Friends,
Former Premier Li Keqiang, the moderating hand on the tiller of the PRC during Xi’s first two terms, died early Friday of an apparent heart attack at the age of 68.
Li, who many saw as a more reform-minded official and open to the kinds of economic liberalizations favored by his fellow economists, had been largely sidelined by Xi Jinping over the past five years as the latter shifted the country ever more towards securitization and a state-controlled economy.
Li’s death leaves many with questions about what might have been. What if Li, not Xi, had been picked as General Secretary nearly 15 years ago? Perhaps we might have seen a far different China emerge, one that was committed to reform and opening, as well as pragmatic about cooperation with democracies instead of forming an Authoritarian Entente with Putin.
Alas it didn’t happen.
While I doubt a similar series of events will unfold, I’m reminded of what did happen nearly 35 years ago when another respected and reform-minded former leader died of a heart attack.
In April 1989, Hu Yaobang died suddenly nearly two years after he had been sidelined and removed from power as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party by Deng Xiaoping and more security focused hard-liners. Like Li, Hu had played a moderating role within the Party and when he died, more than 100,000 students took to the streets in Beijing to mourn him and champion the ideals that they believed he stood for.
Those initial student gatherings expanded and turned into a broader democracy movement in Tiananmen and in other cities across the country. Hu’s successor as General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, sympathized with the movement and wanted to pursue negotiation. Deng and Premier Li Peng sacked Zhao, placed him under house arrest for the remainder of his life, and called in the PLA to end the reform movement.
That effort by Chinese citizens to call for modest liberalization and a loosening of the Party’s grip on power culminated with the imposition of martial law on the night of June 3 and the Tiananmen massacre early on June 4 under the portrait of Mao.
So why would I highlight that story about Hu and popular protest? Because clearly Xi and his supporters are thinking about it today… and taking every measure to downplay and dismiss Li Keqiang’s death. They clearly do not want similar sympathies to animate Chinese citizens today.
Phil Cunningham at the China Story Substack and his running series “CCTV Follies” showed just how desperate the regime is to avoid any kind of repeat of 1989. Terse announcements on CCTV (the party-controlled broadcaster) and print media followed by propaganda notices at the provincial level warning against the dissemination of any information about remembrance or mourning activity. The leaked versions of these notices also direct that only the state-issued obituary can be used in reference to Li.
The Party’s censors clearly understand that there is latent sympathy for Li within the Party’s cadres and that citizens may mobilize around a set of ideals that they associate with the former Premier who stood up to Xi.
What might Chinese citizens rally around?
In March as Li Keqiang was retiring, he gave farewell remarks to government officials in a courtyard. Those remarks were captured by cell-phone videos and distributed before being censored. In those remarks Li obliquely criticizes Xi Jinping, his most memorable phrase being: “Heaven is looking at what humans are doing. The firmament has eyes.”
That may not seem particularly inflammatory to any of us, but in Xi’s China it is downright incendiary.
I would not be at all surprised to see a brave Chinese citizen unfurl a banner with those words at some point in the future, just as Peng Lifa did with his banners on Beijing’s Sitong Bridge a year ago, just before the 20th Party Congress. (No surprise to anyone, Peng Lifa was disappeared the next day, his family and friends remain under government surveillance, and they are forbidden from hiring a lawyer to assist in protecting him).
For more on these internal struggles within the PRC, see the Nikkei Asia article that CCTV Follies highlighted: “In his parting words, Li Keqiang warns that ‘heaven is watching,” Katsuji Nakazawa, Nikkei Asia, March 9, 2023.
Qin and Li
This week, we learned a little more about Qin Gang (the disappeared PRC foreign minister) and General Li Shangfu (the disappeared PRC defense minister). Party mouthpiece CCTV announced that both had been formally stripped of their titles as State Councilors and that Li had been removed as a member of the Central Military Commission. Qin has since been replaced by Wang Yi as foreign minister, but no replacement of General Li has been named.
For those who thought we might get some more detail on WHY these two hand-picked officials of Xi had been purged… tough luck, no explanation was given.
Wang visits Washington while Newsom visits Beijing
On Thursday, Foreign Minister Wang Yi while standing next to a smiling Secretary Blinken at the State Department, made some short remarks before the two began their talks.
Wang started and ended by stressing that Blinken had asked for this meeting; bringing up what must be a sore point for Blinken. When Blinken’s June visit to Beijing was publicly announced, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs released this terse statement from their spokesperson: “as agreed between China and the U.S., U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken will visit China from June 18 to 19.”
One is left to believe, as many suspected at the time, that Blinken and his team had lobbied hard to invite himself to Beijing (and the PRC reluctantly agreed). On Thursday, Wang twisted that knife a bit more by stressing twice, in less than three minutes, that Wang is in Washington only because Blinken again wanted the meeting.
While it may seem petty, this framing is meant to buttress the narrative that it is the United States that is acting irresponsibly and harming the US-PRC relationship. That only when Washington has fully atoned for its sins against the relationship, is Beijing willing to agree to a dialogue again.
In a skillful turn in language, Wang then called for a return to in-depth and comprehensive dialogue, suggesting that the United States had been the one who has refused to have a meaningful dialogue. See Wang’s remarks for yourself:
“China and the United States are two major countries, we have disagreements, we have differences, at the same time we also share important common interests and we face challenges that we need to respond to together.”
“Therefore China and the United States need to have dialogue, not only should we resume dialogue, but the dialogue should be in-depth and comprehensive so that with dialogue we can increase understanding, reduce misunderstanding and misjudgments, constantly seek to expand common ground and pursue cooperation that will benefit both sides so that we can stabilize China-U.S. actions and return it to the triumph of healthy, stable and sustainable development.”
“In China-U.S. relations, from time to time there will be some jarring voices. When it happens, China treats it calmly because we are of the view what is right and what is wrong is not determined by who has the stronger arm or a louder voice, but if one behaves in a way that is consistent with the provisions of the three China-U.S. joint communiques, consistent with international law and basic norms of international relations, and consistent with the climate of the times.”
“We are confident that at the end of the day, facts will calm everything and history will give its fair verdict.”
Rather than refute this framing, Blinken simply conceded that, “I agree with what the foreign minister said,” as he turned and walked away hand-in-hand with Wang.
We have come a long way in nearly three years, when Blinken openly challenged remarks of Yang Jiechi and Wang Yi in a conference room of the Captain Cook Hotel in Anchorage (watch from minute 54:10).
In contrast, Blinken looked downright chastened on Thursday, smiling awkwardly as Wang embarrassed him in front of the cameras.
What a terrible set of optics for the United States as it faces a Chinese Communist Party that is actively supporting two wars against the United States and its allies (Russia in Ukraine and Iran in its war with Israel), while using aggression against three more in the Western Pacific (Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines).
Instead of holding at risk Biden’s meeting with Xi over these threats to vital American interests (a meeting that is far more important to Xi and his economic stability), the Administration seems intent on signalling that Biden will do almost anything to secure his face-to-face meeting with Xi at APEC in November.
For example, Blinken could simply muse outloud that if PRC ships ram the ships of an American Ally in its own internationally recognized EEZ, it makes it difficult for President Biden to meet with Xi. Perhaps, given Xi’s embrace of Russia and Iran, Blinken could have made it clear that now was simply not the right time to meet with Wang (a typical refrain from Beijing when they want to increase the pressure on Washington).
By allowing themselves to be portrayed as an ardent suitor, desperate for a chance to meet and talk, the Administration simply encourages Beijing to demand concessions to get these meetings.
As I have written before, I don’t object to diplomacy. The United States and People’s Republic should communicate with one another and they do. I object to diplomacy done poorly.
As if it couldn’t get worse, the California Governor’s trip to the PRC and his meeting with Xi Jinping further undermined Washington’s position and revealed fissures that the CCP will exploit.
In an incredibly ill-timed trip, the widely recognized leader of the next generation of the Democratic Party, Governor Gavin Newsom, travelled to Beijing to meet with Xi less than a week after Xi warmly hosted Putin, an indicted war criminal. Newsom pushed forward with his trip as he brushed aside calls from human rights groups and other national leaders to cancel or delay.
Newsom portrayed his diplomatic excursion as bringing about climate cooperation between the PRC (26% of global carbon emissions and growing) and California (less than 1% of global carbon emissions and shrinking), but for Beijing, this trip created an incredible opportunity to drive wedges in two important fissures.
One between the federal government and the State of California (and potentially other U.S. states), and another between different factions within the Democratic Party.
In terms of subnational divisions, Newsom went so far as to state publicly that “regardless of what happens nationally, sub-nationally, you have a partner in the state of California.” Essentially, providing a direct invitation to the Chinese Communist Party to interfere in U.S. policymaking by dividing California from the rest of the United States. (checks Constitution… yep Article 1, Section 10 is still there: “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress… enter into any Agreement or Compact with… a foreign Power,”)
From the website of the Office of the Governor of California, October 25, 2023. Based on what’s on the Governor’s website, here is the “Agreement” that they are signing… I have yet to identify when Congress provided “consent” to the State of California to enter into this agreement.
As the heir-apparent of the Democratic Party, and someone who has indicated a future run for President, Newsom’s trip cut the legs out from under the Biden Administration’s principal foreign policy achievement and signaled that he would take a different approach to the question of Taiwan than President Biden, by stating “I express my support for the One-China policy… as well as our desire not to see independence.” For the record, Biden has stated on four occasions (even once while standing next to the Japanese Prime Minister in Tokyo) that the United States WOULD intervene militarily if the PRC used to force to end Taiwan’s independence.
Despite numerous examples of how the CCP seeks to exploit political and subnational divisions within democracies, it appears that Governor Newsom has learned none of those lessons and the officials in the Biden Administration who do watch these issues closely have either failed to make their voices heard or have been pushed aside as Governor Newsom pursues his own diplomatic agenda at the expense of the rest of the country.
Rather than a trip to Beijing, perhaps Governor Newsom could have stayed in California and attended this event on the Stanford campus hosted by former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the leaders of the FBI and other foreign security services as they addressed the threats posed by the PRC.
The rocks and shoals ahead
I understand and appreciate why the Administration is trying so hard to put a floor under the Sino-American rivalry. From a foreign policy perspective, the United States has a lot of other pressing matters that require time and resources. Our grand strategy over the last three Administrations (Obama, Trump, and Biden) had been built on the assumption that the United States could pull back, limit its international engagement, and focus more on domestic matters.
As wars in Europe and the Middle East drag-on and expand, this approach is untenable.
The problem is that the U.S. starting programming the resources it would need for today over a decade ago with the assumption that the international environment would be relatively benign. So we are seriously constrained today, when faced with multiple crises because our assumptions from a decade ago did not pan out. (As I highlighted last week, this is the conclusion from the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission… if you didn’t read it last week, you should do so now).
We should have anticipated a far more hostile international environment, we should have made the necessary investments, we should have been more responsible in our politics… but we didn’t and here we are.
And from a domestic perspective, the Biden Administration will have to devote nearly all their attention to the campaign and election in 2024. Explaining to the American public that they face enormous challenges ahead that will require significant sacrifice is not a good way to win re-election. To say that U.S. partisan politics will be “contentious” over the next 12 months is a massive understatement.
So it is easy to see why, when faced with these competing demands and an American public who has NOT been prepared for these challenges by either political party, an Administration would want to stabilize things between the world’s two superpowers.
We just are not ready yet.
Unfortunately, our adversaries also understand these dynamics. And unlike us, they have spent the last decade preparing to take advantage of “changes, the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years.”
We should be honest with ourselves, our adversaries are unlikely to give us the breathing room to get our house in order or to shuttle limited resources from crisis to crisis.
Screenshots from video of Xi Jinping saying farewell to Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin on March 22, 2023 [China’s Xi tells Putin of ‘changes not seen for 100 years’, Al Jazeera, March 22, 2023]
I have heard some argue that the economic downturn in the PRC and the diplomatic breakthroughs are lights at the end of the tunnel. Those who ascribe to this believe point out that while Xi may have been particularly combative last March, weeks after the surveillance balloon fiasco and coming out of a successful ‘two sessions,’ the full extent of the PRC’s economic headwinds were not yet apparent. Now that those economic challenges are more acute, Xi is ready to come to some sort of truce with the United States.
It seems like wishful thinking to me and I’m reminded of that classic line from the Metallic/San Francisco Symphony Orchestra mash-up, ‘No Leaf Clover’: (see the full music video from 1999 here… I can’t believe its been almost 25 years)
Then it comes to be that the soothing light at the end of your tunnel
Was just a freight train comin’ your way
One would need to assume that the PRC’s economic condition has a great influence on Xi’s decision-making… from my perspective, there is little evidence that is true. Xi does not think deeply on economic matters, nor is he primarily motivated by the kind normative economic orthodoxies that animate leaders in the U.S., Europe, and Japan.
If that were the case, Xi Jinping would have spent the last decade following the advice of his former Premier, Li Keqiang.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Gavin Newsom’s Hong Kong travel plan draws bipartisan fire
Phelim Kine and Blanca Begert, Politico, October 22, 2023
Lawmakers and activists warn that Gov. Gavin Newsom’s decision to travel to Hong Kong to tout his state’s climate agenda risks whitewashing Beijing’s tightening chokehold on the territory.
California Gov. Gavin Newsom is starting his trip to China in perhaps the most politically incendiary Asian city possible.
He landed in Hong Kong on Sunday after a hastily scheduled side trip to Israel, where he met with victims of the Israel-Hamas war.
On China, even fellow Democrats are warning of the pitfalls he faces if he stays silent on Beijing’s crushing treatment of civil rights in Hong Kong.
Newsom should “speak very clearly against the repression of the Hong Kong people,” Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), co-chair of the Congressional Executive Commission on China, said in an interview. “Otherwise it does great damage because it looks like the Chinese repression is accepted and we cannot allow that to be the case.”
COMMENT – The abuses in Hong Kong aren’t they only things that Newsom’s trip risks whitewashing.
From the website of the Office of the Governor of California. Photo taken on Wednesday, October 25, 2023.
From AP article, “Russian President Putin and Chinese leader Xi meet in Beijing and call for close policy coordination,” October 18, 2023. Photo taken on Wednesday, October 18, 2023.
2. ‘Divorce is not an option’ for US and China, Newsom says after Xi meeting
Michelle Toh, CNN, October 26, 2023
“Divorce is not an option” when it comes to the world’s two largest economies, California Governor Gavin Newsom told CNN on Wednesday following his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.
In an interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, Newsom said his meeting with Xi in Beijing had revived hope that the United States and China were at a turning point in their relations.
“We’ve got to turn down the heat. We’ve got to manage our strategic differences. We’ve got to reconcile our strategic red lines,” he said.
COMMENT – If Xi follows through on his promise to annex Taiwan using force, “divorce” will happen overnight.
It would be far better for leaders like Newsom to explain to their constituents those realities, the immense risk that comes from being dangerously coupled to a brutal authoritarian regime, and the need to establish economic ties with those who share our most fundamental values.
Instead, we get meaningless platitudes about “turning down the heat” and the necessity of “reconciling.”
3. U.S. Support for our Philippine Allies in the Face of Repeated PRC Harassment in the South China Sea
U.S. Department of State, October 22, 2023
The United States stands with our Philippine allies in the face of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Coast Guard and maritime militia’s dangerous and unlawful actions obstructing an October 22 Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea.
By conducting dangerous maneuvers that caused collisions with Philippine resupply and Coast Guard ships, the PRC Coast Guard and maritime militia violated international law by intentionally interfering with the Philippine vessels’ exercise of high seas freedom of navigation.
PRC conduct jeopardized Filipino crew members’ safety and impeded critically needed supplies from reaching service members stationed at the BRP Sierra Madre. Obstructing supply lines to this longstanding outpost and interfering with lawful Philippine maritime operations undermines regional stability.
Second Thomas Shoal is a feature well within the Philippine exclusive economic zone and on the Philippine continental shelf. An international tribunal’s July 2016 decision – legally binding on both the Philippines and PRC – made clear that “there exists no legal basis for any entitlement by China to maritime zones in the area of Second Thomas Shoal.” The same ruling affirmed that Second Thomas Shoal is a low-tide elevation outside the territorial sea of another high tide feature – as such, the PRC’s territorial claims to it are unfounded.
The unsafe maneuvers on October 22 and the PRC water cannoning of a Philippines’ vessel on August 5 are the latest examples of provocative PRC measures in the South China Sea to enforce its expansive and unlawful maritime claims, reflecting disregard for other states lawfully operating in the region.
The United States reaffirms that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft – including those of its Coast Guard – anywhere in the South China Sea.
COMMENT – The Chinese Communist Party knows that Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty extends to armed attacks on Filipino armed forces, vessels, and aircraft… they are placing Washington on the horns of a dilemma as the Administration is desperate to put a floor under the Sino-American relationship.
Japan and Taiwan are watching this very carefully.
4. Recent Surge in Tensions in the South China Sea
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, October 23, 2023
Japan expresses serious concern for actions which increase regional tensions including a dangerous action that caused a collision between Chinese and Filipino ships on October 22nd.
Japan believes that the issue concerning the South China Sea is directly related to the peace and stability of the region and is a legitimate concern of the international community including Japan, and thus Japan opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force as well as any actions that increase tensions in the South China Sea.
As stated in the Japan-Philippines Joint Statement in February 2023, the Government of Japan concurs with the Philippines’ long-standing objections to unlawful maritime claims, militarization, coercive activities and threat or use of force in the South China Sea.
Furthermore, Japan highly appreciates the Government of the Philippines for having consistently complied with the Arbitral Tribunal’s award as to the disputes between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China regarding the South China Sea and shown its commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea, as stated in the statement by the Foreign Minister of Japan issued on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the issuance of the award.
Japan has consistently advocated upholding the rule of law at sea and re-emphasizes the importance of efforts toward a peaceful resolution of disputes based on international law.
Japan will continue to cooperate with the international community such as ASEAN Member States and the United States to protect free, open, and peaceful seas.
COMMENT – This is important from Tokyo.
5. AUDIO – The World According to China with Elizabeth Economy
Peter Robinson and Elizabeth Economy, Uncommon Knowledge Podcast, October 24, 2023
Elizabeth Economy, who has recently served as senior advisor for China to the U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo, discusses her insights into the PRC's ambition to remake the international order at the detriment of the United States and other democracies.
COMMENT – It’s always a good idea to listen to what my Hoover colleague Liz Economy has to say.
6. The U.S. and Europe Need to Get Their Act Together on China
Noah Barkin, Foreign Policy, October 19, 2023
The West has wasted precious time in developing a common strategy.
When he talks about the transatlantic relationship, German Economy Minister Robert Habeck likes to recount a conversation he had last year with U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, after the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) was unveiled.
According to his telling, Habeck pointed out to Yellen on a teleconference that the U.S. legislation would create huge problems for European carmakers by shutting them out of a massive subsidy scheme for electric vehicles. “I will never forget the silence on the other side of the telephone,” Habeck recalled during a speech in Berlin last month. “Then she was very direct and said, ‘Well, I think we forgot you.’”
U.S. President Joe Biden entered the White House in 2021 promising a new approach to China, based on robust outreach to U.S. allies across the globe. A landmark agreement for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, the historic Camp David summit in August with the leaders of Japan and South Korea, and a lavish state visit held for Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in June, which yielded cooperation agreements on defense and technology, have demonstrated that, when it comes to America’s partners in Asia, Biden has largely delivered. But as Habeck’s story makes clear, the results with Europe have been less than stellar.
On the positive side, the United States and Europe have set aside Trump-era trade irritants, from steel and aluminum tariffs to a long-running Airbus-Boeing subsidy dispute. They have reached an agreement on transatlantic data flows and set up new structured dialogues focused on China as well as trade and technology challenges.
In European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the Biden team has found an ally in its push to rewrite the rules of economic engagement with China. Von der Leyen, with a landmark China speech in March and an economic security strategy that she unveiled three months later, has tried to build a bridge between Brussels and Washington. The Biden administration has adopted her language on “de-risking” from China, distancing itself from the idea of a more far-reaching “decoupling” that had never had any support in Europe. When von der Leyen travels to Washington this week for a U.S.-EU summit with Biden, the two sides could announce a transatlantic deal on critical raw materials that, from a European perspective, would take some of the sting out of the IRA.
But the reality is that the transatlantic consensus on China—and the trade, technology, climate, and security issues at the heart of this discussion—remains fragile nearly three years into Biden’s term. The French have yet to fully recover from the Australia-U.S.-U.K. (AUKUS) submarine deal, which torpedoed their own defense agreement with Canberra and undermined their strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. And Europe is still smarting from the Biden administration’s campaign to pressure the Netherlands into restricting the sale of advanced chip equipment to China, a result that exposed Europe’s export control policies as flawed and fragmented. The IRA, meanwhile, remains a major bone of contention in the big European capitals, which view it, more than a year after its unveiling, as a slap in Europe’s face and a violation of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
Crucially, neither German Chancellor Olaf Scholz nor French President Emmanuel Macron appear ready to jump on the von der Leyen bandwagon. They are pushing back against core tenets of her de-risking strategy, notably her plans to restrict European corporate investments in China in a narrow set of sensitive sectors, from advanced semiconductors and artificial intelligence to quantum computing and biotechnologies.
French officials are still seething about a joint statement that was put out by Biden and von der Leyen in early March, during her last visit to Washington, in which she committed Europe to upgrading its export control policies and pursuing a U.S.-style outbound regime. “She seems to believe that she has powers that she doesn’t have,” a senior French government official told me recently.
COMMENT – Excellent (yet depressing) analysis from Noah Barkin in Berlin.
Authoritarianism
7. China’s ex-foreign minister Qin Gang stripped of last remaining state title
Sylvie Zhuang, South China Morning Post, October 24, 2023
8. China Dismisses Gen. Li Shangfu, Its Defense Minister, Amid Speculation
Chris Buckley, New York Times, October 24, 2023
9. China Strips Missing Defense Minister of Government Posts
Chun Han Wong, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2023
10. China sacks missing defence chief Li Shangfu with no explanation
William Zheng, Jane Cai, and Jack Lu, South China Morning Post, October 24, 2023
11. Beijing's 'Bridge Man' Protester Peng Lifa Leaves Legacy in China
Micah McCartney, Newsweek, October 25, 2023
Chinese dissident Peng Lifa, aka "Bridge Man," remains locked away, but a human rights activist told Newsweek the Nobel Peace Prize nominee left a lasting imprint on society by challenging the country's most powerful leader in decades.
On October 13, 2022, as China's draconian "zero COVID" measures dragged on, Peng draped a pair of large banners over the side of Beijing's Sitong Bridge. One labeled Xi a "national traitor." The other read: "We want food, not COVID tests. We want freedom, not lockdowns. We want to vote, not a leader. We want dignity, not lies. We are citizens, not slaves."
The lone demonstration took place three days before the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party handed him an unprecedented third term.
Police detained Peng almost immediately, and censors scrambled to take down evidence of the banners from social media. To this day, entering Peng's name on Chinese social media yields no results. Protests are prohibited in China with few exceptions, and Xi Jinping is known to be sensitive about his image.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not respond to Newsweek's request for comment by publication time.
Soon after Peng was taken away, messages echoing his words were anonymously sent to iPhones via the untraceable Apple AirDrop service. This fueled rising discontent that boiled over after a lockdown turned a fire deadly. What followed were the most widespread demonstrations seen in China since the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 1989.
Amnesty International's deputy regional director for Asia, Sarah Brooks, told Newsweek that Peng's actions showed there are "still individuals in China willing to take actions for principles" and hold the government to a higher standard. People who may not otherwise have been willing to come out did, she said.
Brooks pointed out that her organization and others have documented his protest and made it visible to the world, including Chinese diaspora communities.
"We're beginning to see human rights work not limited to borders. There are still ways of supporting movement building when we think of the future of Chinese society—people who are part of that are part of China's future," she said.
Peng has not been heard from since his detention, and his family are all being closely monitored, a source claiming to be in contact with Peng's close associates told Radio Free Asia.
Mike Gallagher (R-WI), chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on China, nominated Peng for the Nobel Peace Prize on October 13 of this year, the one anniversary of the bridge incident. The prize will be awarded on December 10.
12. Gallagher Nominates "Bridgeman" for Nobel Peace Prize
U.S. House Select Committee on the CCP, October 13, 2023
Chairman Gallagher today announced that he will nominate Peng Lifa for the Nobel Peace Prizeon the anniversary of his one-year historic protest against Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rule. In the video above, the Chairman highlights Apple’s role in choking off the protests that Peng Lifa inspired.
On October 13th, 2022 Peng Lifa, aka “Bridgeman” unfurled two banners over Sitong Bridge in Beijing. The banners read "We don’t want Covid Tests, we want food. We don’t want Cultural Revolution, we want reform. We don’t want lockdowns, we want freedom. We don’t want an autocrat, we want votes. We don’t want lies, we want dignity. We are citizens, not slaves.”
Peng Lifa's act of courage led to the largest protests in China since Tiananmen Square – which helped to end the CCP’s draconian COVID lockdowns. Many protestors used Apple’s AirDrop function to bypass authoritarian censors – which Apple then limited after receiving pressure from the Chinese Communist Party. Chairman Gallagher calls on Apple to be transparent about its actions during these protests and to stand up for human rights around the world.
COMMENT – Not a good look for Apple.
13. Why does China claim almost the entire South China Sea?
Anson Zhang, Aljazeera, October 24, 2023
14. China’s Age of Malaise
Evan Osnos, New Yorker, October 23, 2023
15. China Rattles Foreign Firms Again with Arrests, Foxconn Probe
Bloomberg, October 23, 2023
16. China Says Its Probe into Foxconn Is ‘Normal Law Enforcement’
Bloomberg, October 25, 2023
17. China Detains Current, Former GroupM Employees as Part of Commercial Bribery Case
Patience Haggin and Clarence Leong, Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2023
18. The Corporate Retreat from Hong Kong Is Accelerating
Elaine Yu, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2023
19. Uyghurs in Afghanistan fear Taliban buying Huawei surveillance tech
Ruth Ingram, The China Project, October 19, 2023
20. How Canada has been helping China hunt for fugitives for decades
Scott Anderson, Bob McKeown, and Matthew Pierce, CBC News, October 21, 2023
Direction came 'from Ottawa at the highest level,' says former RCMP operations manager.
The Canadian government has given Chinese law enforcement assistance in their pursuit of fugitive Chinese nationals living abroad for decades, an investigation by CBC's The Fifth Estate has learned.
In Canada, that help has sometimes come as a result of quid pro quo deals, people with first-hand knowledge of the relationship, including two former Canadian ambassadors to China, told The Fifth Estate.
Calvin Chrustie, a former RCMP operations officer in British Columbia, said in an interview that he received direction "from Ottawa at the highest level" to "assist and collaborate with" Chinese officials regarding a "high-profile fugitive that they were after in the Vancouver area."
Chrustie said he refused to facilitate a meeting for the Chinese officials, who wanted to interview the fugitive and convince the person to voluntarily return to China to face prosecution.
China has ensured Canada's continuing co-operation by bartering on trade, offering assistance fighting illegal drugs and by negotiating the release of Canadians arbitrarily detained in China, The Fifth Estate investigation found.
"Our economic interests sort of drove this," said veteran Toronto immigration lawyer Lorne Waldman, who represents a number of people now in Canada who are wanted by Chinese authorities.
"We turned a blind eye to the lack of rule of law in China and turned a blind eye to the fact that we should be way more skeptical about the evidence coming from China. And as time went on, we turned a blind eye to the fact that Chinese agents were acting in Canada."
COMMENT – Come on Canada, be better!
21. Chinese Politics since Hu Jintao and the Origin of Xi Jinping’s Strongman Rule: A New Hypothesis
Lin Le, Texas National Security Review, Fall 2023
22. Tale of emperor whose ineptitude ended his dynasty unnerves Chinese censors
Joe Leahy, Financial Times, October 20, 2023
23. The Books I Helped Rescue from China’s Repression
Ian Johanson, Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2023
24. Hong Kong universities under pressure as academics head for exits
Chan Ho-him, Financial Times, October 24, 2023
Shrinking freedom and fears of falling foul of sweeping security law push researchers to leave Chinese territory.
As a political scientist in Hong Kong over the past seven years, Tetsuro Kobayashi found it increasingly difficult to access the public opinion data that played an important role in his research. This year, he decided to leave.
The effects of Beijing’s crackdown on civil liberties in the Chinese territory was one major factor in Kobayashi’s decision to give up his higher Hong Kong salary for a lower-paid position in Tokyo, he said.
“The space for freedom has diminished” in Hong Kong, he said.
Kobayashi is not alone in seeking a more liberal academic environment. Last year, 361 academics left Hong Kong’s eight public universities, a turnover rate of 7.4 per cent and the highest mark in more than two decades, according to official data.
Their decisions “to forfeit the high salary in Hong Kong and move to another country suggests a strong motivation to leave”, said Kobayashi, who left the City University of Hong Kong for Waseda University.
The territory, which boasts a handful of the world’s top-100 ranked universities, has long been an intellectual hub for western academics and a haven for liberal Chinese scholars. But researchers said shrinking academic freedoms and fears of falling foul of a sweeping security law were encouraging some to leave, pointing to a reshaping of the city’s higher education.
“Critically thinking researchers have left,” said Carsten Holz, professor of economics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, leaving junior hires pursuing “apolitical research . . . that they know is politically acceptable”.
Nearly half of the faculty in the social sciences division departed between 2020 and 2022, Holz said. Some took early retirement, while others sought “other job opportunities, including for research that could have endangered one’s safety and wellbeing in Hong Kong”. The result left China studies in the city “toothless”, he said.
Meanwhile, the proportion of mainland Chinese academics at the city’s public universities rose to 35 per cent last year, up from about 24 per cent in 2017, while that of local academics fell from 42 per cent to 33 per cent. The share of international academics remained at about 32-34 per cent.
COMMENT – We should be granting every one of these researchers a green card and path to citizenship.
It would be refreshing if Congressional Republicans could get behind that.
25. US chip curbs stymie efforts by China surveillance group to diversify
Eleanor Olcott, Financial Times, October 24, 2023
26. In northeast China, Russian and Chinese firms ink deals from manufacturing to agriculture
Reuters, October 23, 2023
Environmental Harms
27. California governor visits China and says his state will always be a partner on climate change
Kanis Leung, Associated Press, October 23, 2023
28. Chinese listed firms used endangered animal parts as ingredients -report
Andrew Silver and Selena Li, Reuters, October 23, 2023
29. Chinese drug firms backed by global banks found using leopard and pangolin parts, group says
Michelle Toh, CNN, October 23, 2023
30. 1,000 cats rescued in China from being slaughtered and sold as pork, mutton
Chris Lau, CNN, October 24, 2023
Foreign Interference and Coercion
31. Jon Stewart’s Show on Apple Is Ending
Benjamin Mullin, John Koblin, and Tripp Mickle, New York Times, October 19, 2023
Jon Stewart’s show on Apple’s streaming service is abruptly coming to an end, according to several people with knowledge of the decision, the result of creative differences between the tech giant and the former “Daily Show” host.
Mr. Stewart and Apple executives decided to part ways in recent days, two of the people said. Members of the show’s staff were informed about its end on Thursday. Taping of episodes for the third season was scheduled to begin within a couple of weeks, one of the people said.
The Apple show, “The Problem With Jon Stewart,” debuted to some fanfare two years ago as Mr. Stewart’s return to the talk show format after a six-year hiatus. As host of “The Daily Show” from 1999 to 2015, he turned a low-rated Comedy Central late-night series into a cultural force, becoming one of the nation’s best-known media and political critics.
But Mr. Stewart and Apple executives had disagreements over some of the topics and guests on “The Problem,” two of the people said. Mr. Stewart told members of his staff on Thursday that potential show topics related to China and artificial intelligence were causing concern among Apple executives, a person with knowledge of the meeting said. As the 2024 presidential campaign begins to heat up, there was potential for further creative disagreements, one of the people said.
COMMENT – “Mr. Stewart told members of his staff on Thursday that potential show topics related to China and artificial intelligence were causing concern among Apple executives, a person with knowledge of the meeting said.”
I’m pretty sure this is what Apple was so terrified about… “Jon Stewart on Vaccine Science and the Wuhan Lab Theory,” YouTube, June 15, 2023… Stephen Colbert was certainly terrified of this topic on his show.
32. Newsom’s China trip to include Hong Kong, Tesla stops
Blanca Begert, Politico, October 17, 2023
33. California Gov. Newsom has surprise meeting with China's leader Xi amid warm welcome in Beijing
Huizhong Wu, AP, October 25, 2023
34. CCP using information operations to harass Canadian politicians
Albert Zhang, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 24, 2023
Amid Canada’s public inquiry into foreign interference, the Chinese Communist Party is deploying inauthentic personas on social media and extending its influence operations into the Canadian online environment.
ASPI has identified a cross-platform, coordinated network of inauthentic social media accounts spreading disinformation about Canadian politicians, mostly targeting Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. These accounts claim that Canadian politicians are corrupt, philanderers or liars and have used deepfake technology to falsely attribute these allegations to Liu Xin, a political ‘vlogger’ (video blogger) of Chinese heritage based in Canada. Some family members and associates of Canadian politicians are also being targeted through this new campaign.
ASPI assesses that this network is highly likely a new iteration of the Spamouflage network, which has been linked to Chinese government-affiliated entities numerous times. If that’s correct, it would be the first publicly unearthed example of the CCP using an AI-enabled face swap in its internationally focused information operations and disinformation campaigns.
As part of the new campaign, a subnetwork of accounts is promoting an article published by Red Maple News, an influential Chinese-Canadian online media outlet. The article launders personal—and publicly unavailable—information to defame Teacher Li, a pseudonym for a Chinese painter based in Italy.
Beginning on 7 August, around 2,000 inauthentic social media accounts published more than 15,000 posts in English, French and Mandarin on X (formerly Twitter), Facebook and YouTube targeting at least 50 Canadian politicians from both major political parties, the Liberal Party of Canada and the Conservative Party of Canada. The campaign appears to have subsided since 11 September, four days after the Canadian government’s announcement of a public inquiry into foreign interference. At the time of writing, the network continues to target Liu.
The most common modus operandi of these accounts is to flood replies under both the official and personal social media accounts of Canadian politicians. On X, sometimes the only replies to a politician’s tweet are from inauthentic accounts in the network. The majority of these tweet replies contain disinformation. A strategy of this information operation is to try to draw online users’ attention to claims that, for example, Canadian politicians are corrupt, racist or having extramarital affairs.
The families and associates of Canadian politicians have also been dragged into this activity. This includes posts alleging that the politicians were neglecting their family members, that they fathered illegitimate children or that their children’s sexual orientation was uncertain. Often the phrases used in these posts indicate that the accounts’ operators are most likely non-native English speakers or have used automatic translation services. For example, one post claimed that a politician was engaging in ‘sex transactions’.
In another case, accounts targeting Steven Guilbeault, Canada’s environment and climate change minister, blended an old photo of him being arrested with a sentence outlining his pro-environmental positions and claiming that he reviews the ‘pornhub [a pornography website] web browsing history of every taxpayer in Canada’.
35. Canada tells of China-linked ‘spamouflage’ blitz on MPs’ social media
The Guardian, October 24, 2023
36. Thousands of remote IT workers sent wages to North Korea to help fund weapons program, FBI says
Jim Salter, Associated Press, October 19, 2023
37. The Israel-Hamas War Is Testing China’s Diplomatic Strategy
Lili Pike, Foreign Policy, October 17, 2023
38. Israel-China relationship in danger as state media blames Israel, U.S., and Jews for conflict
Jordyn Haime, The China Project, October 19, 2023
39. Beijing Stages Charm Offensive to Pave Way for Xi Trip
James T. Areddy, Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2023
40. Brussels defies US pressure to join its anti-China gang
Alan Beattie, Financial Times, October 23, 2023
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
41. Californian Human-Rights Advocates Criticize Gov. Gavin Newsom’s Trip to Hong Kong and mainland China
Politico, October 20, 2023
42. U.S. Lawmakers Point to Reports of Forced Labor in China’s Seafood Industry
Richard Vanderford, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2023
U.S. lawmakers said the Biden administration should crack down on China’s use of forced labor in seafood production after an investigative journalism group found widespread transfers of laborers from the country’s Xinjiang region to processing facilities elsewhere in the country.
The administration should block imports from seafood-processing facilities in China that run afoul of a U.S. law meant to target forced labor linked to Xinjiang, home to the country’s Uyghur people and other minority groups, said Rep. Chris Smith (R., N.J) and Sen. Jeff Merkley (D., Ore.) in a letter sent Tuesday to Department of Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas.
The two men head up the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, a government body that monitors China’s human rights record. The lawmakers also said the U.S. should block the import of seafood tied to North Korean forced labor.
They urged “immediate action to ensure that America’s seafood supply chains are forced labor-free.”
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
43. Europe Aims to Break Its China Habit
Christina Lu, Foreign Policy, October 20, 2023
44. Lithium wars: The global struggle for 'white diamonds'
Nikkei Asia, October 22, 2023
45. Hong Kong: The Keystone in China's Economic Statecraft
Sunny Cheung, Jamestown Foundation, October 20, 2023
46. 10 Years Late on China’s Economy
Derek Scissors, American Enterprise Institute, October 17, 2023
47. VIDEO – Why China’s Economy Is at a Turning Point
Ravi Agrawal, Foreign Policy, October 23, 2023
48. The New Economic Security State
Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, Foreign Affairs, October 19, 2023
49. Analysis: China to choose fiscal muscle over big reforms to revive economy
Kevin Yao, Reuters, October 24, 2023
50. China Stimulus Plan to Make ‘Big Impact,’ Ex-PBOC Official Says
Bloomberg, October 25, 2023
51. Capital is leaving China at the fastest pace in more than 7 years, sending the yuan lower
Filip De Mott, Insider, October 23, 2023
52. Towards a common European China strategy?
Jacob Mardell, Heinrich Böll Foundation, October 2023
53. US House panel probes Sequoia’s Chinese tech investments
Demetri Sevastopulo and George Hammond, Financial Times, October 19, 2023
54. Western graphite producers’ shares soar after Beijing announces export curbs
Harry Dempsey, Financial Times, October 23, 2023
55. The Multimillion-Dollar Machines at the Center of the U.S.-China Rivalry
Ana Swanson, Don Clark, and Mara Hvistendahl, New York Times, October 20, 2023
56. How Far Is China’s Slowdown Spreading? Ask a Dairy Farmer 6,000 Miles Away
Mike Cherney, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2023
57. Mitsubishi Motors to End Car Production in China
Kosaku Narioka, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2023
58. How Columbia Sportswear Is Loosening Its Ties to Asia
Peter S. Goodman, New York Times, October 24, 2023
Cyber & Information Technology
59. China should seize new AI opportunities set to reshape global power dynamics, People’s Daily research unit says
Ben Jiang, South China Morning Post, October 17, 2023
60. Controversial Chip in Huawei Phone Was Produced on ASML Machine
Cagan Koc and Diederik Baazil, Bloomberg, October 25, 2023
61. Nvidia says U.S. speeded up new export curbs on AI chips
Reuters, October 24, 2023
62. Estonia seeks China's help over severed Baltic Sea telecom cables
Andrius Sytas, Reuters, October 23, 2023
63. Ex-ASML Staff Accused of Theft Went to Work for Huawei, NRC Says
Cagan Koc, Bloomberg, October 23, 2023
64. Tightened US rules throttle Alibaba and Baidu’s AI chip development
Qianer Liu, Eleanor Olcott, and Ryan McMorrow, Financial Times, October 20, 2023
65. China launches investigation into iPhone maker Foxconn, says state media
Edward White and Kathrin Hille, Financial Times, October 22, 2023
66. Tim Cook Can’t Make iPhones Without This Chinese Company and Its CEO
Yang Jie, Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2023
Military and Security Threats
67. Chinese surveillance firm recommits to UK after new guidance
Daniel Boffey, The Guardian, October 23, 2023
68. Hypersonic Race 2.0: China tests next-gen ‘waverider’ with revolutionary technology
Stephen Chen, South China Morning Post, October 23, 2023
China has developed a new surface material for hypersonic vehicles that can remain intact after a long flight, scientists involved in the project announced.
69. As the world looks elsewhere, China stirs trouble in the South China Sea
Peter Layton, Lowy Institute, October 25, 2023
The Chinese Communist Party-controlled Global Times is already forecasting “more serious collisions”.
China is again making mischief in the South China Sea, although this time while wars rage in Gaza and the Ukraine. The precise timing of its actions in the South China Sea undoubtedly reflects China’s short-term imperatives and long-term plans, but the overall trend is worrying. There may be something to US President Joe Biden’s warning last week that “conflict and chaos could spread [to]…the Indo-Pacific”.
China’s latest actions involve two ship bumpings on the same day in the Ayungin Shoal (aka Second Thomas Shoal), and both well within the Philippines exclusive economic zone. A Chinese Coast Guard vessel nudged a tiny Philippines government-contracted resupply boat, and a Chinese armed militia vessel similarly bumped a smaller Philippines Coast Guard vessel.
This is the first time the Philippines has reported Chinese ships deliberately hitting Philippine government vessels. However, it’s not unexpected.
China has been steadily escalating tensions over several months. More than 100 militia ships and numerous Chinese Coast Guard ships have been swarming around, at times almost colliding with Philippine Coast Guard ships. China’s actions are now being regularly publicised by the Philippines government and the SeaLight think tank, which has monitored China’s tactics.
China argues its Coast Guard and the militia are simply enforcing China’s domestic laws, which the country has unilaterally decided apply to the 90 per cent of the South China Sea it claims. China’s contested take-over of this expanse dwarfs Russia’s attempted annexing of Ukraine at five times larger, and was rejected by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague in 2016.
70. Beijing and Manila trade accusations over ‘provocative’ ship collisions near disputed atoll
Laura Zhou, South China Morning Post, October 22, 2023
71. MI5 head warns of 'epic scale' of Chinese espionage
Gordon Corera, BBC, October 18, 2023
72. China crackdown on cyber scams in Southeast Asia nets thousands but leaves networks intact
Huizhong Wu, Associated Press, October 23, 2023
73. VIDEO – More from the "Five Eyes" intelligence chiefs' warning to 60 Minutes
Brit McCandless Farmer, CBS News, October 22, 2023
74. Readout of National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s Call with National Security Advisor Eduardo M. Año of the Philippines
The White House, October 23, 2023
75. Finland Suspects Chinese Ship’s Anchor Damaged Gas Pipeline
Georgi Kantchev, Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2023
One Belt, One Road Strategy
76. China’s promise of prosperity brought Laos debt — and distress
Shibani Mahtani and Ore Huiying, Washington Post, October 12, 2023
More than $1 trillion in Chinese loans to the developing world is building sparkling infrastructure, but the cost is still being tallied.
At speeds of almost 100 miles an hour, the Chinese-built train zips over the Mekong River and careers through dozens of newly bored tunnels as it travels north from the capital. At its last stop, near the Chinese border, brand-new residential towers rise out of the jungle.
China funded much of the glistening new infrastructure that has transformed this landlocked country of 7.5 million people. The building boom showcases the kind of modernity China says it can offer the world, notably the high-speed Laos-China railway that in a feat of engineering transformed a two-day journey across the country into a sleek three-hour trip. The line was built by Chinese engineers to Chinese rail standards, allowing it to connect to China’s high-speed network.
But Laos is also an economy in distress. Inflation rose to more than 41 percent at its peak this spring. The Laotian kip has depreciated more than 43 percent against the U.S. dollar. In a country where virtually everything is imported, the statistics translate into sacrifice: farmers who can no longer afford fertilizer, children who have dropped out of school to work and families cutting back on health care.
The China-led strategy was meant to protect Laos from these shocks — instead, it led to them. Laos is struggling to repay the billions it borrowed from China to fund the hydroelectric dams, trains and highways, which have drained the country of foreign reserves. As repayments drag, external debt is rising, a vulnerability exacerbated by the pandemic and rising global fuel and food prices.
The AidData research lab at William & Mary, which tracks China’s lending, calculates Laos’s total debt to China over an 18-year period starting in 2000 to be at $12.2 billion — about 65 percent of gross domestic product. Add in loans from other agencies and countries, and Laos’s debt stands at more than 120 percent, according to AidData.
There is “no country in the world with a higher amount of debt exposure to China than Laos. It is a very, very extreme example,” said Brad Parks, AidData’s executive director. “Laos went on a borrowing spree and got in over its head.”
From Washington Post
COMMENT – Laos is a victim of the PRC’s infrastructure building overcapacity. Beijing loans money to Laos to build infrastructure that must be constructed by PRC companies, mostly State-owned Enterprises, so the money just circulates back to PRC firms. Given that there is very little economic rationale for building this infrastructure projects (other than to prop-up PRC State-owned Enterprises) Laotian citizens are left to repay the loans with infrastructure that generates little to no economic return… that’s called a debt-trap.
And whether Beijing intends to entrap countries by design or it is all just by accident, the result is the same as some of the poorest countries fall deeper into a cycle of dependency with the PRC.
77. New Zealand Pivots Right—Toward China
Bernard Hickey, Foreign Policy, October 20, 2023
78. Analysis: Thailand’s proposed land bridge project easier than Kra Canal idea, but steep challenges await
Pichayada Promchertchoo and Rhea Yasmine Alis Haizan, CNA, October 20, 2023
79. The Belt and Road Ahead
Lili Pike, Foreign Policy, October 19, 2023
80. Ten years of China’s Belt and Road: what has $1tn achieved?
Joe Leahy, James Kynge, and Benjamin Parkin, Financial Times, October 22, 2023
81. Pakistan puts 'blind trust' in China as Belt and Road enters new phase
Adnan Aamir, Nikkei Asia, October 23, 2023
82. CPEC at Ten: A Road to Nowhere
Syed Fazl-e-Haider, Jamestown Foundation, October 20, 2023
83. Billion-dollar airport whets Cambodia appetite for Chinese investment
Shaun Turton, Nikkei Asia, October 24, 2023
Opinion Pieces
84. Biden’s Not Pushing U.S. Investors Away from China. China Is
Ming Liao and Mu Chen, Baiguan, October 23, 2023
85. Will China and Russia Reap the Rewards of Global Chaos?
Matt Schrader and Daniel Twining, National Review, October 22, 2023
To counter Xi and his junior partner in Moscow, the West needs to double down on the fight for freedom.
With the Middle East embroiled in its worst conflict in decades and Russia’s war on Ukraine continuing, Chinese president Xi Jinping is confidently asserting his role as the leader of a new authoritarian bloc. This was on full display in Beijing earlier this week, when leaders from more than 130 countries convened to celebrate ten years of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the investment and infrastructure program central to Xi’s global influence campaign. Among the guests of honor? Vladimir Putin, in his first trip to China after launching his brutal invasion of Ukraine.
The fact that Xi would accord a place of honor to Putin signals far more than the Chinese dictator’s questionable commitment to world peace: It shows Russia’s full acceptance of its place as a junior partner in a new 21st century authoritarian alignment committed to destabilizing and degrading democracy around the world. With the world facing crises on multiple fronts in conflicts fomented by authoritarian regimes, the U.S. and its partners must take urgent steps to combat the grave threat posed to global security — and to freedom itself.
Given the steady stream of grim economic news coming out of China, this might seem like a strange argument. Surely the breakdown in the PRC’s debt-driven economic model would put a damper on Xi’s global ambitions? If that’s the case, Xi has yet to receive the memo. We would do well to remember that this is not the first time the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has navigated choppy economic waters. Meanwhile, Beijing has tweaked the BRI to be far less reliant on expensive, big-ticket infrastructure projects, and the CCP has shown no sign of giving up on its hegemonic ambitions. What’s more, the promised decoupling of China from Western economies — even where sensitive dual-use technologies are concerned — has barely kicked into gear.
Putin’s genuflection to Xi before a host of visiting dignitaries signals China’s remarkable diplomatic success in preserving, and even advancing, its vision of a Beijing-centric global order, despite the headwinds of a slowing economy and European anger at Xi’s ongoing support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. The number of leaders in attendance at the forum proves that, even if Beijing is no longer writing huge checks for infrastructure, the offers of trade, training, and technology at the center of the new, stripped-down BRI still have significant drawing power.
Beijing has also been able to keep its relationships with the West largely intact despite the war in Ukraine, even as it pulls Moscow into an ever-tighter economic embrace, allowing Putin to weather the worst of Western sanctions while providing almost everything he needs to keep fighting short of heavy weapons. And all this while both provide diplomatic cover for the likes of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran.
86. A Financial Crisis in China Is No Longer Unthinkable
Greg Ip, Wall Street Journal, October 19, 2023
87. Speak its name: Blockade
Ray Powell, SeaLight, October 23, 2023
88. China’s EV sector burns bright but cannot offset property’s woes
Joe Leahy, Financial Times, October 24, 2023
89. China’s New Graphite Restrictions
Emily Benson and Thibault Denamiel, CSIS, October 23, 2023
90. China’s Great Leap Backward
Jeffrey Frankel, Project Syndicate, October 20, 2023
91. Why We Should Fear China More Than Middle Eastern War
Ross Douthat, New York Times, October 21, 2023
92. Why the AUKUS partnership is about much more than warfighting
Justin Bassi, The Hill, October 23, 2023
93. US-China rivalry creating more hurdles to cooperation on vital technology
South China Morning Post, October 22, 2023
94. Time to Expose the China-Hamas Connection
Massimo Introvigne, Bitter Winter, October 24, 2023
95. The Enemies of Freedom Are Deadlier Than Ever
Gerard Baker, Wall Street Journal, October 23, 2023
96. Meanwhile, China Trouble in the Pacific
Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2023