Ciao Bella!
Photo taken this morning at the Arch of Constantine with the Colosseum to the right in the background.
I’m in Rome for a speaking event at John Cabot University on our favorite subject and, as luck would have it, Xi Jinping has decided to join me in Europe. Though he’s steering clear of me by going to Paris, Belgrade, and Budapest.
Since I was going to be in Europe overlapping with the Chairman of Everything, I had a grand plan for this week’s newsletter. I’d fly into FCO early on Saturday and spend my time until Monday writing for you a comprehensive update on Sino-European relations. I was going to dig into the details of how Brussels and Berlin are pursuing two very different “China policies” and how that is undermining their interests, as well as the interests of the United States.
But it turns out that the weather in Rome is absolutely spectacular in early May and I decided once I got here that I would spend my time exploring the Eternal City… not typing in my hotel room.
Luckily, my colleague and friend Noah Barkin (who will be with me on a panel about Taiwan tomorrow) wrote an excellent summary of the Sino-European relationship last week for the German Marshall Fund, so you should just read that: Watching China in Europe—May 2024. If you don’t subscribe to Noah’s newsletter, you should.
More on the Party’s culpability
While you’re not getting the full commentary this week, I do want to briefly revisit the CCP’s culpability in the fentanyl crisis (i.e. how the CCP is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans due to their intentional export of fentanyl and fentanyl precursors).
After writing about the House Select Committee’s report two weeks ago (read that issue here), I spoke with the author of the report last week and he shared details that I missed.
He pointed me to this PRC Government website for the State Tax Administration, which as of this morning is still active and I recommend thinking a little bit about what this means.
Second image translated using the Google Translate Plug-in for Chrome
So why is this website important?
This website provides manufacturers inside the PRC with details on what the Value-Added Tax (VAT) is for certain products or commodities, as well as the VAT Refund the manufacturer can receive from the PRC Government, if they export the product or commodity.
Sounds benign right?
Well, try typing in these product codes for illicit drugs and their precursors that in many cases have no legitimate usage anywhere in the world and the PRC criminalizes domestically.
Product Code Illicit Drug or Precursor for Illicit Drug
29333300 Fentanyl, Alfentanil, Phencyclidine (PCP or “angel dust”)
29333600 ANPP (fentanyl precursor)
29333700 NPP (fentanyl precursor)
29333400 Other fentanyls and their derivatives
29349200 Other fentanyls and their derivatives
2933990055 JWH-018 (1-pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl) indole, NA-PIMO or AM-678
2932999053 MDMA (commonly known as ecstasy)
2932999054 Cathinones
29329990541 Cathinones
29329990542 Cathinones
193399057 Methylone (gets lower rate than true drugs)
2933990053 Synthetic cannabinoid
2933990054 Synthetic cannabinoid
2933990056 Synthetic cannabinoid
29330057 Synthetic cannabinoid
2933599052 Benzylpiperazine
Here’s the result for the first one (Product Code 29333300) which is Fentanyl, Phencyclidine, PCP, or “Angel Dust” (here is the Fact Sheet on Phencyclidine from the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency).
Second image translated using the Google Translate Plug-in for Chrome
If a manufacturer in the PRC exports Fentanyl or PCP (product code 29333300) outside the PRC they receive a 13% VAT rebate, making the production and export tax free.
This is a substance that the PRC prosecutes individuals for selling domestically (often imposing the death penalty) and at the same time, the PRC provides a tax rebate to a manufacturer who exports it outside the PRC.
Let that sink in.
The Chinese Communist Party, through its complete control of the PRC Government, provides financial incentives to its own companies (which the Party also controls) to manufacture and export the chemicals and pharmaceuticals that have killed more than a half million Americans over the past decade and that the PRC Government considers illegal for sale domestically.
The list above includes drugs and precursors that the PRC “controlled” after much cajoling by the United States Government (fentanyl precursors NPP & ANPP in 2018, fentanyl analogues and some precursors in 2019, and synthetic cannabinoids in 2021).
This isn’t a mistake or some bureaucratic oversight (no one “accidentally” creates export product codes for illicit drugs), Beijing knows exactly what it is doing.
After more than a decade of doing this and repeated requests by the United States to cease this behavior, I think we must conclude that the Chinese Communist Party is doing this intentionally to wreck as much chaos and destruction as possible inside the United States and other countries.
We need to treat Beijing accordingly.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. The WuXi Group
James Mulvenon, April 19, 2024
A report on the national security risks involved with WuXi Group, a PRC biotechnology and biopharmaceutical conglomerate with operations spread across the globe and connected to the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army.
COMMENT – Mulvenon’s report deserves wide circulation.
2. Huawei Secretly Backs US Research, Awarding Millions in Prizes
Kate O’Keeffe, Bloomberg, May 2, 2024
Huawei Technologies Co., the Chinese telecommunications giant blacklisted by the US, is secretly funding cutting-edge research at American universities including Harvard through an independent Washington-based foundation.
Huawei is the sole funder of a research competition that has awarded millions of dollars since its inception in 2022 and attracted hundreds of proposals from scientists around the world, including those at top US universities that have banned their researchers from working with the company, according to documents and people familiar with the matter.
COMMENT – Very glad to see Kate O’Keeffe at Bloomberg doing the same kind of important investigative journalism on the PRC and its commercial entities that she was doing at the Wall Street Journal.
3. China Has Crossed Biden’s Red Line on Ukraine
Matt Pottinger, Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2024
President Biden warned China two years ago not to provide “material support” for Russia’s war in Ukraine. On Friday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken conceded that Xi Jinping ignored that warning. China, Mr. Blinken said, was “overwhelmingly the No. 1 supplier” of Russia’s military industrial base, with the “material effect” of having fundamentally changed the course of the war. Whatever Mr. Biden chooses to do next will be momentous for global security and stability.
Mr. Biden can either enforce his red line through sanctions or other means, or he can signal a collapse of American resolve by applying merely symbolic penalties. Beijing and its strategic partners in Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang and Caracas would surely interpret half-hearted enforcement as a green light to deepen their campaign of global chaos. Mr. Xi sees a historic opportunity here to undermine the West.
This is a moment akin to President Obama’s 2013 red-line failure in Syria. When dictator Bashar al-Assad defied Mr. Obama’s warning not to use chemical weapons on his people, the president abstained from military action, and the consequences were dire. Six months later Moscow launched its 2014 invasion of Crimea—the beginning of the now-decadelong Ukraine War. A failure to act decisively against China now would open a path for Russian victory in Ukraine.
Mr. Biden drew his red line on March 18, 2022, three weeks after Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. “I made no threats,” Mr. Biden said after a video call with Mr. Xi that day. But Mr. Biden said he made sure the Chinese president understood he would “be putting himself in significant jeopardy” and risking China’s economic ties with the U.S. and Europe if he materially supported Russia’s war.
Mr. Biden’s cabinet reinforced his ultimatum with specific warnings. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo warned that the administration could “essentially shut” China’s biggest chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., in response to its chips being used by the Russian military. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen threatened financial sanctions. She followed up with a pledge late last year “to take decisive, and surgical, action against financial institutions that facilitate the supply of Russia’s war machine.”
Trade data suggest Beijing was careful to avoid overtly crossing the red line in 2022. But in 2023, when the Biden administration applied only token sanctions on Iranian entities that provided thousands of kamikaze drones to the Russians—drones that have saturated Ukrainian air defenses and caused widespread carnage—the Chinese probably decided that Mr. Biden’s bluster was a bluff. In March 2023, Mr. Xi visited the Kremlin in a bold show of solidarity with Mr. Putin. It turned out to be a watershed in Moscow’s war, effectively turning the conflict into a Chinese proxy war with the West.
COMMENT – Shameful that we’ve waited a year to finally enforce our own ultimatum.
4. U.S. Imposes Sanctions on Chinese Companies for Aiding Russia’s War Effort
Alan Rappeport, New York Times, May 1, 2024
The Biden administration on Wednesday announced nearly 300 new sanctions on international suppliers of military equipment technology that the administration said have been helping Russia restock its arsenal as it carries out the war in Ukraine.
The sanctions represent a broadening of U.S. efforts to disrupt Russia’s military industrial complex supply chain. They include more than a dozen targets based in China, which the United States says has increasingly been helping Russia arm itself. The Biden administration has expressed growing alarm about the weapons technology alliance between China and Russia. Top U.S. officials have voiced those concerns to their Chinese counterparts in recent weeks.
“Today’s actions will further disrupt and degrade Russia’s war efforts by going after its military industrial base and the evasion networks that help supply it,” Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen said in a statement on Wednesday.
5. TikTok ban in EU is ‘not excluded,’ von der Leyen says
Pieter Haeck, Politico, April 29, 2024
Commission President Ursula von der Leyen hinted that banning TikTok in the European Union is an option, during a debate this evening in Maastricht, featuring parties' lead candidates for the bloc's 2024 election.
"It is not excluded," von der Leyen said, after the moderator referred to the United States, where TikTok faces a national ban unless it is sold by its owner, ByteDance.
She immediately added that the Commission was "the very first institution worldwide to ban TikTok on our corporate phones."
COMMENT – I’m sure this has Chancellor Scholz terrified about PRC retaliation.
6. Exposing the PRC’s Distortion of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to Press its Claim Over Taiwan
Bonnie S. Glaser and Jacques deLisle, GMF, April 30, 2024
The People’s Republic of China’s strategy for pressing its claim that Taiwan is a part of China with no independent status increasingly relies on a claim that UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 establishes, as a matter of international law, the PRC’s “One China” principle. This assertion is based on flawed legal assumptions and arguments. The PRC’s agenda has benefitted from its sustained pressure and influence on UN entities and officials; a pattern of misinterpretation, acquiescence, and misunderstanding by those entities and officials; limited pushback from the United States, Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, and other states (especially in high-profile forums); and structural features of the UN (including its one-state, one-vote format and the low salience of Taiwan issues for many members).
The PRC’s account mischaracterizes the contents of Resolution 2758 (and authoritative UN legal interpretations of the resolution by the UN Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) and others) and ignores the limits to the UN’s powers to make international law. Still, Beijing’s position has made apparent gains in the UN in three areas: UN requirements that references to Taiwan use the nomenclature “Taiwan, province of China”, UN statements that Taiwan is an “integral part” or “part” of China, and misconstruing UN statements concerning “recognition” of the PRC as indicating Taiwan’s lack of international legal status.
If Beijing wins acceptance of its position, it could more credibly claim that the use of force or coercion to achieve unification of Taiwan would be lawful. The PRC could also more plausibly argue that some—but not all—measures by the United States and others to prevent or deter such an outcome would be unlawful. Acceptance of the PRC’s views on Resolution 2758 also would weaken the UN’s integrity and increase the challenges facing the rules-based international order.
COMMENT – Bonnie Glazer has made this point before, but it bears repeating: the United Nations must not allow itself to be coerced into endorsing the CCP’s illegitimate claim over Taiwan.
Authoritarianism
7. Do China’s Venture Capital and Private Equity Firms Welcome State Investment?
Emanuele Colonnelli, Bo Li, and Ernest Liu, Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions, May 1, 2024
INSIGHTS
China’s government is the leading investor in the venture capital/private equity market in China, investing six times more capital than privately-owned investors.
The average fund management firm dislikes government-linked capital and is willing to give up nearly $70 million in potential investments to avoid it. Dislike is highest among the best performing private firms.
Dislike for government capital investment is less when it is tied to local (versus provincial or central) government, and in state-dominated sectors.
Qualitative evidence suggests fund managers dislike government capital because they fear interference due to political, rather than profit-maximizing, incentives.
China’s state-linked investors may not be able to attract the best firms to pursue economic or societal goals.
COMMENT – This study provides an important insight into the motivations of the PRC’s business leaders as they have to deal with a far more authoritarian Chinese Communist Party.
8. The Exodus of China’s Wealthy to Japan
Miho Inada, Wall Street Journal, May 2, 2024
Frustrations with China’s autocratic political system and economic slowdown provoke the flight, helping Tokyo’s luxury property market.
Last year, China native Tomo Hayashi, the owner of a metals-trading firm, moved to Tokyo. He quickly adopted a Japanese name, spent the equivalent of about $650,000 on a luxury waterfront condo and, in March, brought his family to join him.
The 45-year-old, whose two boys just started in a Japanese elementary school, is one of the many wealthy Chinese driving a boom in high-end Tokyo properties and reshaping the city.
Frustrations with Beijing’s autocratic political system, which flared during abrupt pandemic-era lockdowns and have only grown since then, have helped drive the wave, according to real-estate agents and others watching the exodus. China’s economic slowdown and its struggling stock market are also motivating wealthy people to leave the country, they say.
Hayashi, who like many Chinese buyers avoids discussing politics back home, said the move to Tokyo was a challenge. “But we like Japan—food, culture, education and safety,” he said.
Japan isn’t the only haven for Chinese people seeking a Plan B. The U.S., Canada and Singapore are among the countries drawing Chinese migrants, while Hong Kong residents often head to the U.K.
But Japanese cities that are just a few hours’ flight from China are a leading choice for better-off Chinese people. Japan’s real-estate prices are low for foreigners thanks to the weak yen and it is fairly easy for them to purchase property. And the Japanese writing system uses Chinese characters in part, so new arrivals can more easily find their way around.
A report last June by Henley & Partners that tracks worldwide migration trends estimated that a net total of 13,500 high-net-worth Chinese people would migrate overseas during the year, making China the biggest worldwide loser in that category.
COMMENT – I think these last two pieces have a lot in common. China’s best and brightest understand that the Chinese Communist Party is ruining their country and there is nothing they can do about it other than keep their heads down and leave.
9. Analysis: The ulterior motive behind Xi Jinping's latest military reforms
Katsuji Nakazawa, Nikkei Asia, April 25, 2024
10. China enlists Tencent, Weibo and Douyin to protect state secrets
Yukio Tajima, Nikkei Asia, May 1, 2024
11. China’s ties with Russia are growing more solid
The Economist, April 25, 2024
12. VIDEO – Dmitri Alperovitch on China/Taiwan: ‘They're on a path to war’
Washington Post Live, YouTube, April 30, 2024
Dmitri Alperovitch argues China's pursuit of Taiwan is driven by Xi Jinping's personal ambitions, historical perspective, and regional security concerns, rather than direct U.S. involvement. He argues that the escalating tensions indicate a path towards conflict between China and Taiwan.
13. As US Tech Firms Bow to China’s Censorship, Chinese Users Risk Everything to Defy It
Yaqiu Wang, The Diplomat, April 27, 2024
14. U.S. law firm Mayer Brown prepares split from Chinese operations
Echo Wong and Pak Yiu, Nikkei Asia, April 30, 2024
15. Beyond China's Black Box
Jacob Stokes, CNAS, April 30, 2024
16. China warns Antony Blinken US must choose between ‘co-operation or confrontation’
Joe Leahy and Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, April 25, 2024
17. Shades of Yellow
David Bandurski, China Media Project, April 24, 2024
18. Hui Muslims Mobilized to Chase “Spies”
Ma Wenyan, Bitter Winter, April 25, 2024
April 15 in China is National Security Education Day. “Bitter Winter” received several reports on how “national security education” became mandatory around that date in Hui Muslim mosques, under the guidance of the government-controlled China Islamic Association.
Preachers were told that they should focus their sermons on explaining to Muslim devotees the new Law on Guarding State Secrets, which comes into force on May 1 and includes a greatly expanded, if vague, definition of what a “state secret” is.
In Zhenjiang, Jiangsu province, it was reported that in several mosques the Friday sermons were given by United Front legal bureaucrats. All mosques were involved in the campaign promoting the new law and inciting Muslims to protect “state secrets” and report on “spies.”
Banners proclaimed: “Everyone is responsible for everything: promote national security awareness, resolutely resist any behavior that endangers national security, contribute to safeguarding national security by promoting national unity and social harmony and stability.”
In Wuhan, Hubei province, ad hoc committees were formed in the mosques to prepare the National Security Education Day, promote the study of the “Law on Guarding State Secrets” and other security-related laws, and teach believers how to be vigilant and report about “spies.”
19. Two Sessions of China 2024
Lt Gen S L Narasimhan, Gateway House, April 22, 2024
20. Chinese Scientist Who Shared Covid Sequence Protests Lab Closure
Keith Bradsher, New York Times, May 1, 2024
21. Hamas and Fatah Officials, Longtime Rivals, Met in Chin
Damien Cave and Adam Rasgon, New York Times, April 30, 2024
22. How China's ad-hoc tech pipeline fuels Russia's Ukraine war efforts
Tracy Wen Liu and Peter Guest, Nikkei Asia, May 1, 2024
23. The Very Real Limits of the Russia-China ‘No Limits’ Partnership
Keith Johnson, Foreign Policy, April 30, 2024
24. Why Xi Jinping is afraid to unleash China’s consumers
Joe Leahy, Financial Times, April 30, 2024
Environmental Harms
25. China’s Battle Against Air Pollution: An Update
Yanzhong Huang, Council on Foreign Relations, April 24, 2024
26. Tensions grow as China ramps up global mining for green tech
Global China Unit, BBC, April 29, 2024
27. China can't quit coal by 2040, researchers say, despite global climate goals
Channel News Asia, April 23, 2024
Foreign Interference and Coercion
28. Mainland China’s top spy agency vows to fight ‘Taiwan independence’ ahead of William Lai’s inauguration
Yuanyue Dang, South China Morning Post, April 29, 2024
29. China should have confidence to talk to us, Taiwan's president-elect says
Yimou Lee and Ben Blanchard, Reuters, April 25, 2024
30. Most Americans see TikTok as a Chinese influence tool, Reuters/Ipsos poll finds
Jason Lange and David Shepardson, Reuters, May 1, 2024
31. Chinese institute compiled profiles of Canadian MPs of Chinese descent
Robert Fife and Steven Chase, Globe and Mail, April 22, 2024
32. Blinken Meets with Xi as U.S. Pressures China to End Support for Russia
Michael R. Gordon and Brian Spegele, Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2024
33. Scarborough Shoal was a refuge for Filipino fishermen. Then Chinese boats moved in
Luna Pham, Radio Free Asia, April 26, 2024
34. ‘Honeypots’ and influence operations: China’s spies turn to Europe
John Paul Rathbone and Joe Leahy, Financial Times, April 28, 2024
35. Head of Belgian Foreign Affairs Committee says she was hacked by China
Reuters, April 25, 2024
36. Suddenly, Chinese Spies Seem to Be Popping Up All Over Europe
Andrew Higgins and Christopher F. Schuetze, New York Times, April 27, 2024
37. China views European spying allegations as a 'serious problem'
Yitong Wu and Kwong Wing, Radio Free Asia, April 29, 2024
China's responses to allegations of spying in Germany and the United Kingdom suggest that the ruling Communist Party has plenty to lose from closer public scrutiny of its overseas influence operations, analysts told Radio Free Asia in recent interviews.
The arrests highlighted concerns over Beijing's attempts to infiltrate democracies and extend its political influence far beyond its borders.
Beijing on Friday summoned Germany's Ambassador Patricia Flor to protest the arrests of four people for allegedly spying for China.
"I was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs today," Flor said via her X account on Friday. "A quite telling move – but, after all, a good opportunity to explain a few things."
The summons came after German prosecutors on April 22 accused three people of providing information to Chinese intelligence that could have a military purpose, and accused Guo Jian, a parliamentary aide to far-right MEP Maximilian Krah, of spying on the parliament and on overseas dissidents for China.
Flor, who was last summoned in September 2023 after German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock referred to Communist Party leader Xi Jinping as a "dictator," added: "We do not tolerate espionage in Germany, regardless of which country it comes from.”
She noted that it is for the courts to decide whether the accusations against the four defendants are true or not.
Six accused of spying
Flor's summoning came after German police arrested four people on suspicion of spying for China, and as police in the United Kingdom charged two people with spying for China.
Christopher Cash, 29, a former researcher for a prominent British lawmaker in the governing Conservative Party, and Christopher Berry, 32, appeared in a London court on April 26 after being charged with providing prejudicial information to China in breach of the Official Secrets Act.
Neither defendant entered a plea, and only confirmed their names and addresses at a brief hearing at Westminster Magistrates' Court.
A spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in London said the claims of spying for China were "completely fabricated and nothing but malicious slander."
"We ... urge the U.K. side to stop anti-China political manipulation and stop putting on such self-staged political farce," the spokesperson said in comments posted to the embassy website on April 22.
Chen Yonglin, a former political attache at the Chinese Consulate General in Sydney, said diplomatic summonses are usually only used in response to a major incident, and that Beijing's response shows a deep level of concern over spying allegations.
"They will summon the ambassador [only] when they run into a very serious problem," Chen said.
"The Chinese government is going to be very concerned, now that its overseas espionage activities are being cracked down on."
COMMENT – Reminds me of the whole spy balloon fiasco: the Chinese Communist Party violates the sovereignty of another country and interferes in their internal affairs, when the other country discovers it, takes action to protect themselves and makes it public, then Beijing throws a temper tantrum and demands an apology, accusing the other side of “smearing” their good name.
Stay classy Beijing!
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
38. US report claims evidence of arbitrary detention, rights abuses in Hong Kong, as city gov’t refutes ‘bias’ and ‘smears’
Kelly Ho, Hong Kong Free Press, April 24, 2024
39. Hohhot Christians’ Trial: Ban Yanchao Gets 5 Years for Distributing Bibles
Fang Yongrui, Bitter Winter, April 29, 2024
In March, “Bitter Winter” reported about the arrest and prosecution of ten Christian believers from Hohhot, the capital of Inner Mongolia. They were accused of illegal sales of Bibles, but the peculiarity of the case was that the Bibles had been legally published in Nanjing with the government’s authorization. The prosecutor’s argument was that sales of Bibles by an illegal house church not affiliated with the government-controlled Three-Self Church is a crime even if the Bibles are in themselves “legal.”
The ten Christians were Wang Honglan, Ji Heying, Zhang Wang, Wang Jiale, Liu Minna, Li Chao, Yang Zhijun, Ji Guolong, Liu Wei, and Ban Yanhong. Wang Honglan is well-known in the Hohhot Christian community, and had already spent five years in jail and one year in a labor camp. Ji Heying is her husband. Ban Yanhong was regarded by the authorities as another key figure in the group.
They were all arrested in April 2021, and a legal battle followed. The Christians claimed that not only they did not make a profit, they actually lost money since they purchased the Bibles from a Three-Self organization in Nanjing at 95% of the cover price. They then sold them at 75% of the cover price. Their purposes were clearly evangelistic rather than commercial.
Nonetheless, on April 15, 2024, the Hohhot Huimin District Court sentenced Ban Yanhong to five years in jail for “illegal business operations.” The trial continues with respect to the other defendants but the court decided that Wang Honglan, Wang Jiale, Liu Minna, and Yang Zhijun should remain in jail. Li Chao, Ji Heying, Ji Guolong, Liu Wei, and Zhang Wang, have been released on bail but should still face trial.
40. Tibetans from Europe find China’s visa-free policy not so free
Thaklha Gyal, Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2024
41. China erases memory of ‘white paper’ protests in further threat to journalism
Jessie Lau, The Guardian, May 1, 2024
42. A New Round of Restrictions Further Constrains Religious Practice in Xinjiang
Martin Lavička, ChinaFile, April 19, 2024
43. VIDEO – Facing repression in China, Muslims seek freedom in NYC
Aron Ranen, VOA, April 24, 2024
44. China Moving Forced Laborers Amid U.S. Crackdown, Biden Official Says
Richard Vanderford, Wall Street Journal, April 30, 2024
45. European parliament passes law banning forced labor products
Alim Seytoff and Roseanne Gerin, Radio Free Asia, April 23, 2024
46. Uyghur butcher served 7 years in jail for urging friends not to drink alcohol or smoke
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, April 22, 2024
47. Questions surround Uyghur woman’s sudden death
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2024
48. Whistleblowing Uyghur surgeon speaks truth to horror
Radio Free Asia, April 25, 2024
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
49. Made in China 2025: China meets most targets in manufacturing plan, proving US tariffs and sanctions ineffective
Zhang Tong and Dannie Peng, South China Morning Post, April 30, 2024
50. US, Philippines Eye Partnership to Cut China’s Nickel Dominance
Peter Martin and Jennifer Jacobs, Bloomberg, May 1, 2024
51. Binance’s Changpeng Zhao sentenced to 4 months’ prison in US for allowing money laundering
Associated Press, South China Morning Post, May 1, 2024
52. Should Mexico’s new tariffs sound early warning alarms for China’s exports?
Kinling Lo, South China Morning Post, April 30, 2024
53. The infinite connection: How to make the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor happen
Alberto Rizzi, European Council on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2024
54. EU pulls its gun on China
Stuart Lau, Camille Gijs, and Koen Verhelst, Politico, April 26, 2024
55. Huawei Leads Chinese Effort to Compete with Nvidia’s AI Chips
Qianer Liu and Scott Thurm, Information, April 25, 2024
56. Graphite miners lobby US govt to impose levy on China-sourced EV material
Divya Rajagopal, Reuters, April 30, 2024
57. Beijing Braces for a Rematch of Trump vs. China
Lingling Wei, Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2024
58. Tesla's self-driving bid for China faces rivals racing ahead
Reuters, April 29, 2024
59. Demand for critical minerals drives massive changes in global economy
Tobias Burns, The Hill, April 30, 2024
Cyber & Information Technology
60. Tesla Seals Deal for China Maps, Whether Musk Wants Them or Not
Bloomberg, May 1, 2024
61. Musk Courts Chinese Officials to Seek Approval for Tesla’s Self-Driving Technology
Raffaele Huang and Selina Cheng, Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2024
62. Republican China hawks criticize Intel chip in new Huawei laptop
Alexandra Alper, Reuters, April 25, 2024
63. A TikTok ban could also end short-form video as we’ve come to know it
Taylor Lorenz, Washington Post, April 29, 2024
64. AI in Africa opens up new battlefront for China, US
Martin K.N Siele, Semafor, April 30, 2024
65. ByteDance prefers TikTok shutdown in US if legal options fail, sources say
Kane Wu and Julie Zhu, Reuters, April 26, 2024
66. New ASML boss Fouquet must navigate US/China chip war
Toby Sterling, Reuters, April 26, 2024
67. A Chinese Firm Is America’s Favorite Drone Maker. Except in Washington.
Kate Kelly, New York Times, April 25, 2024
Military and Security Threats
68. Chinese coast guard fires water cannons at Philippine vessels in the latest South China Sea incident
Associated Press, April 30, 2024
69. VIDEO – South China Sea: BBC on board Philippine ship hit by Chinese water cannon
BBC, April 29, 2024
70. Taiwan hails U.S.-Japan-Philippines ties as 'great deterrent' to China
Thompson Chau, Cheng Ting-fang, and Lauly Li, Nikkei Asia, April 30, 2024
71. China flexes muscle at sea as new aircraft carrier starts trials
Yuichi Shiga and Tamayo Muto, Nikkei Asia, May 1, 2024
72. China, France agree to deepen military cooperation as South China Sea tensions rise
Amber Wang, South China Morning Post, April 27, 2024
73. A New Pacific Arsenal to Counter China
John Ismay, Edward Wong, and Pablo Robles, New York Times, April 26, 2024
74. States Take on China in the Name of National Security
James T. Areddy, Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
75. Environmental Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative
International Republican Institute, April 2, 2024
76. Argentina’s foreign minister pledges unchanged ‘China-friendly’ policy during visit aimed at steadying strained ties
Alyssa Chen, South China Morning Post, May 1, 2024
77. Is Bougainville the next battleground between China and the U.S.?
Michael E. Miller, Washington Post, May 1, 2024
78. Paraguay: A Promising Government Navigating a Perilous Path
Evan Ellis, Global Americas, April 30, 2024
Opinion Pieces
79. China is buying less from its Asian neighbors, too
Sonal Varma, Nikkei Asia, April 29, 2024
80. Self-Driving Teslas Can’t Duck the US-China Silicon Curtain
David Fickling, Bloomberg, April 30, 2024
81. Lidar: Another emerging technology brought to you by China
Mark Montgomery, Defense News, April 25, 2024
82. The Chips Act has been surprisingly successful so far
Chris Miller, Financial Times, April 30, 2024
83. With TikTok and China, the World’s Democracies Have Played the Sucker for Far Too Long
Tim Wu, New York Times, April 29, 2024
84. Xi Jinping Has Tough Economic Choices Ahead
Raja Krishnamoorthi, Foreign Policy, April 26, 2024