want to halt (and reverse) carbon emissions but lack the political consensus to pay for it on a global scale and so demand a slowing of development and energy intensive activities.
Populations within “developing” countries want the benefits of energy intensive life-styles, but can’t afford low-cardon or no-carbon solutions. They demand that rich countries pay the difference if they want developing countries to adopt more costly energy solutions.
So we are at an impasse… much as we are with international trade.
23. China urges ‘constructive dialogue’ on climate change under Donald Trump
Attracta Mooney, Financial Times, November 12, 2024
Foreign Interference and Coercion
24. New Hong Kong Watch report exposes transnational repression in Hong Kong's digital space
Hong Kong Watch, November 5, 2024
25. Hong Kong journalist to sue Wall Street Journal over sacking
Wei Sze and Edward Li, Radio Free Asia, November 12, 2024
26. Canada Shuts TikTok’s Offices Over National Security Risks
Meaghan Tobin, New York Times, November 7, 2024
27. China uses London travel show to promote its narrative of Xinjiang in the West
Erkin Tarim, Radio Free Asia, November 8, 2024
28. Siemens to 'defend market share' in China, says CEO Busch
Shogo Akagawa, Nikkei Asia, November 13, 2024
29. Japan PM Ishiba set to meet China's Xi on Friday in Peru
Rieko Miki, Nikkei Asia, November 13, 2024
30. Southeast Asia Responds to Trump’s Victory
Joshua Kurlantzick, Council on Foreign Relations, November 8, 2024
31. Palau president hits out at China as re-election confirmed
Aljazeera, November 13, 2024
32. Philippines says China is pushing it to cede claims in South China Sea
Peter Hobson and Lewis Jackson, Japan Times, November 13, 2024
33. Indonesia says it has no overlapping South China Sea claims with China, despite deal
Stanley Widianto, Reuters, November 11, 2024
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
34. He Made a Daring Escape from China. Then His Real Troubles Began.
Nyrola Elimä and Ben Mauk, New York Times, November 10, 2024
35. Once China’s ‘Worst Nightmare,’ Labor Activist Refuses to Back Down
Alexandra Stevenson, New York Times, November 10, 2024
36. Across Asia, crimes against journalists keep mounting
Radio Free Asia, October 31, 2024
37. Hunan’s Changsha Grace Light Church Raided by Police
Mo Yuan, Bitter Winter, November 13, 2024
38. Tibet, Sera Monastery Monk Persecuted to Death in Detention
Lopsang Gurung, Bitter Winter, November 12, 2024
39. “Red Cultural Education” for Clergy of All Religions in China
Hu Zimo, Bitter Winter, November 7, 2024
40. China must urgently release human rights lawyer Yu Wensheng and activist Xu Yan
Amnesty International, November 11, 2024
41. Why Did the Vatican Renew Its Agreement with China?
Massimo Introvigne, Bitter Winter, October 29, 2024
42. Jailed Tibetan community leader denied retrial
Radio Free Asia, November 8, 2024
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
43. Top China Hedge Fund Urges Clients to Pull Cash on Trump Risks
Bloomberg, November 8, 2024
44. Trump's new trade war hangs over APEC summit
Pak Yiu, Nikkei Asia, November 13, 2024
45. China Seen Countering Trump Tariffs with Stimulus, Weaker Yuan
Bloomberg, November 11, 2024
46. A diminished Biden heads to APEC summit in Peru, overshadowed by China's Xi
Isabel Debre and David Biller, Associated Press, November 13, 2024
47. Chinese stocks diverge amid stimulus disenchantment, Trump worries
Echo Wong and Wataru Suzuki, Nikkei Asia, November 11, 2024
48. Singles Day campaigns target overseas Chinese as domestic growth falters
Cissy Zhou, Nikkei Asia, November 12, 2024
49. TikTok and its owner ramped up their hiring from China, even as Congress raised national security concerns
Dan Whateley, Business Insider, November 12, 2024
50. Hong Kong’s Trophy Homes Are Selling at Fire Sale Prices
Alexandra Stevenson, New York Times, November 12, 2024
51. As Trump Threatens a Wider Trade War, the U.S. Confronts a Changed China
Peter S. Goodman, New York Times, November 11, 2024
52. In South America, Trump already losing a trade battle with China
Marco Aquino and Eduardo Baptista, Reuters, November 11, 2024
53. Toyota aims to ramp up China production
Maki Shiraki, Reuters, November 10, 2024
54. Aftermath of Trump’s win eclipses Chinese solar project in Texas
Benjamin Storrow and Kelsey Tamborrino, Politico, November 11, 2024
55. Specter of China hovers over US colleges
Tara McKelvey, Radio Free Asia, November 11, 2024
56. China’s space ambitions face ‘huge test’ from Musk presence in Trump White House
Orange Wang and Enoch Wong, South China Morning Post, November 13, 2024
57. China’s 4 commercial jets unboxed: from the rebranded C909 to a futuristic C939
Frank Chen and Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, November 13, 2024
58. China battery giant CATL would build US plant if Trump allows it
Reuters, November 13, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
59. Tokyo Electron weighs China chip risk as it upgrades profit outlook
Kyoka Yuasa, Tsuyoshi Tamehiro, and Hiroki Masuda, Nikkei Asia, November 13, 2024
60. TSMC Stops Advanced Chip Shipments to Chinese Customers
Meaghan Tobin and Ana Swanson, New York Times, November 9, 2024
61. Vietnam expands chip packaging footprint as investors reduce China links
Francesco Guarascio, Reuters, November 11, 2024
Military and Security Threats
62. Mike Waltz wants America to focus on the threat from China
The Economist, November 13, 2024
63. China holds combat drills at a disputed shoal west of the Philippines
Associated Press, ABC News, November 13, 2024
64. Germany arrests US national accused of spying for China
Aljazeera, November 7, 2024
65. Satellite images and documents indicate China working on nuclear propulsion for new aircraft carrier
David Rising and Didi Tang, Associated Press, November 10, 2024
66. China's Hacker Army Outshines America
Micah McCartney and Didi Kirsten Tatlow, Newsweek, November 13, 2024
67. NATO chief warns of threat from Russian ties with China, Iran and North Korea
John Irish, Japan Times, November 13, 2024
68. Philippines aims to buy US missile launcher in move likely to anger China
Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, November 10, 2024
69. China's J-35A stealth fighter is 'black box' despite splashy debut
Gerry Doyle, Reuters, November 12, 2024
70. Chinese hackers gained access to huge trove of Americans’ cell records
John Sakellariadis, Politico, November 6, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
71. The Belt and Road Isn’t Dead. It’s Evolving.
Mie Hoejris Dahl, Foreign Policy, November 13, 2024
In Latin America, China is saying goodbye to big bets and bridges in favor of a new approach.
Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Peru this week for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, during which he will inaugurate the deep-water port of Chancay, about 45 miles north of Lima. It’s a $3.6 billion project—one of China’s largest infrastructure investments in the region in the past two decades.
It also may be one of the last of its kind.
Upon becoming president in 2013, in an attempt to deepen the so-called going out strategy and find new markets for booming Chinese production, Xi initiated a reform agenda that intensified diplomatic outreach and boosted overseas investment, the capstone of which was the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Big infrastructure contracts were a win-win move: They allowed China to offload excess capacity of steel, labor, and other inputs while providing urgently needed infrastructure to Latin America. Since 2017, 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean have formally joined the BRI, utterly transforming China’s relationship with the continent. China is now Latin America’s second-largest trading partner, after only the United States.
But after two decades of growing sway in the region, Beijing is taking a new approach. As it struggles to manage an economic slowdown, a mounting debt burden, and a broken real estate market, Beijing is bringing an end to the era of high-risk, high-cost mega-infrastructure projects in favor of smaller, new frontier investments in cloud computing, 5G technology, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and electric vehicles.
China has pitched its new strategy to the world as visionary and forward-looking. Its Latin American partners, however, are less convinced.
The significant, long-standing infrastructure gap in Latin America has made leaders hungry for external investment. Whereas the United States and the European Union have been reluctant to put up large sums, China was happy to get involved.
BRI money has funded roads through the jungles of Costa Rica; railways in Bolivia and Argentina; industrial parks and a container port in Trinidad and Tobago; the biggest hydroelectric plant in Ecuador; and the first transoceanic fiber-optic cable directly connecting Asia to South America, stretching from China to Chile, among other projects.
These big infrastructure projects have paralleled increased Chinese investments in soft power and diplomacy. The United States used to be very adept with its Latin American partners, but China has overtaken it, said Benjamin Creutzfeldt, a China scholar.
“The Chinese have become better at engaging through charm offensives with their charismatic ambassadors,” he said. “They learned how to deal with their counterparts effectively.”
But China’s expansion in the region—particularly in hard infrastructure—has come at a cost for Latin America. Chinese companies have been accused of substandard construction practices and corruption in prior big-item investments.
For instance, the Coca Codo Sinclair dam, a hydroelectric rock-fill dam in the jungles of Ecuador, has not stopped making negative headlines since being inaugurated in November 2016. The estimated $3.4 billion project—the largest in Ecuador’s history—was built and financed by China as a flagship BRI project. But by July 2022, more than 17,000 cracks had already splintered across the dam, and many of the top Ecuadorian officials involved in the construction have been imprisoned or sentenced on bribery charges related to the project.
Not only is Ecuador now left with faulty infrastructure, it’s also stuck with crushing amounts of debt. The BRI has shifted China from being Latin America’s ATM to its biggest debt collector. China rivals the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank as the biggest creditor in the region and has left Latin America with the highest level of debt service payments in the world, at an estimated 4 percent of regional GDP. According to the research from the Center for Economic Policy Research, the share of Chinese loans to countries in financial distress increased from about 5 percent in 2010 to about 60 percent in 2022.
For its part, Ecuador is attempting to pay back its debt by exporting oil to China at almost an 80 percent discount. But this arrangement could cause problems for China, too, in the long run.
“Supporting these mega-projects, which do not have big returns, in indebted countries, isn’t necessarily a good business strategy,” said Leland Lazarus, the associate director of national security at Florida International University’s Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy.
“China is at the risk of not getting their money back,” said Axel Dreher, a professor at Germany’s Heidelberg University.
72. Planned link to Brazil raises geopolitical stakes for China-funded port in Peru
Igor Patrick, South China Morning Post, November 12, 2024
73. Peru's Chinese-built mega port to soft launch in late November with Shanghai route
Reuters, October 18, 2024
74. Could China-US rivalry go off the rails in Africa over a resourceful train route?
Jevans Nyabiage and Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, November 12, 2024
75. Beijing pushes to join security efforts for citizens in Pakistan, sources say
Asif Shahzad, Reuters, November 12, 2024
Opinion Pieces
76. How Taiwan can—and often does—help itself
Richard C. Bush, Brookings Institution, November 8, 2024
77. Trump’s Biggest China Problem Won’t Be Trade
Minxin Pei, Bloomberg, November 11, 2024
78. China Should Be Worried About North Korea
Lee Hee-ok and Sungmin Cho, Foreign Affairs, November 12, 2024
79. US getting military part right - and still losing the Pacific
Grant Newsham, Asia Times, November 13, 2024
80. The New U.S. Arctic Strategy Is Wrong to Focus on China
Jo Inge Bekkevold and Paal Sigurd Hilde, Foreign Policy, November 11, 2024
It emphasizes limited Chinese activities instead of the much more potent Russian threat.
The U.S. Defense Department’s latest Arctic strategy, issued in July, clearly states that China is not an Arctic nation, yet it identifies China as the main challenge to U.S. interests in the region. This is the first time the Pentagon officially placed China front and center of its approach to the Arctic. China was not even mentioned in its 2013 Arctic strategy and only once in the 2016 version. In the 2019 version, under the first Trump administration, China was given a more prominent position—but not as a primary emphasis. The 2024 strategy thus reflects China’s status as the pacing challenge to U.S. national security worldwide. With the second Trump administration expected to double down on the U.S.-China strategic rivalry, this reframing of Arctic policy will likely be continued or even accelerated.
In the context of the U.S.-China superpower rivalry, it is natural and understandable that China features prominently in U.S. strategic thinking and policies on various topics and regions around the world. Nonetheless, it is widely acknowledged that global and regional power balances may differ. This means that even though China is now the pacing challenge for U.S. national security at large, its power and ability to threaten U.S. interests varies from one region to another. And indeed, the Arctic power structure differs from the global one, not least due to Russia’s dominant position.
At its core, the United States’ new Arctic strategy prioritizes Alaska as a strategic flank in its rivalry with China. Alaska has played an important role in U.S. national security since the start of the Cold War. It hosts aerospace warning and control systems important to U.S. homeland defense, and, in recent years, the state has become integral to the execution of U.S. operations in the Indo-Pacific theater.
Nevertheless, the Pentagon’s strong focus on the U.S.-China rivalry in its Arctic strategy has two potential pitfalls.
First, by identifying China as the main threat to U.S. interests in the Arctic, the Pentagon’s new strategy contributes to enhancing a somewhat skewed narrative of the threat China actually poses there. While some commentators portray China as a “polar great power” attempting to push its way into the Arctic—and as Beijing runs highly visible Arctic diplomacy—the reality is that China currently has very limited political, economic, and military influence there.
Whereas the U.S. strategy observes that China “seeks to promote the Arctic region as a ‘global commons,’” the Arctic is neither unclaimed nor ungoverned. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) constitutes not only the legal basis on which the Arctic littoral states can claim sovereign rights to most of the Arctic Ocean (this includes the United States, despite its failure to ratify the treaty), but also a core of the governance regime covering the region.
Beijing’s ability to use bilateral channels to enhance its influence is also limited because four of the five are strong democracies and NATO members—and that number increases to seven out of eight if the entire Arctic Council (made up the five littoral states plus Finland, Iceland, and Sweden) is included. It is difficult to see any Arctic nation beyond Russia being keen on enabling China to gain a strong foothold in the region. Indeed, evidence suggests that the Arctic democracies have all become increasingly aware and wary of Chinese overtures. For instance, when rumors surfaced in September that local Norwegian authorities welcomed Chinese investors in the Arctic port of Kirkenes, Norwegian Minister of Justice and Public Security Enger Mehl quickly clarified that Oslo will not allow such an investment if it runs counter to national security interests. Similarly, China has failed to entice Iceland and Greenland—both of which are often seen as particularly vulnerable to the lure of large Chinese investments.
In fact, most of China’s attempts at investing in Arctic resources outside Russia have been put on hold or have failed altogether. Even in the Russian Arctic, China’s economic footprint is relatively limited beyond its engagement in the Yamal liquefied natural gas project. Moreover, China’s ambition for a so-called Polar Silk Road through the Arctic Ocean has yet to result in any substantial shipment of goods through Arctic waters.
Regarding military activities, which is the Pentagon’s main concern, China has no military presence in the Arctic beyond brief visits. Chinese icebreaking research vessels occasionally operate in the Arctic Ocean, and some of their research activities may indeed have military value. In early October, Chinese Coast Guard vessels sailed into the Arctic Ocean for the first time on a joint patrol with two Russian Border Service ships. It will take more than a couple of icebreakers and coast guard vessels to make China a military player in the Arctic.
Wider research activity by China in the Arctic, which members of the U.S. Congress drew attention to recently, clearly may have a dual-use or purely military purpose. Yet this should also be kept in perspective. While the Chinese Polar Research Institute has a presence in Ny Alesund on Svalbard, a Norwegian archipelago, and on Iceland, this is a minor engagement compared to its five independent research stations in Antarctica. Moreover, China’s lack of military presence and activity in the Arctic obviously reduces the military value of any dual-use research. This is clearly the case for the land and sea domains, but perhaps less clear-cut with regard to aerospace activities.
China is increasing its military activity off the coast of Alaska, though. In July, four Chinese naval vessels sailed in the Bering Sea. During the same month, China and Russia conducted their first joint bomber patrol over the North Pacific and Bering Strait, near the coast of Alaska. While these planes might have briefly crossed the Arctic Circle, such activities should be interpreted not as Arctic maneuvers but as Chinese flank operations in the U.S.-China East Asian maritime theater.
The second potential pitfall of overemphasizing China in the U.S. Arctic strategy is the risk of underemphasizing the core challenge to Arctic stability: Russia. Geography allows Russia to claim nearly half of the Arctic under UNCLOS, making it the biggest Arctic state, and China’s ability to enhance its position in the region fully depends on Moscow’s willingness to open its door. From this, it follows that the best way to understand China’s influence in the Arctic is to examine Russia’s position, policies, and interests in the region.
The European Arctic is clearly the most important part of the region in terms of population, as well as economic and military activity. The Kola Peninsula is home to Russia’s Northern Fleet, which operates most of Russia’s nuclear-armed strategic submarines. The missiles on these submarines constitute the only substantial threat against the United States that originates in the Arctic, making the Northern Fleet a prime intelligence interest. Moreover, while it is only a faint shadow of its Soviet predecessor, the Northern Fleet does pose a potential threat to the Atlantic sea lines of communications. Its in the past, the latter concern was mainly related to transatlantic fiber-optic cables, but the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline in September 2022 made it a broader issue. While there is limited undersea infrastructure in the Arctic, it is a concern there, too.
Furthermore, the strategy understates the fact that short of a nuclear exchange with Russia or any other country, the European Arctic is the part of the region where U.S. forces are most likely to be engaged in a conflict and where U.S. forces are already the most active. The U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy and Marines have all been actively engaged in exercises and other activities in the European Arctic in recent years as part of a wider European engagement to deter Russia and support allies. Relatedly, it is hard to envision that the recently reestablished 11th Airborne Division, based in Alaska, has any role in defending Arctic territory in the Indo-Pacific; the division’s exercises suggest that any Arctic role for it will likely be in Northern Europe. This pattern is reflected at the political and strategic military levels, where the United States regularly discusses Arctic issues with Canada and European allies, all of whom are primarily concerned about Russia.
COMMENT – I understand the criticism by the authors, but I think its misplaced. The strategy seems focused on preventing the PRC from gaining greater access and influence in the Arctic and it acknowledges a reality: Russia already is an important Arctic power and has legitimate interests there.
Europe, Canada and the United States can balance Russian power in the Arctic (and they should), but allowing the PRC to play an increased role there will throw off that balance, hence the reason for focusing on Beijing’s activities.
The authors end with this:
“It is evident, therefore, that the strategy is not really about the Arctic, but about China in the Arctic—and about Alaska’s role as a flank in the U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific strategic theater.”
The authors seem to view an effective Arctic Strategy as something that should stand on its own… I think the opposite is true. Integrating the Arctic into our wider grand strategy is the way to go as it allows for prioritization and coherent policies. To do as the authors suggest, we will just get a bunch of stand-alone strategies that make little sense in the aggregate.
81. Trump's Contempt Is China's Gain in Latin America
Juan Pablo Spinetto, Bloomberg, November 13, 2024
82. China’s Cops Are Coming to a City Near You
Karishma Vaswani, Bloomberg, November 11, 2024
83. Will China’s influence in Africa’s AI revolution undermine its sovereignty?
Alberto Lemma, Africa Report, November 5, 2024