More Panda Coercion and the new Indonesian President
Friends,
In my February 25th post, I commented on the Chinese Communist Party’s so-called “panda diplomacy,” using the cuddly bears as weapons of coercion in their people-to-people ties with other countries.
Well, the Party, and the panda cartel they control, are at it again. This time they are traumatizing South Korean children for no other reason than to demonstrate their power over an entire species.
Amid a downpour last week, a weeping crowd gathered to bid farewell to Fu Bao as Beijing demanded her return to China despite the fact that she was born at the South Korean amusement park in 2020, the first panda born in South Korea.
Imagine how difficult it is for parents to explain to their kids why their beloved panda, a fixture of enjoyment in their young lives, is being taken away by a Government that claims it “owns” all pandas, everywhere.
As if Governments can “own” entire species.
Clearly, there are heartless monsters in the Chinese Communist Party.
***
Biden-Xi Phone Call
This week President Biden and Chairman Xi held a 102-minute phone call, despite being more than three years into Biden’s presidency, we can still count on one hand the number of times the two leaders have spoken to each other. The last time they saw one another was in November at the Woodside Summit and the last phone call they had was the summer of 2022.
Comparing and contrasting the two press releases (from the White House and from the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is an interesting exercise.
Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China
The White House, April 2, 2024Background Press Call on the Bilateral Relationship with the People’s Republic of China
The White House, April 2, 2024
President Xi Jinping Speaks with U.S. President Joe Biden on the Phone
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 2, 2024
I was going to do a whole side-by-side comparison, but I’ll just limit it to the the first sentence of the PRC read-out:
“On the evening of April 2, President Xi Jinping spoke with U.S. President Joe Biden on the phone at the request of the latter.”
As with nearly every interaction between the Biden Administration and the PRC, the PRC stresses that the American side requested the engagement.
Now that may seem like just a petty thing (does it really matter who asked for the phone call, you might ask), but in diplomacy, it is a big deal. Beijing effectively portrays Washington, and President Biden specifically, as the ardent suitor.
Beijing did this six months ago when Xi attended the APEC conference and Woodside Summit in the United States. In fact it was the very first point Foreign Minister Wang Yi made at the press conference following the Woodside Summit:
“QUESTION FROM JOURNALIST: Today, President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden held a meeting which was closely followed in the two countries and around the world. How was the discussion between the two leaders? What is most notable about this meeting?
Wang Yi: At the invitation of President Joe Biden, President Xi Jinping traveled to San Francisco for a China-U.S. summit meeting and the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting.”
If we go back to the last phone call between Biden and Xi on July 29, 2022, we see the same thing:
“On the evening of 28 July, President Xi Jinping spoke with US President Joe Biden on the phone at the request of the latter. The two Presidents had a candid communication and exchange on China-US relations and issues of interest.”
This pattern repeats itself over and over… nearly all communication between the two leaders and their closest advisors (here is an example) is portrayed as being initiated by the American side.
Now we have Treasury Secretary Yellen flying back to the PRC for another visit (her last one was in July 2023), despite the fact that her counterpart has not done a visit to the United States since her last trip to Beijing.
Undoubtably, Beijing will portray her visit as self-initiated… that the United States needs China more than the other way around.
This is a problematic dynamic for the United States and should be corrected.
I suspect that the PRC does an awful lot of behind the scenes lobbying to set up engagements and to have calls and meetings with their U.S. counterparts… my colleagues at the White House need to do a much better job at shining a light on this and contesting the way in which Beijing portrays these engagements to the world.
***
Implications of the Indonesian Presidential Election
Before we get to the materials this week, I wanted to highlight an article that is a bit off topic, but certainly connected to our main themes. Dan Slater, a political science professor at the University of Michigan, wrote an excellent piece on the implications of the recent elections in Indonesia, “Indonesia’s High-Stakes Handover” (Journal of Democracy, Volume 35, Number 2, April 2024).
To be honest, I had not been following the details of Indonesian domestic politics (though as the world’s third largest democracy, perhaps I should have been). I faintly knew that President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s time in office was coming to an end because of term limits but had not paid close attention to who would succeed him or the state of Indonesia’s quarter century old democracy. My sense was that President Widodo had done an exceptional job at cementing democratic institutions in Indonesia for the past decade and had improved the sectarian and ethnic relations in his country.
Professor Slater argues that Indonesians and the rest of the world shouldn’t fall into complacency, Indonesian democracy is not secure and stable following the February 14 election and the victory by President-elect Prabowo Subianto.
At first glance, all looks well. Prabowo was the defense minister for Jokowi and his hand-picked successor. Prabowo won in the first round of voting with 96.2 million votes (58.59% of the electorate), the highest of any Indonesian candidate in history, surpassing Jokowi’s 85 million votes in 2019.
But a look at Prabowo’s history, and the last five years of Jokowi’s presidency, suggests there is much to worry about.
Read Slater’s article.
President-elect Prabowo Subianto made a highly unusual pre-inauguration visit last week to Beijing and met with Xi Jinping. Perhaps this had been pre-scheduled under his role as Defense Minister, but the optics are concerning given Beijing’s aggression against Indonesia’s ASEAN partner the Philippines.
Indonesian President-elect Prabowo Sabianto meeting with Xi Jinping on April 1, 2024.
Some things to watch:
Will Beijing further coopt Indonesia into its effort to divide and undermine ASEAN unity, as they have effectively done by making Cambodia and Laos into satellite-states?
Will Indonesians be able to elect local leaders in the local elections scheduled for November 27, 2024 or will Jakarta discard those elections and simply appoint governors and mayors?
Will the plight of Uyghurs and other Chinese Muslims shift public opinion in Indonesia?
Might we see the re-emergence to discrimination and violence against the Chinese-Indonesian minority in Indonesia?
Will Beijing provide Jakarta with the toolbox of surveillance and repression, so as to keep Prabowo Subianto in power should public opinion turn against him?
And how might that be used against any future political opponents of Prabowo?
Given these dynamics, how should Tokyo, Canberra, Delhi, Brussels, and Washington treat a new Prabowo Subianto Administration as it enters office in October?
Thanks for reading!
Matt
MUST READ
1. Tokyo in talks with Manila over sending troops to the Philippines
Demetri Sevastopulo, Financial Times, April 3, 2024
Tokyo and Manila have discussed deploying Japanese forces in the Philippines, as the countries near agreement on several security pacts aimed at boosting regional deterrence against China.
Jose Manuel Romualdez, the Philippines ambassador to the US, said the Manila and Tokyo governments were close to signing a “reciprocal access agreement” that would also let their militaries train and exercise in each other’s countries.
Romualdez said the two countries had discussed deployment of the troops on a rotational basis — an arrangement similar to that under which the US maintains military forces in the Philippines despite the country’s constitutional prohibition of permanent deployments.
“That’s something that we’ve already discussed in the past and we will continue to look at that again as part of our co-operation between our countries,” Romualdez said.
News of the discussions will send a sharp message to China about how the US and its allies are increasingly worried about its military activity in the region — both around Taiwan and in other areas of the South China Sea.
Romualdez was speaking on Wednesday ahead of a landmark US-Japan-Philippines trilateral meeting that US President Joe Biden will host next week with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.
The ambassador said Manila was “considering all of the aspects of our relationship with Japan and certainly that’s one of them”. He expected the two countries to conclude the RAA shortly after the trilateral summit, which will be held on April 12 in Washington.
Marcos will also hold a bilateral meeting with Biden a day after the US and Japanese leaders have a summit that will include a high-profile state dinner at the White House.
Deployment of Japanese troops in south-east Asia would mark a major development for Tokyo and Manila, which have significantly strengthened co-operation with the US to counter China.
COMMENT – I’m not sure if this will happen, but it suggests the direction of travel for relations across the region. Beijing’s aggression against its neighbors has created conditions that were unimaginable just a few years ago.
When the PRC finds itself ringed by countries united in interlocking collective security agreements, the Party will only have itself to blame for being “contained.”
Beijing will lash out and berate countries for being pawns of the United States, but that simply reveals Beijing’s strategic autism. Countries across the region are increasing their defense spending, forging security ties, and banding together because of Beijing, not Washington.
I was very glad to see this announcement:
JOINT STATEMENT: Australia – Japan – Philippines – United States Maritime Cooperative Activity, U.S. Department of Defense, April 5, 2024
Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States uphold the right to freedom of navigation and overflight, and respect for maritime rights under international law, reflected in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Demonstrating our collective commitment to strengthen regional and international cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific, our combined defense/armed forces will conduct a Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) within the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone on April 7, 2024.
The MCA will be conducted by naval/maritime and air force units in a manner that is consistent with international law as well as domestic laws and rules of respective nations, and with due regard to the safety of navigation and the rights and interests of other States. It will also demonstrate professional interactions among naval/maritime and air forces. Ultimately, the MCA will strengthen the interoperability of our defense/armed forces doctrines, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
We stand with all nations in safeguarding the international order based on the rule of law that is the foundation for a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific region. Our four nations reaffirm the position regarding the 2016 South China Sea Arbitral Tribunal Award as a final and legally binding decision on the parties to the dispute.
The Honourable Richard Marles MP, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, Australia:
"Australia is committed to working with partners to maintain the global rules-based order. We recognise that respect for national sovereignty and agreed rules and norms based on international law underpin the stability of our region. Australia has consistently emphasised the importance for all states to be able to exercise rights and freedoms, including freedom of navigation, in a manner consistent with international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The Maritime Cooperative Activity with the Philippines, Japan and the United States demonstrates our firm commitment to work together to maintain a peaceful, stable and prosperous region."
His Excellency KIHARA, Minoru, Minister of Defense, Japan:
"Guided by the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan has the vital importance of striving to realize a free and open international order based on the rule of law and securing regional peace and stability in cooperation with its ally, like-minded countries and others. Japan believes that the issue concerning the South China Sea is directly related to the peace and stability of the region and is a legitimate concern of the international community including Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and the United States, and thus Japan opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo by force, such attempts as well as any actions that increase tensions in the South China Sea."
The Honorable Gilberto C. Teodoro Jr., Secretary of National Defense, Philippines:
"The Comprehensive Archipelagic Defense Concept (CADC) that we are implementing includes strengthening and deepening cooperation and interoperability with all nations, big and small, to maintain regional peace and stability as well as good order at sea based on international law, principally UNCLOS. The series of bilateral and multilateral MCA is a step in building our country’s capacity for individual and collective self-defense. This first in a series of activities demonstrates the enduring friendship and partnership among the peace-loving peoples of the Philippines, United States, Australia, and Japan."
The Honorable Lloyd J. Austin III, Secretary of Defense, United States:
"Every country should be free to conduct lawful air and maritime operations. These activities with our allies Australia, Japan, and the Philippines underscore our shared commitment to ensuring that all countries are free to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. Our operations together support peace and stability at the heart of our shared vision for a free and open region."
This cannot be a one-off exercise, the four countries must turn this into a new normal.
The next step should entail the inclusion of Taiwanese forces into these Maritime Cooperative Activity (MCA) exercises. Until Beijing perceives that the costs of their aggression and coercion is higher than their benefit, we won’t see a change in their behavior.
That will mean that relations will be much more tense with Beijing, but that is the best way to prevent the PRC from initiating a military operation that results in a wider conflict.
2. Why appeasing China will never work
Hiroyuki Akita, Nikkei Asia, March 30, 2024
In the contested waters of the South China Sea, the confrontation between China and the Philippines is intensifying. Manila accuses Chinese vessels of repeatedly harassing Philippine boats with water cannons and other methods such as deliberately colliding with them.
China's growing belligerency is not just the Philippines' problem: The South China Sea is a major trade artery through which large amounts of fuels and goods pass daily, and disruption to this traffic could cause immeasurable harm to the global economy.
What the Philippines has experienced could offer important clues to Beijing's strong-arm tactics -- something the Southeast Asian country can share with the U.S. and Japan when they hold their first trilateral summit in early April.
Tensions began to flare in the latter half of 2023. Manila said a Philippine boat was attacked with water cannons from a China Coast Guard vessel in August while heading toward Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea. The Philippines effectively controls the reef, locally called Ayungin Shoal. In late October, a ship from a Chinese maritime militia collided with a Philippine Coast Guard vessel while trying to obstruct its navigation.
Some Chinese ships had in the past attempted to block Philippine vessels in disputed waters, but this apparently was the first time that such an incident escalated to a collision. Incidents of China Coast Guard vessels and other ships harassing Philippine vessels with water cannons and ramming maneuvers also occurred in November, December, and March. There have been instances where Philippine ships were damaged and crew members suffered minor injuries.
Why have the tensions heightened so much? Pundits might say it is because Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who took office in June 2022, has reversed the conciliatory pro-China policy of his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, and adopted a pro-U.S. stance.
At first glance, the proximate cause of the tensions does seem to lie with Marcos, as his policy U-turn brought a fierce backlash from Beijing. Yet a deeper look into the matter reveals otherwise. In fact, tensions in the waters near the Philippines had been growing before Marcos came to power.
According to Philippine officials and security experts, ships belonging to China's coast guard and maritime militias frequently entered disputed waters during Duterte's time in office, trying to expand their effective control by intimidating and provoking Philippine boats.
But Duterte concealed most of these incidents, revealing only a few. His administration was clearly loath to ruffle Beijing's feathers or admit the failure of its conciliatory policy toward China.
"The Marcos administration has turned to a policy of publicizing aggressive and dangerous actions by China in order to make the world aware of the existing threat," said Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson Commodore Jay Tristan Tarriela.
"But China's aggressive behavior did not begin during the Marcos era. While there are three serious dangerous actions by China that were publicized during the Duterte administration, there are many other incidents then as well."
After taking office, Marcos must have realized that the strategy of appeasing China had not worked and never would. In a move signaling a policy change, he visited the U.S. last May and met with President Joe Biden. Prior to the summit, both countries had agreed to increase the number of U.S. military bases in the Philippines from five to nine.
Marcos is also taking steps to enhance security cooperation with Japan and Australia. Last August, the Philippines joined the U.S., Japan and Australia in quadrilateral military exercises. In early April, Marcos will visit Washington again to meet with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Biden.
The Philippines' experience could offer valuable insights for other countries. Simply put, the lesson to learn is that the strategy of making concessions to China on territorial and other sovereignty issues will never work. As is often pointed out, China believes in the logic of power, and the only way to build a stable relationship with it is to bolster your capabilities to defend your territorial waters and maintain order.
"Whether you adopt an appeasement policy or a challenging attitude, the response you will receive from China will be substantially the same," said Renato Cruz De Castro, a professor at De La Salle University in the Philippines and an expert in maritime affairs. "It is essential to uphold our principles and strengthen the capabilities to defend territorial waters."
In recent years, China has also increased pressure on Malaysia and Vietnam, with which it has other territorial disputes in the South China Sea. "The frequency of Chinese ships entering disputed waters has increased, although coastal countries have not made that public," said a senior official at a think tank in Southeast Asia.
Japan has its own bitter experience. The government of former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, inaugurated in September 2009, adopted a conciliatory approach toward China, advocating the idea of an "East Asian Community," a regional grouping that would include China. The concept was inspired by the example of the European Union.
But China did not soften its stance toward Japan. In September 2010, during the government of Hatoyama's successor, Naoto Kan, collisions between Japanese patrol boats and a Chinese trawler near the Senkaku Islands sparked a diplomatic dispute, and Beijing launched a retaliation. A wave of anti-Japanese demonstrations spread throughout China.
Japan-China relations somewhat stabilized only after the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe restored Japan's ability to deter China by rebuilding its strained alliance with the U.S.
If Donald Trump wins the U.S. presidential election in November, the U.S. could become more inward-looking, and its involvement in Indo-Pacific affairs could diminish. To prepare for such risks, Asian countries need to swiftly beef up security ties not just with the U.S. but with other like-minded nations in the region as well.
On March 1, a conference to discuss security and economic ties among the Philippines, India and Japan was held in Manila under the auspices of the Japan Foundation and the Stratbase ADR Institute. The Philippine delegation expressed expectations for greater cooperation with India and Japan, including the transfer of defense equipment.
For Asian countries, the most desirable goal is to achieve a stable coexistence with China, but that cannot be realized through dialogue alone. It is vital for countries to enhance cooperation to ensure that the balance of maritime power will never sharply tilt toward China.
COMMENT – Great piece of commentary by my friend Hiro Akita.
The Chinese Communist Party absolutely hates it when their neighbors publicize Chinese aggression and malign behavior.
First, it undermines the propaganda narrative that Beijing has sought to embed in international discourse for decades. This narrative falsely portrays the PRC’s rise as peaceful, it asserts that “China has never and will never invade or bully others” (the link is Xi Jinping stating that to the UN General Assembly in September 2021, Xi asserted it again in November 2021 with “Since the founding of the People's Republic, China has never started a single war or conflict, and has never taken one inch of land from other countries”, here is the spokesperson from the PRC Foreign Ministry on February 9, 2023 stating: “We have never invaded any country. We have never started any proxy war. We have never engaged in global military operations or threatened other countries with force” and here… Indians, Tibetans, Uyghurs, Nepalese, Mongolians, Koreans, Filipinos, and Vietnamese would disagree), and claims that the PRC’s foreign policy seeks to “uphold humanity’s common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom.” [Beijing absolutely loves it when they can convince naïve foreigners to parrot this propaganda]
Second, Beijing is deeply offended when a country that it perceives as “small” and “weak” challenges them. Racial stereotypes and nationalistic biases consume CCP strategic thinking. For them, the Philippines does not deserve to stand on the same stage as the eternal Middle Kingdom, the Philippines should be satisfied with following the PRC’s leadership. Territory, resources, and power are things that “belong” to Chinese leaders. From Beijing’s perspective, Manila should be grateful to live under the wisdom and benevolence of the Chinese nation. Having a Filipino leader challenge Beijing directly and publicly is an afront that the Party cannot tolerate.
As I remarked last week, the likelihood of conflict between Beijing and Manila is quite high.
3. It Only Takes a $7,000 Debt to End Up Trapped in China
Rebecca Feng and Elaine Yu, Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2024
Foreign executives can be stuck in the country for years due to small business disputes.
An American executive who lives in China went to Shanghai Pudong airport six years ago for a routine business trip to San Francisco. When he tried to cross the border, he was told he wasn’t permitted to leave China.
“You know what you did,” the border officer told him. He tried another airport and got a similar response.
The executive has been stuck in China ever since. He was the target of an exit ban, a legal tool used by Chinese courts that has left numerous foreign executives trapped inside the country—often with no idea when they will be allowed to leave.
The vast majority of exit bans aren’t applied to people accused of a crime but to those involved in civil litigation, usually business disputes. Even foreign nationals who aren’t personally liable or who left a company years before it got involved in a dispute have been subject to these bans.
China’s government is in the midst of a charm offensive to attract foreign companies and businesspeople after a series of company raids and detentions last year scared off executives and raised serious questions about the risks of doing business in the country.
But Beijing hasn’t attempted to address one of the big risks facing foreigners working in China: the chance they might not be allowed to leave.
The American executive’s story was a textbook case: He had been the general manager of the Shanghai subsidiary of a European company. In 2016, the company’s headquarters stopped sending money to its Shanghai unit, making it unable to pay monthly salaries. The executive tried and failed to raise money from inside China. Many of the company’s employees sued; at least one asked the court to impose an exit ban on him.
COMMENT – No one should be traveling to the PRC until this practice ends.
It is irresponsible for the “friends of China” to be encouraging folks to travel there again, as the State Department’s own travel advisory website makes clear.
As a reminder to everyone, here is the U.S. State Department’s recommendation:
Mainland China – Level 3: Reconsider Travel
Reconsider travel due to the arbitrary enforcement of local laws, including in relation to exit bans, and the risk of wrongful detentions.
Summary: The People’s Republic of China (PRC) government arbitrarily enforces local laws, including issuing exit bans on U.S. citizens and citizens of other countries, without fair and transparent process under the law.
The Department of State has determined the risk of wrongful detention of U.S. nationals by the PRC government exists in the PRC.
U.S. citizens traveling or residing in the PRC may be detained without access to U.S. consular services or information about their alleged crime. U.S. citizens in the PRC may be subjected to interrogations and detention without fair and transparent treatment under the law.
Foreigners in the PRC, including but not limited to businesspeople, former foreign-government personnel, academics, relatives of PRC citizens involved in legal disputes, and journalists have been interrogated and detained by PRC officials for alleged violations of PRC national security laws. The PRC has also interrogated, detained, and expelled U.S. citizens living and working in the PRC.
PRC authorities appear to have broad discretion to deem a wide range of documents, data, statistics, or materials as state secrets and to detain and prosecute foreign nationals for alleged espionage. There is increased official scrutiny of U.S. and third-country firms, such as professional service and due diligence companies, operating in the PRC. Security personnel could detain U.S. citizens or subject them to prosecution for conducting research or accessing publicly available material inside the PRC.
Security personnel could detain and/or deport U.S. citizens for sending private electronic messages critical of the PRC, Hong Kong SAR, or Macau SAR governments.
In addition, the PRC government has used restrictions on travel or departure from the PRC, or so-called exit bans, to:
compel individuals to participate in PRC government investigations;
pressure family members of the restricted individual to return to the PRC from abroad;
resolve civil disputes in favor of PRC citizens; and
gain bargaining leverage over foreign governments.
U.S. citizens might only become aware of an exit ban when they attempt to depart the PRC, and there may be no available legal process to contest an exit ban in a court of law. Relatives, including minor children, of those under investigation in the PRC may become subject to an exit ban.
The PRC government does not recognize dual nationality. Dual U.S.-PRC citizens and U.S. citizens of Chinese descent may be subject to additional scrutiny and harassment. If you are a U.S. citizen and choose to enter Mainland China on travel documents other than a U.S. passport and are detained or arrested, the PRC government may not notify the U.S. Embassy or the U.S. Consulates General or allow consular access.
Check with the PRC Embassy in the United States for the most updated information on travel to the PRC. In some limited circumstances travelers to Mainland China may face additional COVID-19 testing requirements to enter some facilities or events.
The Department of State does not provide or coordinate direct medical care to private U.S. citizens abroad. U.S. citizens overseas may receive PRC-approved COVID-19 vaccine doses where they are eligible.
Do not consume drugs in the PRC or prior to arriving in the PRC. A positive drug test, even if the drug was legal elsewhere, can lead to immediate detention, fines, deportation, and/or a ban from re-entering the PRC. PRC authorities may compel cooperation with blood, urine, or hair testing. Penalties for drug offense may exceed penalties imposed in the United States.
Demonstrations: Participating in demonstrations or any other activities that authorities interpret as constituting an act of secession, subversion, terrorism, or collusion with a foreign country could result in criminal charges. Be aware of your surroundings and avoid demonstrations.
XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION, TIBET AUTONOMOUS REGION, and TIBETAN AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURES
Extra security measures, such as security checks and increased levels of police presence and surveillance, are common in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Tibet Autonomous Region, and Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures. Authorities may impose curfews and travel restrictions on short notice.
If you decide to travel to Mainland China:
Enter the PRC on your U.S. passport with a valid PRC visa and keep it with you.
Read the travel information page for Mainland China.
Enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) to receive alerts and make it easier to locate you in an emergency.
Be aware of your surroundings.
Avoid demonstrations.
Exercise caution in the vicinity of large gatherings or protests.
Avoid taking photographs of protesters or police without permission.
Keep a low profile.
If you are arrested or detained, ask police or prison officials to notify U.S. Embassy Beijing or the nearest U.S. Consulate General immediately.
Review the China Country Security Report from the Overseas Security Advisory Council.
Do not consume drugs in the PRC or prior to arriving in the PRC.
Follow the Department of State on Facebook and Twitter. Follow U.S. Embassy Beijing on Twitter, WeChat, and Weibo.
Visit the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) page for the latest Travel Health Information related to the PRC.
Prepare a contingency plan for emergency situations.
Review the Traveler’s Checklist.
If you plan to enter the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), read the DPRK Travel Advisory. U.S. passports are not valid for travel to, in, or through the DPRK, unless they are specially validated by the Department of State.
4. China bans ‘former good friend’ from talking about Hong Kong
Kwong Wing, Radio Free Asia, April 2, 2024
Stephen Roach [former Chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia] says he was prohibited from discussing Hong Kong during the China Development Forum two weeks ago. The organizers made it clear to him that they only wanted to hear “views constructive to China.”
COMMENT – Below is a post by Stephen Roach on his own website… when the ChiComs lose people like Roach you know there is something rotten in their system.
Stephen Roach, Stephenroachauthor.com, April 5, 2024
That is the tough question that I am now asking myself after my recent trip to Beijing to attend the 25th annual China Development Forum (CDF). Having been to all but the first CDF in 2000, my participation over each of the ensuing 24 years makes me the longest-attending foreign delegate to China’s most important public conference. I have seen the CDF in its best days and in its tougher days. This year was a low point—giving rise to the question I pose above.
I raise this question as a CDF insider, present at the creation of this event by former Premier Zhu Rongji who believed in the power of debate and exchange between senior Chinese leaders and foreign “experts” from academia, think tanks, and multinational businesses. Zhu brilliantly timed the event to occur immediately after the National People’s Congress (NPC), holding the provocative view that the ministers of China’s State Council should be tested by external debate immediately after their internal deliberations at the NPC.
Zhu Rongji practiced what he preached. I remember well my first CDF in 2001 when I was a keynote speaker at what was then a much smaller, more intimate gathering. I presented my views on the global economy, arguing that a post-dotcom slowdown was at hand. Fred Bergsten, founder of the Petersen Institute for International Economics, took the other side of the debate. At the conclusion of CDF 2001, Premier Zhu convened the attendees and listened as John Bond, Chairman of HSBC, began to summarize the three-day gathering. Zhu quickly grew impatient and cut him off; what he really wanted was a live recap of the Roach-Bergsten debate and called on the two of us to summarize our respective positions. At the end of the meeting, Premier Zhu pulled me aside and said in perfect English, “Roach, I hope you are wrong, but we will plan as if you are right.” The next year at the CDF he warmly greeted me with a simple, “Thank you.”
It is in that spirit and in the spirit of many subsequent years of active participation in CDF sessions that I bemoan the loss of what had been a vigorous culture of debate in China. The CDF has effectively been neutered as an open and honest platform of engagement. Word has been sent down from on high that there is room for only “the good stories of China.” Anyone who raises questions about problems, or even challenges, faces exclusion from the public sessions.
That was certainly true for me. On the eve of CDF 2024, I was informed by the powers that be that “… your recent comments on the Chinese economy have generated intense scrutiny and even controversy among Chinese and international press. It is very likely that whatever you say at CDF in a public setting will be misinterpreted and even sensationalized by media, which is not in the best interest of you or us.” As a result, I was not given a speaking role for the first time in 24 years. Moreover, my background paper on Chinese rebalancing that I had been invited to prepare as part of the CDF “Engagement Initiative” was not published or distributed, as was normally the case in the past.
Nor was I the only one singled out. An economist friend who I have known and respected for years was instructed before going on stage not to say anything negative about the economic outlook. Censorship is one thing, political correctness another. But thought control aimed at stifling debate is another matter altogether. That gets to the essence of the question I posed above: What’s the point?
I went to CDF 2024 with the idealistic hope that the flames of the original spirit of this event were still flickering. As I wrote in Accidental Conflict, I am fully mindful of the changes that have occurred in Chinese discourse in recent years. Notwithstanding ever tighter efforts at information control, I harbored the admittedly naïve view that there was still room for analytically grounded, empirically supported research. After all, I had long been viewed as a “good friend of China.” My error was to presume that my special relationship gave me license to raise tough questions about important issues bearing on China’s medium- to longer-term growth outlook.
CDF 2024 closed the door on that possibility. The event was tightly scripted, with no debate, no meaningful exchange of views—not even at the smaller roundtables that have always been designed for engagement. Yes, there were plenty of Western multinationals in attendance, but mainly for shameless, commercialized pitches of their commitments to China and to hear the official view from Beijing that “China is open for business.” CDF 2024 was shorter by a day, with a streamlined agenda that was belatedly posted on the CDF website. The normally high-profile Monday lunch slot was left empty. The premier’s closing session, long a staple of past CDF’s, was replaced by an opening speech that was nothing more than a condensed version of the Work Report he had delivered earlier to the opening session of the NPC on March 5. CDF 2024 was a hollow remnant of its fabled past.
I’d be lying if I didn’t say all this saddens me. I still have great admiration for the Chinese people and for the miraculous transformation of China’s economy over the past 45 years. I refuse to buy the western consensus that China’s development miracle was always doomed to failure. I am highly critical of the outbreak of a virulent Sinophobia that portrays China as America’s most dangerous adversary since the former Soviet Union. I am steadfast in my view that China faces serious structural growth challenges in the years ahead. And I continue to believe that US-China codependency offers a recipe for conflict resolution that would be in the best interest of both superpowers. My agenda remains analytical, not political.
In the end, I intend to keep showing up and to keep pushing for free and open debate in China. And I will continue to do so in the spirit of Deng Xiaoping’s famous credo of “seeking truth from facts.” I am not giving up. That’s the ultimate point of it all.
COMMENT – Few people have played a more important role in the Chinese economic miracle than Stephen Roach. He is committed to helping the Chinese people achieve economic prosperity and that is admirable.
But anyone who is making an investment decision about the PRC or has a business that is exposed to risk from the PRC, should play very close attention to what Roach is saying here. This is not the PRC of Deng Xiaoping or Zhu Rongji.
Needless to say, Roach was not included in the meeting Xi Jinping had with CEOs, business consultants (and Harvard Professor Graham Allison) on March 27th.
He is far more knowledgeable about the challenges facing the PRC than the folks standing with Chairman Xi in this photo, but he has scruples and that has become unacceptable by Beijing.
From Xinhua News Agency and CCTV, names added by me… I’m sure the ones that don’t have names are important, I just didn’t recognize them and I ran out of room.
Only those who tell Xi what he wants to hear, and then repeat those talking points (with enthusiasm) to the rest of the world, get invited to meetings like this one.
What had once been a hothouse of ideas and economic innovation (this was the secret of Chinese leaders like Premier Zhu Rongji and why folks like Roach were willing to participate in the economic experiment), has turned into an echo chamber in which no one can tell the emperor that he has no clothes.
Given that we are in Xi’s third five-year term in office (and that he is likely to stay in his position until he dies), I think it is highly unlikely that we will see a change in a positive direction. I doubt very much that Xi and his cadres will wake up one morning and adopt the kind of pragmatic leadership that made the PRC such an exciting and prosperous place a quarter of a century ago.
As the economy gets worse, which will undoubtably happen without the fundamental reforms that the Party recognized over a decade ago that it must undertake, the Party will become even more paranoid and unwilling to listen to outsiders like Roach.
This will harm the Chinese people more than anyone else. The rest of the world will adapt their supply chains and re-engineer their economies to be less exposed to poor decision-making in Beijing, but the Chinese people won’t be able to adapt as easily (though we are likely to see tens of thousands of them leave the PRC for places like the United States).
Of course, the Party will blame foreigners (particularly Americans) for their condition and seek to shift blame away from themselves, reinforcing Han chauvinism and ultra-nationalism.
It also raises the prospects that Xi and his cadres look to military power to “solve” their problems.
It is possible that the Party will change for the better, and I admire Roach’s persistence, but it is highly unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future.
6. China’s Advancing Efforts to Influence the U.S. Election Raise Alarms
Tiffany Hsu and Steven Lee Myers, New York Times, April 1, 2024
China has adopted some of the same misinformation tactics that Russia used ahead of the 2016 election, researchers and government officials say.
Covert Chinese accounts are masquerading online as American supporters of former President Donald J. Trump, promoting conspiracy theories, stoking domestic divisions and attacking President Biden ahead of the election in November, according to researchers and government officials.
The accounts signal a potential tactical shift in how Beijing aims to influence American politics, with more of a willingness to target specific candidates and parties, including Mr. Biden.
In an echo of Russia’s influence campaign before the 2016 election, China appears to be trying to harness partisan divisions to undermine the Biden administration’s policies, despite recent efforts by the two countries to lower the temperature in their relations.
Some of the Chinese accounts impersonate fervent Trump fans, including one on X that purported to be “a father, husband and son” who was “MAGA all the way!!” The accounts mocked Mr. Biden’s age and shared fake images of him in a prison jumpsuit, or claimed that Mr. Biden was a Satanist pedophile while promoting Mr. Trump’s “Make America Great Again” slogan.
“I’ve never seen anything along those lines at all before,” said Elise Thomas, a senior analyst at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, a nonprofit research organization that uncovered a small group of the fake accounts posing as Trump supporters.
Ms. Thomas and other researchers have linked the new activity to a long-running network of accounts connected with the Chinese government known as Spamouflage. Several of the accounts they detailed previously posted pro-Beijing content in Mandarin — only to resurface in recent months under the guise of real Americans writing in English.
In a separate project, the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a research organization in Washington, identified 170 inauthentic pages and accounts on Facebook that have also pushed anti-American messages, including pointed attacks on Mr. Biden.
The effort has more successfully attracted actual users’ attention and become more difficult for researchers to identify than previous Chinese efforts to influence public opinion in the United States. Though researchers say the overall political tilt of the campaign remains unclear, it has raised the possibility that China’s government is calculating that a second Trump presidency, despite his sometimes hostile statements against the country, might be preferable to a second Biden term.
China’s activity has already raised alarms inside the American government.
In February, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence reported that China was expanding its influence campaigns to “sow doubts about U.S. leadership, undermine democracy and extend Beijing’s influence.” The report expressed concern that Beijing could use increasingly sophisticated methods to try to influence the American election “to sideline critics of China.”
COMMENT – If this is what the PRC is doing to the United States, why on earth is the U.S. Treasury Secretary traveling to Beijing? Her visit sends the wrong message to Beijing and the world.
See next article…
7. Janet Yellen Missed the First ‘China Shock.’ Can She Stop the Second?
Andrew Duehren, Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2024
The first time Janet Yellen went to China, she was impressed.
Then the top economist in Bill Clinton’s White House, she saw an economy booming with the support of Western-style market changes. The growth was lifting millions out of poverty, and Yellen was eager to nurture closer ties in the run-up to Clinton’s state visit to China in 1998.
Now, as Yellen prepares to travel to China this week as President Biden’s Treasury secretary, that optimism has given way to a sense of alarm. A cascade of inexpensive Chinese clean-energy goods is driving down prices on global markets, threatening to snuff out American efforts to nurture a domestic clean-energy industry. In meetings in Guangzhou and Beijing, Yellen is expected to tell her Chinese counterparts to stop relying on exports to prop up their underperforming economy and instead boost their own consumer market.
“We don’t want to be overly dependent and they want to dominate the market,” she said in an interview. “We’re not going to let that happen.”
The warning from Yellen is a sign that the Biden administration is moving toward raising Trump-era tariffs on some Chinese products, including electric vehicles. Such a move could reignite tensions between the world’s two largest economies, which have tried to stabilize relations in recent months.
The message will also mark an evolution for Yellen—and the end of a bygone era in U.S. economic thinking about China. Like other economists of her generation, Yellen, 77 years old, said the surge in Chinese exports at the start of the 21st century had seemed like a positive development, providing low-cost goods to global consumers. But the inexpensive exports also helped hollow out the U.S. manufacturing base in what became known as the China shock, leaving Americans out of work and fueling a political backlash to globalization.
“People like me grew up with the view: If people send you cheap goods, you should send a thank-you note. That’s what standard economics basically says,” she said. “I would never ever again say, ‘Send a thank-you note.’ ”
Within the Biden administration, Yellen has still remained loyal to many traditional beliefs about the benefits of global trade as other officials favor more protectionist measures. She was the leading voice within the administration calling for lowering some tariffs on China earlier in Biden’s term, and she has pushed for more trade with like-minded allies to “friendshore” crucial industries, rather than reshoring them entirely.
COMMENT – I doubt very much that Janet Yellen delivered a “tough message” to Beijing. She is perhaps the friendliest Cabinet Secretary to the PRC in the current Administration and her visit sends a positive message about financial confidence in the Chinese economy.
If Yellen really wanted to send a “tough message” to Beijing, she could do it publicly and in Washington by telling Americans and others around the world that it is a terrible idea to invest in the PRC and that businesses should figure out how to reduce their exposure to the PRC.
But Yellen won’t say those things because she believes the opposite, that a growing Chinese economy is in America’s interest and that national security challenges can be narrowly scoped and not interfere with “business.”
This is a poorly timed visit by perhaps the least appropriate Cabinet Secretary. It suggests to me that there are deep divisions within the Biden Administration on China policy.
If the last 20 years taught us anything, it is that Treasury Secretaries should NOT drive U.S. engagement with the PRC (side-eye at Hank Paulson, Tim Geithner, Jack Lew, and Steven Mnuchin). These individuals are the least equipped to deal with Beijing properly.
It would be far better if Yellen and the Treasury Department spent less time trying to improve the PRC economy and more time on how to improve the financial positions of our allies for the Cold War we find ourselves in.
Janet Yellen, as she laid out in China policy speech last year at John Hopkins, has made it clear that she views her mission as one of ensuring that “the Chinese and U.S. economies [are] closely linked,” that “China’s economic growth need not be incompatible with U.S. economic leadership,” and that “a growing China that plays by the rules can be beneficial for the United States.”
Except that China doesn’t “play by the rules” and a growing China is NOT beneficial to the United States. In reality a growing, more wealthy and more technologically advanced PRC undermines the United States and our interests around the world.
It is abundantly clear that Yellen does not get it and refuses to abandon the concept that the PRC and the U.S. are converging. She cannot wrap her head around the fact that the world has changed.
Unfortunately, those who are most appropriate for dealing with Beijing (Secretary Blinken, Deputy Secretary Campbell, and National Security Advisor Sullivan) are consumed with the national security threats that Beijing is accentuating and exploiting (Beijing’s massive support to Moscow and Tehran, Beijing’s unrelenting cyber-attacks against the United States and allies, Beijing’s interference in our upcoming election, Beijing’s aggression against the Philippines, Beijing’s threats to annex Taiwan, etc.).
To reward Xi and his cadres with a Yellen visit at this time is mind-boggling.
8. Lawmakers propose sanctions on US index funds investing in China
Julienne Raven Lingat, Financial Times, April 2, 2024
Congress is considering legislation that would prohibit funds from investing in PRC companies, which would force a further divestment of foreign capital from the PRC.
COMMENT – These would be excellent pieces of legislation.
It’s worth reading the press release by Congressman Ben Sherman (D-CA) from two weeks ago, I’m heartened by this kind of bipartisanship:
Today, Ranking Member of the Capital Markets Subcommittee, Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA-32), and Congresswoman Victoria Spartz (R-IN-05) announce the introduction of four bills designed to address issues of fairness and risk when Americans invest in Chinese corporations. The most important of these bills would end the capital gains tax break for Americans who invest in Chinese stocks. Sherman and Spartz are also the co-chairs of the bipartisan CPA Caucus.
“I’m very pleased to work with my fellow co-chair of the CPA caucus on a rational set of rules for American investment in corporations based in China. We provide the capital gains tax subsidy to encourage Americans to invest and build our economy,” said Congressman Brad Sherman, CPA. “It makes no sense to forgo U.S. tax dollars to encourage Americans to invest in China’s economy. It’s also unfair, because China provides tax incentives to Chinese investors but not to those who invest in American stocks. The package of bills also requires American public companies to describe their China risk, and steps they are taking to reduce it. Another bill prohibits buying stocks of companies that are such an anathema that we already prohibit buying their products. Finally, we keep Chinese stocks out of index funds, because those funds do no research into the risks these companies pose.”
“As a former Big 4 auditor of multinational publicly traded companies, I understand the risks to financial markets and American investors posed by the lack of transparency and proper auditing of Chinese operations,” Congresswoman Spartz said. “Congress has a duty to the American people to protect their hard-earned money from foreign adversaries like China by demanding transparency and eliminating perverse incentives. I am proud to introduce with my co-chair of the CPA caucus, Congressman Sherman, a legislative package to protect public interest and the U.S. economy from the significant security threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party.”
Each of these four bills address a different threat posed by China to our capital markets. The package of legislation includes:
No Capital Gains Allowance for American Adversaries Act: This bill would eliminate the capital gains tax break for investments in companies based in China, Russia, Belarus, Iran, and North Korea. It also eliminates a related tax break, the “step-up in basis” at death, for investments in such companies. The SEC will require disclosure that no tax breaks are available for these stocks. Additional original cosponsors of this legislation include Representatives Lloyd Doggett (D-TX) and Bill Foster (D-IL).
China Risk Reporting Act: Investors deserve to know the degree to which the American and foreign companies they invest in are dependent upon China and the related risks. This bill would require publicly traded companies that file any reports with the SEC to discuss in their annual reports: (1) the degree to which the company is dependent upon China and the risks China poses, such as supply chain disruptions, intellectual property theft, or nationalization of assets, and (2) the steps the company has taken to reduce its China risk. This bill will force companies competing for capital to reduce their exposure to China. If China invades Taiwan, Congress should be able to impose sanctions, knowing American companies have insulated themselves from the rupture. Hopefully, this will deter such an invasion.
PRC Military and Human Rights Capital Markets Sanctions Act: A recent report identified 144 Chinese companies, or their affiliates, whose practices were so adverse to U.S. interests that it is illegal for Americans to buy their products. Most of these companies have been found to violate human rights. Others play an integral role in the China military-industrial complex. While buying the products of these companies is illegal, it is still legal to buy their stock. This bill would prohibit Americans from investing in the stock of companies that appear on such sanctions lists or have an affiliate on the sanctions list.
No China in Index Funds Act: Index mutual funds minimize their expenses by simply investing in all the companies in a certain market sector, without looking closely at the individual companies. There are unique difficulties in evaluating the risks of investing in Chinese companies. Americans should not invest in these companies without carefully evaluating the risk. This bill will keep these hard-to-evaluate Chinese stocks out of index mutual funds.
While we’re at it, let’s revoke PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations)… Beijing is funding and supplying both Moscow and Tehran, as well as directly attacking the United States, “normal trade relations” can only take place with those whom we have “normal” relations with.
Authoritarianism
9. China Confronts the Middle-Income Trap
Nouriel Roubini, Project Syndicate, April 4, 2024
While China obviously needs to boost private-sector confidence and revive growth with a more sustainable economic model, it is not clear that Chinese leaders fully appreciate the challenges they face. The shift back to state capitalism over the last decade is plainly incompatible with President Xi Jinping’s development goals.
COMMENT – It seems that the interests of the Party (staying in power and retaining control of everything) are at odds with the interests of the vast majority of Chinese citizens (economic prosperity).
10. AUDIO – Understanding China's Regionally Administered Totalitarianism
Chenggang Xu and Jude Blanchette, Pekingology, March 26, 2024
Jude Blanchette is joined by Chenggang Xu, Senior Research Scholar at the Stanford Center on China’s Economy and Institutions and Visiting Fellow at Hoover Institution of Stanford University to discuss the institutional underpinnings of China’s political economy.
What explains the Communist Party’s ongoing resilience? Why did China pivot away from the economic reforms that had generated so much wealth for the country and the government? Xu advances the framework of “Regionally Administered Totalitarianism” (RADT) to describe China’s political economic transition during the reform period. He is also author of the forthcoming book Institutional Genes: The Origins of China's Institutions and Totalitarianism (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) exploring these questions.
COMMENT – My colleague at Hoover, Chenggang Xu, a Harvard PhD in Economics, makes a persuasive argument that the term “Totalitarianism” applies to the PRC under Xi Jinping. It is the Party’s intent to “control everything” and to ensure that no other power (political, social, or economic) is in competition with it. But given the size of the Chinese empire, the Party has adapted a regionally administered approach to achieve this totalitarianism.
He also helps explain why it has been so difficult for scholars and researchers to recognize this fundamental characteristic of modern China.
I recommend listening to the whole thing, Chenggang Xu’s reference to Douglass North’s work on the role that institutions play in political economy encouraged me to start reading North’s 1990 book, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
11. Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China
The White House, April 2, 2024
12. Background Press Call on the Bilateral Relationship with the People’s Republic of China
The White House, April 2, 2024
13. President Xi Jinping Speaks with U.S. President Joe Biden on the Phone
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 2, 2024
14. Biden Talks to Xi About Conflicts, From Ukraine to the Pacific
Edward Wong and Erica L. Green, New York Times, April 2, 2024
15. Biden Warns Xi on Aiding Russia’s War in Ukraine
Michael R. Gordon and Andrew Duehren, Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2024
16. A Chinese Scholar’s Perspective on the Russia-Ukraine War
Guan Guihai, Council on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2024
17. China economists flag GDP slowdown despite Beijing's 'bright future' talk
Peggy Ye and Kensaku Ihara, Nikkei Asia, April 3, 2024
18. Weibo Essay Comparing Party-State’s Economic Policy to Gangsterism Censored
Alexander Boyd, China Digital Times, March 27, 2024
Weibo censors deleted an essay blaming China’s stagnating economic growth on “a failure of political reform” that also compared the Party-state to gangsters and “underworld bosses.” The essay by popular blogger “Mr. Liu Dake” was an uncanny echo of an opinion piece by Hong Kong columnist Lew Mon-hung in the Singaporean outlet Lianhe Zaobao that caused a stir—and was censored—in August of last year. Lew’s piece laid the blame squarely on Xi Jinping and offered a “simple prescription” for high-quality economic growth: political reform. Liu’s piece, too, traced the roots of China’s economic malaise to vested bureaucratic interests unwilling to cede power and capital to experts in order to spur economic growth, i.e. “a failure of political reform.” The Party-state, Liu wrote, is unwilling to cede control of its private fiefdom, like gangsters who deal in “prostitution, gambling, and drugs” rather than set up legitimate businesses.
The erasure of the somewhat hyperbolic essay is but the latest example of censorship of economic-themed online content. In recent months, suggestions that minor political reforms might lead to economic growth have been repeatedly censored—most recently in the case of a Tsinghua University professor who suggested that “effective rule of law, limitations on the exercise of power, and the functioning of a ‘normal’ society” might have salutary benefits for the Chinese economy.
The relentless online censorship of economic content conflicts with messaging from Chinese government officials who continue to promise meaningful economic reforms. Just today, Xi Jinping told an audience of visiting American businesspeople and scholars, “We are planning and implementing a series of significant measures to comprehensively deepen reform, continuously build a first-class business environment characterized by marketization, rule of law, and internationalization, and provide broader development opportunities for enterprises from various countries.” And yet the silencing of meaningful online debate about economic reforms continues unabated.
CDT has translated Liu Dake’s now-deleted Weibo essay in full:
Many are under the impression that “the middle income trap” is about backwards countries that see their technological progress hindered and are thus unable to progress to the next stage of industrial development.
This is simply not the case.
The “middle income trap” is, in fact “a failure of political reform.”
This is because technological progress requires the large-scale reallocation of societal resources.
The societal resources required to establish an R&D facility for manufacturing computer chips are utterly different from those required to establish a production line for making blue jeans. The government’s role in each is worlds apart.
This means that technological advancement requires the large-scale reallocation of power in society, as well. Bureaucratic cliques must hand over an enormous amount of human resources- and financial–decision-making power to technical experts.
Therein lies the problem: during the low-to-middle income stages, the bureaucratic cliques that won out in the power struggle have devolved into vested interests that feast on the benefits of [China’s] demographic dividend. Any financial or personnel reforms instituted by technical experts would cut into the bureaucrats’ “private fiefdoms.”
At present, how willing are these vested bureaucratic interests to give up their place at the feast—even if it is in the best interests of the nation and the well-being of the common people?
The answer is obvious: they are not willing.
Moreover, when facing a common enemy, vested bureaucratic interests will band together to throttle the political activity of technical experts and prevent precious social resources from being siphoned off into the hungry maw of technological R&D.
Even if an academic fraud swindles a few hundred million from the bureaucracy, as long as the fraudster is “one of their own,” then the loss stays “within the family” and isn’t a complete waste. But paying actual salaries to researchers, purchasing lab equipment for professors, and upgrading university laboratories—bureaucrats see those expenditures as a complete waste of money.
Here’s an extreme example. Why do gangsters all across the world, no matter how much territory they control, only engage in “dirty businesses” such as prostitution, gambling, and drugs? Why don’t they just set up a factory and make an honest living?
Because a factory requires a great deal of labor and capital, which have to be managed. And what underworld boss would be willing to cede such crucial control to mere managers?
Page through the history books and you’ll find that every country that has made the leap, that has escaped the middle income trap, has also experienced a concomitant period of bloodshed.
What’s more, during the era that other countries were escaping the middle-income trap, even the light bulb hadn’t been invented yet, and the resources required for moving to the next phase of industrial development were quite limited, indeed.
So what are prospects for moving on to the next phase of industrial development in this era, given the complex web of conflicting societal interests?
COMMENT – Here is the piece from August 2023 (Censors Quash Discussion Of Singapore Paper’s Op-Ed Criticizing Xi Jinping, Alexander Boyd, China Digital Times, August 25, 2023).
19. How Chinese Students Experience America
Peter Hessler, The New Yorker, April 1, 2024
20. How China Will Be Challenged By a 100-Year Storm
Ray Dalio, Time, March 29, 2024
21. Beijing Deplores Taiwan's Next President, but Welcomes an Old One
Chris Buckley and Amy Chang Chien, New York Times, March 31, 2024
22. Chinese University of Hong Kong removes copies of ‘unauthorised’ student publication from campus
Kelly Ho, Hong Kong Free Press, March 26, 2024
The publication was managed by the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s student union before the body was forced to shutter in 2021, with the university accusing students of making potentially illegal remarks on national security matters.
The University Community Press was not affiliated with CUHK and was not recognised by the university, CUHK told HKFP last Friday. The statement came a few days after the student editorial team announced that it would suspend the supply of physical copies of the publication until further notice.
The publication, formerly known as CUHK Student Press, was managed by the student union before the body was forced to shutter in 2021. CUHK at the time accused student representatives of making potentially illegal remarks on national security matters and said they had “exploited the campus for their political propaganda.”
From Instagram, missing newspaper stand on the campus of CUHK.
COMMENT – I suspect quite a few faculty members at CUHK are ashamed of this, though they are too terrified to do anything about it.
At the same time, there is likely a large contingent of faculty that fully supports these measures and really does believe that a student newspaper is a serious national security threat.
This is how a vibrant city dies.
23. Radio Free Asia Leaves Hong Kong, Citing Security Law
David Pierson, New York Times, March 29, 2024
24. Hong Kong’s pro-democracy Civic Party officially folds after 18 years
Hans Tse, Hong Kong Free Press, March 28, 2024
Hong Kong’s Civic Party, which was once the city’s second-largest pro-democracy party, has officially shut down after 18 years – joining dozens of other civil society groups which folded in the wake of a Beijing-imposed national security law.
Members of the Civic Party – nicknamed “the barristers’ party” – voted last May to dissolve it amid a leadership vacuum. No members came forward to stand for positions on its executive committee.
The party conducted a six-month voluntary winding-up process, clearing its headquarters. On Wednesday its listing in the companies registry was cancelled.
Chairperson Alan Leong, a senior counsel, told local media the move symbolised the party was “disappearing once and for all.” He said it was difficult to assess the possible legal risks facing the party even after its disbandment.
COMMENT – Sad day for these citizens, sad day for Hong Kong, and a sad day for freedom and liberty everywhere.
Rather than convince citizens through their accomplishments and the logic of their arguments, the Chinese Communist Party demands that no one challenge them for the right to rule. This is the kind of imperialistic thinking that Dr. Sun Yat-sen had tried to rid China of when he founded the Republic of China in 1912.
If Sun were alive today, I suspect he would be deeply disappointed by where Xi Jinping has led the PRC.
25. The high cost of being a whistleblower in China
Violet Law, Al Jazeera, April 1, 2024
While the right to report wrongdoing is recognised in the Chinese constitution, it comes with strict limits.
In the early 1990s, a mysterious illness began to spread rapidly among villagers across several provinces in central China.
At the time, HIV/AIDS had already emerged in other parts of the world, including Europe and the United States, where cases were transmitted mostly through sexual contact. In China, however, people were infected after selling their blood and plasma or receiving transfusions contaminated in the trade.
Over the following decade, as many as 300,000 people in Henan province, the epicentre of the trade, were infected – a scandal exposed by local retired gynaecologist Dr Gao Yaojie.
Long before eye doctor Li Wenliang sounded the alarm on COVID-19 and succumbed to the virus in early 2020, Dr Gao was China’s best-known whistleblower. Her decision to expose the source of China’s AIDS epidemic made her an exile for the last 14 years of her life. She died last December at the age of 95 in New York.
Despite official erasure (Baidu Baike, China’s Wikipedia equivalent, says Gao settled overseas on a visiting fellowship), Chinese netizens mourned Gao’s death on the same Weibo “wailing wall” page where they commemorated Li.
Gao’s descent from national prominence to relentless official persecution exposed just how ruthless Beijing could be, even at a time when it was seen as opening up to the world.
“All she wanted was the freedom to speak out, to tell the whole world the truth behind China’s AIDS epidemic and to keep a record for history,” said former journalist Lin Shiyu, who edited most of the books Gao published while in exile in the US. “That was why she fled China.”
COMMENT – I missed her death at the time, but here’s an excellent New York Times article about Dr Gao Yaojie and the persecution she faced for letting the public know about the AIDS epidemic raging across the PRC in the 1990s.
Dr. Gao Yaojie, Who Exposed AIDS Epidemic in Rural China, Dies at 95, Chris Buckley, NYTs, December 10, 2023
Despite government efforts to silence her, she drew global attention to an epidemic that devastated rural China and killed tens of thousands.
…
Officials concealed, ignored, or played down the outbreak for years, and infected villagers received little help until the furor that had been inspired by Dr. Gao and several other Chinese doctors and experts prompted the government to distribute medicine.
“AIDS not only killed individuals but destroyed countless families,” Dr. Gao said in an interview with The New York Times in 2016. “This was a man-made catastrophe. Yet the people responsible for it have never been brought to account, nor have they uttered a single word of apology.”
AUDIO - Gao Yaojie, a pioneering activist who exposed China's AIDS epidemic, dies at 95, Emily Feng, NPR, December 11, 2023
Dr. Gao Yaojie in 2007… dangerous threat to the Chinese Communist Party.
There is something very wrong with a nation and its government when it cannot recognize someone like Dr Gao Yaojie as a national hero. The Party’s obsession with its own reputation and paranoia about threats to its own power has killed many, many thousands of Chinese citizens.
When brave people, like Dr. Gao, speak out, the Party views them as dangerous threats.
26. Chinese state media stoked allegation Taiwan's president would flee war
Yimou Lee and James Pomfret, Reuters, March 31, 2024
27. Foreign Direct Investment into China Plummets to 23-Year Low
Qing Na, Caixin, April 1, 2024
Net foreign direct investment (FDI) into the Chinese mainland plummeted to a 23-year low last year, government data showed Friday.
The $42.7 billion inflow is less than a quarter of that seen in 2022. The latest result was revised up from the $33 billion preliminary number published by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) last month.
COMMENT – Plenty of countries experience economic downturns, this can only be explained by the loss of confidence in the policy competence of the Chinese Communist Party.
28. U.S. Tech Giants Turn to Mexico to Make AI Gear, Spurning China
Yang Jie and Santiago Pérez, Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2024
29. On Fentanyl, Biden Should Look to Work with China
Zongyuan Zoe Liu, Council on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2024
Environmental Harms
30. How Gulf states are putting their money into mining
Harry Dempsey and Chloe Cornish, Financial Times, March 31, 2024
31. China solar industry faces shakeout, but rock-bottom prices to persist
Andrew Hayley, Reuters, April 3, 2024
32. China Responds to Damning Study About Environmental Damage
Micah McCartney, Newsweek, February 27, 2024
33. What is SF6? Study raises concerns about gas that is 24,000x more powerful than CO2
Euronews, April 7, 2024
An electrifying China is largely behind the increase in emissions of SF6, which is used to insulate power lines.
A greenhouse gas 24,000 times more powerful than carbon dioxide is being driven up by China’s growing electricity needs, according to a new study.
CO2 is the number one greenhouse gas on our radar for good reason. A gas naturally present in the atmosphere but turbocharged by humans’ fossil fuel combustion, it is the single biggest contributor to the climate crisis.
But an overload of carbon isn’t the only gas threatening Earth’s climate; international agreements cover a number of other gases including a man-made grouping of fluorinated (F) gases.
Foreign Interference and Coercion
34. Canadian Lawmaker Testifies Chinese Students Were Bused in to Elect Him
Norimitsu Onishi, New York Times, April 2, 2024
Han Dong, a member of Parliament who is accused of benefiting from the Chinese government’s help, testified at a public hearing on foreign interference.
A member of Canada’s Parliament testified on Tuesday that high school students from China were transported by bus to vote for him in a party election that is at the center of a federal inquiry into interference in Canadian elections by China and other foreign countries.
Testifying during a public hearing in Ottawa, the Parliament member, Han Dong, a Chinese-Canadian politician formerly from Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Party, said that he had met and sought the support of the students from a private high school in 2019, but that he did not know who had chartered or paid for the bus on the day of the election.
A Canadian intelligence report disclosed during the hearing said there were indications that a “known proxy agent” of the Chinese Consulate had provided the students “with falsified documents to allow them to vote” even though they did not reside in Mr. Dong’s electoral district.
Noncitizens over the age of 14 can register and vote in party elections as long as they show proof they live in an electoral district.
According to the report, there were also indications that the Chinese Consulate had coerced the students to back Mr. Dong by issuing “veiled threats” related to their visas and their families back in China.
The Chinese Embassy has consistently denied interfering in Canadian politics.
Mr. Dong’s testimony was part of an ongoing federal inquiry into foreign meddling in Canada’s political system, especially the general elections of 2019 and 2021. The inquiry was called after a series of intelligence leaks to the Canadian news media indicated that the Chinese government had interfered in both elections by supporting candidates favorable to its policies and by undermining its critics.
COMMENT – Chinese Communist Party interference in Canadian domestic politics (to the benefit of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his ruling Liberal Party) is a big story that does not seem to be getting the kind of attention it deserves.
Canadian journalist Sam Cooper has been trying to raise public awareness (his Substack The Bureau is excellent and something everyone should subscribe to). Just to give you a flavor, here are a few of his latest posts:
Breaking: CSIS Director changed report on PRC interference in MP Han Dong's riding after discussion with PM Trudeau's advisor (April 4, 2024)
Hostile state agents could install Prime Minister without election, MP Michael Chong testifies (April 4, 2024)
Ottawa knew of Chinese Communist attacks on Conservatives in 2021 but decided not to intervene: Commission lawyer (April 3, 2024)
MP Han Dong questioned on 2019 nomination "irregularities" and Chinese high school voters (April 2, 2024)
AUDIO – The Bureau Podcast: How high does the Winnipeg-Wuhan Lab story go in Canada, and does it connect to PRC Election Interference? (March 27, 2024)
Dr. Xiangguo Qiu tasked in PRC "biological intelligence collection mission" (March 19, 2024)
San Cooper is also the author of the book, Wilful Blindness: How a Network of Narcos, Tycoons, and CCP Agents Infiltrated the West (2021).
It pains me to say this, but I think we need to consider the current Canadian Government to be deeply compromised by the Chinese Communist Party and cannot be fully trusted. Canadian institutions, particularly the Office of the Prime Minister, appear unable to respond effectively to the CCP’s interference in their internal policy-making.
The fact that Prime Minister Trudeau was unwilling to act on these gross violations of Canadian sovereignty that he had been made aware of, even as the PRC Government held two Canadian citizens hostage for almost three years (December 2018 to September 2021), suggests this cannot be solved by him.
35. China Is Targeting U.S. Voters and Taiwan with AI-Powered Disinformation
Dustin Volz, Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2024
Online actors linked to the Chinese government are increasingly leveraging artificial intelligence to target voters in the U.S., Taiwan and elsewhere with disinformation, according to new cybersecurity research and U.S. officials.
The Chinese-linked campaigns laundered false information through fake accounts on social-media platforms, seeking to identify divisive domestic political issues and potentially influence elections. The tactics identified in a new cyber-threat report published Friday by Microsoft are among the first uncovered that directly tie the use of generative AI tools to a covert state-sponsored online influence operation against foreign voters. They also demonstrate more-advanced methods than previously seen.
Accounts on X—some of which were more than a decade old—began posting last year about topics including American drug use, immigration policies, and racial tensions, and in some cases asked followers to share opinions about presidential candidates, potentially to glean insights about U.S. voters’ political opinions. In some cases, these posts relied on relatively rudimentary generative AI for their imagery, Microsoft said.
COMMENT – We seem to be sleepwalking into a really dangerous situation. Instead of sending the Treasury Secretary to Beijing to make nice, these kinds of revelations should be driving a far more aggressive policy towards the PRC and vastly increased defense spending.
36. Writing of South China Sea rule book delayed by lack of trust: maritime expert
Alyssa Chen, South China Morning Post, April 2, 2024
37. Majority of ASEAN people favor China over U.S., survey finds
Tsubasa Suruga, Nikkei Asia, April 2, 2024
38. India rejects China's renaming of 30 places in Himalayan border state
Reuters, April 2, 2024
39. Philippines prepared to respond to China's attempts to interfere with re-supply missions
Karen Lema, Reuters, April 3, 2024
40. China turns to AI in propaganda mocking the ‘American Dream’
Erin Hale, Al Jazeera, March 29, 2024
Human Rights and Religious Persecution
41. Central Asia leaders overlook plight of Uyghurs to woo China
Kasim Kashgar, Voice of America, April 4, 2024
Any resentment among Central Asian leaders over China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority was swept aside during recent tours of the region by the chairman of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Chinese minister of public security.
The warm welcome given the Chinese officials reflects the region’s growing economic ties with Beijing and its uneasiness with Russia — the region’s longtime guarantor against domestic rebellion — as that country struggles on the battlefield in Ukraine.
42. Boasting About Torture: A Uyghur View of Putin and Xi Jinping
Kok Bayraq, Bitter Winter, April 3, 2024
43. Hong Kong activist denied early release days after new security law axed eligibility
Irene Chan, Hong Kong Free Press, March 26, 2024
Hong Kong activist Ma Chun-man has been denied early release after being jailed in 2020 over a national security case. He is the first prisoner to be made ineligible for early release after a new domestic national security law was enacted on Saturday.
Citing sources, local media outlets reported on Monday that Ma was expected to be released that day, following a remission of his sentence. However, his detention continued as the Commissioner of the Correctional Services Department (CSD) was unsatisfied that Ma’s early release would not endanger national security.
The new, homegrown security law, which came into effect on Saturday, raised the threshold for national security prisoners to apply for early release. A national security prisoner may not be granted early release unless the CSD commissioner is satisfied that remission “will not be contrary to the interests of national security,” according to the law.
44. Erasing Memories, Concealing Evidence: China’s Efforts to Obscure the Uyghur Genocide
Mamtimin Ala, The Diplomat, April 3, 2024
The Uyghur genocide is gradually and silently fading away, as if it never occurred in the first place.
The risk of the Uyghur genocide being forgotten is a grave concern. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has not only employed deliberate and calculated tactics to conceal its genocide and crimes against humanity in East Turkestan but has also orchestrated a campaign to ensure others forget it is happening.
Gregory H. Stanton, the president of Genocide Watch, formulated a comprehensive framework known as the 10 stages of genocide, outlining the different phases leading up to the occurrence of genocide. It starts with classification as a crucial stage in identifying an enemy, a social or ideological outcast to be eradicated, and concludes with denial as the final stage in refuting the perpetration of genocide.
Genocide is an ongoing process. While it may physically end with the annihilation of a population, it persists in the memories of survivors, spanning generations. Therefore, for those responsible for genocide to disavow their culpability, they must eliminate all traces of its occurrence, including memories. Every genocide requires psychological warfare, with the destruction of victims’ memories being a crucial aspect.
Within this context, let us analyze the Uyghur genocide currently unfolding in East Turkestan, renamed “Xinjiang,” or “new territory,” when it was annexed by Communist China in 1949, focusing on the erasure of collective memories as a strategy of the Chinese government and the CCP to evade legal and moral responsibilities for it. This strategy consists of three main components: the destruction of Uyghur infrastructure, culture, and narratives.
45. Arab politicians praise China’s policies in Xinjiang
Radio Free Asia, April 3, 2024
Experts say Beijing orchestrated the visit to conceal its persecution of Uyghurs while trying to expand its global influence.
A delegation of Palestinian and other Arab politicians praised China’s policies in Xinjiang during a visit to the northwestern region, sparking criticism from experts and Uyghur rights advocates for not highlighting the plight of fellow Muslims living in the region.
The delegation was led by Bassam Zakarneh, a member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council of Palestine and made up of politicians from Syria, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Jordan and Tunisia, according to a report by the Global Times.
On March 27, Xinjiang’s Communist Party chief Ma Xingrui welcomed them to Urumqi, the regional capital.
The goal of the visit, according to a Xinjiang Daily report, was to present a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Xinjiang and convey a narrative of a peaceful and vibrant region to the international community.
That’s in sharp contrast with the United States and some Western parliaments, which have accused China of carrying out a genocide against the 11-million-strong Uyghurs who live in Xinjiang – a region taken over by Chinese Communists in 1949 – by imprisoning, torturing and sterilizing those who do not fall into line.
Beijing has denied the claims and said that alleged concentration camps are in fact vocational training centers that have since been closed.
To the visiting delegates, Ma touted the region’s development, stability and guarantee of human rights for all ethnic groups, and accused the United States and the West of spreading lies, according to Chinese media reports.
“Their objective is to restrict and control China through Xinjiang,” Ma was quoted as saying.
‘See it for yourself’
During their meeting with Ma, the delegation praised China’s creative governance measures and “unprecedented progress in economic development,” the Xinjiang Daily said.
The delegation head said that “people of all ethnic groups live a good life, enjoy full freedom of religious belief, and have smiles on their faces,” according to the report, which didn’t provide the names of who spoke or any direct quotes.
The paper went on to say that the delegation said the United States and other Western nations are “smearing” China’s Xinjiang policy and fabricating rumors.
“Why not come and see it for yourself?” the delegates said, according to the Xinjiang Daily. “We will tell more people what we saw and heard in Xinjiang, China, so that Arab countries can better understand the real Xinjiang, China.”
But experts on the region said China orchestrated what the delegates would and wouldn’t see during their visit so as to conceal the persecution of the Uyghurs.
The visitors should have been allowed to speak directly and freely with Uyghur Muslims living in the region, said Robert McCaw, director of the Government Affairs Department at the Council on American-Islamic Relations.
“Apparently, China wants to reach out to these leftist movements in the Arab world, and China wants to use them as its own propaganda,” said Mustafa Akyol, senior fellow at the Cato’s Institute’s Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. “The Arab world should not be influenced by China.”
Political dynamics at play
China has used such visits to Xinjiang to win over other Muslim groups – and push them away from the United States and other Western powers, experts say. It has also supported the Palestinians, as it seeks to expand its influence in the Middle East.
Ten 10 months ago, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas told Chinese President Xi Jinping during a visit to Beijing that he believed the Xinjiang issue, often framed as a human rights concern, was in fact a battle against terrorism, extremism and separatism.
And last August, China invited delegates from the 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to visit Xinjiang, in a bid to promote its rosy narrative about the peace and prosperity enjoyed by Uyghurs and blunt international criticism.
“China seeks to build consensus and strengthen its global influence,” said Ma Ju, an ethnic Muslim Hui scholar based in the United States.
Meanwhile, Muslim nations may be unwilling to criticize China because they need its political support and investment, experts said.
Although some Muslim countries have endured a painful history under Western colonialism, they may be willing to overlook that China has effectively colonized the Uyghur homeland, Ma said.
“For them, the primary concern seems to be finding a method to counter the influence of the U.S. and the West,” he said.
46. Zhou Fengsuo: “Xi Jinping Is the Natural Product of an Evil System”
Marco Respinti, Bitter Winter, April 4, 2024
47. Young activists recall abuse at Hong Kong juvenile correctional facility
Hsieh Fu-yee, Radio Free Asia, March 30, 2024
They tell of beatings and anal rape amid a rise in the youth prison population and clampdown on dissent.
48. China LGBTQ community hangs tough in dissent amid repression
Pak Yiu, Nikkei Asia, February 20, 2024
49. CCP Launches 3-Year “Tough Battle” Against The Church of Almighty God
Jiang Tao, Bitter Winter, April 2, 2024
50. China court jails 'tortured' rights activist Xu Qin for four years
Kitty Wang, Radio Free Asia, April 1, 2024
Authorities in the eastern Chinese province of Jiangsu have handed a four-year jail term to veteran rights activist Xu Qin, after repeatedly delaying her trial and sentencing despite concerns over her deteriorating health, and amid reports of torture from a prominent rights group.
The Yangzhou Intermediate People's Court sentenced Xu, a key figure in the Wuhan-based China Rights Observer group founded by jailed veteran dissident Qin Yongmin, to four years' imprisonment on March 29 for "incitement to subvert state power," a charge frequently used to target peaceful critics of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, the Civil Rights and Livelihood Watch rights website reported.
Industrial Policies and Economic Espionage
51. China’s banks cut salaries, rescind bonuses amid economic slowdown and Beijing’s financial reshuffle
He Huifeng, South China Morning Post, April 1, 2024
52. Behind China’s new-energy overcapacity as it changes the face of manufacturing and raises the stakes of competitiveness
He Huifeng and Kandy Wong, South China Morning Post, April 1, 2024
53. China’s new data agency plans fast track to powerful national computing network
Jane Cai, South China Morning Post, April 3, 2024
54. China's tech workers trapped in jobs by noncompete contracts
Cissy Zhou, Nikkei Asia, April 3, 2024
55. Mainland China, G7 responses to Taiwan escalation would harm all parties, research finds
Ralph Jennings, South China Morning Post, April 2, 2024
56. Top China Lithium Firms Look Past Profit Slump and Vow Expansion
Bloomberg, March 31, 2024
57. Yu Hua on why young Chinese no longer want to work for private firms
The Economist, April 2, 2024
58. How Xi Jinping plans to overtake America
The Economist, March 31, 2024
59. Gallium Has More Than Doubled in Price on China Export Curbs
Bloomberg, April 3, 2024
60. China Home Sales Drought Persists with Little Recovery Sign
Bloomberg, March 31, 2024
61. Frugality Bites for China’s Cash-Strapped Local Governments
Cheng Siwei and Qing Na, Caixin, April 3, 2024
62. China Developers’ Shares Suspended in Hong Kong for Missing Results Deadline
Sherry Qin, Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2024
63. Agricultural Giant Syngenta Scraps $9 Billion Listing in China
Dave Sebastian and Jiahui Huang, Wall Street Journal, March 29, 2024
64. Hong Kong’s port loses ground as exporters pivot to mainland China
Chan Ho-him, William Langley, and Andy Lin, Financial Times, March 31, 2024
65. China’s rival to Boeing and Airbus looks to Asia first
Chan Ho-him, Financial Times, April 2, 2024
66. Yellen to Visit China for Top-Level Economic Talks
Alan Rappeport, New York Times, April 2, 2024
Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen will make her second trip to China this week for high-level talks aimed at further stabilizing the relationship between the world’s largest economies as political rancor in the United States intensifies ahead of the presidential election.
During four days of meetings in Guangzhou and Beijing, Ms. Yellen plans to meet with representatives from American companies, Chinese students and professors, and China’s top economic officials. The trip comes as the Biden administration tries to balance a tougher stance toward China, including restricting access to American technology and retaining tariffs on billions of Chinese exports, while keeping regular lines of communication open and avoiding an economic war.
The Treasury Department announced the trip as President Biden and Xi Jinping, China’s leader, held a call on Tuesday on a variety of issues. In a statement after the call, the White House said Mr. Biden had raised concerns with Mr. Xi about China’s “unfair trade policies and nonmarket economic practices” that harm American workers and explained that the United States would continue to take steps to prevent Chinese access to advanced American technology that could threaten national security.
A senior Treasury Department official who previewed Ms. Yellen’s trip said it was taking place in the spirit of responsibly managing the economic relationship between the countries.
67. US states are cutting off Chinese citizens and companies from land ownership
Phelim Kine, Politico, April 3, 2024
68. Lawmakers urge Biden to call out more Chinese biotech firms
Karen Freifeld, Reuters, April 2, 2024
A Republican and a Democratic member of Congress are calling on the Biden administration to add seven Chinese biotech firms to a list created by the Defense Department to highlight firms it says are allegedly working with Beijing's military.
In a letter dated March 29 seen by Reuters, Republican Michael Gallagher and Democrat Raja Krishnamoorthi asked Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to take the action since Beijing could harness the power of biotechnology to strengthen its military.
Cyber & Information Technology
69. APT31: the Chinese hacking group behind global cyberespionage campaign
James Pomfret and Yew Lun Tian, Reuters, March 26, 2024
70. Cyber-attacks linked to Chinese spy agencies are increasing, say analysts
Helen Davidson, The Guardian, March 26, 2024
Cyber-attacks linked to Chinese intelligence agencies are increasing in capability and frequency as they seek to test foreign government responses, analysts have warned in the wake of revelations about a mass hacking of UK data.
On Tuesday, the UK and US governments accused hacking group Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT 31), backed by China’s government spy agency, of conducting a years-long cyber-attack campaign, targeting politicians, national security officials, journalists and businesses. The UK said the hackers had potentially gained access to information on tens of millions of UK voters held by the Electoral Commission, as well as for cyber-espionage targeting lawmakers who have been outspoken about threats from China.
Both the US and UK governments announced sanctions against linked Chinese companies and individuals.
COMMENT – Perhaps it is time to stop delivering “strongly worded demarches” and start imposing significant penalties on PRC entities for these attacks.
DOJ indictments of Chinese intelligence agents (who will never set foot inside the United States) may sound strong, but Washington could be doing a lot more to impose cost on Beijing for these attacks.
Here are a few suggestions:
Instead of going to Beijing this week, Treasury Secretary Yellen could remain in Washington and approve significant financial sanctions against the PRC Government, using the authorities granted by President Obama nine years ago (Executive Order 13694, Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities)
The Treasury Department could speed up its development of outbound investment restrictions focused on the PRC (prohibit U.S. persons and entities from investing in the PRC until Beijing takes tangible actions to cease these attacks).
Stop granting export licenses to companies selling restricted dual-use technology to PRC companies.
For export controls move away from a “Small Yard with a High Fence” and transition to a “Medium-sized Yard with a High Fence.”
Ban TikTok and WeChat.
Expel PRC Diplomats.
71. China quietly making progress on new techniques to cut reliance on advanced ASML lithography machines
Che Pan, South China Morning Post, April 1, 2024
72. US Asks South Korea to Toughen Up Export Controls on China Chips
Mackenzie Hawkins and Sam Kim, Bloomberg, April 2, 2024
73. US urges allies to bar firms from servicing key chipmaking tools for China
Alexandra Alper and Karen Freifeld, Reuters, March 27, 2024
74. Why Threads is suddenly popular in Taiwan
Zeyi Yang, MIT Technology Review, April 2, 2024
75. Implementation of Additional Export Controls: Certain Advanced Computing Items; Supercomputer and Semiconductor End Use; Updates and Corrections; and Export Controls on Semiconductor Manufacturing Items; Corrections and Clarifications
U.S. Commerce Department, April 4, 2024
76. Chinese Assessments of AI: Risks and Mitigation Strategies
Rebecca Arcesati and Rogier Creemers, CSIS, April 2, 2024
77. US may soon unveil list of Chinese chip factories barred from receiving tech
Karen Freifeld and Alexandra Alper, Reuters, March 28, 2024
78. One Satellite Signal Rules Modern Life. What if Someone Knocks It Out?
Selam Gebrekidan, John Liu, and Chris Buckley, New York Times, March 28, 2024
79. Early Clues Emerge on Senate’s Plans for TikTok
Natalie Andrews and Kristina Peterson, Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2024
80. Cyber board says Chinese hack of US officials was 'preventable'
Reuters, April 2, 2024
81. DHS report rips Microsoft for ‘cascade’ of errors in China hack
Ellen Nakashima and Joseph Menn, Washington Post, April 2, 2024
Military and Security Threats
82. Beijing’s Increasing Maritime Gray Zone Operations Around Taiwan’s Outlying Islands - Jamestown
John Dotson, Jamestown Foundation, March 29, 2024
83. Chinese warships spotted again at Cambodia naval base
Yuji Nitta, Nikkei Asia, April 1, 2024
84. China’s military to hold live-fire exercise on Myanmar border as fighting continues
Hayley Wong, South China Morning Post, April 2, 2024
85. Philippines preparing for ‘worst case scenario’ in South China Sea
Shweta Sharma, Independent, April 2, 2024
86. US, Japan, Philippines plan joint South China Sea naval patrols
Phelim Kine, Alexander Ward, and Lara Seligman, Politico, March 29, 2024
87. Philippines says China's 'coercive, aggressive' actions discussed with top U.S. security adviser
Karen Lema and Mikhail Flores, Reuters, April 1, 2024
One Belt, One Road Strategy
88. Sri Lanka PM says China to develop strategic Hambantota port, Colombo airport
Agence France-Presse, South China Morning Post, March 28, 2024
89. Indonesia's Prabowo meets Xi in rare pre-inauguration China visit
Nana Shibata and Ck Tan, Nikkei Asia, April 1, 2024
90. Xi calls Indonesia high-speed rail a 'gold standard' of ties
Nana Shibata and Ismi Damayanti, Nikkei Asia, April 2, 2024
91. Confronting the China Challenge in Africa: The Lobito Corridor
Eduardo Castellet Nogués, CEPA, April 2, 2024
Opinion Pieces
92. All people of faith should stand against China’s Uyghur genocide
Shmuly Yanklowitz, America Magazine, April 3, 2024
93. China’s property market is at risk of an overcorrection, not oversupply
Weijian Shan, South China Morning Post, April 3, 2024
94. South China Sea cooperation better for China than conflict
Vandana Hari, Nikkei Asia, April 1, 2024
95. The Cold War Has Ended, A Multi-Polar War is Replacing It
Richard E. Caroll, Modern Diplomacy, April 3, 2024
96. China Is Still Rising
Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Affairs, April 02, 2024
97. The US Can’t Let China Dominate the Small-Drone Market
Thomas Black, Bloomberg, April 1, 2024
98. China Should Not Repeat History with Taiwan’s Quake
Karishma Vaswani, Bloomberg, April 3, 2024
99. Netflix’s 3 Body Problem is sci-fi. But beyond the alien threat lies the trauma of modern China
Tania Branigan, The Guardian, April 3, 2024
100. Power Is the Answer in U.S. Competition with China
Michael Mazza, Foreign Policy, March 31, 2024
101. Bidenomics Is Making China Angry. That’s OK.
Paul Krugman, New York Times, March 28, 2024
102. How Green Energy Makes Us Vulnerable to Cyberattack
Allysia Finley, Wall Street Journal, March 31, 2024
103. China’s hypocrisy on trade
Rana Foroohar, Financial Times, March 31, 2024
104. Can Intel Serve Two Masters?
Peter Coy, New York Times, March 29, 2024
105. A new strategic concept could be useful in the US military’s defense of Taiwan
Mike Pompeo and Bryan Clark, The Hill, April 2, 2024