Friends,
Happy Father’s Day to all the dads out there. Give him a hug or a phone call, he will appreciate it.
This week, like all weeks, we have a lot going on and we get into that below.
But first, rather than dive into one or two topics, I’d like folks to consider a few high-level developments and perhaps do some stocktaking.
#1 – The PRC came under heavy criticism again at the G7 Summit in Italy with nine paragraphs of the joint statement devoted to Beijing’s destabilizing activities. [is it just me or has the G7’s joint statements become obnoxiously long?... this one clocks in at 44-pages and nearly 20,000 words] It is striking how this forum established in 1973 as an ad hoc gathering of finance ministers has become arguably the world’s most important forum for international cooperation.
#2 – We learned that in May, Russia became the #1 supplier of natural gas to Europe, overtaking the United States for the first time since the start of Putin’s full-scale war on Ukraine. [this likely comes as a shock to those of us who had believed that Europe had severed its energy dependency on Russia in the spring of 2022 and that the NATO allies were united in undermining Moscow’s war machine]
#3 – The Europeans imposed relatively low tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles immediately after European parliamentary elections took place last week. European parties from the right of the political spectrum, many with EU-skeptic platforms, gained ground and French President Macron called for snap elections that could further destabilize France. [for more on the French angle, see this opinion piece in the New York Times on Friday, “France Is on the Brink of Something Terrifying”]
#4 – Since late 2023, Germany has been struck in a budget crisis. Infighting within the ruling coalition government and the effects of German law, which severely limits state borrowing, has meant that Berlin cannot meet its long-term defense commitments to NATO or even fulfill immediate shortfalls in the Bundeswehr. This (and #2 above) will make transatlantic cooperation extremely difficult.
#5 – Indian Prime Minister Modi was forced to form a coalition government after his party, the BJP, performed poorly in elections last month. It remains to be seen how this will impact Indian economic reforms, India’s relationship with the United States, and its rivalry with the PRC.
#6 – Japanese Prime Minister Kishida is under significant pressure to step down as his Cabinet approval rating sinks to under 17%. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been plagued by a corruption scandal associated with election funds and Kishida may be forced out so that the Party can prepare for the Lower House parliamentary elections that must take place before the fall of 2025.
#7 – It has been nearly 18 months since the world became enthralled with the risks and opportunities of artificial intelligence and the hype is beginning to fade. OpenAI released its chatbot, called ChatGPT, in November 2022 and by January 2023 it became the fastest growing software application in history. Folks predicted that it and other generative AI applications would both solve humanities problems and/or bring humanity to an end. Like other technologies before, it appears that we are adjusting to it.
#8 – Oh and we are less than two weeks away from the first Biden-Trump Presidential Debate on June 27 in Atlanta, a month away from the Republican National Convention on July 15 in Milwaukee, and two months away from the Democratic National Convention on August 19 in Chicago.
Deep breaths everyone.
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Sleepwalking Toward War: Will America and China Heed the Warnings of Twentieth-Century Catastrophe?
Odd Arne Westad, Foreign Affairs, June 13, 2024
In The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914, the British historian Paul Kennedy explained how two traditionally friendly peoples ended up in a downward spiral of mutual hostility that led to World War I. Major structural forces drove the competition between Germany and Britain: economic imperatives, geography, and ideology. Germany’s rapid economic rise shifted the balance of power and enabled Berlin to expand its strategic reach. Some of this expansion—especially at sea—took place in areas in which Britain had profound and established strategic interests. The two powers increasingly viewed each other as ideological opposites, wildly exaggerating their differences. The Germans caricatured the British as moneygrubbing exploiters of the world, and the British portrayed the Germans as authoritarian malefactors bent on expansion and repression.
The two countries appeared to be on a collision course, destined for war. But it wasn’t structural pressures, important as they were, that sparked World War I. War broke out thanks to the contingent decisions of individuals and a profound lack of imagination on both sides. To be sure, war was always likely. But it was unavoidable only if one subscribes to the deeply ahistorical view that compromise between Germany and Britain was impossible.
The war might not have come to pass had Germany’s leaders after Chancellor Otto von Bismarck not been so brazen about altering the naval balance of power. Germany celebrated its dominance in Europe and insisted on its rights as a great power, dismissing concerns about rules and norms of international behavior. That posture alarmed other countries, not just Britain. And it was difficult for Germany to claim, as it did, that it wanted to make a new, more just and inclusive world order while it threatened its neighbors and allied with a decaying Austro-Hungarian Empire that was hard at work denying the national aspirations of the peoples on its borders.
A similar tunnel vision prevailed on the other side. Winston Churchill, the British naval chief, concluded in 1913 that Britain’s preeminent global position “often seems less reasonable to others than to us.” British views of others tended to lack that self-awareness. Officials and commentators spewed vitriol about Germany, inveighing particularly against unfair German trade practices. London eyed Berlin warily, interpreting all its actions as evidence of aggressive intentions and failing to understand Germany’s fears for its own security on a continent where it was surrounded by potential foes. British hostility, of course, only deepened German fears and stoked German ambitions. “Few seem to have possessed the generosity or the perspicacity to seek a large-scale improvement in Anglo-German relations,” Kennedy lamented.
Such generosity or perspicacity is also sorely missing in relations between China and the United States today. Like Germany and Britain before World War I, China and the United States seem to be locked in a downward spiral, one that may end in disaster for both countries and for the world at large. Similar to the situation a century ago, profound structural factors fuel the antagonism. Economic competition, geopolitical fears, and deep mistrust work to make conflict more likely.
But structure is not destiny. The decisions that leaders make can prevent war and better manage the tensions that invariably rise from great-power competition. As with Germany and Britain, structural forces may push events to a head, but it takes human avarice and ineptitude on a colossal scale for disaster to ensue. Likewise, sound judgment and competence can prevent the worst-case scenarios.
THE LINES ARE DRAWN
Much like the hostility between Germany and Britain over a century ago, the antagonism between China and the United States has deep structural roots. It can be traced to the end of the Cold War. In the latter stages of that great conflict, Beijing and Washington had been allies of sorts, since both feared the power of the Soviet Union more than they feared each other. But the collapse of the Soviet state, their common enemy, almost immediately meant that policymakers fixated more on what separated Beijing and Washington than what united them. The United States increasingly deplored China’s repressive government. China resented the United States’ meddlesome global hegemony.
COMMENT – Odd Arne Westad is too good of an historian to write this piece.
History doesn’t teach clear and unambiguous lessons, as he seems to suggest here, it teaches conflicting and often contradictory lessons.
The “sleepwalking into war” thesis suggests that there is a fairly simple way for the United States and the People’s Republic to avoid a war: one or both sides must compromise and reassure the other. Under this thesis, oft repeated by other writers and commentators, leaders that compromise and avoid provoking their rival exercise “sound judgement and competence” and leaders that don’t do that, suffer from either “human avarice or ineptitude.”
Given that Westad published his article in Foreign Affairs (and not Qiushi, the Chinese Communist Party’s leading theoretical journal published by the Central Committee), I think we can safely assume that his audience is American leaders and the American public. Which means he believes the onus is on the Washington to reassure and appease Beijing.
Under this thesis, a “competent” American leader should avoid exasperating the structural factors that make war more likely. So, what does that mean in practice?
According to Westad, Washington should:
Think of the PRC today like Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II because “China today shows many of the same signs of hubris and fear that Germany exhibited after the 1890s” and “Some of [the PRC’s] complaints about American behavior are strikingly similar to those that Germany lodged against Britain in the early twentieth century.”
Reassure Beijing because “[i]f the United States wants to prevent a war, it has to convince Chinese leaders that it is not hell-bent on preventing China’s future economic development.”
The concept of self-determination should be sacrificed to appease the Chinese Communist Party: “What is remarkable about the Taiwan situation is that it is clear to all involved—except, perhaps, to the Taiwanese most fixed on achieving formal independence—that only one possible compromise can likely help avoid disaster.”
“Washington could say that it will under no circumstances support Taiwan’s independence, and Beijing could declare that it will not use force unless Taiwan formally takes steps toward becoming independent.” This is the position both sides have had for the last 50 years, the problem is that Beijing wants to “solve” this issue and has dropped its earlier path of “peaceful unification.”
Well, that settles it… to avoid a devastating Sino-American War all we need are leaders in Washington who exercise “sound judgement and competence” to reassure CCP leaders in Beijing that their visions of territorial expansion are legitimate and appease their desire to annex another country. Then “rational” leaders in Beijing will see that starting a war of aggression isn’t necessary and they will cease in their efforts to overturn an international system they believe is unfair.
Under this logic, President Kennedy should have pulled U.S. troops out of West Berlin in 1961 when Khrushchev demanded the withdrawal of American, French and British troops because we were “sleepwalking into war.”
In a more holistic assessment of what history might teach us about this moment, Westad should have pointed out how this “sleepwalking into war” thesis had significant impacts after WWI and arguably contributed to the start of the next world war. This thesis did not originate with him or even with Christopher Clark, who wrote the 2012 book The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914.
He should have pointed out that this same “sleepwalking into war” thesis weighed heavily on the minds of leaders with “sound judgment and competence” in London, Paris, and Washington of the 1930s.
In the 1930s, Berlin believed that the international order established after WWI was unfair to them and they felt that Germans and German territory had been illegitimately separated from them and that they were justified in using force to achieve unification (Anschluss means “unification” or the annexing of Austria into Germany).
Leaders of “sound judgment and competence” in London, Paris, and Washington who themselves were persuaded by the “sleepwalking into war” thesis, sought to find compromises and reassure Berlin, even as Berlin became more committed to its own sense of victimization and emboldened by the weak response of London, Paris, and Washington to German aggression in Europe. In many ways the “lesson” that Westad expects us to glean from 1914 was the exact same lesson that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain learned from WWI and which influenced his actions at Munich.
I doubt that Westad would want his policy advice in this article to be associated with Munich, but since he opened the door on the arguments of how World Wars start, I think it is fair to make the comparison.
This is the tricky thing about history, its lessons are rarely as clear cut as the articles in Foreign Affairs suggest.
One correction to his article:
Quoting Odd Arne Westad: “At the geopolitical level, China’s view of the United States began to darken in 2003 with the invasion and occupation of Iraq. China opposed the U.S.-led attack, even if Beijing cared little for Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s regime. More than the United States’ devastating military capabilities, what really shocked leaders in Beijing was the ease with which Washington could dismiss matters of sovereignty and nonintervention, notions that were staples of the very international order the Americans had coaxed China to join. Chinese policymakers worried that if the United States could so readily flout the same norms it expected others to uphold, little would constrain its future behavior. China’s military budget doubled from 2000 to 2005 and then doubled again by 2009. Beijing also launched programs to better train its military, improve its efficiency, and invest in new technology.”
Nope, the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis darkened the CCP’s view of the United States and motivated the PRC to undertake a massive military modernization program. Westad’s fixation on the invasion of Iraq and how that “caused” PRC leaders to undertake a military build-up is just chronologically wrong (and one suspects that he cherry-picked that event and date to imply that the darkening was Washington’s fault… more specifically George W. Bush’s fault).
But as Westad knows, an effect must follow a cause and a cause cannot follow an effect.
In 1997, following the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, Chinese Leader Jiang Zemin initiated a massive military modernization program. Starting in 1997 and for next 2+ decades, the PRC made double digit increases in defense spending every year except one. As Richard Bitzinger describes in his December 2011 article, “Modernising China’s Military, 1997-2012”: “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has since the late 1990s been engaged in an ambitious, concerted, and methodical transformation.”
2. U.S. tops China as ASEAN's largest export destination
Atsushi Tomiyama, Norman Goh, and Apornrath Phoonphongphiphat, Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2024
ASEAN countries' exports to the U.S. in the January-March period surpassed those to China for the first time in six quarters as the region's trade appears to be shifting along with moves in the global supply chain.
Nikkei Asia compiled data for ASEAN's 10 members based on statistics from the bloc's secretariat, individual governments and local media reports.
COMMENT – I’ve been told over and over again since the summer of 2016 that without the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership… now called the CPTPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), the U.S. could never have an important trade relationship with ASEAN, ASEAN would be pulled inevitably into the PRC’s sphere of influence, and that countries in Southeast Asia wouldn’t think that America was involved in their economic futures.
I was told that the TPP/CPTPP was the ONLY way the U.S. and Southeast Asia could expand their economic relationship and that if Washington (and all those populists in both parties who hated international trade and globalization) didn’t change their approach and join the TPP/CPTPP, then America’s influence in the region would collapse.
Lo and behold, it seems the death of America’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia has been greatly exaggerated.
The policies begun under the Trump Administration, and accelerated by the Biden Administration, which seeks to make the United States less dependent on the PRC has started to work AND it brings greater benefits to other countries in the region (shh 🤫 … don’t call it “decoupling” because that’s impossible… “French finance minister says economic ‘decoupling’ from China is impossible”).
I’m shocked… just shocked… that the doom and gloom I continuously heard from the lobbyists of multinational companies and the those who peddle free-trade dogma wasn’t really true. (some examples: “America Must Return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership” September 2021, “What’s Next for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)?” September 2021, “Bipartisan duo propose plan for TPP reentry” December 2022, “Rejoining TPP” December 2020, “After RCEP’s Launch, the US Urgently Needs to Rejoin the TPP,” November 2020).
Contrary to popular belief, the Cold War between the United States and the People’s Republic, along with the decoupling that is taking place between the two countries, isn’t leading to a collapse in international trade.
As anyone would likely have guessed had they thought about it (instead of the knee-jerk hysteria we’ve heard for years), trade flows and supply chains are moving. And it appears that these policies (which folks decried as disastrous and catastrophic) provide tangible benefits to the people of Southeast Asia and the United States.
3. China Sends Most Advanced Fighter Jets to Contested Border—Satellite Images
Aadil Brar, Newsweek, June 4, 2024
China has deployed advanced J-20 fighter jets along the contested border with India, new satellite imagery shows.
"Analysis of imagery collected over Shigatse Air Base in China shows the deployment of six likely J-20 stealth fighter aircraft near the Indian border," said U.S.-based geospatial intelligence provider All Source Analysis on May 30.
The Chengdu J-20, also known as Mighty Dragon, isn't known to be permanently deployed at the Shigatse Air Base, making it a rare occurrence, according to All Source Analysis.
4. China's rush to control news of stabbed Americans hints at sensitivities
Grace Li, Nikkei Asia, June 12, 2024
An apparent initial effort by Chinese authorities to suppress news about the stabbing of four American instructors on its soil earlier this week highlights concern for fragile U.S. ties, experts said.
Four foreign nationals were attacked in a park in the northeastern city of Jilin around noon on Monday. They were later identified as instructors from Cornell College in the state of Iowa who are teaching at a local university, according to a notice published by the local police late on Tuesday afternoon.
COMMENT – Reports are that the individual who stabbed these instructors from Iowa did so based on Anti-American views.
I doubt we will get much of an investigation, but that shouldn’t be surprising since the Chinese Communist Party has been spending years portraying America as an enemy and a threat to the Chinese people, whether that is through an espionage awareness campaigns that portray all Americans as spies or the effort to blame the PRC’s economic troubles on Washington.
5. F.A.A. Investigating How Counterfeit Titanium Got into Boeing and Airbus Jets
Mark Walker, New York Times, June 14, 2024
The material, which was purchased from a little-known Chinese company, was sold with falsified documents and used in parts that went into jets from both manufacturers.
Some recently manufactured Boeing and Airbus jets have components made from titanium that was sold using fake documentation verifying the material’s authenticity, according to a supplier for the plane makers, raising concerns about the structural integrity of those airliners.
The falsified documents are being investigated by Spirit AeroSystems, which supplies fuselages for Boeing and wings for Airbus, as well as the Federal Aviation Administration. The investigation comes after a parts supplier found small holes in the material from corrosion.
In a statement, the F.A.A. said it was investigating the scope of the problem and trying to determine the short- and long-term safety implications to planes that were made using the parts. It is unclear how many planes have parts made with the questionable material.
6. EV tariffs expected to slow but not halt China's drive into European market
Cissy Zhou, Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2024
The European Union's new tariffs on China-made electric vehicles may throw up some roadblocks for Chinese manufacturers looking to boost sales in the region, but the likes of BYD are expected to remain competitive against local producers.
The European Commission said on Wednesday that it will impose provisional tariffs on Chinese EVs from July due to China's "unfair" use of state support. Definitive measures, if any, are expected to be confirmed by year-end.
7. China urges EU to reverse EV tariffs, Chery undeterred
Liz Lee, Laurie Chen and Nick Carey, Reuters, June 13, 2024
Beijing on Thursday slammed EU tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles as protectionist behaviour even as the country's top auto exporter said the duties would not derail its expansion plans for Europe, including making EVs in Spain this year.
The reaction from China and others embroiled in the dispute, including European and Chinese car makers, points to clear opposition to the EU decision and an eagerness to de-escalate the situation.
8. Pakistan's Gwadar port shows China's Belt and Road can fail
Kira Schacht, Deutsche Welle, May 13, 2024
Pakistan's Gwadar port was meant to be a shining success for China's Belt and Road Initiative. But almost two decades later, it still sits empty.
In November 2016, Gwadar port symbolized stability, peace and prosperity for Pakistan — at least according to then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
"This day is the dawn of a new era," he told the opening ceremony crowd, which had gathered to witness a row of Chinese trucks arriving to load cargo onto the first-ever container ship to pass through the port.
It was the official launch of the port's operations nearly a decade after its completion. The ceremony also marked the start of the prestigious China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of China's global collection of infrastructure projects and trade networks known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Yet today, nearly eight years later, this new era has yet to dawn. A DW analysis shows what went wrong.
'Investors thought Gwadar would become Dubai'
The idea behind the CPEC was to connect China's western Xinjiang province with the sea via Pakistan. This would shorten trade routes for China and help avoid the contentious Malacca Strait choke point, a narrow waterway between Malaysia and Sumatra that links the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Pakistan, meanwhile, would benefit from increases in trade, infrastructure and industry along the 2,000-kilometer corridor (1,240 miles), all financed by China.
COMMENT – Rather than assuming that the purpose of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was primarily “economic,” as PRC and Pakistani leaders assert publicly, one might assume when looking at the map that the entire project was “strategic” with the primary purpose being the containment of India.
Under that logic, CPEC looks like a success, not a failure.
9. China pushes rival Ukraine peace plan before Swiss summit, diplomats say
Laurie Chen, Reuters, June 13, 2024
China, skipping a weekend summit on a peace plan for Ukraine, has been lobbying governments for its alternative plan, 10 diplomats said, with one calling Beijing's campaign a "subtle boycott" of the global meeting in Switzerland.
Ninety states and organisations have registered to take part in the summit on Saturday and Sunday in the alpine resort of Lucerne, which will seek to build support for Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy's peace proposals, including the full withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.
Moscow, which was not invited to Lucerne, has dismissed the meeting as futile. China, which has close ties to Russia, says it will not attend the conference because it does not meet Beijing's requirements, including the participation of Russia.
China and Russia proclaimed a "no limits" partnership just days before President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Russia's smaller neighbour in February 2022. Beijing says it is neutral in the conflict and has not supplied Moscow with weapons or ammunition.
10. VIDEO – The Long Game: Behind the Investigation
Stuff Circuit, June 2024
“China’s global influence is one of the defining stories of our times.”
COMMENT – Watch the full movie below about the decades long foreign interference campaign that the Chinese Communist Party has been waging in New Zealand. It is a full-length (1 hour 20 minute) documentary)
11. VIDEO – This Chinese Island Holds the Secrets to Beijing’s Massive Naval Expansion
Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2024
China is expanding its naval bases on the tropical island of Hainan in the South China Sea. Two of Beijing’s most important naval facilities, Yulia and Longpo, have undergone dramatic expansion to accommodate a growing fleet of vessels and to provide a home for China’s new sea-borne nuclear deterrent.
Authoritarianism
12. Don’t talk to media, Tiananmen massacre families warned ahead of June 4 anniversary
Chen Zifei, Radio Free Asia, May 28, 2024
State security police place dissidents, activists under guard or take them on enforced 'vacations.'
Chinese authorities have ordered relatives of those who died in the 1989 Tiananmen massacre not to give media interviews, while veteran activists who took part in the pro-democracy movement that year are slapped with restrictions as part of a nationwide "stability maintenance" operation ahead of the 35th anniversary of the bloodshed, Radio Free Asia has learned.
A security guard has been posted outside the home of Zhang Xianling, a founding member of the Tiananmen Mothers victims group whose 19-year-old son died in the military assault on Beijing, group spokesperson You Weijie told RFA Mandarin.
"Most of the victims' families haven't been placed under guard for the 35th anniversary this year," You said. "Only Zhang [Xianling] has -- there are guards outside her door."
"We have all been told not to give interviews to journalists in our homes because the anniversary of June 4 is nearly here," she said.
The move is part of the ruling Chinese Communist Party's "stability maintenance" system that aims to control the words and movements of anyone they think might cause some kind of trouble for the authorities on politically sensitive dates.
Public mourning for victims or discussion of the events of spring and summer 1989 are banned in China, and references to June 4, 1989, are blocked, filtered or deleted by the Great Firewall of government internet censorship.
13. What does Chinese repression look like? View these photos of Hong Kong.
Washington Post, June 4, 2024
14. Talking Tiananmen with a Chinese Chatbot
Alex Colville, China Media Project, June 4, 2024
Chinese developers hope to build the AI of the future. What, if anything, will it have to say about the past?
As China strives to surpass the United States with cutting-edge generative artificial intelligence, the leadership is keen to ensure technologies reach the public with the right political blind spots pre-engineered. Can Chinese AI hold its tongue on the issues most sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party?
To answer this question, I sat down with several leading Chinese AI chatbots to talk about an indisputable historical tragedy: the brutal massacre by soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army on June 4th, 1989, of hundreds, possibly thousands, of students and citizens protesting for political freedoms. The Tiananmen Massacre, often simply called “June Fourth,” is a point of extreme sensitivity for China’s leadership, which has gone to extremes to erase the tragedy from the country’s collective memory. Annual commemorations in Hong Kong’s Victoria Park were once the heart of global efforts to never forget, but this annual ritual has now been driven underground, with even small gestures of remembrance yielding charges of “offenses in connection with seditious intention.”
My discussions with Chinese AI were glitchy, and not exactly informative — but they demonstrated the challenges China’s authorities are likely to face in plugging loopholes in a technology that is meant to be robust and flexible.
False Innocence
Like their Western counterparts, including ChatGPT, AI chatbots like China’s “Spark” are built on a class of technologies known as large language models, or LLMs. Because each LLM is trained in a slightly unique way on different sets of data, and because each has varying safety settings, my questions about the Tiananmen Massacre returned a mixture of responses — so long as they were not too direct.
My most candid query about June Fourth was a quick lesson in red lines and sensitivities. When I asked iFlytek’s “Spark” (星火) if it could tell me “what happened on June 4, 1989,” it evaded the question. It had not learned enough about the subject, it said, to render a response. Immediately after the query, however, CMP’s account was deactivated for a seven-day period — the rationale being that we had sought “sensitive information.”
The shoulder-shrugging claim to ignorance may be an early sign of one programmed response to sensitive queries that we can come to expect from China’s disciplined AI.
The claim to not having sufficiently studied a subject lends the AI a sort of relatability, as though it is simply a conscientious student keen to offer accurate information, and that can at least be candid about its limitations. The cautious AI pupil naturally does not want to run afoul of 2022 laws specifying that LLMs in China must not generate “false news.”
But this innocence is engineered, a familiar stonewalling tactic. It is the AI equivalent of government claims to need further information — or the cadre who claims that vague “technical issues” are the reason a film must be pulled from a festival screening. The goal is to impede, but not to arouse undue suspicion.
15. Whispering advice, roaring praises: The role of Chinese think tanks under Xi Jinping
Nis Grunberg and Grzegorz Stec, MERICS, May 8, 2024
16. Hong Kong Cancels Activists’ Passports in Unprecedented Move
Bloomberg, June 12, 2024
17. VIDEO – Why China Says the U.S. and Philippines Are Setting Up an Asian NATO
Taiwan Talks, June 12, 2024
Taiwan Talks is in Manila for a two-part special following Asia's premier security forum, the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. At the forum, China accused the U.S. of seeking to set up an Asian NATO and said Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a direct result of NATO’s eastern expansion. We ask what's behind China's narrative and whether U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s speech gave fuel to Beijing’s fire with his theme of Indo-Pacific convergence in a multipolar world.
18. American AI Startups Relocate China-based Engineers
Juro Osawa and Stephanie Palazzolo, The Information, June 11, 2024
19. G-7 to Call on China to Stop Helping Russia’s War in Ukraine
Alberto Nardelli, Bloomberg, June 12, 2024
Kyiv’s allies are accusing Beijing of providing Russia with technologies and parts — either found in weapons or necessary to build them — aiding Moscow’s efforts to get around wave after wave of G-7 trade restrictions on many of those goods. Banned materials often get to Russia through third countries such as China and Turkey or networks of intermediaries.
Environmental Harms
20. China sends glacial water from Tibet to the Maldives, raising concerns
Lobsang, Tenzin Pema and Tenzin Dickyi, Radio Free Asia, June 5, 2024
Tibetans meanwhile are being told to save water as Beijing engages in water diplomacy.
C4ADS, June 11, 2024
As global demand for critical metals like cobalt, copper, and gold rises in response to a burgeoning green economy, Chinese enterprises are acquiring an increasing number of mining concessions right up against protected land in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) — threatening local biodiversity and regional stability alike.
Executive Summary
A rapid increase in mining concessions granted to foreign entities near protected areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) poses a risk to the biodiversity and stability of the region. Mining, especially for copper, gold, and cobalt, is an extractive process that, when unregulated, risks local ecosystems and biodiversity and threatens local socioeconomic stability.
Since 2015, the DRC Ministry of Mines granted the majority of foreign-owned mining concessions within, adjacent to, or in close proximity to protected areas to enterprises that publicly available information indicates are owned or funded by Chinese nationals. Among mining concessions within 10 kilometers (km) of protected areas in the DRC, at least 20% of all active concessions and 45% of active foreign-owned concessions appear to be Chinese-owned. Furthermore, this number appears to be increasing, with a 69% average year-on-year increase in new mining concessions granted to Chinese owned enterprises within 10 km of protected areas since 2015.
This brief examines the potential risks of the increase in foreign-owned mining concessions to biodiversity and stability in the DRC, focusing on the rise in Chinese mining activity and the documented association of Chinese mining enterprises with illicit activity.
Ultimately, DRC policymakers should be aware of this trend and be prepared to enact more stringent regulations to preserve the integrity of protected areas in Africa’s second largest country. Furthermore, the Chinese government should maintain consistency with its published guidelines and ensure that it holds its nationals accountable for the exploitation of natural resources abroad or risk associating consumers of its electronic products with environmentally unsound practices in Africa.
22. China’s record heat and heavy rain raise food security concerns
Edward Szekeres, Fred Hu, and Robert Shackelford, CNN, June 14, 2024
China is grappling with extreme weather as severe drought and record temperatures scorch the north while heavy rains inundate the south, raising concerns about food security in the world’s second-largest economy.
Areas of the country that produce a lot of rice and wheat have been badly affected, disrupting spring and summer planting seasons.
Foreign Interference and Coercion
23. Most Americans unaware of foreign intel operations’ scope on social media, State Dept. official says
David DiMolfetta, NextGov, June 6, 2024
Stuff Circuit, June 2024
COMMENT – Watch this documentary. Perhaps New Zealand will finally take these issues seriously.
25. Australia, NZ more wary on China as Premier Li visits
Kirsty Needham, Reuters, June 12, 2024
26. China dismisses Taiwan's concerns after man arrested on river leading to Taipei
Japan Times, June 12, 2024
27. Election Interference and Information Manipulation
Mareike Ohlberg, German Marshall Fund, June 6, 2024
The West remains focused on Russia as a sponsor of electoral disinformation and manipulation, but in recent years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as another key actor to watch.
Taiwan has been a key target for the PRC in this regard for many years. It was no different in January, when Taiwan’s voters elected, for a historic third consecutive time, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate for president. The experience, however, offers valuable lessons for other democracies confronting Beijing’s nefarious strategies.
Against this background, GMF’s Indo-Pacific program convened a closed-door roundtable in Washington, DC on April 10 and offered Taiwanese NGOs a platform to present their analysis of the recent election interference to officials, policymakers, and think-tank representatives from around the world. Participating Taiwanese NGOs included the Taiwan FactCheck Center, CoFacts, the Taiwan Information Environment Research Center (IORG), and Doublethink Lab. A Taiwanese government official also gave a presentation.
The report below presents key findings from the roundtable, with additional analysis from the author and the participating NGOs.
28. America Is Losing the Arab World: And China Is Reaping the Benefits
Michael Robbins, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler, Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2024
29. A report claims certain parliamentarians colluded with foreign states — could they be charged?
Brennan MacDonald, CBC News, June 8, 2024
Some parliamentarians were accused this week of conspiring with foreign governments, but their exact numbers and their identities remain a mystery to the public — and to many of their colleagues.
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) — a group of MPs and senators who hold top secret security clearances and are permanently bound to secrecy under the Security of Information Act — released a heavily redacted report on foreign political interference Monday.
In it, NSICOP alleged that some MPs and senators are "wittingly" helping foreign governments like China and India meddle in Canadian politics.
The allegation sparked outrage and expressions of distrust on Parliament Hill, and the Conservatives called on the Liberal government to reveal the identities of the parliamentarians under suspicion.
Public Safety Minister Dominic LeBlanc has been refusing to do so, saying it would be inappropriate to release the names and citing his obligations under the Security of Information Act.
NSICOP chair David McGuinty said the committee's "hands are tied" and it can't divulge the identities of the parliamentarians cited in the report. He said it's now up to the RCMP to decide what happens next.
COMMENT – Keeping things classified because it would embarrass political leaders seems like a poor rationale.
The Canadian Government appears unable or unwilling to handle these problems. In my opinion, the problem starts with Prime Minister Justin Trudeau who has been dragging his feet on this issue for years since the CCP’s interference in Canadian democracy overwhelmingly benefits him and his Liberal Party.
Don’t be surprised to see a backlash once he leaves power.
30. A Global South with Chinese characteristics
Niva Yau, Atlantic Council, June 13, 2024
At the peak of China’s economic growth toward the end of the 2010s, Beijing began to advocate for an alternative model of governance that prioritizes economic development and rejects the centrality of the protection of individual rights and “Western” democratic processes. At the heart of this new push to legitimize authoritarian governance was the example of China’s own remarkably rapid economic development under Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership and an implicit assertion that such successful growth legitimizes not only China’s own autocratic system, but also other non-democratic political systems. The global implications of this development have grown clearer as Beijing has embarked on a steadily expanding mission to promote its political system alongside its economic success in countries across the Global South.
As early as 1985, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping explained, in plain language, that the Chinese political system would resist changes despite economic integration with the world. He told the Tanzanian president at the time, “Our reform is an experiment not only in China but also internationally, and we believe it will be successful. If we are successful, it can provide some experience for developing countries.” In 2017, a new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, repeated this sentiment using similar language.
The path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.” - Source: “Full Text of Xi Jinping’s Report at 19th CPC National Congress,” Xinhua, November 4, 2017
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long pursued foreign acceptance of Chinese political narratives and encouraged their adoption to further China’s interests. However, China typically does not need to cajole countries into accepting its messaging about successful development. Many developing country leaders, having witnessed the Chinese “economic miracle” in which it developed at a remarkable pace after first opening its economy to the world in the late 1970s, take seriously China’s narrative about the benefits of a more authoritarian system and are willing to consider the calculated risk of experimenting with what Beijing is offering. Even as China’s economic growth has slowed significantly and its political system has grown more repressive under Xi, the number of countries welcoming Chinese governance lessons continues to grow, enhancing Beijing’s global influence. This has significant implications for the future of democracy, the protection of individual rights, and the nature of the global order.
Training future authoritarians
One of the most direct ways that Beijing promotes authoritarian governance is through training programs for foreign government officials on Chinese governance practices. This report investigates a new dataset of Chinese government files on such trainings, uncovering how Beijing uses these sessions to directly promote ideas and practices that marry economics and politics to make a case for its authoritarian capitalism model. Beyond encouraging sympathy for Chinese narratives among officials across the Global South, the programs also provide practical assistance for host countries to fast-track adaptation of Chinese practices. The sessions also appear to serve intelligence-collection purposes by requiring each participant to submit reports detailing their prior exchanges and engagements with other foreign countries on specific training subjects. This report outlines the content Beijing teaches officials in various developing countries and the anticipated benefits to Beijing from these programs. It also explains how these initiatives fit into China’s broader ambitions to undermine the liberal democratic norms that currently underpin the global order.
The author obtained 1,691 files from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) containing descriptions of 795 governmental training programs delivered (presumably online) in 2021 and 2022 during the pandemic. Each program description contains a title indicating the subject of training; the name of the Chinese entity subcontracted to deliver the training; the timing and language of instruction; invited countries and regions; group size; the professional background and demographic requirements for trainees; and training program objectives. Additionally, each description included an outline of the training content, including names of instructors and contact information for subcontracted entities.
In 1981, Beijing began delivering training programs, first branded as foreign assistance, in coordination with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as part of an effort to provide aid and basic skills to developing countries. In 1998, the Chinese government broke away from that cooperation arrangement and began offering its own centrally planned training programs directly to governmental officials from countries across the Global South. Beijing reportedly hosted 120,000 trainees from the Global South between 1981 and 2009, with 4,000 programs across twenty fixed areas. With initial success, the programs expanded from their original objective and the number of trainees increased in the next decade, with 49,148 trainees in 1,951 programs between 2010 and 2012, and more than 200,000 trainees in around 7,000 programs between 2013 and 2018.
Evidence in the newly obtained 2021 and 2022 files indicates that the objectives of Chinese governmental training programs for foreign officials have changed significantly. Trainings are no longer foreign assistance programs with primarily humanitarian assistance aims, but clearly serve to directly inject narratives that marry authoritarian governance with economic development—in other words, to promote an autocratic approach to governance.
31. China training Global South in 'authoritarian' ways, report says
Pak Yiu, Nikkei Asia, June 13, 2024
Tens of thousands take online seminars teaching Beijing's political ideology.
China has been exporting its governance model and Communist Party ideology to developing countries through training programs run under the guise of a business academy, according to a new report by the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub.
The report says 795 online seminars were funded by the Chinese government in 2021 and 2022 pushing an overall message that authoritarian control is essential for economic development. The findings are based on over 1,000 documents from the Academy for International Business Officials (AIBO), an educational institution run by China's Ministry of Commerce.
COMMENT – When folks assert that there isn’t a cold war between the PRC and the US, one of the reasons I hear is that unlike the First Cold War, there isn’t an ideological component to the competition between Washington and Beijing.
I hope this article, and the report from the Atlantic Council before it, will help dispel that myth.
32. A new threat to cannabis users: Smuggled Chinese pesticides
Paige St. John, Los Angeles Times, June 14, 2024
In coordinated raids last September, multiple California agencies stormed a network of illegal cannabis-growing warehouses across Oakland while state cannabis regulators singled out a salmon-colored warehouse complex surrounded by 7,000-volt security fencing.
The warehouse building — home to two licensed cannabis operations — was “highly-likely” the conduit that illegal growers used to ship their product into the legal market, a state agent told a judge. Inside the rooms, inspectors found 43,000 plants growing beneath high-intensity lights. None had the tracking tags required to be placed on legal plants.
But the surprise was what was found in the men’s room.
Beside Hot Shot insect foggers and jugs of familiar chemicals were mylar bags labeled in Chinese. Inside each were cellophane packets of wood shavings soaked in unknown pesticides.
The same kinds of packets had been found earlier that year on illegal farms in Siskiyou County, where lab tests had revealed a cocktail of dangerous insecticides and fungicides that when burned would emit a cloud of pest- and mold-killing smoke. Among the unusual substances was isoprocarb, which is not permitted in the United States; profenofos, an organophosphate so harmful its use here was discontinued in 2016; and fenpropathrin, an acutely toxic insecticide that is fatal if inhaled.
Additional tests would show the warehouse plants were tainted with some of the same pesticides.
Contraband Chinese pesticides present a new challenge for California cannabis regulators as they struggle to keep harmful chemicals out of licensed products. Some of the poisons are so unfamiliar that few chemical analysis labs in the state would be equipped to test for them if California required it.
A Los Angeles Times investigation based on confidential state records, public files, online sales and social networks found that in the last three years, the use of contraband Chinese pesticides on cannabis farms has spread across California.
Yet officials have not issued warnings to alert those working on cannabis farms about the dangers of these chemicals, or mandated cannabis products sold to the public be tested for them.
But their presence has prompted multiple warnings to law enforcement personnel, including by the state Department of Pesticide Regulation, the California National Guard and the state Environmental Protection Agency.
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
33. China #MeToo journalist sentenced to five years in prison, supporters say
Nectar Gan, CNN, June 14, 2024
A leading #MeToo journalist in China has been sentenced to five years in prison on subversion charges, according to supporters, as the ruling Communist Party ramps up its effort to dismantle what remains of the country’s civil society.
From CNN
Huang Xueqin, an independent journalist, was found guilty by the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court Friday for “inciting subversion of state power,” supporters said.
Labor activist Wang Jianbin, another defendant in the case, was sentenced to three and a half years, according to supporters, who shared a copy of the verdict on X.
Huang told the court she would appeal, the supporters said, though it was not immediately clear if Wang would also appeal.
Huang, 36, and Wang, 40, have already spent nearly three years behind bars within China’s opaque judicial system.
They were detained by authorities in the southern city of Guangzhou in September 2021 and stood trial behind closed doors in September last year.
Huang, who worked as an investigative reporter for liberal-leaning media outlets in Guangzhou before becoming an independent journalist, had been an instrumental figure in sparking China’s #MeToo movement.
In 2018, she helped bring about the country’s first #MeToo case, using her influential social media presence to amplify the voice of a graduate student who accused her PhD supervisor of unwanted sexual advances.
She also spoke up about her own experiences of sexual harassment as a young intern at a national news agency, where she claimed she was groped and kissed by a senior male reporter and mentor.
To show the prevalence of the issue, she surveyed 416 female journalists in 2018 and found 84% of them had experienced sexual harassment in the workplace.
“There are so few people prosecuted because there are only so few victims who report,” she told CNN in a 2018 interview. “To most victims, it’s shame.”
Huang and Wang were detained the day before Huang was scheduled to fly to the United Kingdom to start her master’s degree on gender violence and conflict at the University of Sussex.
In a statement on Friday, Amnesty International noted the pair’s conviction came a day before the 1,000th day of their first arrest.
“These convictions will prolong their deeply unjust detention and have a further chilling effect on human rights and social advocacy in a country where activists face increasing state crackdowns,” the rights group said.
“These malicious and totally groundless convictions show just how terrified the Chinese government is of the emerging wave of activists who dare to speak out to protect the rights of others.”
Chinese courts are tightly controlled by the ruling Communist Party and have a conviction rate above 99.9%.
34. US lawmakers query credibility of Volkswagen forced labor audit
Alex Willemyns, Radio Free Asia, June 3, 2024
A ‘red flag’ on Volkswagen stock was reversed after an audit in Xinjiang found no evidence of forced Uyghur labor.
35. Chengdu Early Rain Church Member Detained for Commemorating Tiananmen
Qi Junzao, Bitter Winter, June 10, 2024
36. Al-Azhar rejects negative integration that erases Muslims' religious identity: Al-Azhar Grand Imam
El-Sayed Gamal El-Din, Ahram Online, June 6, 2024
Al-Azhar rejects negative integration that strips Muslims of their religious identity and erases it but encourages positive integration of Muslims into the societies in which they live, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar Sheikh Ahmed El-Tayeb said in his meeting with the Head of Chinese State Administration for Religious Affairs Chen Ruifeng.
In a meeting with Ruifeng and a high-level delegation of Chinese officials, including the Chinese Ambassador to Cairo Liao Liqiang, on Thursday in Cairo, the Grand Imam inquired about media reports concerning restrictions imposed on Muslims in China, such as prohibitions on communal prayers and fasting.
He asserted that Islamic teachings instil in Muslims the culture of peaceful coexistence within any society and encourage them to contribute to developing their communities and countries. Islam’s principles, El-Tayeb added, promote coexistence and acceptance of others.
"We encourage the positive integration of Muslims into the societies in which they live, but at the same time, we reject negative integration that seeks to strip Muslims of their religious identity and erase it,” he said, adding that it was important to recognize that this only happens when some try to interfere with the fundamentals and rules of religions by restricting believers from practising their religious rituals.
37. Tiananmen crackdown anniversary: performance artist surrounded, taken away by police
Tom Grundy, Hong Kong Free Press, June 3, 2024
38. Hong Kongers light up Lion Rock on Tiananmen Square massacre anniversary
Alice Yam and Han Qing, Radio Free Europe, June 3, 2024
39. The forgotten victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre
Wang Yun, Radio Free Asia, June 3, 2024
Hundreds still suffer in obscurity for their role in the 1989 pro-democracy movement, veteran activists say.
When thousands crowded into Beijing's Tiananmen Square in 1989 a show of public grief for late ousted Premier Hu Yaobang, kickstarting weeks of student-led protests, Zhang Qiang was a student at the South China University of Technology.
Zhang, who once marched at the head of a group of students to protest at the gates of the Guangdong Provincial People's Government, is now homeless, ostracized by society and abandoned by his family.
He has no fixed abode, nor even an ID card in a country where pretty much anything requires one.
Unlike the better-known names of the 1989 student movement -- Wang Dan, Wu'er Kaixi and Chai Ling, for example -- few will ever hear his name.
Yet there are hundreds, possibly thousands like him, according to activists who have been tracking the nationwide program of prison sentences and other forms of official retaliation meted out to idealistic youngsters because of their involvement for a few brief weeks in the summer of 1989.
Zhang still remembers the sense of outrage he and his classmates felt when Chinese Communist Party leader Deng Xiaoping declared martial law in Beijing on May 19.
"We thought this was a violation of the constitution and of the law, and would bring disaster down on this country," Zhang recalled.
So he marched at the front of a group of students to the provincial government, and was designated a "ringleader" by the authorities, a label that was to affect his life for decades to come.
40. Colleagues of VOA Uyghur journalist jailed for their links to him
Gulchehra Hoja, Radio Free Asia, June 7, 2024
41. 'Sitting in jail for everyone else' - a Hong Kong democrat's sacrifice
Jessie Pang and James Pomfret, Reuters, May 30, 2024
Owen Chow has spent most of the past four years in prison and in repeated court hearings, fighting charges carrying a possible life sentence - a far cry from his days as a nursing student and one of thousands supporting Hong Kong's democratic freedoms.
The 27-year-old is one of 14 convicted on Thursday of conspiracy to commit subversion. Two were acquitted and 31 have pleaded guilty in the landmark national security case, which has drawn international criticism of the financial hub.
Once one of Asia’s most liberal cities, China-ruled Hong Kong is experiencing a years-long crackdown on dissent under China-imposed security laws that have silenced liberal voices, unnerved investors and triggered a wave of emigration.
The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of China's State Council has said the laws will "secure Hong Kong's prosperity and stability" as well as safeguard the interests of overseas investors, democracy and freedom.
42. Uyghur brothers shot dead on same day in Xinjiang prison
Shohret Hoshur, Radio Free Asia, June 3, 2024
43. US college instructor recounts surviving stabbing in China to Iowa public radio
Nectar Gan and Marc Stewart, CNN, June 12, 2024
44. U.S. Adds Three Chinese Companies to Blacklist Over Forced Labor Allegations
Dylan Tokar, Wall Street Journal, June 11, 2024
A seafood processor, shoemaker and aluminum manufacturer all participated in programs that provide forced labor by Uyghurs and other minorities from Xinjiang, officials say.
45. US college instructor recounts surviving stabbing in China to Iowa public radio
Nectar Gan and Marc Stewart, CNN, June 12, 2024
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
46. The graphite fight: US tariffs trigger race to build non-Chinese supply chain
Financial Times, June 8, 2024
Key material for electric vehicle batteries has been neglected by industry to date, giving China almost 100% of market.
“Building a non-China, IRA-compliant anode supply chain needs to be done, and it will be done eventually,” said Gregory. “But it will be done slowly and at tremendous cost.”
47. G7 leaders set to highlight Chinese overproduction
Hiroyuki Akiyama, Nikkei Asia, June 12, 2024
48. The New CEO Trapped in the U.S.-China Chip Battle
Kim Mackrael, Asa Fitch, and Yang Jie, Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2024
49. China’s glut of idle property causes headache for the government
Amy Hawkins, The Guardian, June 12, 2024
The Economist, June 13, 2024
Chinese officials seem pleased with the yuan’s recent progress as a global currency. The international monetary system is diversifying at an accelerating pace, said Pan Gongsheng, the governor of China’s central bank, in March. The yuan has become the fourth-most active currency in global payments, he noted. In trade finance, it now ranks third. And according to the central bank’s data, about half of China’s transactions with the rest of the world (for financial assets, as well as goods) are now settled in yuan.
Despite these gains, the yuan’s global position still looks modest compared with past expectations. In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09 it was easy to imagine a bigger role. In 2008 Fred Hu, then of Goldman Sachs, predicted the yuan would account for 15-20% of foreign-exchange reserves by 2020. More memorably, “Super Sad True Love Story”, a novel written by Gary Shteyngart and published in 2010, imagined a dystopian future in which a tottering America had pegged the crumpled dollar to the mighty yuan.
…
The yuan's share was just 2.3% at the end of last year, according to the latest IMF data, down from a peak of 2.8% in the first quarter of 2022. Thanks to that decline, the yuan has dropped back behind the Canadian dollar in the pecking order, and now ranks sixth (see chart). The “yuan bloc” also remains hollow.
COMMENT – Ouch! I bet Xi’s people won’t show him this chart.
51. China’s control and coercion in critical minerals
Ian Satchwell, The Strategist, June 7, 2024
Markets for critical minerals are no longer shaping up to be the next components of the global economy to be dominated by China. They already are.
While Western nations were sleeping, China built vertically integrated supply chains for several critical minerals vital to the energy transition and high technology applications, including defence equipment.
Critical mineral supply chains are increasingly subject to Chinese government manipulation focussed on creating and maintaining monopolies and monopsonies. The scale and scope of this competition is presenting Australia and its partners with significant economic and security challenges. The Australian government’s 2 June divestment order to China-linked entities with shareholdings in rare earths developer Northern Minerals is an example of what will be needed to counter China’s domination of critical minerals supply.
Stricter foreign investment oversight may mitigate some of the more egregious attempts to grab control of minerals projects in Australia. Meanwhile, various coercive behaviours are directly affecting Australian mining interests at home and abroad and threatening growth of more diverse, secure and sustainable critical mineral supply chains. Several recent developments have highlighted the growing intensity of these threats.
The situation is becoming acute in several countries in resource-rich Africa, where Australian companies contributed 29 percent of the continent’s exploration spending for all minerals in 2023. (Canadian companies contributed another 29 percent.) Russia-influenced deterioration of security in several mineral-rich African nations is supporting China’s aspirations.
Two Australian companies, operators of world-scale lithium properties that are being developed into mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Mali, have been edged out by China-based joint-venture partners amid disputes with national governments, plummeting share prices and suspensions from the ASX. Control of the resources will consolidate China’s role as effectively the world’s central banker for lithium: it already controls around 80 percent of processing and an increasing share of global mine production.
52. 5 Things to Know About Chinese Drone Company DJI
Craig Singleton, FDD, June 12, 2024
Chinese drone manufacturer Shenzhen DJI Innovation Technology Company Limited (known simply as DJI) controls over 70 percent of the global drone market, perfectly illustrating the fusion of China’s economic ambitions with its strategic military buildup.
DJI’s deep ties with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as its role in aiding and abetting human rights abuses, have attracted significant policymaker scrutiny in the form of new regulations and legislation. Measures like the Countering CCP Drones Act are gaining traction to safeguard American critical infrastructure and uphold ethical standards, ensuring that critical cutting-edge technologies remain tools for advancement and not instruments of oppression.
53. Beijing falls behind Singapore in global start-up ecosystem ranking amid US-China tech war
Ben Jiang, South China Morning Post, June 12, 2024
Beijing has fallen three places from 2022 to No 8 in the latest ranking of the world’s top 40 start-up ecosystems, as a weak domestic economy and growing tensions with Washington deter investment interest in China’s capital.
Silicon Valley came out on top, while New York and London were tied in second place, according to the latest Global Start-up Ecosystem Ranking (GSER) published by research firm Startup Genome.
54. A Requiem for Hyperglobalization: Why the World Will Miss History’s Greatest Economic Miracle
Dev Patel, Justin Sandefur, and Arvind Subramanian, Foreign Affairs, June 12, 2024
The Berlin Wall’s fall was a unique moment in geopolitical history, ushering in an era of unipolarity as the United States became the world’s hegemon. But it also heralded an unprecedented economic phenomenon: convergence. As early as the fifteenth century, formerly prosperous societies from Mesoamerica to China suffered reversals of fortune, falling—or being pushed—behind the West. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, growth rates in rich and poor nations diverged even further. But as the Cold War drew to a close, this grim historical pattern broke, and developing countries started growing faster. Within another decade, they began catching up, albeit slowly, with living standards in the rich West.
Some poorer economies had already experienced success in the twentieth century—South Korea and Taiwan prospered beginning in the 1960s, followed by Indonesia, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand. But the era of convergence that began around 1990 stands out for its ubiquity of remarkable growth, extending to a plurality of developing countries. As a group, they started reversing their previously bleak economic fortunes. The world saw a historic decline in poverty not just in China and India but also in Latin America and, starting in the mid-1990s, in sub-Saharan Africa.
Every country pursued unique policy choices. But although ideology and favorable macroeconomic conditions helped power this astonishing era of convergence, arguably the most important factor was hyperglobalization, the rapid increase in trading opportunities beginning in the late 1980s. It is uncanny how convergence coincided in timing with hyperglobalization: they began together in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when developing countries became more exposed to trade and then started growing faster than their rich counterparts. Hyperglobalization and convergence also peaked together. And since the end of the COVID-19 pandemic, both phenomena appear to be coming to an end. As a share of GDP, developing countries’ trade has returned to where it stood at the start of the twenty-first century, and developing economies have started growing more slowly than advanced ones—returning to the pattern that dominated until the late 1980s.
55. Europe Navigates a Precarious Road on China Electric Vehicle Tariffs
Chris Bryant, Bloomberg, June 12, 2024
56. Stellantis Moves Some EV Production Out of China Due to EU Tariffs
David Sachs, Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2024
57. Germany Trying to Prevent or Soften EU Tariffs on China EVs
Kamil Kowalcze and Arne Delfs, Bloomberg, June 14, 2023
58. China’s Economic Powerhouse Is Feeling the Brunt of Its Slowdown
Bloomberg, June 11, 2024
59. US weighs more limits on China's access to AI chips, Bloomberg reports
Reuters, June 11, 2024
Cyber and Information Technology
60. South Korea grapples with data security as Chinese apps gain massive user base
Yeji Chung, Korea Pro, June 7, 2024
Experts warn of potential data leakage and cyber surveillance as TikTok and Temu expand their reach in the country.
Leaked documents from iSoon, a Chinese state-affiliated hacking group, have unveiled China’s extensive cyber intrusions targeting foreign entities, including South Korea. These revelations highlight the growing risks of data security breaches and cyber espionage by Chinese hacking groups, which pose significant threats to the South Korean government and corporations.
The leaked files, which include images, chat logs and a 3-terabyte collection of call logs from South Korea’s LG Uplus telecom provider, provide unprecedented insight into China’s national security data-gathering industry.
The documents spotlight the increasing sophistication and organization of state-sponsored cyber-attacks, ranging from data theft and financial asset compromise to manipulating online platforms for political gains.
COMMENT – This topic is not getting enough attention.
61. Microsoft Grilled on Capitol Hill Over Security Failures
James Rundle, Kim Nash, and Catherine Stupp, Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2024
Lawmakers asked about a series of recent breaches, the company’s business practices in China.
62. Mario Draghi says Europe must not be ‘passive’ in face of China import threat
Financial Times, June 14, 2024
63. Kishida wants active cyberdefense bill to be drawn up swiftly
Japan Times, June 7, 2024
64. America’s assassination attempt on Huawei is backfiring
The Economist, June 13, 2024
COMMENT - Lazy journalism by The Economist.
The United States did not pursue policies to “assassinate” Huawei, the United States pursued a more limited goal: prevent Huawei from building and operating a global 5G telecom network and prevent market consolidation which would have created dangerous dependencies on Chinese telecom equipment manufacturing.
In that effort Washington has been relatively successful:
Huawei won far fewer 5G contracts over the past six years than had been predicted.
There are more companies manufacturing wireless telecom equipment for 5G networks, reversing the market consolidation that Huawei and the PRC Government had intended.
Key U.S. Allies and Partners prohibited Huawei from their networks and continue to rip and replace.
After suffering these setbacks, Huawei pivoted to other sectors and other markets. As long as we don’t take Huawei’s marketing hype at face value, it remains to be seen how well they will do in those new sectors.
It is entirely possible that new dangers will arise from this pivot by Huawei and as that happens, I expect the United States will take action.
Had Washington intended to “assassinate” Huawei, the U.S. Government had options, like comprehensive financial sanctions from the U.S. Treasury which would have made it impossible for Huawei to conduct transactions in U.S. dollars or a Commerce Department “denial order” which would have prohibited all U.S. companies from trade with Huawei (an “Entity Listing” by Commerce is a less severe sanction). Neither the Trump nor the Biden Administrations have used those tools on Huawei.
Military and Security Threats
65. PLA sends 3 advanced Type 055 destroyers for training exercise in South China Sea
Amber Wang, South China Morning Post, June 13, 2024
66. VIDEO – Marcos' Philippines Confronts China in South China Sea: Is Conflict Imminent?
CNA Insider, June 4, 2024
It has been two years since President Marcos Jr won the Philippines' Presidential race, and tensions are high in the South China Sea. Each day brings new confrontations between Chinese and Filipino vessels in the disputed waters.
In a departure from his predecessor, President Duterte’s stance, President Marcos Jr has had a tumultuous relationship with China. From cancelling BRI projects to brinkmanship in the South China Sea, relations between Manila and Beijing have deteriorated. At the same time, the Philippines draws closer to the US, potentially changing the complexion of US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.
67. U.S. cannot afford another 'lost decade' responding to China, authors say
Ken Moriyasu, Nikkei Asia, June 8, 2024
The failure of successive U.S. administrations to respond adequately to the stunning growth of Chinese power stands as one of the three biggest foreign policy blunders since World War II, alongside the 1965 escalation in Vietnam and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, authors of a much-talked-about new book told Nikkei Asia.
In "Lost Decade: The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power," Robert Blackwill, a former ambassador to India, and Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security, conclude that the "pivot to Asia" strategy has so far failed, distracted by conflicts in Europe and the Middle East.
"Now more than ever, the United States should pivot to Asia," Blackwill said.
The concept of a pivot was first floated by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011. Her Foreign Policy article "America's Pacific Century" argued that "the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the center of the action."
68. Vietnam tells China they must respect each other’s maritime rights and interests
Cyril Ip, South China Morning Post, June 12, 2024
69. China’s maritime militia: the shadowy armada whose existence Beijing rarely acknowledges
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, June 12, 2024
They look like simple fishing boats but are capable of swarming in huge numbers to help Beijing stake its territorial claims in the South China Sea
Chinese fishing boats started swarming the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea in mid-May. Some had already been drifting around the picturesque reef in the Philippines exclusive economic zone for some time.
However, the Chinese boats were not regular fishing vessels, and they weren’t there to fish. They were there to counter a Philippine aid flotilla aiming to deliver supplies to fishers near the disputed shoal. In the end, the aid flotilla turned back before it reached the shoal.
The Chinese vessels were part of a maritime militia, a shadowy armada whose existence Beijing rarely acknowledges and that it has long used to help hold or take disputed territory it says it owns in the region.
The militia has a long history in the area. Its key role in seizing Scarborough Shoal in 2012 set off one of the most high-profile territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
The shoal is just one of a range of sites that have seen dangerous clashes between China and other competing claimant nations. The tensions have escalated to make the South China Sea a potential flashpoint in one of the most strategically and economically important waterways in the world.
70. Chinese Assessments of the War in Ukraine, 2 Years on
CSIS, June 11, 2024
What insights are scholars in China drawing from the war in Ukraine, over two years on from Russia’s invasion in February 2022? Here, leading experts leverage recently translated scholarship to explore how Chinese analysts weigh the key dynamics, likely trajectory, and broader geopolitical implications of the war.
71. VIDEO – China’s Stockpiling and Mobilization Measures for Competition and Conflict
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 13, 2024
The hearing will evaluate the Chinese Party-state's efforts to prepare society for a period of enhanced competition, crisis, or conflict. Commissioners and witnesses will:
Examine Chinese leaders' rhetoric and efforts to instill a siege mentality in the Chinese public.
Examine China's efforts to materially and financially prepare its economy for a crisis or conflict scenario through efforts to boost domestic production capacity, sanction-proof its economy, and attain self-sufficiency in key sectors.
Assess China's national defense mobilization system and ability to leverage civilian resources during a crisis.
72. Not Ready for a Fight: Chinese Military Insecurities for Overseas Bases in Wartime
Howard Wang and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, RAND, June 7, 2024
The People's Republic of China is brokering international access agreements to expand its security footprint overseas and extend the reach of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). While these bases' utility in peacetime is clear, their utility in wartime is less so.
The authors of this report explore China's military strategy for its overseas bases—specifically, how Chinese military researchers view the utility of overseas bases during a war—based on a review of open-source Chinese military writings. The authors then address the risks that these bases might pose to U.S. military interests through 2030.
Chinese military writings suggest that the PLA has neither the intent nor the capability to use overseas military bases to launch preemptive attacks or other offensive operations on U.S. forces or interests through at least 2030. While Chinese overseas military basing remains important to monitor, the authors' research shows that Chinese bases overseas are unlikely to become threats to U.S. interests and forces during this time frame. The authors also note that any PLA shift toward conducting offensive operations from its overseas bases may be accompanied by specific indications and warnings that the U.S. government can monitor.
73. How China Could Quarantine Taiwan
Bonny Lin, Brian Hart, Matthew P. Funaiole, Samantha Lu, and Truly Tinsley, CSIS, June 5, 2024
74. Chinese military releases bold video simulation of Taiwan invasion
Alex Blair, News.com.au, May 28, 2024
75. Swedish defense chief says actions against Philippines in South China Sea threaten global security
Jim Gomez, Associated Press, June 7, 2024
76. US wishes India luck with 'structural issues' in strained China ties
Kanishka Singh, Reuters, June 12, 2024
77. Modi’s Taiwan Ties Have Rattled China
Rishi Iyengar, Foreign Policy, June 11, 2024
In the week since he staked his claim for a third term as India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi’s official account on X (formerly Twitter) has been replete with replies to congratulatory messages from dozens of global leaders—from Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelensky to U.S. President Joe Biden to Pakistan’s Shehbaz Sharif, and even the likes of Bill Gates and Elon Musk.
But one post in particular raised hackles in China and eyebrows everywhere else. Taiwan’s recently elected president, Lai Ching-te, was among the first to congratulate Modi last week in a message that touted “the fast-growing” Taiwan-India partnership. Modi responded by endorsing “closer ties” between the two governments as well as a “mutually beneficial economic and technological partnership.”
China, predictably, did not take it well. “China opposes all forms of official interactions between the Taiwan authorities and countries having diplomatic relations with China,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning told reporters, reiterating Beijing’s stance that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China” and adding that “China has protested to India about this.”
78. Philippines says China poses ‘existential’ threat in South China Sea
Financial Times, June 11, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
79. The Evolution of Chinese Engagement in Argentina under Javier Milei
Evan Ellis, CSIS, June 5, 2024
In August 2023, then-Argentine presidential candidate Javier Milei declared he would not make “pacts with Communists.” Months later, following his election, he declined an invitation to Argentina to join the China-dominated BRICS organization, signaling a deepening of the political distancing from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that began under his once pro-PRC predecessor Alberto Fernandez. However, the move did not necessarily signal an end to the substantial private trade and investment relationship between the two countries.
As Argentina’s economic crisis deepened under President Fernandez, most of China’s high-profile infrastructure projects in Argentina became paralyzed over financing and other questions. Such projects included an $8 billion nuclear reactor at Argentina’s Atucha III complex, two dams on the Santa Cruz River, work on the Belgrano Cargas rail system, dredging of the Paraguay and Paraná Rivers to support the continued operation of the hidrovía (waterway), and problems in approving a Chinese port project near Antarctica.
Even before the election of President Milei in November 2023, China had deepening difficulties in Argentina, including the cancellation of Argentina’s purchase of China’s JF17/FC-1 fighters in favor of U.S.-produced F-16 fighters. China also had replaced its dynamic Spanish-speaking ambassador and military attaché with a new ambassador, Wang Wei, who spoke mainly Italian, and a new attaché whose second language was Portuguese, not Spanish. Argentine China experts perceived that the PRC was informally downgrading the relationship.
Despite Argentine foreign minister Diana Mondino’s cordial, professional approach toward the PRC and her assurances of Argentina’s continued interest in transparent commercial and diplomatic relations with China, relations continued to deteriorate. The PRC suspended a $6.5 billion bank credit that it had extended to the outgoing government, and its banks have reportedly put on hold credit for major investment projects in the country. In addition to the PRC’s reaction to President Milei’s remarks about China, the PRC was also reportedly offended by Taiwanese government representatives’ attendance at an academic event with Mondino involving Kung Guo Wei, a visiting professor from Taipei’s famous Tamkang University, before Mondino became foreign minister. Nevertheless, PRC-Argentina commercial relations are significant and, arguably, poised to deepen under President Milei’s government, driven by the likely turnaround of the Argentine economy and projects by private businesspersons and provincial and local-level politicians.
80. FILM – Made in Ethiopia
DC/DOX, June 2024
When a massive Chinese industrial park lands in rural Ethiopia, a dusty farming town finds itself at the new frontier of globalization. The sprawling factory complex’s formidable Chinese director, Motto, now needs every bit of mettle and charm she can muster to push through a high-stakes expansion that promises 30,000 new jobs. Ethiopian farmer Workinesh and factory worker Beti have staked their futures on the prosperity the park promises. But as initial hope meets painful realities, they find themselves, like their country, at a pivotal crossroads.
Filmed over four years with singular access, Made in Ethiopia lifts the curtain on China’s historic but misunderstood impact on Africa, and explores contemporary Ethiopia at a moment of profound crisis. The film throws audiences into two colliding worlds: an industrial juggernaut fueled by profit and progress, and a vanishing countryside where life is still measured by the cycle of the seasons. And its nuance, complexity, and multi-perspective approach go beyond black-and-white narratives of victims and villains. As the three women’s stories unfold, Made in Ethiopia challenges us to rethink the relationship between tradition and modernity, growth and welfare, a country’s development, and its people’s well-being.
81. ‘Made in Ethiopia’ Review: A Compelling Look at Chinese Influence in Eastern Africa
Murtada Elfadl, Variety, June 9, 2024
In “Made in Ethiopia,” directors Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan take the macro issue of China’s influence in Africa and present it provocatively through the micro lens of its effect on a few Chinese and Ethiopian individuals striving for a better life. The film is set at a Chinese industrial complex in Dukem, a small town southeast of Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa. It follows an ambitious Chinese businesswoman trying to expand the complex with the help of Ethiopian bureaucrats and the consequences this expansion has on a factory worker and a farming family that lives nearby.
The businesswoman is Motto Ma, a delusionally ambitious outsider who says things like, “The industrial complex is a tourist hotspot. We are considering selling tickets.” She makes up the lie, believes and then hypes it. Motto (the film refers to all the subjects with just their first names) is both charming and wily, the type of person who would sing at her company’s function despite not having any talent. At one point, she announces to the camera, “I starved myself to death for two days to fit this dress.” She’s willing to cajole, threaten and push anyone to get what she wants. She thinks she understands what Ethiopians need, but she’s all hubris. All of this makes her the perfect subject for a documentary.
Motto is such a loud and colorful character that she overshadows her Ethiopian counterparts. Contrasting Motto is Betelihem “Beti” Ashenafi, a quiet factoryworker with modest dreams. Motto claims that her work would make Ethiopians realize their dreams within their lifetime. Something unattainable without her industrial complex expansion. But in Beti, we see how wrong and far-fetched those claims are. Despite working hard and trying to elevate herself, she’s stuck in a never-ending circle of thwarted aspirations. However, because Motto dominates most of the film, Beti’s story comes through as an afterthought.
Providing a stronger counterpoint to Motto is Workinesh Chala and her family. They are farmers whose land was taken by the government so the Chinese industrial complex can expand. They were promised replacement land which they never received. As “Made in Ethiopia” unspools, Workinesh and her young daughter Rehoboth give the film its most compelling scenes. As Rehoboth describes the source of her mother’s resilience, “Made in Ethiopia” gets to show the Ethiopian side of this complicated quandary clearly. With this family’s story, the film finally demonstrates how cultural differences and power imbalance can impede even the most generous of intentions.
“Made in Ethiopia” is ostensibly a film about clash and conflict, and it doesn’t disappoint in that regard. Indeed, it presents an epic scene in which some of the Ethiopian factory workers rebel against the hard working conditions. The scene is deepened by focusing on Edae, the factory translator who mediates between the workers and their supervisor. Centering Edae shifts the narrative from a straight David and Goliath story with clear heroes and villains into a complicated morality tale of ever-changing priorities and loyalties.
82. China says it is willing to upgrade economic corridor with Pakistan and deepen ties with Brazil
Associated Press, June 7, 2024
Beijing is willing to work with Islamabad to build an upgraded version of an economic corridor linking the two countries, China’s leader Xi Jinping told visiting Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Friday.
Sharif pledged to ensure the safety of Chinese workers in Pakistan, according to a report on their meeting posted online by state broadcaster CCTV. The report said that Sharif offered his government’s condolences for the deaths in March of five Chinese engineers in a suicide bombing in Pakistan. They were working on a dam project in the South Asian country.
The Pakistani leader, near the end of a five-day visit, is making his first trip to China since his election in March. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor includes building and improving roads and rail systems to link western China’s Xinjiang region to Pakistan’s Gwadar port on the Arabian sea. It is part of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative to increase trade by building infrastructure around the world.
Xi said he hopes that Pakistan will ensure the safety of Chinese personnel and projects, CCTV reported.
Earlier in the day, Xi met with Brazilian Vice President Geraldo Alckmin, who expressed hope that many Chinese companies would participate in a Brazilian government infrastructure program that includes railways, energy, port and airport projects.
Xi said that China-Brazil ties are a model to promote solidarity and cooperation among emerging economies. The Chinese leader has sought to deepen ties with Brazil, Russia and several other countries to counter America’s dominance in international affairs.
83. A New Chinese Megaport in South America Is Rattling the U.S.
Ryan Dube and James T. Areddy, Wall Street Journal, June 13, 2024
In this serene town on South America’s Pacific coast, China is building a megaport that could challenge U.S. influence in a resource-rich region that Washington has long considered its backyard.
The Chancay deep-water port, rising here among pelicans and fishermen in small wooden boats, is important enough to Beijing that Chinese leader Xi Jinping is expected to inaugurate it at the end of the year in his first trip to the continent since the pandemic.
Majority-owned by the giant China Ocean Shipping group, known as Cosco, Chancay promises to speed trade between Asia and South America, eventually benefiting customers as far away as Brazil with shorter sailing times across the Pacific for everything from blueberries to copper.
As nations around the world shudder at a new flood of cheap Chinese manufactured goods, the port could open new markets for its electric vehicles and other exports. China is already the top trade partner for most of South America.
COMMENT – These PRC companies are all State-owned/State-controlled firms.
Opinion Pieces
84. Why China Is Sabotaging Ukraine: Beijing Has No Interest in a Peace Agreement It Can’t Help Broker
Alexander Gabuev, Foreign Affairs, June 14, 2024
For a moment last August, it seemed that Beijing was finally ready to distance itself from its “no limits partnership” with Moscow. That month, Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent his special envoy for the war in Ukraine, Li Hui, to discuss Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s peace formula with diplomats from several countries, including Ukraine and the United States. The formula calls for Russia to withdraw to Ukraine’s 1991 borders, send its war criminals to international tribunals, and pay reparations to Kyiv. The plan clearly represents Kyiv’s favored conclusion to the conflict, and merely by engaging with it, Beijing suggested that it might be ready to play hardball with Moscow.
But China’s first public participation in discussions about that formula was also its last. On May 31, Beijing announced that it would not be joining some 90 other countries at a June 15–16 peace summit in Switzerland to debate, based on Zelensky’s proposal, how to end the war. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Mao Ning, explained that Beijing would attend the summit only if Russia were a participant and if any plan presented would receive a hearing. For Ukraine, both requirements are nonstarters.
Xi, it seems, will not abandon his troublesome Russian partner or even pay lip service to aiding Kyiv. Instead, China has chosen a more ambitious, but also riskier, approach. It will continue to help Moscow and sabotage Western-led peace proposals. It hopes to then swoop in and use its leverage over Russia to bring both parties to the table in an attempt to broker a lasting agreement.
85. China 'legacy' chip fears best addressed with targeted measures
Douglas Fuller, Nikkei Asia, June 7, 2024
86. The US Needs More Nukes. Biden Finally Gets That.
Hal Brands, Bloomberg, June 14, 2024
Some Americans worry that building up the arsenal will start an arms race. Sorry, but China has already begun one.
Jacob Heim, Zachary Burdette, and Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, War on the Rocks, June 11, 2024
While Washington continues to debate its Ukraine policy, everyone can be relieved that no side has employed any nuclear weapons yet. When the United States and its partners intervened after Russia’s full-scale invasion, there were serious and well-reasoned concerns about the extent to which the conflict could escalate. These worst-case scenarios never unfolded partly because the United States and its partners calibrated their intervention, rejecting proposals like a no-fly zone that could have brought the U.S. and coalition militaries into direct contact with Russian forces. This proxy warfare strategy helped the United States manage escalation in a similar fashion to various proxy conflicts throughout the Cold War.
In contrast to this indirect defense of Ukraine, President Joe Biden has repeatedly threatened to defend Taiwan directly with U.S. forces. A direct conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China would push the United States into untested waters that it managed to avoid during the Cold War and create escalation risks comparable to worst-case fears about the war in Ukraine. The protracted conflict in Ukraine should serve as a stark reminder that wars are easier to start than to end and that fighting a nuclear-armed great power requires a fundamentally different mindset than what the United States and its allies became accustomed to over the past three decades.
The United States should enter any conflict with a nuclear-armed great power like China with a theory of victory that outlines how the war will end and how it will manage escalation. Theories of victory are causal stories about how to defeat an adversary. They are the principal tenets of a strategy rather than strategies themselves, and U.S. presidents have historically created them with their most senior military advisors. Developing a theory of victory requires identifying the conditions under which an enemy will stop fighting and then outlining how to shape the conflict in a way that creates those conditions. China’s burgeoning nuclear arsenal, long-range conventional strike capabilities, and cyber exploits against U.S. critical infrastructure are strengthening its ability to escalate in diverse ways, including striking the U.S. homeland. To avoid a Pyrrhic victory, theories of victory against nuclear powers must consider how to keep the war limited.
This article outlines several potential theories of victory for a U.S.-Chinese war over Taiwan, focusing on denial and military cost imposition because they are the most viable and influential. We argue that a denial theory of victory is the best way to strike the balance between the desire to maximize the chances of U.S. success and the imperative to manage escalation. The U.S.-led coalition should avoid theories of victory that rely on military cost imposition, especially because of the difficulties of finding a “sweet spot” of targets that are valuable enough to influence Beijing’s decision-making but not so valuable that attacking them causes unacceptable escalation. This is a dilemma we call the “Goldilocks challenge.”
88. Congress must step in to fix America’s shipbuilding crisis
Senator Dan Sullivan, Washington Examiner, June 11, 2024
89. The U.S. military plans a ‘Hellscape’ to deter China from attacking Taiwan
Josh Rogin, Washington Post, June 10, 2024
90. China isn't giving Taiwan's Lai Ching-te any honeymoon
Derek Grossman, Nikkei Asia, June 14, 2024
PLA is stepping up practicing for war, but cooler heads may prevail.
91. US and China Are Forgetting What Red Lines Are For
Minxin Pei, Bloomberg, June 12, 2024
From the beginning of the war in Ukraine, the US has argued that Western resolve would be tracked closely not just by Russia but China. That’s certainly been true. But Beijing, at least, may not be receiving the messages Washington intends to send.
Efforts to punish Russia for its aggression have, in fact, taught China valuable lessons in how to survive a conflict with the US and its allies. Chinese leaders are closely studying how their ally has been able to sustain a war economy despite punishing sanctions (with critical help from China itself). Meanwhile, they have accelerated steps to fortify the economy, with plans to achieve “absolute food security” and technological self-sufficiency.
92. China and Russia Are Beating the US in Africa
James Stavridis, Bloomberg, June 13, 2024
Africa, with 60% of the arable land on the planet, 30% of the mineral reserves and a population approaching 1.5 billion, is an increasingly vital region for global security. Unfortunately, the US has not been adapting to a rapidly changing scene. In the latest blow, US troops have been forced to leave Niger, where the Pentagon had enjoyed a longstanding security partnership.
At the same time, Russia and China are consolidating political and military influence across the continent. Russian paramilitaries and mercenaries, using the model of the now-defunct Wagner Group, have been operating in Mali, Congo, the Central African Republic and other states. Autocratic leaders are hoping for economic benefits from Beijing’s Belt and Road initiative — and to purchase AI-enhanced versions of the equipment that has made China a surveillance state.